“We are determined to help the Afghan people we work to assist the Afghan people multilaterally through the UN and this Council,” Thomas-Greenfield told a UN Security Council briefing on Afghanistan.
Last year, the United States led a UN Security Council effort to unanimously adopt a resolution that established a carve-out for the delivery of humanitarian aid for the Afghan people, Thomas-Greenfield said.
The ambassador noted that the United States is the biggest donor to Afghanistan, contributing more than $2 billionDollars in humanitarian assistance to the country.
“Unconventional thinking” is one People are fond of creating pithy shortcuts and analogies. When it comes to “Things Military,” here is one of mine:
Military forces are like a conventional automobile – they need four tires, sitting on the ground in unison, or the car doesn’t go very far. Think of it as a Venn diagram, if the car analogy doesn’t work. Moving on…The four “tires” of the military are:
Catania, Sicily (Jan 15, 2003) – U.S. Marines stand prepare Meal’s Ready to Eat (MRE) for shipment. U.S. Navy photo.
1. Food– No matter how well-equipped or trained your troops may be, if they have no food, they will be unable to fight within seven days. Period. Troops need an absolute minimum of 2,800 calories (and preferably 3,500-3,600) – weighted towards carbohydrates – per day, in order to function effectively in combat. Without food, troops can function for three to five days, maximum. After that, their effectiveness rapidly falls off, until they will not be able to walk; that phase takes between eight and eleven days, and they will be dizzy and on the verge of incoherent after about six or seven days. There are examples of people “surviving” or “lasting” for two or more weeks without food — but those people were confined to bed, minimizing all physical exertion, and required constant care. In the case of hunger-strikers, after two weeks, they will be too weak to lift a glass of water to their lips. In situations where this has happened in the past, the medical remediation starts with small amounts of rice milk, with recovering taking weeks, at the very least.
Food. Because it is existential, few people give it any thought. You, on the other hand, can never let food drift too far from a military unit’s calculations.
Oil Field, Saratoga, Texas, 1908.
2. POL/Fodder (POL/F) – Modern armed forces, be they military, paramilitary or police, rely on powered systems at some level. Whether for vehicles, generators, stoves or fodder for animals (mules, yaks and camels are still used for military pack transport around the world), POL/F supplies are absolutely critical to operations. Neglect your POL/F, and your troops will be reduced to marching, carrying only what extra supplies they can carry on pack frames, or that they can drag behind them on hand carts…and then, their food requirements will skyrocket (see #1, above), requiring them to carry less operational weapons and supplies (i.e., mortars, mortar bombs, rockets and their launchers, artillery munitions, etc) in favor of the extra food needed – assuming, of course, that the operational weapons can even be carried or dragged by the troops.
Whether you intend – or are forced – to use bicycles, POL/F is a factor that you can never neglect, if you expect to function effectively in an operational environment.
Rows and rows of shells are stored upright in a New Zealand ammunition dump during World War I near Acheux, France.
3. Munitions– Another existential within the modern military sphere – and thus, frequently ignored – “munitions” are everything that physically strikes the enemy: ammunition of all kinds, knives, grenades, etc. If you are not careful in planning or accounting for the amount of ammunition you both have and need, your troops will very quickly burn through everything they have, leaving them – quite literally – with nothing but knives, sharp sticks, rocks and harsh language…that quip is only funny when no one is shooting at you.
Bridge radios of Irish offshore patrol ship LÉ Róisín (P51) photographed in Helsinki.
4. Communications– Without a radio communications system, you are limited to runners, bugles and whistles (all of which are still in use, in places) and the limit of the range of your voice. That is fine, at the lowest tactical levels, but those have long been rendered impractical for anything above platoon level, as the speed and scope of military operations has increased. There is also the issue of communications security, including codes and ciphers. It is an in-depth issue, far too complex to fully address here, but it is nonetheless something the prospective user needs to get a handle on early.
The Pennsylvania National Guard’s First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry during a parade to mark the U.S. Army’s 237th anniversary in 2012. US Army photo.
5. Motivation– Finally, Motivation is the engine of the “military automobile.” Nothing outlined above, nothing in this document, and nothing in any conventional manual you will ever find, means anything if your troops are not motivated to strive, struggle and sacrifice for the Cause, whatever that cause might be. None of it matters, if your troops are not willing to use the tools at hand effectively, if at all. They will sit down when they think you can’t see them; they will desert if they think that they can get away with it; and they will run the first time someone shoots at them in earnest.
These are the five things you can never shortcut. The minute you think you can get away with short-sheeting these points, you’re losing.
While the US Coast Guard was on patrol in the South China sea, they stopped by the Solomon Islands to make a routine stop for a little R & R and refueling. The request to dock was ignored by authorities, forcing the USCGC Oliver Henry to dock at Papua New Guinea.
A United States Coast Guard vessel was unable to enter Solomon Islands for a routine port call because the Solomon Islands government did not respond to a request for it to refuel and provision, a US official said.
The islands’ government did not immediately answer a Reuters request for comment. The Solomon Islands has had a tense relationship with the United States and its allies since striking a security pact with China in May.
The USCGC Oliver Henry was on patrol for illegal fishing in the South Pacific for a regional fisheries agency when it failed to obtain entry to refuel at Honiara, the Solomons’ capital, a US Coast Guard press officer told Reuters in an emailed statement.
The US vessel was diverted to Papua New Guinea instead, the official said.
The Ukrainian military is set to receive 800 “Carpet Bomber” Revolver 860 Drones from Taiwan, a move that further isolates Taiwan from China, while also potentially leading to a greater share in the military drone market for Taiwan.
Ukraine has reportedly received nearly 800 Taiwan-made Revolver 860 combat drones, dubbed “flying mortars,” to strengthen their drone armament against Russian forces.
On August 18, the Polish tech media outlet WP Tech reported that the Ukrainian military had acquired 800 Taiwan-made Revolver 860 Armed VTOL UAVs as a “donation.”
The report referred to the large quadcopter as a “flying mortar” due to its rotating drum-like bomb bay containing eight 60-millimeter mortar shells.
The spokesperson of the drone manufacturer, DronesVision, told Taiwan News that the company provides military equipment to Poland-based companies and that it cannot comment on where these firms transfer the drones next, citing “non-disclosure agreements” with its clients.
One of the oft overlooked aspects of the military in general are the small items that form part of a soldier’s kit. While the vast majority of these items are very mundane, indeed, occasionally an item appears which offers a sea-change in its sphere.
While mass produced, purpose-designed combat first aid dressings date back to the early 1920’s with the advent of the “Carlisle Dressing“, developed at the US Army’s Carlisle Barracks, in the aftermath of World War One, surprisingly little further development occurred until PerSys Medical’s design came along. The Carlisle Bandage was a simple affair, simply a sterile dressing on one side, backed by a gauze, later cotton, cloth backing used to secure it in place. (Indeed, Bar-Natan attributes his drive to invent the bandage with being issued Carlisle bandages manufactured in 1938, during his time as an IDF medic.)
While the Carlisle and its successors were useful, and certainly saved lives on the battlefield, they were far from perfect solutions. The dressings frequently came loose, and the design allowed for a great deal of contamination to enter the wound area, even if tightly secured in place. The only way to effectively protect the wound from post-trauma infection was to apply an ace-type elastic wrap after applying the battle wound dressing. Obviously, this was rarely done, as medics tended to use the space and weight of the ace wrap to carry extra bandages, instead.
Variants of the Carlisle were used all the way into the 1990’s, two being included in the first-aid kit of the day, until the deployment of the modern IFAK, which includes the “Emergency Dressing”, as it is termed by the US Military.
Bar-Natan’s design abandoned the simplicity of the Carlisle, in favor of a significantly improved version which, although somewhat more complex to use, provides far better care for an injury victim. The Emergency Bandage comes already attached to an ace-type wrap, which is integral to the dressing’s function. After removal, the sterile side of the dressing is applied as direct pressure to the wound area, and the elastic wrap is wound one turn around the extremity (or the torso or head), until it meets the second essential part of the design.
U.S. Military First Aid Kit. US Department of Defense photo.
The Emergency Bandage’s patented “pressure bar” is a stirrup-shaped device mounted directly with the elastic wrap. Slipping the wrap through the stirrup of the pressure bar, then reversing the direction of the wrap, causes the pressure bar to exert a mild tourniquet-type force against the wound. This results in the creation of an additional barrier to external media contaminating the injury. The wrap is then secured in place by the bandage’s closure bar, which hooks into the bandage in much the same way as a ballpoint pen clipping to a shirt pocket.
US Military-issue IFAK, 2012. US Army photo.
Additionally, the Emergency Bandage can in many instances be self-applied one-handed, something extremely difficult, if not impossible, with the Carlisle-model dressing family.
Mated to QuikClot-impregnated gauze, this provides a very powerful field dressing that is practical, easy to use and easy to train on. Indeed, the Emergency Bandage has been credited with saving many of the victims of the notorious 2011 shooting in Tucson, AZ, in which Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was critically wounded.
The Emergency Bandage – the “Israeli Bandage” to many US troops – has saved, and continues to save, lives in combat theaters and disaster emergencies, around the world.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
When the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Commandant, General David H. Berger, announced his radical visionin 2019 of “reinventing” the Marine Corps to perform duties on a basis more in line with the guidance from then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, his program proved to be highly controversial, not least, in light of recent events in Ukraine and Russia. This vision radically restructures the Marine Corps, removing main battle tanks entirely, and significantly reducing both “bayonet strength” in infantry battalions, as well as heavily cutting back on conventional artillery and tactical air transport, all in an attempt to fight the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
It is bewildering – to say the least – as to how these ideas could work verses a major-war opponent may be an open question. Primarily, the controversy revolves around the significantly reduced capacity in fire support.
However, times change, and technology changes apace.
Okinawa, April – June 1945: An American rocket ship fires a salvo of rockets during the bombardment of Okinawa. US Navy photo.
Case in point: As technology and high-tech industry has expanded throughout the world, more and more nations are developing energetic and dynamic design firms. Recently unveiled by Indonesian shipbuilder PT Ludin, the Atasena-class X-18 ATC (Armored Troop Carrier) – originally called, for obvious reasons, the “Tank Boat” – may look like something out of a “GI Joe” movie, but it is definitely an innovative development of preexisting concepts.
Name of Indonesia islands greater than 1000 km2 in area.
Comprised of over 18,000 separate islands, and being on the front lines of both insurgency, piracy and general world unrest, Indonesia has a definite need for an inshore fire support vessel with a heavy punch. In this, the X-18 “Tank Boat” certainly delivers.
Designed by PT Ludin, the X-18 ATC is to be built by the veteran small craft yards of North Sea Boats. The current production unit that has undergoing testing by the Indonesian Army is armed with the Cockerill C1030 MK44S 30mm cannon unmanned turret. A mock-up vessel, shown at international arms shows when the details of the X-18 were released mounted a mock-up of a planned Cockerill 105mm cannon with an automatic loading system in a small, 2-person turret, with a 360° traverse and a pair of .50cal/12.7x99mm heavy machine guns as secondary weapons, with other secondary weapons possible. In either configuration, the X-18 can also carry up to 60 troops, up to 5 tons of cargo, or a variety of small, rigid-hulled inflatables. This would allow the deployment of conventional boarding or landing parties, as well as special operations teams — who could potentially have 105mm artillery support within a 10km arc from the craft. Another planned version would mount some form of dedicated anti-ship, and possibly anti-submarine, missiles.
CONCLUSION
With a reported draft of only 0.8 meters and a reported 600nm range (the distance from Washington, D.C. to Miami, FL) at 9 knots (but able to cruise at 40 knots, with a 50 knot maximum speed), the twin-hulled catamaran design would certainly have long legs. The design is impressive enough – in theory – to have reportedly garnered an early order from the United Arab Emirates, with India, Greece and the Philippines expressing serious interest.
A U.S. riverboat (Zippo monitor) deploying napalm during the Vietnam War. US Navy photo.
While its armor (NATO Stanag 4569) may be rather unimpressive, proof only against small arms and shell fragments at a distance, in the inshore environment, the ability to swiftly bring large numbers of troops, backed up by significant firepower, to bear on an enemy’s rear areas is a major advancement in firepower.
This is something that the USMC, struggling with shrinking procurement budgets and a general drop-off in enlistments, should seriously consider adding to its arsenal, not least because of a projected purchase price of under US$20million each.
Not every bright idea comes out of the US defense establishment.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
We all hear about them on the news: Those places where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are housed and trained; where they form up to deploy to some remote space on a map that most of us had never heard of a week ago…
But — what is a ‘base’, exactly?
Here at The Freedomist, we covered one aspect of this question some time ago, but this article will take a broad overview of the question at large.
Aside from castles or fortresses, “bases” come in a vast array of forms. Certain histrionics aside, a “military base” can come in almost literally any form. There are massive bases, such as Fort Bliss, in Texas or the Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, which are larger than some states, but there are also tiny installations that are also bases, such as Marine Barracks, Washington D.C., which is a mere 6 acres (2.4 ha) in size, and has been in continuous use since 1801. As a result, a base can take almost any shape.
At the same time, size comparisons obscure the question. A different way to think about a “generic” base, however, would be to consider it as a collection of components. Generally speaking, a “base” – while it may have a specific purpose – is where troops can be housed and trained for combat; where they can do at least basic levels of maintenance on weapons and equipment; and where supplies sufficient for a unit to deploy (in theory) can be safely and securely stored.
The training component is the hard part here, because even with the many advances in “virtual” training that have taken place in the last thirty-odd years, troops still need to actually fire live ammunition thought their weapons; short of actual nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, nothing focuses training like the dangers of live-fire. When we are dealing with classes of personal weapons, firing ranges of fifty to five hundred yards or meters in length may well be sufficient. Once we move into longer-ranged weapons – heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, tank cannons and actual artillery – the ranges quickly become very long range.
But…short of that? Let’s do a thought experiment.
We will start with a large open field. A road, perhaps a highway or freeway, runs along one side of the field. Imagine one to four multi-story motels, clustered together; nearby, is a small, two-story office building. To one side, there is a gas/convenience station, and a large chain-style restaurant. There are one or two warehouses, a full-service garage, a few large parking lots filled (hopefully) with large and heavy vehicles. There are a scattering of other buildings, including one that is very “blockish”-looking building surrounded with barbed wire; there might even be a fire station. There is likely a shooting range, one hundred to five hundred yards/meters in length. If the unit’s home nation is relatively wealthy – and wise – there may be a small housing development across the road from the actual base, with family homes for married troop’s whose families live with them. None of the buildings are very “upscale”; most would be described with uncharitable snobbery as “drab” or even “ramshackle” or “brutalist” if someone wanted to be nasty. That would be the effect of government contracting restrictions.
What was just described above are the very basic facilities for an infantry battalion of 700-1,000 troops. There would be a few more buildings if the unit is more specialized, but the above description represents a generic enough core. Drop, say, another dozen or so of these areas close together, add an actual hospital, a large supermarket nestled next to a department store (if they’re not combined), a branch bank, a few more gas stations and regional-scale airport that can handle C-130-type aircraft, a few very long-distance (say, two to five miles in range) and you have a base suitable for a brigade-to-division scale unit – anything from eight to sixteen thousand troops.
Reserve or militia units can get away with one or two buildings, with a large and fenced-off parking lot, as long as they keep personal weapons and a basic load or two of ammunition at home…However, these units are going to be extremely limited in what operations they can carry out.
In sum, most military bases are not too dissimilar from a small town – except, of course, for the weapons, uniforms and intent. Aside from the occasional museum, most military installations /are/ drab, dreary and uninviting, and not places most people would want to live in for very long. But that dividing line, that willingness to tolerate minimalist living environments because their belief in the greater good, is best described in a paraphrase of the words of neoconservative essayist and film critic Richard Grenier —
Originally, this article was going to be considerably different, until research suddenly swerved in a different direction. That direction is to reinforce a fundamental military truth:
Artillery was, is, remains and will remain, the “King of Battle.”
While retaining the “Dragon Fire II” vehicle-mounted 120mm mortar, the reading on the rationale behind these decisions stands testament to an unacceptable failure by the military establishment in the United States to focus on reality.
Since combat operations commenced in Afghanistan in 2001, the US military in general has drilled down to a focus almost exclusively on “counterinsurgency operations” (COIN). Although pointedly left unsaid in public, this is a reaction to the fact that the US military establishment essentially abandoned COIN operations in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, to focus exclusively on the perceived threat of a Soviet invasion to Western Europe, and the assumed nuclear exchanges that would follow. In the aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorating into guerilla conflicts, the US military swung the pendulum 180° in the opposite direction from the 1980’s.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Francis Fukuyama foolishly proclaiming the “End of History”, although rarely spoken out loud, military forces were seen as almost redundant anachronisms in many quarters, and should be reduced both in scale and capabilities, rendering them as something like heavily-armed police forces, with the occasional, movie-ready SWAT teams for hostage rescue. Combat operations like the first Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom were seen as aberrations, large operations against technologically inferior despot forces with lots of heavy (if antiquated) weapons and gear, and lots of troops, who – if not very well-trained or motivated – at least had plenty of simple weapons, and who would require somewhat more force than the international equivalent of a beat cop holding up their hand and saying “HALT!” in a loud voice.
Enter Russia.
While we are not going to delve too deeply, here, into the politics of this year’s Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia is currently – by their own counts (which should, of course, always be taken with a large grain of salt) – running an average of c.580 fire missions per day. Assuming that these missions are run according to Russian military doctrine, each of these missions are a “battery shoot” involving a battery of four to six weapons. Roughly 30% of these would be rocket artillery, mostly from BM-21 ‘Grad’ type rocket systems, with the remainder fired by conventional “tube” artillery [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artillery]. Using the most conservatively realistic figures, this equals approximately 7,000 conventional artillery rounds being fired.
Per day.
This come out to over 200,000 rounds in a 30-day period.
In contrast, the Western democracies have “bet the farm” on weapon accuracy, developing “precision everything” in mortar, rocket and conventional artillery rounds. They chose this route, because the conventional news media is ecstatic over images of dead civilians, which is much more likely when using “dumb” weapons. Needless to say, such casualty-limiting precision comes at a price: the M982 “Excalibur” 155mm precision-guided artillery round costs anywhere from US$68,000 to $175,000 per round (depending on who is counting).
In the West, conventional “dumb” artillery rounds cost between US$300 and $1,000 each. This, of course, begs the question: is “smart” better than “dumb“?
Certainly – if you can afford it. Can the West?
Currently, following the defense budget cuts in FY2022 by the Biden administration, artillery ammunition procurement is being cutby some 36%. In the very best case scenario, this means that the United States currently produces enough ammunition in a calendar year for anywhere between ten days and three weeks of combat firing, based – again – on the mostconservative take on Russian claims of artillery fire missions and estimated rates of ammunition expenditure in Ukraine. And the United States is sending ammunition to Ukraine to go along with the 155mm howitzers and other weapons we are already supplying.
And the US is not alone. In 2021, the British Army conducted a large-scale, “main force” wargame where they completely exhausted national stocks of critical ammunition – at the national level – in eight days. Similarly, only about 2,100 units of the vaunted Javelin missile are produced each year – and the Ukrainians are claiming to fire “hundreds” of Javelins daily, leaving the US defense industry scrambling to bring new production streams online. The FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile is in a similar situation.
Worse still, Russia is known to have fired over 1,000 “cruise missiles” since invading the Ukraine proper in February of 2022. Even given the highly questionable reports of those firings’ performance, it is clear that the Russian industrial base is still more than capable of supplying the weapons and ammunition to the firing lines (the logistical aspects of this are an entirely different subjects).
It is vital to keep in mind, again, that the technical accuracy and reliability of the Russian arsenal is not the question, here. The fact is that they are able to maintain production and consumption rates of comparatively “dumb” systems – and firing something at the enemy is better than firing nothing, because you’re waiting on resupply.
The conclusion here is clear: the West is functionally trying to counter Russian aggression from a hospital bed, while ignorant children are playing with its life support equipment.
This is not 1939, and the West is no longer the “Arsenal of Democracy.” Ukraine is paying, and will continue to pay, a heavy price for trusting the modern-day Western states…and unless something is done quickly, the people of the West may well pay that price, as well – assuming that we do not pay an even heavier price.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Shortly prior to the 95th founding anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Monday, China for the first time revealed a video featuring the launch of what resembles a DF-17 missile, in a move experts said on Sunday displayed the flexibility of the “aircraft carrier killer” hypersonic weapon that is almost impossible to intercept, at a time when tension is rising in the Taiwan Straits amid US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s possible visit to the island of Taiwan.
State broadcaster China Central Television on Saturday released a video titled “The capabilities of the Chinese troops shown in 81 seconds”, celebrating the upcoming China’s Army Day, which falls on August 1.
A scene in the video, showing live-fire launch of a missile from a transporter erector launcher on a highway in a desert, attracted particular attention by military enthusiasts, who said the missile resembles the DF-17 hypersonic missile, which has been publicly displayed at the National Day military parade on October 1, 2019 in Beijing.
If the missile shown in the video is indeed a DF-17, this would be the first time China has publicly revealed a footage on the DF-17’s live-fire launch, observers said.
Being able to launch on a highway in a desert demonstrated that the new-type missile does not require a preset launch position to launch, Song Zhongping, a Chinese…
As First-World States Amp Up Their High Tech, The Opposition Sticks To Basics
An F-35 Lightning II prepares to take off, Luke Air Force Base, AZ – USAF photo by Sr Airman Devante Williams; Public Domain
Over the last hundred years or so, uncountable amounts of money have been spent by various countries, to develop ever more sophisticated weapons and vehicles, many times, almost literally reinventing the wheel. The latest gargantuan expenditures that come to mind are the M1 Abrams tank, the Zumwalt destroyer and the F-35b airplane.
Iranian soldiers with a BGM-71 TOW missile during the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988
Why this should be so, is of great discomfort to both defense companies and armies, around the world. The reason defense companies are worried is that the civilian Toyota vehicles are “good enough” for most combat vehicle applications. They are simple, rugged, durable, easy to understand and operate, and – most importantly – cheap.
Roll-on/roll-off ferry terminal at Queenscliff, Victoria, 1993.
On the military side, these are also concerns, but the military – by necessity – goes deeper: the very ubiquitous nature of the vehicles (driven by market, not military forces), in addition to their built-in ruggedness, makes it supremely difficult to both identify and attrit an asymmetric enemy’s mobile infrastructure without attacking civilian targets at the same time.
Mongol horseman, 14th Century
It has long been known that light vehicles equate to light cavalry. Unfortunately, historically, conventional militaries have always had a distinctly difficult time dealing with forces that can master the techniques of light cavalry campaigns.
U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. Haiti, circa 1919.
Similarly, it has long been recognized that simple, robust weapons systems give unconventional forces near-parity of effectiveness at the “boots on the ground” level of combat. As long ago as 1940, in the US Marine Corps – in its “Small Wars Manual” – recognized that as technology developed, and lightweight, fully automatic weapons spread, the tactics the manual outlined would be rendered obsolete.
AK-74 assault rifle
Modern small arms development has essentially hit a plateau in the years since 1946. Once the move to self-loading rifles was complete, what remained were alterations to ergonomics and attachments. The weapons could be massed produced with a very high degree of mechanical simplicity built in…This, of course, resulted in the development of the near-universal AK-series of assault rifles in the hands of both urban and rural guerrilla forces, as well as the later tribal militias, to say nothing of its continued use by regular armed forces throughout the world.
Adding to the difficulty for conventional armies is the widespread deployment of highly effective, yet almost laughable uncomplicated, heavy support weapons at the squad level, primarily the RPG-7 and the General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).
An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier fires an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, Helmand province, Afghanistan, May 20, 2013. USMC photo.
The RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, while becoming less capable against frontline combat vehicle armor, is still more than capable against light vehicles, light or hasty fortifications, and even some aircraft. A robust and simple design, the RPG-7 is a valuable weapon in any force’s arsenal, and is widely available.
PKM Machine Gun
Likewise, the Soviet-designed PKM GPMG is another simple, robust and highly capable weapon system, easily a match for anything produced by the West.
Of course, except for the Toyota pickup trucks, the two things that the above weapons all have in common is that they are both products of Cold War-era Soviet Army design bureaus, and were handed out in vast numbers to many armies and guerrilla groups as the Cold War ground on.
And yet, their effects remain.
Adding to the problem is the impact of remotely piloted drone technology, especially drones modified to drop small munitions on target. Coupled to cheap and reliable internet access and radio technology, as well as the wide dissemination of both automated and manual secure encryption methods, armies trying to chase down irregular, terrorist and/or guerrilla forces today have issues far outside the scope of previous generations.
The challenge for both conventional forces, defense companies, and perhaps especially the political leadership of First World powers, frankly, is to find a way to equip the large security forces necessary to ensure a counterbalance to terrorist groups that operate like multinational corporations, while not cutting off their noses to spite their faces, by bankrupting the countries they are trying to sell their products to.
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