Military – The Freedomist

Horses To Motorcycles To Drones

Michael Cessna May 29, 2026

Logistics is one of those murky things a lot of people see, but have no idea what the terms mean. “Logistics“, in its most basic form, is acquiring, storing, issuing and moving “stuff” – all the little “bits-n-bobs” that keep any complex organization moving and functional. And that is no less true with guerrilla armies than it is with major-state militaries.

Military analysts usually tend to focus on the weapons and combat vehicles – the RPG, the tank, the drone – while underweighting the system that delivers those weapons to the right place at the right time. In the Sahel, that analytical blind spot is proving costly. The jihadist forces operating across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have not succeeded because they have better weapons than the Malian Army or the Russian Africa Corps. They have succeeded because they have built a more coherent logistics and operational system – and because they have evolved that system rapidly, deliberately, and in direct response to what their enemies have deployed against them.

Understanding how that system works is more useful than cataloging which towns have fallen this week.

The Platforms: Motorbikes And Technicals

The foundational tactical decision JNIM and its affiliated groups made was the replacement of the ancestral horse with the motorbike. This is not a trivial observation. The Fulani and Tuareg peoples of the Sahel have been mounted raiders and pastoralists for centuries – mobility is culturally embedded in their operational DNA. The motorbike preserves that mobility while adding range, speed, and cargo capacity that no horse can match across the Sahel’s distances.

The standard JNIM assault unit documented in multiple engagements consists of approximately 50 motorbikes carrying 100 fighters, supported by technicals – pickup trucks mounting machine guns or light crew-served weapons. The unit concentrates rapidly on an objective, strikes from multiple directions simultaneously in the early morning hours before garrison troops are fully alert, and disperses equally rapidly into the surrounding terrain before air assets can respond. The Sahel’s immensity works in their favor: 50 motorbikes scattering in 50 directions across a landscape the size of Western Europe present a targeting problem that helicopter gunships and drones cannot efficiently solve. By the time Russian or Malian aircraft arrive on station, the attacking force has already dissolved back into the population and the landscape.

*Jihadist pickup truck in Timbuktu in 2012. Photo by “Magrebia”, via Flickr. CCA/2.0 Generic.*

This dispersion discipline is not accidental. It is a practiced tactical response to the one genuine advantage government forces hold – airpower. The attackers do not stand and fight when aircraft arrive. They scatter, reassemble elsewhere, and attack again.

The Intelligence Layer: HUMINT Over TECHINT

One of the most analytically significant aspects of JNIM’s operational approach is its intelligence architecture. Where the Africa Corps relies on technical intelligence – drone surveillance, signals intercept, aerial ISR – JNIM operates through deep human networks embedded in the communities it controls or influences.

The car bomb that drove through multiple checkpoints at Kati on April 25, 2026, killing Mali’s Defense Minister, required precise knowledge of checkpoint locations, shift patterns, internal base layout, and the physical location of senior government figures within the compound. That intelligence could not have been collected remotely. Someone – or multiple someones – with access to the base provided it. The attack’s success was an intelligence failure before it was a security failure.

This HUMINT advantage is structural, not accidental. JNIM recruits heavily from Fulani communities that have experienced systematic abuses from both government forces and Russian contractors – communities that have rational grievances and existing social networks that the group can tap. The Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2025 Global Terrorism Index documented that JNIM’s attacks resulted in 1,454 deaths in 2024, a 46% increase from the year before, with an average lethality of ten deaths per attack. That lethality reflects targeting precision, not random violence — and precision requires intelligence.

The Drone Revolution

The most significant tactical evolution of the past two years has been JNIM’s integration of commercial drones into its operational system – and the speed of that integration is striking. The group’s first documented drone activity occurred in Bandiagara, Mali, in September 2023. By July 2025, a Policy Center for the New South analysis documented over two dozen confirmed drone incidents, with 82% occurring since March 2025. The acceleration from first use to routine employment took less than 24 months.

The drones serve multiple functions. As ISR platforms, they allow JNIM commanders to conduct reconnaissance of fortified positions, assess garrison strength, and monitor government force movements before committing attack units. The April 25 FLA assault on Kidal opened with drone strikes on armored vehicles to pin down the garrison – a tactic directly parallel to what Ukrainian forces have been doing to Russian armor since 2022. As strike platforms, FPV drones have been used against Malian Army convoys, the Bayraktar TB2 drone control center at Kidal, and even against the Africa Corps’ own drone relay stations.

*Drone hexcopter with camera. 2014 Public Domain image courtesy of Pixabay.*

The technical barrier to entry is now minimal. Commercial drones paired with consumer-accessible software and offline AI are sufficient to conduct operations with genuine tactical effect. A group that can afford motorbikes can afford drones. And the asymmetry is brutal: a $500 commercial drone with a modified payload can destroy a vehicle worth hundreds of thousands of dollars and ground an entire convoy.

Existing government countermeasures have not kept pace. JNIM’s ability to strike secured military sites – including the Kati base that houses the Malian head of state – demonstrates that no fixed position in the country can be considered reliably protected from drone observation and attack.

The Strategic Layer: Economic Warfare

Perhaps the most sophisticated element of JNIM’s operational system is its use of economic warfare as a strategic tool. Since September 2025, the group has imposed a fuel blockade on Bamako – not by occupying the capital, but by systematically attacking fuel tankers on the road corridors from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. The blockade required no dramatic military action. It required sustained, coordinated interdiction of a single critical logistics node – fuel supply – that the Malian government cannot function without.

The effect on the capital was immediate and visible: fuel shortages, price spikes, and the diversion of military resources from offensive operations to convoy escort duty. The Africa Corps, theoretically Mali’s elite counterinsurgency force, spent significant operational capacity protecting tanker trucks rather than pursuing insurgent groups. The insurgents had converted their mobility advantage into a strategic economic lever without ever needing to win a conventional battle.

The broader lesson is one that military analysts have consistently under-weighted: insurgent success in the Sahel is not primarily a function of weapons or even tactical skill. It is a function of organizational coherence, intelligence depth, economic understanding of the adversary’s vulnerabilities, and the patience to build a parallel administrative and governance structure in the spaces the state has abandoned. JNIM now administers territory. It collects taxes, in the form of “zakat“. It adjudicates disputes. It bans secular music and enforces its interpretation of Sharia law in towns it controls.

It is, in the most uncomfortable analytical sense, governing. And governments, however brutal, are considerably harder to defeat than armed bands.

*The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To*

Eight Days

Michael Cessna May 14, 2026

There is a number that should be haunting every defense ministry in the Western world right now, and it belongs to Britain. Tom Tugendhat, MP for Tonbridge and a man with actual military service to his name, stated it plainly in late April 2026: the United Kingdom can sustain major combat operations for approximately eight days. Not eight months. Not eight weeks. Eight days. In the same breath, he confirmed what open-source analysts have been documenting from the Ukraine front: Russian artillery is burning through upwards of twenty thousand rounds per day.

*Official portrait of Tom Tugendhat MP. House of Commons / Laurie Noble, 2024. CCA/3.0 Unported*

Those two numbers, placed side by side, tell you everything you need to know about where thirty years of post-Cold War optimism have left one of history’s great military powers.

The Arithmetic Of Hollowness

Eight days is not a figure Tugendhat invented for shock value. He is a former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee who served as a British intelligence officer in Iraq and Afghanistan. When he says it, he is drawing on briefings and wargames the public does not see. And the institutional analysis supports him.

The Royal United Services Institute – Britain’s premier defense think tank – has assessed that deploying a single armored brigade would consume somewhere between seventy and eighty percent of the British Army’s total combat engineering capability. A full division – the kind of force Britain would be expected to field in a serious NATO commitment – is, in RUSI’s measured language, “fanciful.” The regular Army currently stands at around 140,000 personnel, a number that sounds substantial until you compare it to France’s 250,000 or consider that a meaningful portion of that figure exists on paper rather than in uniform and ready to deploy.

The naval picture is no better. A Royal Navy carrier strike group is an impressive thing on paper – and it represents, on most operational days, nearly the totality of what the fleet can put to sea simultaneously. Two Type 45 destroyers, two Type 23 frigates, one fleet ready escort for home waters, and perhaps one attack submarine if the scheduling works out. That is not a global power’s navy. That is a capable but brittle force that cannot absorb losses or sustain extended high-intensity operations.

The Money Problem – And The Accounting Problem

Britain has technically met the NATO two-percent GDP spending guideline every year since its introduction in 2006, and officials in London have been quick to point that out. What they are slower to mention is that up to a quarter of that headline figure is absorbed by the nuclear deterrent – Trident and its associated infrastructure – leaving the conventional forces funded at something closer to 1.5 percent in practical terms. Germany, which spent barely over one percent of GDP on defense a decade ago, has now surpassed Britain in absolute defense expenditure and overtook the UK as NATO’s second-largest spender in 2024.

The Starmer government has committed to raising defense spending to 2.6 percent of GDP by 2027 and, following the June 2025 NATO summit, to 3.5 percent by 2035. The Ministry of Defense has warned of a £28 billion funding shortfall over the next four years even at current commitment levels [https://www.cityam.com/charts-uk-defence-reeves-nato-starmer-trump/]. The Treasury, managing a government that is simultaneously trying to fund the NHS, fix crumbling infrastructure, and service a substantial national debt, has responded to these warnings with the fiscal equivalent of a shrug. The ambition to reach three percent, officials have noted, will be achieved “when economic and fiscal conditions allow.” [https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/defense-equipment-united-kingdom] In a period of low growth and geopolitical turbulence, that is a phrase that can mean almost anything.

Meanwhile, NATO itself has moved the goalposts. At The Hague in June 2025, the alliance committed members to five percent of GDP – 3.5 percent on core defense, 1.5 percent on resilience and infrastructure – by 2035. Britain currently sits below the NATO alliance average as a share of GDP, lagging behind thirteen member states including Estonia, Latvia, and Poland – countries that, unlike Britain, share a border with the threat and have drawn the appropriate conclusions.

The Political Dimension

Tugendhat’s speech at the Policy Exchange think tank did not confine itself to hardware and stockpiles. He identified something harder to fix than an ammunition shortage: a political culture that has systematically avoided hard choices about defense for a generation.

*155 mm artillery rounds for the M777 howitzers. Yukon Training Area, near Eielson Air Force Base. 2012 photo by US Army. Public Domain.*

“For three decades, we have been projecting an image of a Britain that no longer exists,” he said in 2026. The gap between Britain’s self-image – permanent Security Council seat, nuclear power, special relationship with Washington, the shadow of Churchill – and its actual military capacity has become wide enough to drive a naval convoy through. British generals, Tugendhat noted, have told him that the entire firepower of today’s British Army is less than what a single brigade commander could call on in the 1990s.

There is also a legal dimension that Tugendhat raised and that deserves more attention than it typically receives. He argued that British forces have been progressively fettered by legal constraints – human rights legislation improperly applied to battlefield conduct – that have had a measurable chilling effect on operational decision-making, as well, as on recruitment and retention. Whether or not one agrees with that argument, the perception within the force that prosecution rather than a medal awaits those who act decisively is a real factor in institutional confidence.

The Starmer government’s commitment to defense is “genuine,” in the sense that the numbers are moving in the right direction. But political commitment to a 2035 target does not fill an ammunition bunker today. It does not add a frigate to the fleet this year. It does not give the Army the engineering and logistics depth RUSI says it is missing. The eight-day window is not a projection of where Britain will be in a decade. It is where Britain is right now.

The Wider Lesson

Britain is not uniquely culpable here – the peace dividend was a collective European indulgence, and most NATO members spent the post-Cold War decades making the same assumptions about permanent stability and American underwriting. What makes the British case worth examining closely is the distance between the country’s continued great-power rhetoric and the material reality of its defense posture. France, for all its problems, has maintained a more coherent expeditionary force and a defense industrial base that can actually produce things under pressure. Poland is spending nearly four percent of GDP and building an army that is beginning to look like one of NATO’s more serious land forces. Germany has belatedly recognized the emergency and is spending accordingly.

Britain, by contrast, is in the uncomfortable position of being a country whose defense vocabulary still runs on Cold War confidence while its actual capabilities have been quietly liquidated to help balance budgets that were never quite balanced anyway.

Eight days. Russia burns around twenty thousand artillery rounds a day. The math is not complicated. The question is whether the political system can close the gap between the image and the reality before that arithmetic becomes relevant in the worst possible way.

Bear Trap: Russia’s African Disaster

Michael Cessna May 8, 2026

There is a photograph – actually a drone image, captured by Azawadi rebel forces – of a Malian Army forward operating base somewhere in the Sahel. It is a large square of compacted dirt berm, perhaps 300 meters on a side, with a scattering of structures inside and no meaningful standoff from the surrounding terrain. It looks, as one analyst put it, like something a child might construct with Lincoln Logs. No overlapping fields of fire. No depth. No overhead cover. Wide open to drone observation from any direction. It is, in the bluntest possible assessment, not a fortification. It is a target with a flag on it.

Aerial view of a Malian Army forward operating base in the Sahel region, as photographed by an Azawadi Liberation Front drone during the 2026 offensive. Precise date and location undisclosed. Image released via open-source social media channels. Public Domain.

That image tells you most of what you need to know about why Russia’s African adventure is failing – and why it was always going to fail.

How It Started

When Mali’s military junta expelled French forces in 2022 and invited Wagner Group mercenaries to fill the security vacuum, Moscow portrayed the arrangement as a sovereign, non-colonial alternative to Western intervention. The narrative was carefully constructed: France had failed after nearly a decade of Operation Barkhane. The United Nations mission MINUSMA had failed. Russia, unburdened by colonial guilt and uninterested in human rights lecturing, would succeed where the West had not.

The opening force package was approximately 1,000 Wagner mercenaries. Mali is a country of 1.24 million square kilometers – roughly the size of Western Europe. The math was not encouraging from the start.

*Russian mercenaries in Africa, 2019. Photo by Florence Maïguélé, CorbeauNews. CCA/4.0 International.*

*Map of West Africa, 2024. Map author WikiUser Rowanwindwhistler. CCA/4.0 International.*

Wagner’s initial operational focus was not counterinsurgency in any meaningful sense. It was regime protection and resource extraction – concentrating in Bamako to shield the junta, while securing gold mining operations in the north. This is the model Russia has used across Africa: armed presence as a business arrangement, with strategic minerals as partial payment. The security of the population was, at best, a secondary consideration. At worst, it was actively counterproductive. Between January 2024 and Wagner’s exit in June 2025, Wagner and Malian soldiers caused more than 1,440 civilian casualties – four times the number of deaths and injuries attributed to JNIM jihadist forces during the same period.

In counterinsurgency operations, killing the population you are supposed to be protecting is not a viable long-term strategy.

The July 2024 ambush at Tinzaouatène was the first major indicator that the arrangement was structurally unsound. A Wagner convoy moving to secure a gold mining site was ambushed in the desert by Tuareg rebels of what would become the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Local sources claimed 84 Wagner fighters and 47 Malian soldiers killed, in effect, the complete destruction of Wagner’s 13th detachment. Wagner survivors later accused Malian intelligence of deliberately underestimating rebel numbers. Malian officers accused the Russians of ignoring chains of command and treating them with open contempt. As one senior Malian officer told The Sentry research organization: “We have gone from the frying pan to the fire.” The ambush reverberated far beyond the Sahel: for years, Wagner’s brand across Africa had rested on a carefully cultivated reputation for ruthless effectiveness – the force that succeeded where Western armies hesitated. Tinzaouatène punctured that reputation in a single afternoon, and the puncture was public: drone footage of the aftermath circulated across social media within hours, reaching every junta government on the continent that had been weighing a Russian security arrangement.

*Touareg tribesman in Algiers (Algeria). 2015 photo by WikiUser Amine loua. CCA/4.0 International.*

How It’s Going

After Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense absorbed Wagner’s African operations into a new entity called the Africa Corps – named, with what can only be described as either spectacular historical tone-deafness, or a badly mismanaged sense of humor – after the Wehrmacht’s North African expeditionary force of WW2. Roughly 70-80% of the Africa Corps was composed of former Wagner fighters. The same men, the same doctrine, the same fundamental mismatch between the mission and the force available – now with a Ministry of Defense letterhead.

The total Russian force in Mali reached approximately 2,000 personnel by late 2024. Two thousand troops, in a country the size of Western Europe, facing two converging insurgencies – JNIM’s Fulani-recruited jihadist network operating across the center and south, and the Tuareg-led FLA pressing from the north – that had demonstrated the ability to coordinate operations despite having no particular affection for each other.

The structural intelligence failure compounded everything else. The Small Wars Journal published a detailed analysis in March 2026 noting that Africa Corps operated as a TECHINT-rich, HUMINT-poor force – capable of drone strikes and signals intelligence, but systematically unable to cultivate the human networks necessary to understand insurgent intent before it materialized as an attack. The coercion-based approach to information gathering – intimidation and violence rather than community trust – actively destroyed the conditions necessary for effective intelligence collection…something all the more remarkable, given the widespread availability of afteraction reports from the mid-1990’s to today. JNIM’s ongoing fuel blockade of Bamako, which required sustained preparation, coordinated logistics, and expansion into southern Mali where the group had previously had minimal presence, was not detected until it was already operational.

The Fall Of Kidal

On April 25, 2026, JNIM launched a coordinated assault on Kati – the largest military base in the Bamako region, home to senior government figures including Mali’s Defense Minister. A car bomb driven through multiple checkpoints into the residential sector killed Defense Minister Sadio Camara and mortally wounded the chief of intelligence. The operation required insider knowledge that the junta has not publicly explained.

Simultaneously, the FLA launched its main offensive against Kidal — the strategic northern city that Wagner had captured in November 2023 in what was supposed to be the high-water mark of the Russian intervention. Within hours, FLA forces had overrun the city’s checkpoints, the police station, and the governor’s palace. The Russian Africa Corps garrison, unable to expect reinforcements with every available aircraft pinned down responding to the Bamako diversionary attacks, negotiated an exit — paying their way out of encirclement and withdrawing north in a convoy of trucks that included Tornado-G multiple rocket launchers and a D-30 howitzer.

*Map of the Mali War, to early 2026. Map author WikiUser Borysk5. CCA/4.0 International.*

They left behind a fully operational drone control substation, relay equipment, and a command post. The symbolism was not lost on anyone.

“It is the most consequential battlefield setback Russia’s African project has suffered,” said Justyna Gudzowska of The Sentry. “It is a major reputational and political blow,” inverting the idea that the Russian model was working.

The Structural Problem Russia Cannot Solve

The Carnegie Endowment’s analysis of the situation, published in March 2026, identified the core issue with precision: Russia is repeating France’s mistakes, favoring a heavy military hand without a political strategy to address the root causes of violence, all while simultaneously being less competent than France in the military dimension…an “achievement”, all by itself.

The Tuareg question has generated five rebellions since Malian independence in 1960. Every external power that has intervened in Mali – France included – has addressed the symptom without touching the cause. The Malian junta’s refusal to consider meaningful autonomy arrangements for the north, combined with its expulsion of the regional security architecture that might have provided some coordinating function, has left the country with fewer tools to address the insurgency than it had in 2021.

Russia has not brought a political strategy. It has brought mercenaries, helicopter gunships, and a mining concession model that has consistently generated civilian casualties faster than it generates security. The instability it was hired to contain is now pushing southward toward the West African coast – toward Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo, countries with the region’s largest populations and most developed economies.

That dirt berm in the drone photograph is not just a poorly built fortification. It is a precise architectural expression of the entire Russian strategic approach in the Sahel: a perimeter with no depth, no overlapping fields of fire, wide open to observation, and apparently designed by people who have never seriously considered what happens when the enemy actually arrives.

They arrived on April 25th.

The Little Missile That Could – A Tools of the Trade Joint

Michael Cessna May 1, 2026

In this series, we have looked at many weapons that refused to die, weapons that conquered the world through simplicity, and weapons that failed their operators despite genuine technological ambition. This week, we look at something rarer: a weapon whose single most important moment in combat history changed the entire Western understanding of armored warfare overnight – and whose descendants are still being sold on the world market today. The Soviet 9M14 Malyutka – “Little One” in Russian, designated “AT-3 Sagger” by NATO – is not a weapon many casual readers will recognize by name. But its fingerprints are on nearly every anti-armor doctrine written since 1973, every advanced armor development, and every ATGM guidance improvement that followed its debut on the banks of the Suez Canal in October 1973.

The Weapon

Development of the Malyutka began in July 1961, when the Soviet government assigned competing design teams at the Tula and Kolomna arsenals to produce the USSR’s first man-portable anti-tank guided missile. The design brief drew on Western systems of the 1950s – the French Entac and Swiss/West German Cobra – but the Soviets pushed for a smaller, more portable package optimized for infantry carry. The result entered service in 1963: an eleven kilogram missile that fits into a fiberglass suitcase that functions as a base for the missile’s launch rail, guided by a joystick an wire control system, using Manual Command to Line of Sight (MCLOS) guidance.

*The periscopic sight and joystick control unit for the Soviet Sagger AT-3 anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW) system. 1984 image from US National Archives. Public Domain.*

*AT-3 Sagger/9K11 Malyutka ATGM in its fiberglass carrying case. US Army photo. Public Domain.*

MCLOS guidance is exactly what it sounds like. The operator acquires the target, launches the missile, and then manually steers it to impact by watching a flare on the missile’s tail and manipulating a joystick that sends correction signals down a wire unspooling behind the missile in flight. It demands genuine skill, steady nerves, and an operator who can remain stationary and focused while a tank crew actively attempts to kill him. Soviet production peaked at 25,000 missiles per year during the 1960s and 1970s, making it almost certainly the most widely produced anti-tank guided missile in history. Exports went to over 45 nations, from Afghanistan and Algeria to Vietnam and Zimbabwe.

The weapon could be carried by a single infantryman, fired from the ground using a simple suitcase-style launcher, or mounted on vehicles including the BRDM reconnaissance vehicle and the BMP infantry fighting vehicle. Maximum effective range was 3,000 meters – considerably beyond the effective range of any unguided rocket reviewed so far in this series. The basic warhead penetrated more than 400mm of rolled homogeneous armor. On paper, for its time, it was a genuine tank killer.

*9M14 Malyutka anti-tank missile on BMP-1 APC, at the Army History Museum and Park in Kecel, Hungary. 2005 photo by WikiUser: VargaA. CCA/4.0 Int’l.*

October 1973: The Sagger Panic

On October 6, 1973 – Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar – Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal in a coordinated assault that caught the Israeli Defense Forces badly off-balance. What followed in the first 48 to 72 hours was one of the most shocking reverses in Israeli military history, and the Malyutka was at the center of it.

Egyptian infantry crossed with Malyutka teams carrying three times the normal missile load. They deployed in static firing positions along the eastern bank and waited for Israeli armor – specifically the tank-heavy Israeli counterattack doctrine that had worked so devastatingly in the Six Day War of 1967. The Israeli tank crews – victims of “Victory Disease” – helpfully obliged, charging forward without infantry support in the manner that had defeated Arab armies six years earlier.

The Malyutka teams were ready.

The results were catastrophic. In the first days of the war, Egyptian Sagger teams knocked out Israeli armor at a rate that generated genuine panic in Israeli command structures. In total, Sagger’s knocked out more than 800 Israeli tanks and other combat vehicles during the war. A period known simply as the “Sagger Panic” set in, during which the future of the main battle tank as a concept was openly questioned – by NATO planners as much as by the Israelis themselves. If Egyptian infantry with Soviet missiles could kill Israeli Centurions and M60 Patton tanks at will, what would Soviet infantry equipped with the same missiles do to NATO armor in Central Europe?

*Israeli M-60 main battle tank, destroyed during fighting in the Sinai Peninsula, 1973. Photo from””Military Battles on the Egyptian Front” by Gammal Hammad. Public Domain.*

The answer the Israelis eventually developed was both tactical and improvised. Artillery concentration on suspected Sagger operator positions – suppressing the men rather than intercepting the missiles – proved effective. Tank crews learned to advance aggressively toward launch signatures rather than halt and present stationary targets. Firing rounds in front of the tank to generate dust clouds disrupted operator visibility. Moving laterally while the missile was in flight, exploiting the MCLOS system’s requirement for continuous operator correction, helped to cause misses. These Israeli adaptations were subsequently adopted wholesale by NATO as standard ATGM countermeasure doctrine. The “Little One” had, in six days of combat, restructured how the Western alliance thought about tanks, infantry, and the relationship between them.

*An Israeli soldier with a Sagger anti-tank rocket. 1974 photo by Israel Press and Photo Agency (I.P.P.A.) photographer. CCA/4.0 Int’l.*

The Weapon’s Limitations – And Its Evolution

The same combat record that demonstrated the Malyutka’s shock effect also revealed its constraints. MCLOS guidance demanded a level of operator training and composure that mass-fielded infantry forces could not reliably produce. Combat hit probabilities for MCLOS variants have been documented at approximately 25% under real conditions – effective enough in the hands of well-trained Egyptian teams in prepared positions, but far less reliable in dynamic, fast-moving and violent combat. The minimum engagement range of 500-800 meters forced operators into exposed forward positions. And the slow missile speed – averaging a mere 120 meters per second – gave alert tank crews meaningful reaction time if they spotted the launch.

Soviet designers addressed these limitations progressively. The 9M14M Malyutka-M, entering service in 1973, improved the motor to reduce flight time. The 9M14-2 Malyutka-2, entering service in 1992, replaced MCLOS with SACLOS – Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight – guidance, the same improvement that distinguished the Dragon II from its predecessor, dramatically reducing operator skill and workload management requirements. The 9M14-2M added a tandem HEAT warhead for use against reactive armor. Serbian engineers at VTI developed the Malyutka-2T with a 1,000mm penetration tandem warhead and a radio-guided variant with a range of 5 kilometers and a speed of 200 meters per second – a very different weapon from the 1963 original in almost every parameter except the basic airframe.

China produced its own unlicensed derivative, the HJ-73 Red Arrow, in multiple improved variants. Iran produces the RAAD-T – itself a reverse-engineered copy, supplied to Hezbollah and various militia forces and documented in conflicts across the Middle East and Yemen.

Still In The Field

The Malyutka family has appeared in virtually every significant ground conflict since 1973: the Iran-Iraq War, Grenada, the Gulf War, both Chechen Wars, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine, on both sides. Free Libyan Army rebels were filmed using Saggers in 2011. Syrian opposition forces uploaded Sagger firing videos from 2012 onward. Current confirmed operators include Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Syria, Iran, and a range of non-state actors who have acquired the weapon through the vast quantities exported during the Cold War.

*Map with 9M14 operators in blue and former operators in red. 2015 image by WikiUser: Jurryaany. CCA/4.0 Int’l.*

The weapon that crossed the Suez Canal in a suitcase in 1973 is still on the world’s battlefields in 2025 – modernized, copied, improved, and proliferated to an extent that makes any meaningful accounting of current stocks essentially impossible. That is the definition of a weapon that solved a real problem, in a way that the world found impossible to stop buying.

The Dragon was America’s answer to the same requirement at roughly the same time. The Malyutka was the Soviet answer. One of them changed the world. The other is remembered primarily for its 20% hit rate and the relief that the Javelin finally arrived.

The Dragon They Loved To Hate – A Tools of the Trade Joint

Michael Cessna April 24, 2026

Every series has its cautionary tale. The M72 LAW refused to die because it kept solving real problems. The RPG-7 conquered the world through its sheer brutal simplicity. The Carl Gustaf earned its longevity through continuous intelligent evolution. The SMAW survived on institutional momentum and genuine urban assault utility. This week, we going to look at the weapon that rounds out this series on a different note entirely – the one that didn’t work very well, that the troops genuinely disliked, that the Army was trying to replace almost from the moment it was fielded, and that still managed to serve for 26 years before the Javelin finally put it out of its misery.

Meet the M47 Dragon.

*US Marine carrying the M47 Dragon Anti-Armor Missile System, May, 1997. USMC Photo by LCPL E.J. Young. Public Domain.*

The Dragon holds a legitimate historical distinction: it was the first man-portable, shoulder-fired, wire-guided anti-tank missile to reach production. That is genuinely significant. Every weapon system we have covered in this series has been an unguided rocket or recoilless round – point it, pull the trigger, hope for the best. The Dragon was something categorically different: a wire-guided missile that the operator steered to the target using a tracker that read infrared emissions from a pyrotechnic source on the missile’s tail, automatically transmitting correction signals through a wire that unspooled behind the missile in flight. In theory, a trained operator could guide a Dragon onto a tank at 1,000 meters with precision that no unguided rocket could match. In theory.

The Pit of Origin

The Army’s requirement for what it called a Medium Antitank Weapon dated to 1959 – the same Cold War imperative that drove the entire weapons landscape we have been exploring in this series. The Soviets were fielding T-55s and T-62s in massive numbers, and NATO needed infantry-portable anti-armor capability at every level of the force structure. The heavy end was covered by the BGM-71 TOW, a crew-served wire-guided missile that remains in service today. The Dragon was supposed to cover the medium range – something one man could carry and fire, that could kill a tank at ranges beyond what any unguided rocket could reliably reach.

McDonnell Douglas won the development contract in 1966. The weapon was designated FGM-77, nicknamed ‘Dragon’ in 1967, and first fielded to U.S. Army units in Europe in January 1975. The Army assigned one Dragon per rifle squad, with a dedicated anti-armor specialist as the operator. Approximately 7,000 launchers and 33,000 missiles were eventually produced, with export sales to Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and pre-revolutionary Iran.

*Map of M47 Dragon operators in blue with former operators in red. 2015 map by Wikimedia Commons User Jurryaany. **CCA/4.0 Int’l**.*

On paper, the specifications were reasonable for the era: effective range of 65 to 1,000 meters, maximum range of 1,500 meters, a HEAT warhead capable of penetrating 330mm of rolled homogeneous armor on the base model. The guidance system required no assembly before firing – the operator simply removed the shock absorbers, attached the tracker unit, sat down, and fired. Lighter than most contemporary guided anti-tank systems in Western Europe, it gave American infantry a tank-killing capability at the squad level that was genuinely novel.

In practice, the Dragon was a mess.

The Problems Begin

The guidance system demanded that the operator track the target continuously from the moment of firing until impact – in the open, stationary, for up to eleven seconds on a base-model Dragon shot at maximum range. Eleven seconds is a very long time to sit still while a tank crew, now aware they are being engaged, attempts to shoot back. The Dragon’s distinctive “popping” sound as its side-mounted thruster rockets fired corrections downrange announced the shot to anyone within earshot. U.S. Army planning documents from the Cold War period acknowledged bluntly that Dragon crews were expected to take heavy casualties in any actual European land battle.

Soldier of the 25th Infantry Division firing an M47 Dragon anti-tank missile during Exercise COBRA GOLD ’87, Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, 1987. US Army photo by SSGT Valentino M. Gempis. Public Domain.

The hit probability numbers were damning. A U.S. Army study of Dragon firings under combat conditions found a hit rate of approximately 20%. For a weapon whose entire value proposition rested on guidance precision, this was a serious indictment. The causes were multiple: the sudden loss of the missile’s 30-pound weight from the shooter’s shoulder caused many operators to flinch badly enough to break target track at the moment of launch. The wire could break. Bodies of saltwater – a notable concern for a weapon issued to Marines – could interfere with the missile’s circuits. Crosswinds degraded accuracy. Over-correction by the operator caused the missile to ground itself. And the base warhead was quickly rendered inadequate by Soviet advances in explosive reactive armor.

The Marine Corps, to their credit, did not simply accept the situation. In 1986 they initiated a product improvement program that produced the Dragon II – an 85% increase in armor penetration, entering USMC service in 1988. A further upgrade, the Dragon III, added a tandem warhead precursor charge. The Army, already focused on finding a replacement, largely declined to participate in the improvement program. The two services were, characteristically, heading in different directions with the same weapon.

Combat Record and Exit

The Dragon saw combat in Grenada in 1983, and during Desert Storm in 1991, where 150 launchers and 5,000 rockets were deployed. Its performance in the Gulf War was, at best, unremarkable – the conflict’s short duration and the Iraqi Army’s swift collapse limited meaningful data collection. What the Gulf War did confirm was that the Dragon’s export customers had occasionally lost weapons to advancing Iraqi forces, making Iraq an inadvertent operator of American anti-tank technology – a recurring theme in Middle Eastern arms flows.

Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division scan for targets with an M47 Dragon anti-tank weapon in the firing position during Operation URGENT FURY, October, 1983. The soldier in the foreground is carrying two M72 light anti-tank weapons over his shoulder. US Army photo by SPC 5 Edward Nevala. Public Domain.

The weapon the Army had been waiting for arrived in the form of the FGM-148 Javelin, a fire-and-forget infrared-guided missile that allowed the operator to acquire the target, lock on, fire, and immediately take cover – no eleven-second tracking requirement, no sitting in the open while the missile flew. The Javelin entered service in 1996, and the Dragon was officially retired from U.S. service in 2001. The US Army destroyed its last remaining missile stocks at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama on September 8, 2009. It was not a moment of particular mourning.

The Dragon’s afterlife has been appropriately ironic. Iran reverse-engineered it as the Saeghe, which has been supplied to Hezbollah and various militia forces across the Middle East. Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand continue to operate versions of the system. The weapon that American infantry quietly despised for a generation has found a second career in the hands of non-state actors and smaller militaries that cannot afford the Javelin – which, at roughly $175,000 per missile, represents a rather different procurement universe.

Conclusion

The Dragon is the necessary counterpoint to everything else in this series. The M72, the RPG-7, the Gustaf, and the SMAW all demonstrate that simple, well-matched solutions to genuine problems tend to outlast their predicted obsolescence. The Dragon demonstrates the corollary: that technological ambition without adequate attention to the human factors of combat – the flinch, the exposure time, the noise signature, the weather vulnerability – produces weapons that technically work, while practically failing the people who carry them.

The Javelin learned those lessons. The Dragon paid for the education.

The SMAW – A Tools of the Trade Joint

Michael Cessna April 17, 2026

The Bunker Buster

For the last few weeks, we have walked through the M72 LAW, the RPG-7, and the Carl Gustaf – three weapons that between them define the spectrum of man-portable anti-armor and assault systems that have shaped infantry combat since the 1960s. Each represented a coherent, and unique, design philosophy: the M72 disposable and simple; the RPG-7 cheap and reloadable; the Gustaf precise and multi-role. Today we look at the outlier – the weapon that does not fit neatly into any of those categories, was adopted by exactly one branch of the U.S. military, and spent its entire service life being replaced by systems that never quite replaced it: the Mk 153 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon, universally known as the SMAW.

Marines with 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, fire Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapons during Exercise Koolendong at Bradshaw Training Area, Aug 23, 2014. USMC photo by Sgt. James Gulliver. Public Domain.

The SMAW is a Marine Corps weapon, through and through. It was fielded in 1984 as a Marine Corps-unique system; the Army borrowed 150 launchers and 5,000 rockets for Desert Storm, then gave them back (as the FGM-148 Javelin was coming online in the mid-90’s, along with the increasing intent to adopt the Carl Gustaf to replace both the M67 Recoilless Rifle, and the positively awful M47 Dragon), and for four decades it has been the Corps’ primary tool for the mission the name describes: assaulting fortified positions. Not primarily killing tanks – though it can, to a point – but destroying bunkers, breaching walls, collapsing buildings, and suppressing crew-served weapons dug into hardened positions. That is a different set of mission requirements than any of the weapons we have previously covered in this series, and it produced a different weapon.

Where It Came From

The SMAW’s lineage runs through Israel, which is fitting – the Israelis have spent decades solving exactly the kind of close-quarters urban assault problems the SMAW was designed for. In the late 1970s, Israel Military Industries developed the B-300, an 83mm reloadable rocket launcher optimized for infantry assault operations. The Marine Corps, looking for a replacement capability after the collapse of the FGR-17 Viper program – the same procurement disaster that sent the Army to the AT4 – found the B-300 and adapted it for American service.

*Marines test SMAW at Camp Lejuene, 1982. USMC/Infantry Magazine. Public Domain.*

The American version added one distinctive and genuinely unusual feature: a spotting rifle. Mounted on the right side of the launch tube, this 9mm device fires ballistically matched tracer rounds at the target before the main rocket is launched. The idea was sound – use cheap tracer rounds to confirm the firing solution before committing an expensive rocket to the shot. In practice, it added weight, complexity, and required the operator to expose himself repeatedly to enemy observation while working through the spotting process. It was a British design concept grafted onto an Israeli launcher for American Marines, which gives you some sense of the SMAW’s somewhat eclectic ancestry.

The result weighed 16 pounds unloaded, fired 83mm rockets loaded from the rear, and entered service with the Marines in 1984 – the same year the Army was fielding the AT4 and the same period the M72 was being theoretically retired. In practice, all three ended up in service simultaneously, which tells you something about the difficulty of replacing any weapon system that actually works.

Combat Record

The SMAW’s combat record is built primarily around the Iraq War the began in 2003, and specifically around the Battle of Fallujah. In the street-by-street fighting of both the first and second offensives in 2004, the weapon found its calling. The SMAW-NE – “Novel Explosive,” which is the military’s characteristically understated designation for a thermobaric warhead – proved devastatingly effective against the fortified rooms, tunnels, and hardened positions that Iraqi insurgents had constructed throughout the city. A thermobaric warhead works by dispersing a fuel cloud and then igniting it, producing an overpressure wave capable of collapsing lightly constructed buildings and lethal to personnel in enclosed spaces. It is not a subtle tool.

A US Marine Corps (USMC) troop with the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, fires an MK-153 SMAW round at an insurgent stronghold during Operation Al Fajr, Fallujah, Iraq. Marine Corps photo by LCPL J.A. Chaverri, USMC, November, 2004. Public Domain.

When the SMAW-NE lacked the penetrating power to breach certain reinforced walls directly, Marines developed a two-shot technique: first fire a High-Explosive Dual-Mode round to punch a hole through the wall, then send the thermobaric round through the opening into the room behind it. Tactically effective, if somewhat baroque. The broader point is that the weapon was being adapted in real time to meet a combat environment no one had fully anticipated – which is, as we have noted throughout this series, what separates useful weapons from expensive museum pieces.

In Afghanistan and Iraq more broadly, the SMAW gave Marine infantry squads a direct-fire breaching and suppression capability that neither the M72 nor the AT4 provided. The Army, which had returned its borrowed SMAWs after Desert Storm, later developed its own derivative – the SMAW-D, designated the M141 Bunker Defeat Munition – a disposable single-shot version using the same warhead. Even the Army eventually admitted the mission was real.

The Spotting Rifle Problem & Mod 2

The original SMAW’s spotting rifle was its perpetual liability. It was over 30 years old by the 2000s, experiencing increasing failure rates, and the process of firing multiple tracer rounds to range a target was slow and exposed the operator. In 2013, Marines at Quantico tested a modified SMAW with thermal and laser range-finding technology that replaced the spotting rifle. The results validated the concept, and in 2015 the Marine Corps contracted for the SMAW Mod 2 – a complete overhaul that replaced the spotting rifle with a Modular Ballistic Sight, incorporating a laser rangefinder, ballistic computer, and thermal capability. Weight dropped from 16 pounds to 13 pounds. Fielding to the Fleet Marine Force began in November 2017.

The Mod 2 was, by all accounts, a significant improvement. It was also, almost immediately, announced as the weapon’s final iteration before replacement.

The Gustaf Takes Over

The Marine Corps has been transitioning to the Carl Gustaf M4 as its primary infantry shoulder-fired system – and in doing so, has eliminated the 0351 occupational specialty, the Infantry Assault Marines who were trained specifically in SMAW employment. The Gustaf’s broader ammunition family, lighter weight in its M4 configuration, and compatibility with laser-guided rounds made the case for consolidation straightforward. Why maintain two separate systems, two separate MOS pipelines, and two separate logistics chains when one weapon covers the mission set of both?

The answer, for forty years, was institutional inertia, procurement complexity, and the SMAW’s genuine effectiveness in the one role it was specifically designed for. Those are not trivial reasons. But the Gustaf’s evolution has finally rendered them insufficient.

The SMAW is not gone yet – it remains in inventory and, as of 2023, Ukrainian forces of the 68th Jager Brigade were documented using it in operations against Russian forces. Old weapons, as we have noted repeatedly [https://freedomist.com/are-you-sure-you-want-to-throw-that-away/] in this series, have a way of finding new wars to fight. But its role as the Marine Corps’ primary assault weapon is drawing to a close, replaced by the Swede that finally convinced everyone it could do the job better.

This forms a fitting end to this series on man-portable anti-tank weapons. From the M72 to the RPG-7 to the Gustaf to the SMAW – four weapons, four design philosophies, and one consistent lesson: the weapon that solves a real problem, solved well, outlasts every prediction of its obsolescence.

Next time, we’ll look into a weapon that didn’t work so well – the M47 Dragon.

The Goose Is Loose – A Tools of the Trade Joint

Michael Cessna April 10, 2026

Previously, we have looked at the M72 LAW and the RPG-7 – two weapons born from the same fundamental problem, that solved the issue by two very different design philosophies: One is disposable, one is reloadable. One is American, one is Soviet. Both are still on the world’s battlefields today. This week, we look at the weapon that split the difference between them, outlasted both as a frontline system in the world’s most capable militaries, and is currently destroying Russian tanks in Ukraine: the Carl Gustaf 84mm recoilless rifle.

U.S. troops call it “the Goose,” or just “the Gustaf.” The British call it “Charlie G.” The Swedes, who invented it, call it the Granatgevär m/48 – “Grenade Rifle, Model 1948.” Whatever you call it, the weapon has been in continuous production and frontline service since 1948, is now operated by more than 40 countries, and in 2022 a Ukrainian crew used one to destroy a T-90M – Russia’s most advanced operational main battle tank. Not bad for a design that was old when the Korean War started.

What A Recoilless Rifle Even Is

Before going further, it is worth taking a moment to explain what a “recoilless rifle” is – because the term confuses people who are used to thinking about weapons in terms of either conventional rifles, artillery or rocket launchers.

When a conventional firearm – or cannon – fires, the propellant gases accelerate the projectile forward, and by Newton’s third law, an equal and opposite force pushes back against the shooter. That is “recoil“. In a pistol or rifle, the weapon’s mass and the shooter’s body absorb it. In a large-caliber weapon, like an artillery piece, uncontrolled recoil would be catastrophically injurious to the shooter and structurally ruinous to even a stout tube.

*Cumulative shell (H.E.A.T) diagram. 2005 image by Robert Blazek. Public Domain.*

The recoilless design solves this by venting a precisely calculated portion of the propellant gases out of the rear of the weapon through a cone-shaped Venturi nozzle at the moment of firing. The rearward thrust of those escaping gases almost exactly cancels out the forward thrust driving the projectile. The net result on the shooter is dramatically reduced recoil – not zero, but manageable even from the shoulder. The tradeoff is that the rearward ejecting blast of gases is substantial, creating a “danger zone” behind the weapon and generating a dramatic visible signature. But for a weapon that can deliver an 84mm shaped-charge round accurately at 500 meters, that is a tradeoff most militaries have been willing to make for over seven decades.

A coalition force member fires a Carl Gustav recoilless rifle system during weapons practice on a range in Helmand province, Afghanistan; Feb, 2013. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Benjamin Tuck. Public Domain.

The Gustaf fires its rounds at 290 meters per second – nearly three times the muzzle velocity of a World War II bazooka. The result is superior accuracy at range, and a rifled barrel that spins its projectiles for further stability. This is not a “point and pray” weapon – with proper training, it is a precision tool.

The Weapon & Its History

The Carl Gustaf’s origins trace to the Swedish Army’s experience in watching World War II unfold from the sidelines and drawing many correct conclusions. Sweden’s first attempt at a shoulder-fired recoilless weapon – the 20mm Pansarvärnsgevär m/42 – was already obsolete when it entered production in 1942, capable of penetrating only about 40mm of armor at a time when German and Soviet tanks were fielding considerably more. Designers Hugo Abramson and Harald Jentzen at the state-run Carl Gustafs Stads Gevärsfaktori scrapped the small-bore approach entirely, scaled their design up to 84mm in diameter, and paired the recoilless principle with a shaped-charge warhead. The resulting weapon entered Swedish service in 1948.

It first saw combat with Swedish UN peacekeepers during the Congo Crisis of the early 1960s, where it proved rugged and versatile under operational conditions. Export orders soon followed. The M2 variant, introduced in 1964, spread the weapon across NATO and allied militaries. U.S. Army Special Forces, the Rangers, and the British SAS adopted the M3 variant in the 1990’s for bunker-busting and anti-vehicle work. By 2014, the U.S. Army was ordering the Gustaf for conventional infantry units deploying to Afghanistan, specifically because enemy forces could reach American troops with RPG-7s at ranges where U.S. squads had no equivalent direct-fire response.

*Swedish rocket launcher in action at a roadblock in Katanga, during_Operation_Unokat, December, 1961. Unknown author. Public Domain*

The current production model, the M4 “MAAWS” (Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System), weighs under seven kilograms – about 15 pounds – and measures less than one meter in length. It accepts a digital fire control device that communicates ballistic data directly to programmable ammunition. It can fire laser-guided rounds developed jointly by Saab and Raytheon, accurate to 2,500 meters. It can also fire the same basic HEAT rounds it was firing in 1948. That backward compatibility with legacy ammunition means nations can modernize their launchers without replacing their ammunition stockpiles – a procurement detail that matters enormously for smaller militaries.

The Ammunition Story

The Gustaf’s real competitive advantage over both the M72 and the RPG-7 is its ammunition flexibility, and this is where the “multi-tool” description earns its keep. The current round family includes:

Anti-armor HEAT rounds, including a tandem-warhead variant capable of defeating reactive armor
A High-Explosive Dual-Purpose round effective against bunkers and light armor
Anti-personnel rounds including a flechette “shotgun” load described by one veteran Ranger as “a giant shotgun where it shoots inch-long little needles at a huge spread”.
Smoke and illumination rounds for screening and marking.
A confined-spaces HEAT variant safe to fire from inside buildings.
And finally, a laser-guided multipurpose munition effective at 2,500 meters.

*A Depiction of Ammunition Variants for the MAAWS. Undated US Army graphic. Public Domain.*

No other man-portable shoulder-fired system offers this range of capability from a single re-loadable launcher. This is why, despite weighing more than the M72 and costing considerably more per launcher than an RPG-7, the Gustaf has not only survived but expanded its user base across seven decades of continuous warfare.

Poland ordered the Carl Gustaf M4 system in a deal worth over $1.2 billion in March 2024. Japan ordered 300 units in 2023. Australia, the Baltic states, and NATO as a whole have placed ongoing orders. The weapon’s procurement momentum is accelerating, not declining.

The Bottom Line

The M72, the RPG-7, and the Carl Gustaf represent three answers to the same question: how do you give infantry the ability to destroy armor, breach fortifications, and suppress defended positions without becoming dependent on vehicle-delivered fire support that may not be available? The American answer was disposable simplicity. The Soviet answer was cheap reloadability. The Swedish answer was precision versatility – and it cost more and weighed more, but it has proven more capable in more operational contexts than either alternative.

*U.S. Marine fires an M3A1 Multi-role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System during unknown distance engagement training, Aug. 14, 2023. USMC photo by Cpl. Aidan Hekker. Public Domain.*

In a budget environment that increasingly rewards lowest unit cost procurement, the Gustaf’s continued and expanding success is a useful reminder that the cheapest weapon per unit is not always the most economical weapon per mission accomplished.

The Goose is still flying. And judging by the order books, it will be for some time to come.

The RPG-7: The Titan of the Man-Portable Anti-Tank World – Tools of the Trade

Michael Cessna April 3, 2026

Last week, we looked at the M72 LAW – a 1963 American design that refused to die, and recently earned a genuine second act through Norwegian engineering ingenuity. This week, we look at the weapon on the other side of that Cold War equation: the RPG-7. Where the M72 is the more elegant solution – lighter, more sophisticated, but ultimately more expensive to produce – the RPG-7 is the Soviet answer to the same problem, while coming from a fundamentally different philosophy about what this sort of weapon system is supposed to be.

The weapon’s full designation is Ruchnoy Protivotankovy Granatomyot-7 – “Hand-held Anti-tank Grenade Launcher, Model 7” – though the English backronym “Rocket-Propelled Grenade” has stuck hard enough that most people have forgotten it was ever anything else. Development began in 1958, to replace its predecessor, the RPG-2 the weapon was formally adopted by the Soviet Army in 1961, and it has not stopped being produced or used since. Over nine million units have been manufactured. It has seen combat in more than 80 countries. It is, without serious competition, the most widely distributed anti-armor weapon in the history of warfare.

Design Philosophy

The RPG-7’s design lineage is still the same as the M72 – the US bazooka, and the German Panzerfaust, both attempting to solve the fundamental problem of giving infantry a fighting chance against armor at range – but the Soviet solution diverged sharply at the design level. Where the M72 is disposable and self-contained, like the Panzerfaust, the RPG-7 is reusable like the bazooka. The launcher tube – a 40mm steel tube, wood-wrapped for heat protection, weighing about 15 pounds – is a permanent asset. The rocket-propelled grenades are loaded separately at the muzzle, with the oversized warhead protruding forward of the tube in the weapon’s distinctive silhouette.

*A Romanian soldier aiming a AG-7 (licensed RPG-7 copy) during a military exercise of the romanian 191st Infantry Battalion. Photo by Dragoş Anghelache. CCA/3.0*

This reusability carries real tactical implications. A squad equipped with RPG-7s can carry multiple warhead types for the same launcher – anti-armor, anti-structure, thermobaric, fragmentation – and select the appropriate round for the target. The M72 gives you one round per tube. The RPG-7 gives you one launcher and as many rounds as your ammunition bearers can carry (typically three spare rounds per carrier). For conventional Soviet infantry doctrine, which envisioned massive combined-arms engagements against NATO armor in Central Europe, this made sense. One RPG-7 per motorized rifle squad (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1998/infantry-rpg.htm) was the standard Soviet assignment – a number that irregular forces consistently exceeded in practice, if at all possible.

*Some RPG-7 Ammunition types. Image by LivePi3.14, 2005. CCA/4.0 International*

The weapon does, however, present real limitations that deserve honest acknowledgment. A 1976 U.S. Army evaluation found that in an 11 km/h crosswind, a gunner firing at a stationary, tank-sized target could not expect a first-round hit more than 50% of the time at 180 meters. The backblast, while less dangerous than many Western counterparts in confined spaces – Soviet doctrine allowed firing from inside rooms with only two meters of standoff – is still substantial and signature-generating. And the weapon’s effective anti-armor range tops out around 300 meters against a moving target, limiting its utility as armor protection has advanced.

But its strengths are formidable, and they are the strengths that matter most in the environments where most of the world’s actual fighting gets done.

A Polish and US soldier load an RPG-7 during combined live-fire training at Drawsko Pomorskie Training Area in Drawsko Pomorskie, Poland, Oct. 29, 2016. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Lauren Harrah. Public Domain.

Combat Record

The RPG-7’s first confirmed combat use was during the Six-Day War in 1967, and it has barely paused since. In Vietnam, it became the primary tool of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces against American armor and, critically, helicopters – a use case the weapon was never designed for, but adapted to with lethal effectiveness. In Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen employed it as their weapon of choice against Soviet armor, APCs, trucks, and helicopters, averaging one RPG for every ten to twelve fighters in the field…or, roughly one RPG-7 per squad.

The Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 produced the RPG-7’s most famous moment in American military consciousness: Somali militiamen used the weapon to shoot down two U.S. Army MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, triggering the events immortalized in the 1999 book and 2001 movie “Black Hawk Down“. The irony runs deep – the CIA had taught Afghan Mujahideen how to use the RPG-7 against Soviet helicopters during the 1980s, and the technique came back to haunt the US military.

In Chechnya, the weapon demonstrated what disciplined urban employment looked like. Chechen hunter-killer teams of three to four fighters – an RPG gunner, a machine gunner, and a sniper – simultaneously engaged single Russian armored vehicles from multiple elevations, including ground level, second and third stories, and basements, while the sniper and machine gunner suppressed supporting infantry. Russian armored columns in Grozny during the first Chechen war may have lost 100 tanks and 250 armored fighting vehicles. This is the tactical template that every urban army has had to study since.

In Ukraine today, the weapon is in simultaneous use by both sides – Ukrainians firing Soviet-designed RPG-7s against Soviet-designed tanks, while Russian forces do the same. Texas-based AirTronic USA has supplied a modernized American variant, the PSRL-1, to Ukrainian forces – a US-built RPG-7 derivative, fighting Russian armor. The symmetry is almost poetic.

*PSRL-1 (modified American copy of the Soviet/Russian RPG-7) in use during training by soldiers of the National Guard of Ukraine. Photo by ngu.gov.ua. CCA/4.0 Int’l.*

The Broader Point

The RPG-7 costs somewhere under $500 per launcher. Warheads run roughly $100 to $500 per round depending on type. A single M1 Abrams main battle tank costs approximately $10 million. The math here is not complicated, and it is precisely that math that drives procurement decisions in most of the world’s militaries – not the ones planning to fight peer adversaries across the Fulda Gap, but the ones planning to fight the wars that actually happen: insurgencies, urban battles, and asymmetric confrontations where the side with the RPG-7 does not need to win every engagement, only enough of them, among other modes of warfare.

The M72 and the RPG-7 are mirror images of the same Cold War problem, solved by two different industrial philosophies. One is elegant, lightweight, and disposable. The other is crude, heavy, reloadable, and has outlasted every attempt to declare it obsolete. Both are still operating on the world’s battlefields today.

Next time: the Carl-Gustaf — the recoilless rifle that splits the difference.

The Old Dog Learns A New Trick – Tools of the Trade

Michael Cessna March 27, 2026

There is a recurring pattern in defense procurement that the Pentagon’s acquisition bureaucracy never quite manages to learn: the weapon system everyone writes off as obsolete has a habit of refusing to die, because the problem it solves refuses to go away. The M60 tank is one example. The M72 Light Anti-armor Weapon – the LAW – is another, a contemporary of the M60 and in some ways a more interesting one, because its “second act” required not just political will but genuine engineering ingenuity.

The M72 entered US Army and Marine Corps service in 1963, replacing the aging M20 Super Bazooka as the individual infantryman’s answer to armored threats. The concept was elegantly simple: a 66mm rocket, pre-loaded in a telescoping aluminum-and-fiberglass tube, weighing under five pounds, that one man could carry, deploy, fire, and discard. No maintenance, no crew requirement, no logistics tail beyond the round itself. The design lineage ran straight back through the American bazooka and the German Panzerfaust of World War Two – the perennial infantry problem of “how do you kill a tank without becoming a tank yourself” – solved with the tools of 1963.

Disposable Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW M72). Also shown is a cross-section of the launch tube with its accompanying payload, a 66mm rocket with a shaped charge warhead. Photo dated 1985-1990 from **Audiovisuele Dienst Koninklijke Landmacht** (AVDKL). CCA/4.0 Int’l

It saw its first extensive combat in Vietnam, where it earned a mixed reputation. The weapon was effective against light armor, bunkers, and fortified positions, but early production runs suffered from warhead detonation failures in flight, requiring a full recall and safety redesign. A large part of the early reports of failures of the M72 were shaped by the disaster of the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, which was overrun by Communist forces using PT-76 light tanks, vehicles which the M72 should have handled with ease.

*A Polish PT-76 amphibious light tank coming out of the water during an amphibious exercise. 1971 photo from “Czołg pływający PT-76. TBiU 12 WMON, Warszawa 1971.” Public Domain.*

A number of quality control and design issues surfaced immediately, which contributed to the base being overrun. The US defense establishment responded quickly. The corrected versions returned to service and remained there – through the wars of Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Iraq – long after the system had nominally been “replaced” by the Swedish-designed AT4 in the mid-1980s.

In contrast, the Soviet bloc had the RPG-7, a near-direct copy of the WW2 Panzerfaust. While effective, it had all of the problems of the WW2 bazooka…but that’s for another article.

The lighter weight and lower cost of the LAW made it ideal for the kind of urban and mountain combat that dominated the post-Cold War operational environment. A soldier could carry two LAWs where one AT4 fit. That arithmetic matters.

The Huge Problem That Looked Unsolvable

By the time the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began generating serious after-action data, a specific and deadly – but not unknown – problem had crystallized around shoulder-fired rocket systems: the backblast.

Traditional rocket launchers – the M72 included – generate a massive cone of super-heated gas behind the shooter at the moment of firing. In open terrain, this is a manageable hazard. In urban combat, it is frequently a killing problem. A Marine firing from inside a room, a doorway, or from behind a wall faced an ugly choice: expose himself fully to take the shot from a position where the backblast had clearance, or fire from cover and risk serious injury or death from the blast redirecting off interior surfaces.

Packing crates being used to demonstrate the danger of the M72’s back blast. Ft. Lewis, WA. 1969 photo by L. Johnson, Photo Facility Branch, Audio-Visuals Department, US Army, Ft Lewis, WA. Public Domain.

According to Defense News [https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/eurosatory/2018/06/11/nammos-new-m72-launcher-causes-no-damage-when-fired-from-inside-a-room/], several Marines died as a direct result of having to expose themselves to take shots that could not safely be taken from covered positions. The requirement was real, documented in blood, and the Marine Corps knew it.

*A US Army soldier fires an AT4, Ft Lewis, WA, 2007. Note the dramatic backblast from the AT-4. US Army photo. Public Domain.*

The Solution: Liquid Physics & Norwegian Engineering

The answer came from Nammo, the Norwegian-American defense manufacturer that had been producing M72 variants under license since 1966. Their engineers developed a patented system using an inert organic high-density liquid chamber at the rear of the launcher. When the rocket fires forward, the liquid is expelled rearward, absorbing and dispersing the energy that would otherwise produce the lethal backblast. The result is a fire signature at the muzzle roughly equivalent to a 9mm pistol at night – and a backblast so reduced that, in a demonstration firing inside a 12-by-15-foot shed in the Arizona desert, the only evidence of the shot was a spray of liquid on the rear wall and floor.

*Cut-away diagram of an M72 LAW rocket, from US Army Technical Manual TM 9-1300-200 General Ammunition. US Army image. Public Domain.*

The system, designated M72 Fire From Enclosure (FFE), qualified for US service and entered a five-year Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity contract with a maximum value of $498 million. The Marine Corps Systems Command announced in May 2024 that current M72 variants would be succeeded by two FFE configurations: the M72A8, optimized for anti-armor work against light vehicles, concrete walls, and APCs; and the M72A10, a multi-purpose anti-structure munition with a dual-mode fuze capable of defeating brick, adobe, earthen fortifications, and light vehicles. Initial deliveries of 1,930 M72A10s and 800 M72A8s were scheduled for calendar year 2024, with production at Nammo’s Mesa, Arizona facility ramping to maximum capacity by mid-2025.

The tactical implications are significant. A squad that previously had to maneuver into exposed firing positions to employ rocket systems can now maintain concealment throughout the engagement. The reduced visual and acoustic signature – equivalent to the flash of a 9mm handgun – means the shooter’s position is not immediately compromised by the shot. And at 13 pounds, the M72 FFE is light enough that a squad can carry three to six systems rather than the single, heavier launcher a squad might previously field.

The Broader Lesson

The M72 FFE fits squarely into the pattern visible across modern procurement: the weapons that survive are not always the most sophisticated, but the ones whose core function remains essential, and whose designers remain willing to solve new problems rather than declare the mission accomplished. Urban warfare is not a temporary phase of the operational environment. From Fallujah to Mosul to Mariupol, the defining tactical challenge of the past two decades has been combat in built-up areas, where engagement distances collapse, cover is everywhere, and the cost of exposure is measured in seconds.

A weapon system that began its life in 1963 solving the problem of Soviet tank columns crossing the Fulda Gap has been re-engineered to solve the problem of a soldier taking a shot from inside a building in a city the Pentagon did not anticipate fighting in. That is not obsolescence. That is adaptability – and in a budget environment where new platforms cost billions and take decades, adaptability is increasingly the only procurement strategy that works.

Next time, we’ll look at the RPG-7.

The Real Military How-To, Part 1

Michael Cessna March 21, 2026

In the past, we have frequently discussed the “democratization” of military-everything, from equipment acquisition through “higher-level” things, like “DIY” navies and air forces, but we have never really covered the actual methodology of “training” on an effectively zero-budget.

This is a sphere that I have been studiously avoiding treading into, mostly because I felt a moral responsibility to avoid adding fuel to the global fire in a “granular” way. However, that view has evolved over time: There is plenty of military talent out there at various levels – from “Tier One” military forces, to a couple of people in a Toyota Hilux with Grampa’s shotguns. In effect, no – I am not doing anything “out of bounds”.

For full disclosure, when I joined the United States Marine Corps in 1984, the very first job I had “in the Fleet”, was as a Publications Clerk”…I’m not sure if that job even exists anymore, in any way that I would recognize. As a result, my natural inclination as a bibliophile raged in full force. And, after the domination of the PDF format, I have assembled a…let’s say “overly large” collection of military manuals.

As a result, over time, I started thinking about what a personal “emergency military library” would look like: What books and manuals would I put in there? How small could I make it? And so on…

In thinking on this for several years, I came to the conclusion that such a library would be useful not only for someone actually carrying a rifle or leading troops, but to the average civilian – not someone thinking about the end of the world, but who watches the news, sees LOTS of stories about current conflicts, but has no foundation to “fact check” the media…and that is a far more dangerous situation, than publishing a list of very basic works to try and teach you the absolute basics.

The current conflict in Iran brought this into sharp focus: I cannot list the number of news reports and “expert analysis” that I have seen on the revolution in Iran that started on December 28th, that get nearly every single point wrong, at some level. It’s so bad, it’s actively dangerous to viewers, who are left with a highly skewed view of how things actually work out on “the sharp end“. It is dangerous, because otherwise well-meaning people get hysterically angry over things that anyone who has been in a Tier One military longer than a year knows – or at least, should know…and, as the US military understood almost ten years ago, the military is preparing – quietly – for extended combat operations in urban, and highly public, environments.

Students in the Basic Computer Systems Operator Course at the Army’s Computer Science School at Fort Gordon, GA. In the left foreground is a visiting student from the armed forces of Djibouti. 1988 photo from the U.S. National Archives. Public Domain.

As a start to try and remedy this situation, I have curated two lists: a short (14 videos) playlist of videos at YouTube, and a list of basic books and manuals, outlined below. There are much larger lists in each category, but the purpose here, is to at least get you, the Reader, started. Even if you have been in the military for any length of time, I think you’ll find these useful.

The thing with learning “things military” is that it takes time – this is not The Matrix, and no one is going to download a karate program into your head for you to instantly “know karate“. The YouTube link above is 14 videos…for the Short List. The full playlist is over 80 videos long. Likewise, the fourteen books below are only the “initial reading list” – and even the longer list (well over 60 individual titles) is painfully short…But, these two lists will give you the basics of how militaries work.

A pair of notes on the titles below: Many of these are older titles, some dating from the 1950’s. This was deliberate. I have found that after about 1998, many – if not most – modern military manuals are written in modern “corpo-speak”, and are nearly useless in conveying information meaningfully…That, or I’m a dinosaur. Likely the latter…OTOH – “old” does not mean “wrong” or “useless”. Take note.

*Staff meeting of the the 112th Cavalry (Texas National Guard), during the Battle pf Arawe, Papua New Guinea, 1944. US Army photo. Public Domain.*

Second, the titles below are available either as online PDF’s (marked with an ” * “) or as paper copy editions (marked with a ” + “); some are available in both formats.

Below each entry, I will provide my own review of the title, and why you need it.

+* OPNAV P 34-03 – Landing Party Manual, 1960 USN — Chapters 2-3, 5 and 12-13

This might seem like a strange manual to start with, but if I were writing this article in 1980, this manual would have eliminated about five of the other manuals here. Starting in 1920, the United States Navy began generating “Landing Party Manuals” for naval officers to study while at sea, in case they were tasked to command such parties ashore – Lieutenant Jones might be a heck of a good Engineer, but do they know how to mount a formal Interior Guard? The chapter selections are deliberate; the chosen chapters cover basics like Close Order Drill, Ceremonies, Interior Guard, physical training with rifles, and basic marksmanship – these functions change very little over time. The other chapters are interesting from a strictly historical perspective, but – this manual dates from 1960, and things like infantry tactics and first aid have radically changed since then.

+Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach; Dandridge M. Malone

A lot gets written about “leadership”, but the actual “how” has rarely been focused on in the understandable detail applied here by Malone. Note that this dates from 1983, so if you insist on being offended by your own shadow, you might want to skip this one.

*FM 16-100 – Character Guidance Manual (1961)

Sometimes, military forces are forced to settle on bringing in recruits from the literal “wrong side of the tracks”. Military forces hold dominant powers that many civilians simply do not recognize until far too late. The US Army recognized this in the 1950’s, and wrote this manual as a guide to help officers try to keep their troops from falling into criminal behaviors, in order to prevent court-martialing half of their unit for bad behaviors that unnecessarily got out of hand. Note that this manual is no longer used. Food for thought.

+Combat Leader’s Field Guide, 14th Ed.; Jeff Kirkham

Because the Landing Party Manual is so badly out of date on tactics in 2026, Kirkham’s work at least partly remedies that. While thin on the use of drones – which is constantly evolving and changing, as both Ukraine and Iran, among other conflicts, show – Kirkham sticks to the rock-bottom basics of small-unit infantry combat, the most fundamental combat task on the modern battlefield.

+*Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT); Direct link to USMC PDF link; Amazon link

The US Marine Corps developed a winning method for fighting in urban environments (when allowed to actually employ their tactics as developed). Those tactics are laid out here. When combat in built-up areas looks confusing, chaotic, and dirty, this manual can help clarify what’s going on, far more than the commentary from CNN talking-heads.

+*MCTP 3-01E Formerly MCWP 3-15.3 Sniping; Archive PDF; Amazon link

“Snipers”, in the literal sense, get a poor rap, especially from certain “subject matter experts”, who should know better, and from “influencers” more interested in making political and/or moral zingers. Snipers are actually one of the most powerful and decisive units in infantry combat. Understanding how they function, and their impact on the battlefield is critical for grasping the shape of modern combat.

+Combat Service Support Guide, 4th Ed.; John E. Edwards

Troops need a LOT of “stuff” in action. In the military, that is now termed “Combat Service Support“. It’s dull, unglamorous, hard and back-breaking work…but if someone gets it wrong, the troops do not move, do not eat and do not shoot weapons – they are, quite literally, reduced to rocks and harsh language. While there are entire bookcases devoted to the subject, this volume offers the best single-volume summary out there.

+Guide to Military Operations Other Than War; Keith Bonn and Anthony Baker

This term – “Military Operations Other Than War“, or “MOOTWA” – started out as a highly-mocked term, taken as an example of the military’s descent into morbidity. Over time, however, this sphere of operations – using military forces for non-warfighting operations like humanitarian aid and disaster relief, among others – has demonstrated how important it really is. This overview is something that cannot be ignored, if you want to understand the full scope of what well-run militaries are capable of.

*A basic framework for constructing an SOI document

Not a book or formal manual, but a website dedicated to an absolutely vital concept: how to get units to talk to each other, and talk internally, in a secure way, so that the “bad guys” don’t understand what you are doing…You need more than CB radios, and this page offers you a place to start. This is linked here, in order to show how complex even small unit communications can be.

*Map Reading and Land Navigation, FM 3-25.26 (2005)

You, the Reader, would likely be amazed at how few people know how to navigate with a map, let alone in the dark and rain, with a compass. If you read nothing else here, read this, because you can get stuck in the middle of nowhere easily and unexpectedly….Also — Browse the FAS “MAN” site, and support FAS, if you can. Their information is aging in places, but the entire “MAN” site is well worth your time.

*Field Fortifications – FM 5-15 (1968)

What combat footage from Ukraine, and you can be forgiven for thinking that you are watching colorized footage from the trenches of France in the First World War. This 1968 US Army manual explains the basics of building hasty fortifications in the dirt. If it looks dumb, but keeps you alive – it’s not dumb. Side Note: Check out BITS.de — it’s a vast archive, that I frequently use…Just watch out for their frames – highly annoying, but their only real problem.

*Military Gov’t Manual – FM 27-5 (1947)

When armies overrun – “conquer”, if you prefer – enemy territory, they then need to administer it, until some sort of civilian authority can be established. I selected this specific edition, because it was written in the immediate aftermath of World War 2, when territories all over the world had to be administered by military officers with little knowledge or training…and the farther we got from WW2, the less effective the new manuals got – “newer” is not necessarily “better”.

+*US Army First Aid Manual FM 4-25.11; 2002 online edition; 2018 print edition (my recommendation – how much is your life worth, again?)

Exactly what it says. People get hurt, sometimes seriously, and transport to a real medical facility might not arrive for a dangerously long time. A lot of times…it will come down to you.

*+Nuclear War Survival Skills; Cresson Kearney – HTML & PDF: Amazon (2022 ed.)

This might seem like an odd inclusion, but Kearney’s skill-sets apply almost 1:1 to military forces as they do to civilians. There are absolutely military-specific manuals for this sort of thing, but most of those are too military-specific for most civilians to digest. This is maintained and constantly updated, so I recommend checking the OISM site, first, before buying the hardcopy.

The fourteen titles above will not make you a general, or even a corporal. What they =will= do is give you enough foundation to watch the news coverage of any conflict — Iran, Ukraine, or whatever comes next — and understand, in basic terms, what is actually happening on the ground, rather than relying on what a studio commentator with no field experience – or a former officer who hasn’t carried a rifle in more years than you have been alive – tells you is happening. In a media environment more interested in advertising dollars than accurate reporting, where military illiteracy is the norm rather than the exception, that foundation is worth more than it might appear.

In Part 2, I will lay out the short YouTube playlist.

The Platforms: Motorbikes And Technicals

The Intelligence Layer: HUMINT Over TECHINT

The Drone Revolution

The Strategic Layer: Economic Warfare

The Arithmetic Of Hollowness

The Money Problem – And The Accounting Problem

The Political Dimension

The Wider Lesson

How It Started

How It’s Going

The Fall Of Kidal

The Structural Problem Russia Cannot Solve

The Weapon

October 1973: The Sagger Panic

The Weapon’s Limitations – And Its Evolution

Still In The Field

The Pit of Origin

The Problems Begin

Combat Record and Exit

Conclusion

The Bunker Buster

Where It Came From

Combat Record

The Spotting Rifle Problem & Mod 2

The Gustaf Takes Over

What A Recoilless Rifle Even Is

The Weapon & Its History

The Ammunition Story

The Bottom Line

Design Philosophy

Combat Record

The Broader Point

The Huge Problem That Looked Unsolvable

The Solution: Liquid Physics & Norwegian Engineering

The Broader Lesson

You may have missed

Back FREEDOM for only $4.95/month and help the Freedomist to fight the ongoing war on liberty and defeat the establishment's SHILL press!!