October 28, 2026

Global Outlook

Continuing Disintegration – No Honor Among Thieves

Continuing Disintegration – No Honor Among Thieves

Michael Cessna October 17, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

The more things change, the more they stay the same. As we wrote back in January of 2025, the various terror, drug and insurgent groups in Afghanistan – not content with fighting each other- are poking what they see as a weakened tiger, in the form of a highly dysfunctional Pakistan.

With Pakistan clearly on the losing end of it brief – and terrifying – war with India in May, the various jihadist groups north of the Hindu Kush smelled weakness, and a steady intensification of attacks have been quietly growing, an intensification largely ignored in the wider world press, in favor of Israel v. Hamas, Ukraine v. Russia, and the “Gen-Z – Discord” revolts erupting in states from Morocco to Nepal.

 

Landscape of Afghanistan, with the Hindu Kush range in the background, and a T-62 MBT in the foreground. 2007 Public Domain photo by WikimediaUser davric.

 

The 2025 Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict that erupted in earnest in mid-October represents more than routine border skirmishes—it signals a fundamental breakdown in one of the region’s most consequential relationships. After decades of Pakistan supporting the Taliban as a strategic asset, Islamabad now finds itself conducting airstrikes on Kabul and trading artillery fire with forces it helped bring to power. The bitter irony is impossible to miss: Pakistan’s former proxy has become its primary security threat.

 

October Escalation

The immediate catalyst arrived on October 8, when militants killed 11 Pakistani military personnel, including a lieutenant colonel and a major, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Orakzai district. Pakistan’s response crossed a critical threshold — airstrikes not merely in border regions but directly on Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, targeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leadership allegedly sheltering under Afghan Taliban protection.

The fighting that followed was the deadliest since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Pakistan claims it killed over 200 Afghan Taliban and allied fighters while losing 23 soldiers. Afghanistan counters that it killed 58 Pakistani soldiers while suffering only nine deaths. Both sides claim to have captured or destroyed dozens of enemy border posts. Independent verification remains impossible, but satellite imagery and verified drone footage confirm significant damage to Afghan military compounds.

The violence forced a 48-hour ceasefire brokered by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but border crossings remain closed and tensions simmer. More ominously, Pakistan has adopted what analysts call a “new normal” doctrine: any attack originating from Afghan territory will trigger immediate cross-border retaliation, regardless of diplomatic cost.

 

The TTP: Pakistan’s Self-Inflicted Wound

At the conflict’s core lies the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, formed in 2007 during America’s “War on Terror.” The TTP seeks to overthrow Pakistan’s government and impose strict Islamic law, demanding the release of imprisoned members and reversal of tribal area integration into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. What makes the TTP particularly dangerous is its ideological alignment with and sanctuary provided by the Afghan Taliban.

The numbers tell a grim story. The TTP conducted at least 600 attacks against Pakistani security forces in the past year alone, with 2025 activity already exceeding all of 2024. August 2025 marked the deadliest month of militant violence in over a decade, with 194 people killed and more than 200 injured in 143 attacks across Pakistan. Pakistani security force casualties in 2025 are on track to be the highest ever recorded.

The TTP has evolved beyond “simple insurgency“, threatening to expand attacks against Pakistan’s military-run commercial enterprises — fertilizer companies, construction firms, housing authorities, and banks. This represents a significant escalation, potentially bringing urban areas into a conflict previously concentrated in remote borderlands.

Briefly, a “simple insurgency”, as defined by Google’s AI search tool can be described as:

 

A simple insurgency is an armed rebellion by a small, lightly armed group against a more powerful, established government. Because they lack the strength for a conventional military conflict, insurgents use guerrilla tactics and rely heavily on the support of the local population to challenge the ruling authority. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Key characteristics of a simple insurgency • Asymmetric warfare: A simple insurgency is defined by the severe mismatch in power between the rebels and the government they oppose. Insurgents, often called guerrillas, compensate by using hit-and-run attacks and avoiding direct, pitched battles.
• Irregular tactics: Instead of traditional army maneuvers, insurgents employ a variety of tactics to weaken the government and increase their own control and legitimacy. These can include:

• Guerrilla warfare
• Terrorism
• Sabotage
• Propaganda and recruitment

• Protracted struggle: Insurgencies are not short, decisive conflicts. They are typically protracted political-military campaigns designed to outlast and exhaust the government through persistent, focused violence.
• Focus on the population: The ultimate target of an insurgency is not just the government’s military forces, but the loyalty and support of the civilian population. Gaining popular support is the key to success. Insurgents accomplish this by:

• Providing services
• Discrediting the government
• Gaining the trust of people in rural or remote areas

• Driven by ideology: While some rebellions are a temporary revolt, insurgencies are often fueled by a powerful ideology that explains people’s grievances and provides a vision for a new political order. This can include motivations based on religion, ethnicity, or politics.
• Control over territory: Unlike purely terrorist organizations, a central objective of an insurgency is to control resources and eventually establish an alternative government in a particular area. [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]

Simple insurgency vs. other conflicts • Revolution: A simple insurgency lacks the widespread, organized structure of a full-scale revolution, even though it may share the same goal of overthrowing the government.
• Coup d’état: This is different from a coup, which involves a swift, elite-driven seizure of government power. An insurgency, by contrast, relies on a protracted struggle for popular support and does not have the resources for a quick power grab.
• Terrorist organization: While insurgents may use terrorism as a tactic, their ultimate goal is different from purely terrorist groups. Insurgents aim to build an alternative government and control territory, while terrorist groups typically do not. [6, 7, 9, 10, 11]

Notes:

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency
[2] https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/insurgency
[3] https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/insurgence
[4] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/mr-history-page/MR-Categories-Guerrilla-Warfare/Daskal-1986/
[5] https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B4S5499XQ%20CounterInsurgency%20Measures.pdf?ver=2016-02-10-114636-310
[6] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T01127R000300220005-6.pdf
[7] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgency
[8] https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3890242/the-challenges-of-next-gen-insurgency/
[9] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf
[10] https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/military-history-and-science/revolt-rebellion-and-insurgency
[11] https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurgency

 

Pakistan’s Strategic Blunder

The current crisis exposes Pakistan’s catastrophic series of miscalculations of the past. For decades, Islamabad’s military establishment pursued “strategic depth” in Afghanistan as a hedge against India, covertly supporting the Taliban even while publicly backing America’s War on Terror. The assumption was straightforward: a friendly Taliban government in Kabul would provide strategic advantage while ending Pakistan’s internal insurgency problems once American forces departed, by exerting control over the “Pakistani Taliban”.

Of course, the opposite promptly occurred. Since the Taliban’s 2021 return to power after the Biden Administration’s disastrous withdrawal from the country, the TTP has grown dramatically more capable and aggressive. Pakistan now faces an irreconcilable contradiction: the same Afghan Taliban it supported for decades now provides sanctuary to Pakistan’s primary internal security threat. Having invested enormous political and military capital ensuring Taliban victory, Pakistan cannot effectively pressure Kabul to eliminate TTP sanctuaries without undermining its broader regional objectives.

When Pakistan demands the Taliban eliminate TTP safe havens, Kabul either urges negotiations with the militants or claims inability to control them—sometimes both simultaneously. Pakistan’s leadership increasingly believes the Taliban deliberately weaponizes the TTP, either to expand Taliban-style governance into Pakistan or enable an allied Pashtun entity to control northwestern Pakistan.

 

The India Factor

Complicating matters further, India has pursued normalization with the Taliban precisely as Pakistan-Taliban relations deteriorate, almost certainly for that very reason – the brutal calculus of ‘realpolitik‘ usually wins, afterall. Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi in October, with India announcing plans to reopen its Kabul embassy and calling the meeting “an important step in advancing our ties.” For Pakistan, which fought its brief war with India in May, this Taliban-India rapprochement represents strategic encirclement…which India well-understands.

Pakistan’s military noted the “serious provocation” of the fighting’s timing during Muttaqi’s India visit. The rhetorical shift is stark: Pakistan no longer refers to the Taliban as an “interim government” but as a “regime,” questioning their legitimacy to govern and calling for a more inclusive Afghan government. This represents a near-suspension of diplomatic ties between former allies.

 

Strategic Dead Ends

Pakistan’s options appear uniformly unattractive. Military operations against the TTP face fundamental constraints: the militants operate from Afghan territory beyond Pakistani reach, enjoy Afghan Taliban protection, and can simply retreat across the disputed Durand Line border when pressured. Localized clearing operations may temporarily displace militants but cannot hold territory without massive troop deployments that remain deeply unpopular among border populations.

Durand Line Border Between Afghanistan and Pakistan. CIA Image, 2007. Public Domain.

Negotiations offer no better prospects. Previous ceasefires collapsed when the TTP refused to compromise on core demands fundamentally incompatible with Pakistan’s constitutional order. The TTP’s demand for sharia law implementation and tribal area autonomy restoration cannot be reconciled with Pakistan’s governance structure. Moreover, the TTP’s track record of breaking agreements makes any deal inherently unstable.

Cross-border airstrikes — Pakistan’s current approach — risk escalating into broader conflict while failing to address root causes. The strikes humiliate the Afghan Taliban publicly, potentially driving them closer to the TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups. Pakistan is adopting tactics it vehemently criticized when India employed them against Pakistan itself earlier this year—a dangerous precedent that normalizes cross-border military action in a nuclear-armed region.

 

Regional Implications

The conflict’s reverberations extend beyond bilateral relations. China, with massive “Belt and Road” investments in Pakistan, watches nervously as infrastructure becomes militant targets. Regional powers including Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have urged restraint, recognizing that instability along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border threatens broader security. The Kremlin’s Moscow Format Consultations specifically pressed the Taliban to eliminate the TTP threat – pressures Kabul shows no inclination to heed.

Perhaps most troubling, the conflict validates Pakistan’s historical paranoia about strategic encirclement while simultaneously demonstrating how that paranoia drove the very policies that created current threats. By backing the Taliban as a hedge against India, Pakistan helped create a government that now shelters Pakistan’s most dangerous internal enemy while courting Pakistan’s primary external rival.

And this, in a nuclear-armed nation with a very shaky government.

 

No Good Options

As the temporary ceasefire holds precariously, at least for the moment – the fundamental problem remains unresolved: Pakistan faces an emboldened insurgency operating from sanctuary areas it cannot easily eliminate without destroying relationships it spent decades building. The Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, must balance protecting ideological allies against managing fallout from Pakistani military actions — a calculation complicated by its own limited control over remote regions and internal pressure from hardline factions…in public, at least.

History suggests leaders within the Taliban understand that Afghan governments ending up on Pakistan’s wrong side rarely survive. Yet the Taliban’s public posture suggests they believe they can continue supporting the TTP without triggering Pakistani countermeasures sufficiently severe to destabilize their regime. Whether this calculation proves correct may determine the region’s stability for years to come.

What seems certain is that Pakistan’s investment in the Taliban as a strategic asset has become a strategic liability of the first order — a cautionary tale about the dangers of relying on militant proxies as instruments of state policy. The militants Pakistan once cultivated have become the militants Pakistan can no longer control, operating from territory Pakistan helped them secure. The tragic irony would be complete if it weren’t so dangerous.

…But.

The most important thing to remember in this swirling morass of barely concealed knives, is that the two main players – India and Pakistan – are both nuclear-armed powers…and no one, including them, is quite sure how steady are the hands on those launch keys.

Prepare yourself accordingly.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

War Economics in the Shadows

War Economics in the Shadows

Michael Cessna June 13, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

Wars require money, in some form. Combatants have to buy weapons, ammunition, food, vehicles, fuel, spare parts, lay down bribes for intelligence and suborning various people, and medical supplies, along with just simple tools…and that’s before we talk about whether they actually pay their fightersd.

In the shadowy realm of contemporary warfare, the most destructive conflicts are increasingly those where the combatants get their war chests filled by distant, foreign capitals. From Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression to Yemen’s devastating civil war, proxy conflicts have become the preferred method of great power competition — offering what military strategists euphemistically call “quick, relatively cheap and low-risk options for the continuation of policy aims“.

Proxy warfare has evolved from Cold War-era confrontations into a sophisticated financial enterprise that operates through complex networks of state sponsors, shell companies, and illicit economic activities. As Foreign Policy columnist Emma Ashford observed, proxy wars have become a preferred method of great power competition, allowing major powers to exert influence while maintaining plausible deniability. Understanding the financial mechanisms that sustain these conflicts is crucial for comprehending modern geopolitical dynamics and developing effective countermeasures.

Yet behind every proxy war lies a complex economic ecosystem that determines not just who fights, but how long they can sustain the violence. Understanding these financial networks reveals uncomfortable truths about modern warfare: conflicts are increasingly about economic endurance rather than battlefield tactics, and the nations writing the checks often have more control over outcomes than the soldiers pulling triggers.

 

The State Funding Model: Direct Government Support

The most straightforward financing mechanism involves direct state funding of proxy forces. President Vladimir Putin’s extraordinary admission in June 2023 revealed that “the financing of the entire Wagner group was fully ensured by the State,” with the Russian Defense Ministry pouring nearly $1 billion into Wagner operations from May 2022 to May 2023. This disclosure shattered decades of Kremlin denials and provided unprecedented insight into how major powers fund their proxy operations.

No nation has perfected the economics of proxy warfare quite like Iran. Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” represents perhaps history’s most sophisticated proxy financing operation, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force managing an estimated budget exceeding $1 billion annually for terrorist financing. This staggering sum supports between 140,000 and 185,000 proxy fighters across Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen.

Groups that are part of the “Axis of Resistance”. 2024 image via Kaliper1. CCA/2.5

Iran represents perhaps the most systematic state-sponsored proxy financing network. The U.S. State Department estimated that Iran spent more than $16 billion supporting the Assad regime and its proxies between 2012 and 2020. In 2020 alone, Iran funneled more than $700 million to Hezbollah, while providing more than $100 million annually to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These massive transfers occur through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which serves as Tehran’s primary mechanism for financing proxy operations across the Middle East.

The scale of Iran’s investment becomes clear when examining individual recipients. Hezbollah alone receives more than $700 million annually from Tehran, a sum that dwarfs the entire defense budgets of many small nations. As Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah candidly admitted in 2016: “Hezbollah’s budget, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

Iran’s proxy economics operate on multiple levels simultaneously. Beyond direct cash transfers, Tehran provides weapons manufacturing capabilities, enabling proxies to achieve self-sufficiency while maintaining plausible deniability. In Syria, Iran helped organize, train, and fund over 100,000 Shia fighters, demonstrating how proxy economics can scale to conventional warfare levels when strategic interests demand it.

The sophistication of Iran’s financial network became apparent in 2016 when Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly announced that “all of his organization’s funding comes directly from Iran,” emphasizing that “the budget of Hizbullah, its salaries, its expenses, its food, its drink, its weapons, and its missiles come from the Islamic Republic of Iran“. This funding bypasses traditional banking systems, with Nasrallah confirming that transfers occur directly, “not through banks and other financial institutions”.

The Iranian model reveals a crucial economic principle: proxy wars succeed when sponsors can provide “stable and ample funding” while maintaining political control over their assets. Tehran achieves this through what former CIA analyst Norman Roule describes as controlling “their weaponry, their funding and significant political relationships with their key leaders”.

 

Economic Integration and Development Funding

China has pioneered a more sophisticated approach through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which launched in 2013 with the Silk Road Fund’s $40 billion initial capital. While ostensibly focused on infrastructure development, analysts worry that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development and military expansion. The program’s dual-use potential becomes apparent through [debt-trap diplomacy, where China allegedly uses unsustainable loans to gain leverage over debtor governments.

A 2021 study analyzed over one hundred debt financing contracts China signed with foreign governments and found that the contracts often contain clauses that restrict restructuring with the Paris Club, providing Beijing with significant leverage over partner nations. This economic influence can be converted into military access, as demonstrated by China’s naval base in Djibouti, which many observers see as the first of many potential military expansions.

 

The Technology Transfer Economy

Modern proxy warfare increasingly revolves around technology transfer rather than simple arms sales. The Iran-North Korea weapons pipeline exemplifies this evolution, with both nations sharing ballistic missile technology, submarine designs, and nuclear expertise. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile closely resembles North Korea’s Hawasong-14, while satellite imagery suggests Iranian technical expertise contributed to North Korean missile silo construction.

This technological cooperation creates self-sustaining proxy economies. Rather than remaining dependent on foreign suppliers, proxies gradually develop indigenous capabilities. Iran has mastered this approach, transferring not just weapons but “the means of production and modification to enable independent manufacturing” to its proxy network.

The economic advantages are compelling. Technology transfer builds redundancy of supply, reduces shipping risks, enhances deniability, and creates local employment that strengthens proxy loyalty. For sponsors, it represents a long-term investment strategy that pays dividends far beyond any single conflict.

 

The Ukrainian Counter-Model: Coalition Economics

Ukraine’s defense against Russian invasion illustrates a different proxy economic model—multilateral coalition funding. Rather than relying on a single sponsor, Ukraine has assembled a diverse funding coalition including the United States, European Union, individual NATO members, and unexpected participants like Japan and South Korea.

This approach offers both advantages and vulnerabilities. Coalition funding can provide massive resource flows — U.S. assistance alone has exceeded $350 billion according to various estimates. However, it also creates dependency on multiple political systems with different priorities and election cycles. As U.S. support becomes uncertain under changing administrations, the sustainability of coalition-funded proxy warfare faces its ultimate test.

Japan and South Korea’s involvement demonstrates how proxy economics extend beyond traditional security partnerships. Both nations provide substantial non-lethal aid while “replenishing U.S. weapons stocks, supplying the United States with artillery shells and thereby freeing up Washington’s ability to send shells to Ukraine.” This creates layered economic relationships where allies subsidize great power proxy warfare indirectly.

 

The Russian Adaptation: Sanctions and Substitution

Russia’s proxy economic strategy has evolved dramatically under international sanctions pressure. Traditional funding mechanisms disrupted, Moscow has increasingly relied on partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to sustain both its direct war effort and proxy relationships. China provides crucial economic support that enables Russia to withstand Western sanctions, while Iran supplies drones and North Korea provides ammunition and even troops.

This adaptation reveals how proxy economics adjust to pressure. When conventional funding channels close, sponsors develop alternative networks. Russia’s use of Wagner Group mercenaries represented an attempt to privatize proxy relationships, creating plausible deniability while maintaining operational control. The Wagner model failed primarily due to political rather than economic factors, but its brief success demonstrated the potential for corporate proxy structures.

 

Escalation Economics

Perhaps most concerning is how proxy war economics influence conflict escalation. Traditional deterrence theory assumes rational actors will avoid escalation due to increasing costs. However, proxy warfare inverts this logic. As former CIA analyst Norman Roule observes, Iran operates as “an arsonist that then subcontracts out to other arsonists”, empowering proxies with resources while maintaining strategic distance.

This creates moral hazard problems where proxies may escalate beyond their sponsor’s intentions, confident that economic support will continue. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel exemplifies this dynamic—Iran provided the economic foundation enabling Hamas capability, but the timing and scale caught Tehran off-guard, demonstrating how proxy economics can enable conflicts that spiral beyond original parameters.

 

Resource Extraction and Illicit Trade

Proxy groups increasingly finance their operations through control of natural resources and illicit trade networks. The U.S. Treasury Department revealed in 2023 that Wagner Group entities in the Central African Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Russia engaged in illicit gold dealings to fund Wagner operations. These operations involve sophisticated shell company networks, with Wagner using companies like Midas and Diamville to convert CAR-origin gold into U.S. dollars.

The U.S. Treasury Department exposed a convoluted Iranian illicit financing scheme in 2018 where Hezbollah officials, working with Iranian operatives and Russian companies, facilitated shipment of millions of barrels of Iranian oil to the Assad regime. The Assad regime would then transfer hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to the IRGC-QF, which distributed funds to Hamas and Hezbollah. In one documented transaction, a Hezbollah official confirmed receipt of $63 million as part of this oil-for-terror scheme.

 

The Sustainability Question

Ultimately, proxy war economics succeed or fail based on sustainability. Iran’s model works because oil revenues provide consistent funding streams relatively insulated from international pressure. Coalition models like Ukraine’s support depend on sustained political will across multiple democracies—a more fragile foundation.

The economic lessons are clear: modern conflicts are won by whichever side can maintain funding longest, not necessarily whichever side fights best. This reality transforms strategy from tactical to economic, making treasury departments as important as defense ministries in determining conflict outcomes. As proxy wars become the dominant form of great power competition, understanding their economic foundations becomes essential for anticipating tomorrow’s conflicts—and their likely victors.

 

Private Sector and Diaspora Financing

Proxy organizations also tap into private funding sources and diaspora communities. Hezbollah has relied on funding from the Shi’ite Lebanese Diaspora in West Africa, the United States, and the Triple Frontier region along the junction of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. These networks often operate through legitimate businesses and charities that serve as fronts for money laundering operations.

The United States has sanctioned numerous charities and front companies for providing financial support to proxy groups, including the Holy Land Foundation, which was designated in 2001 for providing millions of dollars annually to Hamas. These sanctions have had limited effectiveness, as current U.S. sanctions have not significantly impacted Iran’s relationships with its proxies.

 

Banking and Financial System Exploitation

Modern proxy financing relies heavily on exploiting legitimate financial institutions. A C4ADS report on leaked Wagner documents showed that without legitimate financial institutions such as JP Morgan Chase and HSBC as intermediaries, the Wagner Group would not have been able to establish a foothold in Africa. In 2017, the Sudanese Mining company Meroe Gold, acting as a shell company for Wagner, used JP Morgan Chase to process payments to sellers in China.

Iran has developed sophisticated methods to circumvent banking sanctions. The U.S. designated Bank Saderat in 2006 for facilitating transfers of hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, new financial networks continuously emerge to replace sanctioned institutions.

 

Government-to-Government Contracts

Some proxy financing occurs through legitimate government contracts that provide plausible cover for military support. Putin revealed that Wagner received contracts worth billions of rubles, including payments from governments who hired Wagner services, such as the Malian government, which reportedly paid Wagner more than $10 million each month. These arrangements allow both parties to maintain the fiction that the services being provided are purely commercial rather than military.

 

A Brave, New World

The financing of proxy warfare presents significant challenges for international security and governance. As noted by RAND Corporation analysts, geopolitical drivers of proxy warfare can often be self-reinforcing, with states able to develop proxy warfare capabilities very quickly, within a couple of years. The financial networks supporting these capabilities are equally adaptable, evolving new methods to circumvent sanctions and detection.

Recent developments suggest that proxy warfare financing will continue to evolve with the global financial system. Cryptocurrency, digital payment systems, and new forms of economic integration provide both opportunities and challenges for states seeking to fund proxy operations while maintaining deniability.

The complexity of modern proxy war financing reflects the broader evolution of international conflict, where economic warfare, information operations, and traditional military action converge in ways that challenge conventional approaches to conflict resolution and accountability. Understanding these financial mechanisms is essential for policymakers seeking to address the root causes of contemporary global instability.

…Money makes the world go ’round – it also helps to burn it.

 

The Descent Gains Momentum

 

 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Somalia Is Unraveling: Al-Shabaab’s Siege of Mogadishu and the Specter of State Collapse

Somalia Is Unraveling: Al-Shabaab’s Siege of Mogadishu and the Specter of State Collapse

Michael Cessna May 30, 2025 0

 

 

Introduction

The ancient nation of Somalia occupied a pivotal position in the ancient Indian Ocean trading network during Roman times, serving as a crucial intermediary between the Mediterranean world and the riches of Asia. The Somali coast, known to classical geographers as part of the “Land of Punt” and later “Barbarikon“, provided essential ports of call for merchants navigating the monsoon winds between Roman Egypt and India.

Somali traders controlled access to valuable aromatic resins, particularly frankincense and myrrh, which were harvested from the Boswellia and Commiphora trees, respectively, both of which are native to the region. These precious commodities were in enormous demand throughout the Roman Empire for religious ceremonies, medical applications, and luxury consumption. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a first-century maritime trading manual, describes numerous Somali ports including Malao, Mundus, and Mosylon, detailing the goods available and trading protocols.

Map of the routes of the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (1st century CE). 2007 map by PHGCOM. CCA/4.0

 

Beyond aromatics, Somalia served as a transshipment point for goods flowing between Africa’s interior and Asian markets. Gold, ivory, and exotic animals from the African hinterland passed through Somali ports en route to Roman and Indian merchants, while manufactured goods, textiles, and spices from India and Southeast Asia were distributed along the East African coast. This strategic position made Somali city-states wealthy intermediaries in a trade network that connected three continents and sustained the luxury economy of the Roman Empire.

 

Somalia’s Italian Colonial Years (1889-1960)

Somalia’s Italian colonial period began in the 1880’s when Italy gradually secured much of the territory through a series of protection treaties, with formal control established in 1889 when the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and Italy signed the Treaty of Wuchale. In 1885, Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the sultans of Obbia and Caluula, who placed their territories under Italy’s protection.

Unlike other European colonial powers, Italy initially struggled to establish effective control over the vast, arid territory. Starting in the 1890s, the Bimaal and Wa’dan revolts near Merca marked the beginning of Somali resistance to Italian expansion, coinciding with the rise of the anti-colonial Dervish movement in the north. The most dramatic upheaval occurred in British Somaliland, where the uprising led by Mohammed ibn Abdullah Hassan (known to the British as the Mad Mullah) took two decades to suppress.

The colonial administration focused primarily on the southern agricultural regions, establishing banana and cotton plantations along the Shebelle and Juba rivers. Effective Italian control remained largely limited to the coastal areas until the early 1920s, and by the end of 1927, following a two-year military campaign against Somali rebels, Rome finally asserted authority over the entirety of Italian Somaliland.

Italian rule intensified under Fascist governance after 1922. A new era of conflict began in Somalia in 1923 with the arrival of the first governor appointed by Mussolini, when a vigorous policy was adopted to develop and extend Italian imperial interests. Under the first fascist governor Cesare Maria De Vecchi (1923–1928), the colonial state planned ambitious policies of agricultural and infrastructural expansion, with the goal of preparing for the military conquest of neighboring Ethiopia.

In 1936, the region was integrated into Italian East Africa as the Somalia Governorate, which lasted until Italy’s loss of the region in 1941 during the East African campaign of World War II. By February 1942, most of Italian Somaliland had been captured by the British, and Italian Somalia was under British administration until 1949.

Following the war, Italian Somaliland became a United Nations trusteeship known as the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian administration from 1950 to 1960, with legislative elections held in 1956 and 1959. On November 21, 1949, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence.

On July 1, 1960, the Trust Territory of Somalia united with former British Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, with Mogadishu as the nation’s capital. The Italian colonial legacy left lasting impacts on Somali society, including architectural influences visible in Mogadishu today, agricultural techniques, administrative structures, and the Italian language, which was an official language during the Fiduciary Mandate and in the first years of independence, with the majority of Somalis having some understanding of the language by 1952.

 

The Fall of Siad Barre

Beginning with the 1969 seizure of power by Siad Barre, the country spent some twenty-one years under his iron-fisted dictatorship, until growing resistance to his military junta during the 1980s, eventually boiling over into all-out civil war. From 1988 to 1990, the Somali Armed Forces engaged in combat against various armed rebel groups, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the northeast, the Somali National Movement in the northwest, and the United Somali Congress in the south.

Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, c.1970. Public Domain.

 

The rebellion effectively began in 1978 following a failed coup d’état, when Barre began using his special forces, the “Red Berets,” to attack clan-based dissident groups opposed to his regime. The regime’s brutality intensified in 1988 with systematic human rights abuses and genocide against the Isaaq clan, resulting in up to 200,000 civilians killed and 500,000 refugees fleeing to Ethiopia.

In response to these humanitarian abuses, Western aid donors cut funding to the Somali regime, resulting in a rapid “retreat of the state,” accompanied by severe devaluation of the Somali Shilling and mass military desertion. On January 27, 1991, pressure from the United Somali Congress and other groups ultimately forced President Barre to flee Somalia, ending his dictatorship and plunging the country into civil war.

 

Operation Gothic Serpent and the Battle of Mogadishu

Following the United States’ 1992 intervention in Somalia in “Operation Provide Comfort“, to protect food distribution to the population, a shift began under the newly-elected Clinton administration, in mid-1993. This shift led to the United States leading what became known as “UNOSOM II” (United Nations Operation in Somalia II), an ill-advised attempt at forcible “nation-building“, with foregin nations attempting to impose “peace and unity” in an internally-warring nation at gunpoint.

Operation Gothic Serpent, launched in August 1993, represented the United States’ most significant military intervention in Somalia during the height of the civil war. The operation aimed to capture faction leader Mohamed Farrah Aidid, whose forces had killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers and were disrupting humanitarian aid distribution.

The mission culminated in the October 3-4, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, when U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force operators attempted to capture key Aidid lieutenants in the city center. The operation went catastrophically wrong when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades, trapping American forces in hostile territory.

Members of Task Force Ranger under fire in Somalia, October 3, 1993 — the Battle of Mogadishu. U.S. Army Rangers Photo. Public Domain.

 

During the 15-hour firefight that followed, 18 American soldiers were killed and 73 wounded, while Somali casualties numbered in the hundreds. The graphic images of dead American servicemen being dragged through Mogadishu’s streets shocked the American public and led directly to U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in March 1994.

The incident profoundly influenced U.S. foreign policy for years, contributing to American reluctance to intervene in subsequent humanitarian crises, including the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The battle became emblematic of the challenges facing international intervention in failed states.

 

The Return of the Terror State

Somalia now stands on the precipice of complete state collapse as Al-Shabaab militants have encircled the capital of Mogadishu in what analysts are calling the most serious threat to the government since the height of the civil war in the 1990’s. The terrorist organization’s lightning offensive, launched in February 2025, has shattered the fragile gains made by international forces over the past decade and returned the specter of jihadist control to the Horn of Africa.

VBIED attack by Al-Shabaab on base controlled by Ethiopian security forces, 2022. Al-Kataib Media Foundation. Public Domain.

 

The scale of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence cannot be overstated. From launching coordinated attacks across multiple provinces to capturing strategic towns within 30 kilometers of Mogadishu, the group has demonstrated a tactical sophistication and operational capability that has caught both the Somali government and international partners off guard. What began as seemingly isolated assaults on February 20, 2025, has evolved into a systematic campaign to strangle the capital and force the collapse of the federal government.

The terrorists have employed a multi-pronged strategy combining conventional military tactics with asymmetric warfare, utilizing car bombs, infiltration operations, and terror attacks to maximize psychological impact while minimizing their own exposure to counterstrikes. Their capture of Adan Yabaal on April 16th marked a particular turning point, as this strategic town had served as a crucial staging area for government counteroffensives.

 

A Regional Terror Network

Al-Shabaab’s current offensive represents more than a localized insurgency; it exemplifies the group’s evolution into a transnational terrorist organization capable of projecting power far beyond Somalia’s borders. This transformation was starkly illustrated in the January 15, 2019 attack on Nairobi’s DusitD2 hotel complex, which demonstrated Al-Shabaab’s expanding operational reach and recruitment capabilities.

The DusitD2 attack, marking the rise of “Obiwan Nairobi“, was particularly significant as it marked a strategic shift in Al-Shabaab’s methodology. Unlike previous operations that relied heavily on ethnic Somali operatives, the five-man terrorist cell that carried out the Nairobi assault included Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent, including a suicide bomber from the coastal city of Mombasa. The 20-hour siege resulted in 21 deaths and 28 injuries, representing Kenya’s worst terrorist attack in four years.

What made the DusitD2 attack particularly alarming for counterterrorism officials was the extensive planning involved. Security footage revealed that Al-Shabaab operatives had been conducting surveillance of the target since at least December 2016, demonstrating a level of operational security and long-term planning that suggested significant organizational sophistication. The attack also revealed the group’s ability to recruit from within Kenya’s security establishment, as one of the attackers was identified as the son of a Kenyan military officer.

 

The Collapse of International Strategy

The current crisis exposes the fundamental failure of the international community’s approach to Somalia over the past two decades. The transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and subsequently to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), has created critical security gaps that Al-Shabaab has ruthlessly exploited.

The timing of Al-Shabaab’s offensive was no coincidence. Launched just weeks after the ATMIS-to-AUSSOM transition on January 1, 2025, the attacks capitalized on coordination problems, reduced troop levels, and uncertain funding for the new mission. The group’s ability to “launch around 50 percent more attacks per month in 2025 compared to its 2024 average” demonstrates how effectively they have exploited this institutional vulnerability.

Compounding these challenges is the reduction in U.S. support under the Trump administration. American assistance to Somalia’s elite Danab special forces has been curtailed, including the cessation of salary supplements that had doubled soldiers’ pay from $200 to $400 per month. This has severely impacted morale and combat effectiveness of the only units that had previously proven capable of matching Al-Shabaab in direct confrontation.

 

The Siege Strategy

Al-Shabaab’s current approach reflects lessons learned from recent insurgent successes worldwide, particularly the Taliban’s 2021 conquest of Afghanistan and the Syrian opposition’s rapid advance on Damascus in 2024. Rather than attempting a direct assault on Mogadishu that would allow government forces to concentrate their remaining strengths, the terrorists have opted for a siege strategy designed to slowly strangle the capital.

By controlling the major roads and supply routes into Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab can gradually increase pressure on the city’s three million inhabitants while conducting a psychological warfare campaign through bombings, mortar attacks, and assassination attempts. The March 18th bombing of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade, which killed four people while narrowly missing the president himself, exemplifies this strategy of creating a climate of terror while systematically degrading government capabilities ([source]()).

 

International Response and Turkish Gambit

As traditional Western partners have reduced their commitments, Somalia has increasingly turned to Turkey for military assistance. Ankara has announced plans to nearly triple its deployment to 800 soldiers, including 300 commandos and 200 drone operators, while also securing lucrative contracts for port and airport operations in Mogadishu. This represents a significant shift in regional power dynamics as Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa.

The new terminal of Aden Abdulle International Airport built by Turkish companies in Mogadishu, Somalia. January 25, 2015 AMISOM Photo by Ilyas Ahmed. CC0/1.0 Universal Public Domain.

 

However, Turkey’s intervention faces the same fundamental challenges that have plagued international efforts in Somalia for decades: the inability of foreign forces to address the underlying governance failures that have made the country vulnerable to extremist exploitation in the first place.

 

The Looming Catastrophe

Current trajectory suggests Somalia is heading toward a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. With nearly 6 million people already requiring humanitarian assistance and 4.6 million facing acute food insecurity, the collapse of government control in Mogadishu would create a crisis that could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

Al-Shabaab’s vision extends far beyond Somalia’s borders. The group has never concealed its ambition to establish a caliphate encompassing all of East Africa, making their current advance on Mogadishu not just a threat to Somalia but to regional stability. With their demonstrated capability to conduct sophisticated attacks like the DusitD2 operation and their growing recruitment networks across the region, Al-Shabaab’s success in Somalia could serve as a launching pad for expanded terrorism throughout East Africa.

The international community faces a closing window to prevent a complete collapse of the Somali state. Without decisive action to reinforce Mogadishu’s defenses and address the fundamental governance challenges that have enabled Al-Shabaab’s rise, the world may soon witness the emergence of the first jihadist-controlled capital in Africa since the Taliban’s return to Kabul.

Somalia may now be a failed state, but the global community is at least trying to backstop the country…for the moment. But, in the current calculus of war around the world, the possibility of Somalia collapsing to Al-Shabaab, like Afghanistan to the Taliban, the possibility exists of a return to the “old days” of Somali piracy, up until 2012. This time, however, there are no easy answers for Western nations who rely on commercial vessels passing Somalia, but who – unlike post-2012 – are unable to juggle all the necessary theaters, making ignoring Somalia a very attractive, short-term proposition, in spite of the potential levels of economic damage.

This is also known as “whistling past the graveyard.”

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

The Descent Gains Momentum

The Descent Gains Momentum

Michael Cessna May 9, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

Introduction

Beginning on May 6, India launched what it calls “Operation Sindoor“, striking multiple targets in Pakistan that it claims are “terrorist infrastructure”, in retaliation for the April 22 attack on the Pahalgam resort are in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Radical Islamist jihadists massacred 26 men – 24 Hindus, one Christian, and one Muslim who tried to stop them – in front of their families. This has terrified the nations of the world, as both India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals of ~180 warheads, each…and the potential for a nuclear exchange is very high.

The disputed Kashmir region, showing the sub-regions administered by India, Pakistan, and China. 2003 map by US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Public Domain.

 

As we reported in January, the “weakest link” in this equation remains Pakistan: Unable to maintain control of it’s creations – the Taliban in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself – as well as Lakshar-e-Taiba and its clone, The Resistance Front (TRF) (the group responsible for the Pahalgam attack), Pakistan is also losing control of its Balochistan province to regional separatists, as it struggles to contain multiple threats, mostly of its own making, while others – like the TRF – have now provoked India into military-scale violence.

The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir represents one of the most enduring territorial conflicts in modern history, entangling India and Pakistan in a complex web of historical, religious, and geopolitical tensions since their independence from British rule in 1947. Alongside this territorial conflict, the countries faced another critical challenge: sharing the waters of the Indus River system, ultimately resolved through the landmark Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.

Origins of the Kashmir Dispute

Colonial Roots and Partition (1846-1947)

The foundations of the conflict trace back to 1846 when the British East India Company, following their victory in the First Anglo-Sikh War, sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, through the Treaty of Amritsar. This established the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir under Dogra rule, despite its Muslim-majority population.

View of the Pahalgam Valley, 2011. Photo by KennyOMG. CCA/3.0

When British India was partitioned in August 1947, the fate of its princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, was left to their respective rulers. Despite having a Muslim-majority population, Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. Caught between accession to India or Pakistan, Singh initially sought independence. However, when tribal raiders from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province invaded Kashmir in October 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession with India in exchange for military assistance.

This pivotal decision ignited the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-48). The conflict ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in January 1949, leaving Kashmir divided along what became known as the Line of Control (LoC). India controlled approximately two-thirds of the territory, including the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh, while Pakistan administered the remaining third, known as Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan).

The UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite to determine Kashmir’s final status were never implemented due to disagreements over the conditions for such a vote. India maintained that Pakistan must first withdraw its forces, while Pakistan insisted that India should reduce its military presence before any referendum.

Subsequent Conflicts and Changing Dynamics

The unresolved Kashmir issue led to further wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, though the latter focused primarily on the independence of East Pakistan’s (now Bangladesh). The 1972 Simla Agreement established the LoC as the de facto border and committed both nations to resolve their differences peacefully.

The dispute took a darker turn in the late 1980’s with the emergence of an armed insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan provided moral and material support to the separatist movement, while India deployed substantial military forces to counter it. The conflict became increasingly militarized, with accusations of human rights abuses on both sides.

The 1999 Kargil War, a limited conflict sparked by Pakistani infiltration across the LoC, further strained relations. The post-2001 era saw sporadic peace initiatives alternating with periods of heightened tensions, particularly following terrorist attacks in India allegedly linked to Pakistan-based groups.

Soldiers of the Indian Army depicted after capturing a hill from Pakistani forces during the Kargil War, 1999. Indian Army photo. GODL.

And then…there is Article 370.

Article 370: An Unnecessary Knife-Twist

Article 370 was a special provision in the Indian Constitution that granted Jammu and Kashmir significant autonomy within the Indian Union. Enacted in 1949 as a “temporary provision,” it allowed the state to have its own constitution, flag, and considerable independence in all matters except foreign affairs, defense, and communications.

The provision emerged from the unique circumstances of Kashmir’s accession to India. When Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in 1947, it was with the understanding that Kashmir would retain substantial autonomy. Article 370 formalized this arrangement, restricting the Indian Parliament’s legislative powers over the state and requiring consultation with the state government for extending constitutional provisions beyond the agreed domains.

Over time, Article 370’s implementation evolved. Through presidential orders, particularly in 1954, many provisions of the Indian Constitution were gradually extended to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 35A, introduced through this mechanism, allowed the state legislature to define “permanent residents” and grant them special privileges regarding property rights and government employment.

For seven decades, Article 370 remained a politically charged issue. Supporters viewed it as honoring India’s commitment to Kashmir’s distinct identity, while critics saw it as an obstacle to full integration and development.

On August 5, 2019, the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, effectively nullified Article 370 through presidential orders and parliamentary legislation. The state was simultaneously reorganized into two union territories: Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and Ladakh (without one). This dramatic constitutional restructuring fundamentally altered Kashmir’s relationship with the central government and remains deeply contested both domestically and internationally.

The Indus Waters Treaty: A Rare Success in Water Diplomacy…With Implications

Against this backdrop of territorial conflict, both countries faced another pressing challenge: sharing the waters of the Indus River system, which originates in Tibet and flows through both countries. The Indus and its tributaries are vital for agriculture, energy production, and water supply in both nations.

Facilitated by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The treaty allocated the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan, though India retained limited rights to use the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes, irrigation, and hydroelectric power.

Indus Valley River system. 2020 image from OpenStreetMap contributors. CCA/2.0

 

The treaty established the Permanent Indus Commission to address disputes and facilitate communication on water-related issues. It also included provisions for the construction of replacement works to compensate Pakistan for the loss of water from the eastern rivers.

Remarkably, the Indus Waters Treaty has survived three wars and numerous crises in Indo-Pakistani relations until now. It stands as a testament to the potential for cooperation even amid broader conflicts, though it has faced increasing strain in recent decades due to growing water scarcity, climate change, and dam construction projects.

Legacy and Contemporary Challenges

The Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, with both countries maintaining their respective claims to the entire territory. The region’s strategic importance has only increased with China’s growing influence in parts of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, creating a complex trilateral dimension to the conflict.

Meanwhile, the Indus Waters Treaty, despite its durability, faces mounting pressures. India’s construction of dams on the western rivers, though technically permissible under the treaty, has raised concerns in Pakistan about reduced water flow. Climate change threatens the Himalayan glaciers that feed the Indus system, potentially exacerbating water scarcity and heightening tensions over the existing allocation framework.

The intertwined histories of the Kashmir dispute and the Indus Waters Treaty illustrate both the challenges and possibilities of Indo-Pakistani relations—a narrative of persistent conflict alongside pragmatic cooperation necessitated by shared geographical realities.

Pakistan’s Political Instability: A Dangerous Variable

Pakistan is experiencing significant political instability, with 2024 being one of the most violent years in over a decade. The February elections failed to restore order and were marred by allegations of military manipulation to keep former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party out of power. This contentious domestic political situation creates opportunities for militants to exploit local anger and makes it more difficult for the government to mount a unified challenge against these groups.

The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government faces multiple internal challenges, including skyrocketing commodity prices and difficulties finalizing deals with the International Monetary Fund to stop the devaluation of the rupee. This economic pressure has eroded public confidence in the current government.

In the security sphere, multiple groups are eroding Pakistan’s internal stability, with the “Pakistani Taliban” and ISIS-K, as well as a number of Balochi groups, are all vying to either carve out their own sections of Pakistan, or to seize outright control of the entire nation – and its nuclear arsenal. And all the while, the mainline Taliban are also sharpening their knives, looking to dismember the entire Pakistani state. In this, those groups have been greatly aided by the failures of the Biden administration in 2021, which left behind vast amounts of advanced military equipment for the taking.

Looking into 2025, Pakistan continues to grapple with a volatile political and economic environment characterized by political paralysis, fragmented coalitions, and increasing military influence that hinders effective governance. This combination of political fragmentation, economic crisis, and rising security challenges combined to create a volatile mix of factors with significant regional implications.

The Nuclear Dimension: Stakes at Their Highest

Both India and Pakistan have built up nuclear arsenals primarily designed to prevent wars, not start them. India maintains a “no first use” policy, meaning it will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack on Indian forces or territories. Pakistan, however, has a “full spectrum deterrence” policy aimed at using tactical nuclear weapons to counter both nuclear threats and conventional military attacks from India.

The BADGER explosion on April 18, 1953. Photo by of National Nuclear Security Administration / Nevada Site Office. Public Domain.

The nuclear stakes are enormously high – even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill 20 million people in a week. If such an exchange triggered even a minor “nuclear winter”, nearly 2 billion people in the developing world would be at risk of death by starvation.

The introduction of nuclear weapons in 1974 fundamentally changed the dynamic of the India-Pakistan conflict, raising the stakes of any confrontation. India’s first nuclear test that year triggered an arms race that eventually saw Pakistan develop its own nuclear capabilities two decades later.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif recently stated that Pakistan would only use its nuclear weapons if “there is a direct threat to our existence.” However, he has also warned that Pakistan’s military has been reinforced because an Indian military incursion is “imminent” following the recent attack in Kashmir.

The Water Crisis: An Exitential Dimension to Conflict

The April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in the popular tourist destination of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, killed 26 vacationing tourists. The attack was claimed by a group called The Resistance Front (TRF), which Indian authorities claim is closely linked to the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, site of the April 22 attack. 2017 photo by Srinu maripi. CCA/4.0

The Indus Waters Treaty suspension by India follows the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir. Pakistan has deemed this suspension illegal, with significant implications for its agriculture and economy. About 80% of Pakistan’s cultivated land relies on the Indus river system.

In response to the attack, India announced the immediate suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, something not done in the more than 60 years of the treaty’s existence. The Indian government stated the treaty will remain suspended “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.” India has closed its main land border with Pakistan at Attari and ordered Pakistani nationals in India to leave the country within 48 hours. India is also reducing diplomatic staff at both missions from 55 to 30 personnel and has expelled military advisors from Pakistan’s embassy in New Delhi…In effect, India has had enough of Pakistan supporting anti-Indian insurgents.

Pakistan has responded to India’s moves with its own countermeasures:

Pakistan has closed its airspace to all Indian airlines, and suspended all trade with India, including through third countries, and halted special South Asian visas issued to Indian nationals. Pakistan has also rejected India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, with officials stating that any attempt to stop or divert water belonging to Pakistan would be considered “an act of war”.

The Indus Waters Treaty suspension is particularly significant because the treaty gave Pakistan unrestricted access to the waters of the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—which account for nearly 70% of the total water flow in the Indus river system. Around 80% of Pakistan’s cultivated land, approximately 16 million hectares, depends on water from this vast river network.

Military Modernization: Raising the Stakes

Both India and Pakistan have acquired new military hardware since their last major clash in 2019, opening up new conventional strike options. India has inducted 36 French-made Rafale fighter jets with advanced capabilities, while Pakistan has acquired J-10 fighters from China. Both sides have also upgraded their air defense systems.

Donald Trump’s United States now faces the challenge of balancing its support for India with calls for restraint from Pakistan. With both nations holding nuclear weapons, the risk of escalation is high, and Washington will likely push for diplomatic solutions to de-escalate the crisis.

The current crisis represents the biggest breakdown in India-Pakistan relations since 2019, when a suicide bombing killed 40 Indian soldiers in Kashmir. The current situation follows a pattern where flare-ups between the countries have seen targeted attacks and reprisals, escalating slowly while giving each side the option to step back and defuse. However, the current nature of the strategic moves are of a severity not seen since 1971.

Conclusion

While both sides are desperate to moderate the fighting, the better to avoid the nuclear threshold, Pakistan’s internal instability implies the possibility that external forces in Afghanistan could take this moment to strike Pakistan from the opposite border. The potential impact is hard to model, but should a major land conflict arise, it is possible that Pakistan’s government could collapse, bringing control of its nuclear arsenal into question.

 

BREAKING Update: Operation Sindoor

On May 6, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” conducting missile strikes in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Reports indicate there were at least 24 strikes across nine target locations, with explosions heard across Kashmir. These strikes were in direct retaliation for the April 22nd attack on a resort in Pahalgam, a picturesque town in the Himalayas of Indian-controlled Kashmir, which killed some 26 tourists, infront of their families.

The operation targeted six locations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir (Muzaffarabad and Kotli) and Pakistan’s Punjab province (Bahawalpur), crossing both the Line of Control and the international border. India describes the strikes as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory.”

The casualties and damage reported, to 5.7.2025:

Pakistan claims at least 26 civilians were killed and 46 injured by India’s strikes, including teenagers and children, with the youngest victim being three years old. Twelve civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir were also reportedly killed by Pakistani shelling from across the border.

The strikes hit what India calls “terrorist infrastructure” sites, some allegedly linked to the attack that killed 25 Hindu tourists and one local in Indian Kashmir last month. The name “Sindoor” is significant – it refers to the red powder Hindu women apply to their foreheads when married.

Pakistan’s response:

Pakistan has called India’s strikes an “act of war” and stated it would respond. Pakistani forces have already exchanged gunfire with Indian forces along the Line of Control.

As both countries’ leaders held crisis meetings, the UN Secretary-General has expressed “deep concern” over the strikes, and several nations including the US, UAE, China, and Japan have called for de-escalation.

This represents the worst fighting in more than two decades between these nuclear-armed neighbors. The situation is still developing rapidly, with Pakistan promising to retaliate “at a time, place and manner of its choosing.” Major airlines are now avoiding Pakistani airspace as tensions remain high.

The Freedomist is continuing to monitor events as they evolve.

 

 

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

  1. Julian Thompson (1994), Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict
  2. Thomas Ricks (2012), The Generals
  3. James F. Dunnigan (2003), How To Make War, 4th Edition
  4. James F. Dunnigan (1991), Shooting Blanks

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

The Congo Bloodbath – Why You Should Care

The Congo Bloodbath – Why You Should Care

Michael Cessna January 31, 2025 0

 

 

 

On Monday, January 27, the city of Goma, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the former Zaire), fell to an assault by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group, Causing a sudden escalation in the fighting of one of the worlds least-known conflicts, a conflict that has run, in various phases, since the 1960’s. This does not mark an end to the fighting, by any means, but it does hint at a new phase, a phase which – coupled to the Trump administration’s upset to the region by its 90-day suspension of foreign aid across the board – could prove to be a disaster for high tech manufacturing industries around the world.

At the center of the fighting, are the vast mineral deposits of “rare earth elements” in the region, on both sides of Lake Kivu, in the DRC and in Rwanda, which is also home to its own vast mineral deposits. These rare earth elements are fundamental to the workings of everything from nuclear power plants to the computer device you are reading this on.

Lake Kivu, Africa, as seen from space, 2003. NASA Image. Public Domain.

So – if there is plenty of mineral wealth to go around, what’s the problem?

There are two factors at work, here. First, is the long history of mostly-European (and a few American) mining conglomerates, seeking to maximize profits by operating largely with what amounts to slave labor. This has been going on since at least the 1880’s, but today, disgruntled rebel groups have access to the same weapons as the governments and corporations that oppose them, as was predicted in 1940.

Detail from Page 8 of The Small Wars Manual (1940), USMC. Public Domain.

 

Second, is the phoenix-like rebirth of the DRC’s neighbor, Rwanda.

When most people in the west hear the word “Rwanda”, their first thought is likely a dim memory of the horrors of the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, and the abject failure of the “world community” to intervene to stop the genocide.

But, out of that fire, Rwanda emerged with a new face.

Rwanda’s transformation since 2000 represents one of Africa’s most remarkable recovery stories. Following the devastating genocide of 1994, which claimed an estimated 800,000 lives and shattered the country’s social fabric, Rwanda embarked on an ambitious development strategy under President Paul Kagame’s leadership.

The country adopted “Vision 2020“, a comprehensive development program focusing on transforming Rwanda from an agricultural subsistence economy into a knowledge-based, middle-income nation. This strategy prioritized several key areas: good governance, human resource development, private sector development, infrastructure, and regional economic integration.

Rwanda’s economic approach emphasized technology and business-friendly reforms. The government invested heavily in digital infrastructure, establishing widespread internet connectivity and promoting tech education. This earned Rwanda the nickname “Africa’s Singapore,” reflecting its ambition to become a regional hub for technology and services. The country consistently ranked among Africa’s easiest places to do business, attracting significant foreign investment.

In education, Rwanda made dramatic progress, achieving near-universal primary school enrollment and significantly increasing secondary school attendance. The country also emphasized women’s empowerment, achieving one of the world’s highest rates of female parliamentary representation.

Parallel to its domestic development, Rwanda emerged as a significant contributor to international peacekeeping operations. This involvement served multiple purposes: demonstrating Rwanda’s recovery, providing professional development for its military, and generating revenue through UN peacekeeping reimbursements.

The Rwandan military, rebuilt after the genocide, has become one of Africa’s most professional forces. By the early 2020’s, Rwanda ranked among the top contributors to UN peacekeeping missions globally. Rwandan troops earned particular praise for their effectiveness in challenging environments like South Sudan and the Central African Republic.

This peacekeeping role reflected Rwanda’s broader regional ambitions. The country positioned itself as a stabilizing force in central Africa, though this role sometimes generated controversy, particularly regarding its involvement in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo.

Rwanda’s development model, while successful in many metrics, has faced criticism regarding political freedoms and regional relations. Nevertheless, its economic achievements are substantial: sustained GDP growth, reduced poverty rates, improved healthcare access, and increased life expectancy. The country’s per capita income more than tripled between 2000 and 2020.

The country’s approach to reconciliation and justice through the Gacaca courts system, while controversial, has been studied as a unique model for post-conflict societies. Rwanda balanced the need for justice with practical considerations of processing hundreds of thousands of cases, while simultaneously working to rebuild national unity.

This combination of domestic development and international engagement has transformed Rwanda from a symbol of tragedy to a notable example of post-conflict recovery and development. Its experience offers important lessons about the relationship between security, governance, and economic development in post-conflict situations.

However, another aspect of the other side of the “Rwanda Coin” is its involvement with and support of the M23 rebel group.

The March 23 Movement (M23), formed in 2012, emerged from earlier rebel groups in eastern DRC, drawing its name from a March 23, 2009, peace agreement between the DRC government and the CNDP rebel group. The organization primarily consists of ethnic Tutsis from North Kivu province, sharing ethnic ties with Rwanda’s ruling elite.

Rwanda’s relationship with M23 has been consistently controversial. While Rwanda officially denies supporting the group, multiple UN reports and international investigations have documented evidence of Rwandan military support, including weapons transfers, tactical guidance, and direct military assistance. This support appears motivated by several factors: security concerns about anti-Tutsi forces in eastern DRC, economic interests in the mineral-rich region, and strategic ambitions for regional influence.

The first M23 rebellion (2012-2013) captured international attention when the group briefly occupied Goma. UN investigations during this period found substantial evidence of Rwandan support, including direct military intervention. This led to international pressure and aid suspension from several Western donors, eventually contributing to M23’s defeat and exile of its leaders to Uganda and Rwanda.

The M23 resurfaced in late 2021, launching new offensives in North Kivu. Fresh evidence emerged of Rwandan support, including allegations of direct military involvement. Rwanda has consistently argued that its actions are defensive, citing the presence of FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) – a group partly composed of perpetrators of the 1994 genocide – in eastern DRC.

The conflict reflects deeper regional tensions. Rwanda’s involvement with M23 has strained relations with neighboring countries and complicated its carefully cultivated international image as a model of post-conflict development. The DRC government has repeatedly accused Rwanda of using M23 as a proxy force to maintain influence over eastern DRC’s resource-rich territories.

The international response to Rwanda’s alleged support for M23 has been complex, partly due to Rwanda’s important role in regional stability (especially in Mozambique, to battle that country’s islamist insurgency) and its significant contributions to UN peacekeeping missions elsewhere in Africa. This has created a paradoxical situation where Rwanda is simultaneously a major contributor to African peacekeeping while being accused of destabilizing a neighboring state.

The situation highlights the complex interplay between regional security, ethnic politics, and economic interests in the Great Lakes region. Rwanda’s support for M23, while officially denied, appears to follow a pattern of intervention in eastern DRC that dates back to the aftermath of the 1994 genocide.

The Great Lakes of Africa. 2015 Image by MellonDor. CCA/4.0 International.

 

The implications of M23’s capture of Goma are severe, if Rwanda is actually deploying its own forces to back the rebels, given M23 stating their intent to march on the DRC capitol of Kinshasa to overthrow the government there.

While it may seem cold, given the scale of human suffering, the economic impact on the readers of this article and their neighbors could potentially be immense. The Trump administration’s 90-day suspension of foreign aid creates additional complications in an already volatile situation. Rwanda, which receives significant US assistance for both development and military programs, might find its peacekeeping capabilities affected just as regional tensions escalate. Similarly, the DRC’s government, already struggling to maintain control in its eastern regions, could see its military effectiveness further diminished by this temporary funding gap. This aid suspension, while brief, comes at a critical moment when both nations are positioning themselves for potential broader conflict, potentially accelerating the region’s descent into deeper instability.

Given the professional nature of Rwandan troops in general, there is a very real chance that this training may have been transferred to the M23 rebels after their unsuccessful rebellion a decade ago. The best example of this is the treatment of some 280 captured Romanian mercenaries, a profession with a long history in the region, which is jnot known to be very lenient in its treatment of non-African ‘operators’ when captured – the Romanians are in the process of being repatriated as this article goes to press, happy that they are not meeting a far worse fate than an unexpected plane flight home.

There is a solid chance that there may be serious disruptions to rare earth mineral extraction in the offing, disruptions that could potentially impact US and Western tech industries in a very short span of time. Events in Africa may not impact you, immediately or directly, but they will do so, eventually.

Forewarned is forearmed.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Disintegration – How The Taliban’s Drug Trade Could Bring On World War 3

Disintegration – How The Taliban’s Drug Trade Could Bring On World War 3

Michael Cessna January 17, 2025 0

 

 

 

Prelude

With the US Presidential election over, and Donald Trump about to be sworn in for the second time, many of the wars in the Middle East, as well as the war in Ukraine, seem to have paused for a moment, waiting to see what Trump will do. With the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the resulting complete re-shape of the power dynamics in the region, the world seems to be waiting to see if peace will break out.

With a possible ceasefire in Gaza, this may seem likely. However, there is another theater to the Middle East, and that conflict may very well be the next explosion from the region…and, while it may sound like hyperbole, this burgeoning conflict could potentially result in a real nuclear nightmare.

That place is a familiar spot on the map: Afghanistan.

With the disastrous collapse of the United States presence in the country in the summer of 2021, the Taliban returned to power in the country, and quickly tried to assume the mantle of a legitimate government. Of course, being the Taliban, that was not in the cards, as the Taliban continue with their deranged policies in governance, and are increasingly being undermined by “ISIS-K“, who quickly entrenched in the post-US Afghanistan after their initial teething troubles in the region, and now use their territories as a base to launch international attacks on nations it considers itself to be at war with.

Aside from the Taliban’s shift in income – destroying opium poppy fields, while moving heaven and earth to step up the production of methamphetamines and fentanyl (which both require less processing than opium-into-heroin, and is cheaper to make per kilo) – they are starting to try and play the “Galtieri Card” to increase their support by dredging up Afghanistan’s long-standing ax to grind: the Durand Line.

Old Wounds

The Durand Line, which established the current Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 1893, through an agreement between British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, has remained a source of tension and conflict in the region for over a century. This arbitrary border, drawn by British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand – in an era when the opiate Laudanum use was rampant among European elites – cut through traditional Pashtun tribal territories, effectively dividing the Pashtun people between what would become Afghanistan and Pakistan. This status makes the Durand Line the local equivalent to the hated Sykes-Picot Agreement that created the 20th Century borders farther west, carving up the corpse of the Ottoman Empire.

Durand Line Border Between Afghanistan and Pakistan. CIA Image, 2007. Public Domain.

From its inception, the legitimacy of the Durand Line has been contested. Successive Afghan governments have historically argued that the agreement was signed under duress and was meant to be temporary, lasting only 100 years. The Pashtun tribes, who had historically moved freely across these territories, never accepted the border’s legitimacy, viewing it as an artificial division of their ancestral lands.

Following the partition of India in 1947, Afghanistan became the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, citing the Durand Line dispute. Afghanistan’s position has consistently been that the agreement was with British India, not its successor state, Pakistan, and thus was voided after partition. This led to several border clashes in the 1950s and 1960s.

The rise of the Taliban, which is predominantly Pashtun in composition, added new complexity to the dispute. During their first period of rule (1996-2001), the Taliban, while focused on internal control, never officially recognized the Durand Line. Their perspective was influenced by both Pashtun nationalism and their vision of an Islamic emirate that transcended colonial-era borders.

The porous nature of the border has had significant strategic implications. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), the border’s ambiguity allowed mujahideen fighters to move between Afghanistan and safe havens in Pakistan. This pattern repeated during the U.S.-led intervention (2001-2021), with Taliban fighters utilizing the same cross-border mobility.

After returning to power in 2021, the Taliban maintained their historical opposition to the Durand Line. Tensions escalated when Pakistan attempted to fence parts of the border, leading to several armed confrontations between Taliban and Pakistani forces. The Taliban’s position reflects both Pashtun nationalist sentiments and practical considerations – the border’s porosity benefits their strategic interests and traditional trading routes.

The dispute has broader implications for regional stability. The unresolved border issue complicates counter-terrorism efforts, enables cross-border militant movements, and affects economic development in the border regions. For the Pashtun communities living along both sides of the line, the border remains largely theoretical, with daily life involving regular cross-border movement for trade, family connections, and seasonal migration.

Recent years have seen periodic skirmishes along the border, with both Taliban forces and Pakistani military engaging in limited conflicts over fencing attempts and border control measures. These tensions are growing, and if left unchecked, threaten the safety of the globe itself.

Unstable Nukes

Pakistan, however, is an animal of a completely different stripe. While a Sunni-Islamic state like Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Pakistan remains unique, as the only Muslim nation in the world with a nuclear arsenal, including the capability to launch that arsenal. What has been worrying every nation in the world with any ounce of sense, is that Pakistan has spent most of the last fifteen years on the razor’s edge of civil war.

The Taliban’s territorial claims in dispute of the Durand Line would carve out a significant chunk of Pakistan, and it is open to question how loyal much of the Pakistani Army might remain to Islamabad, given their reportedly Assad-Syria levels of morale (at the 4 minute mark).

Clearly then, this is a worry, as a collapse of the government of Pakistan throws open the question of the nation’s nuclear arsenal…but then, another player is at this particular table:

India

Thinking About The Unthinkable

When British India was partitioned, what is now modern India came into being, along with Pakistan. As a majority-Hindu state, religiously speaking, with an estimated 80% of the population being of the Hindu faith. And – as Hindus and Muslims have a long history of violent clashes, so too have India and Pakistan in the modern day.

While that may seem to be a simple historical note, the situation is complicated by the fact that India, too, is a nuclear power, equally capable of launching nuclear weapons, and – given its post-partition conflicts with its Muslim neighbor to the north – is not about to stand by and watch Pakistan’s nuclear force fall into the hands of a group like the Taliban – or ISIS-K – which views nuclear weapons as essentially VERY large hand grenades…

If that sounds like me saying that India has a plan to secure that foreign arsenal, that’s because that is exactly what I am saying: after Pakistani intelligence’s almost-certain collusion in the 2008 terror attack on the Indian city of Mumbai, India would be absolute fools to have not created and staged a plan to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons…and that, post-2008 India certainly is not.

Conclusion

In this context, it should not be too difficult to see the potential disaster looming. While Trump may, indeed, have plans in place to solve the Gaza and Ukraine wars on Day 1, Afghanistan and Pakistani unrest is another matter, entirely. In addition to our reporting on the potential of a war between Morocco and Algeria of the Western Sahara (a subscriber exclusive), Afghanistan trying desperately to “war” their way out of failed-state status could well lead to a nuclear disaster of the first order…and the repercussions of that, no one can legitimately predict with any accuracy.

Look to your personal safety and security.

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

World Situation Report for 2024 – The Year In Review

World Situation Report for 2024 – The Year In Review

Michael Cessna December 20, 2024 0

 

 

 

 

 

As we close out the year of 2024, it has certainly been a monumental year. Movements have waxed and waned, politicians have been both humiliated and nearly assassinated, business leaders have actually been removed from the field, nations have fallen, wars continue, and security flaws have been exposed. This article will close out the year; the next article will be in the first week of January.

Pretty standard stuff, really…except that many of these events this year have been truly significant.

The United States

Starting with the proverbial elephant in the room, Donald J. Trump – the 45th President of the United States – was reelected to the Presidency by a very comfortable margin over his primary challenger, the thoroughly un-electable Vice President Kamala Harris. Trump’s re-election was secured following his survival of an assassination attempt on July 13th, in Butler, Pennsylvania, where the former President missed death on live television by literally millimeters; innocent bystanders were not so lucky. The image of a blood-spattered Trump being hustled away from the target zone by Secret Service agents while shouting “Fight, fight, fight!” has joined the Zapruder film in the minds of a new generation of Americans of what political violence actually looks like.

But it was not the attempt itself that secured Trump’s victory: it was the response from the Biden White House to the assassination attempt – especially in its agencies frankly unbelievable responses to the events, including washing down the crime scene within hours of the attempt, and cremating the shooters remains before any proper autopsy or toxicology screen could be done on the remains. The other issue was the gleeful responses from a wide swath of the political Left in the United States, alternately cheering the attempt and whining over the assassin missing his mark (although he didn’t).

A wounded President Trump at the Republican National Convention’s final night. Photo credit by Tim Kennedy. CCA/2.0

 

Reasonable and rational Americans were shocked and disgusted by the extreme Left’s responses, and began moving away from the Biden camp in earnest…which quickly led to shocking replacement of Biden on the Democrat Party ticket by Kamala Harris within days of the failed attempt. Harris was confirmed as the Democrat candidate without a voting process allowing other candidates to present themselves to party members as options…the end result was an election that flipped the leadership of the US again, by a comfortable margin.

The reason for concentrating on the US election so much, is that it represents a sea-change in US politics, not simply concerning domestic policies, but in international policies. This is both a blessing and a curse for the incoming administration, as the world is tired of the United State’s 50% chance of a 180° swing in its policies every four years.

On top of all of this, is the widespread outpouring of frankly disgusting sexual angst from the Left over the alleged assassin of United Healthcare CEO Brian Thompson. Once again, we were “treated” to deranged lunatics fawning over a potential killer, and the mainstream media promotes this view, in a desperate attempt to ignore the real reasons why sympathy for a murdered healthcare CEO is nearly impossible to find.

And finally, no end-of-2024 recap for the United States would be complete without talking about the waves of drones that have been plaguing the East Coast since November, which we covered last week. Short answers:

  1. Aliens don’t use FAA-approved navigation light patterns, and
  2. If a nuclear weapon, nuclear waste, or chemical anything had been lost in New Jersey, drones would be in the sky 24/7, and every flavor of law enforcement and the military would be out in the streets, armed to the teeth, and being highly hostile to anyone who looked at them sideways, until they found the missing cargo. Instead, we have seen the US Government, Inc. display a level of incompetence at such a staggering level, it boggles the imagination, as – 23 years after 9/11 – “mystery drones” are operating with impunity inside US airspace, at low altitude, and no one in the government has any idea who is responsible for making a decision on what to do about it, and no one is willing to take responsibility for acting in good faith.

 

Gnaw on that, for a while.

 

Europe

Europe continues to descend into failed-state status, as continual squabbling and inefficiencies in the structure of the European Union are crushing the economy of Europe as a whole, while “Great” Britain is desperately trying to outdo its continental neighbors in becoming a drug-addled, comic-opera version of Charlie Chaplains “The Great Dictator“, and France’s Emmanuel Macron is desperate to prove that he is not a literal “Momma’s Boy” by alternately trying to either start World War 3 by sending French and NATO forces into direct combat against Russia, while trying to revive its flagging influence on a continent that is past-done with France trying to be the colonial overlord with a nice face.

Of course, this includes the war in Ukraine, where Russia’s Vladimir Putin is hanging on long enough for Trump to step in and kill support to the absolute donkeys leading the lions of the Ukrainian forces. The Ukraine has only held as long as it has, because the general character of the “spear-carriers” in the literal trenches is as good as it is – it all fails, though, when you get above the level of the battlefield that is in range of Russian artillery.

The Middle East

The big news in the Middle East as the year closes is obviously the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. After ruling the country since 1971, Bashar Assad was forced to flee into exile in Russia after “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) a revived Al Nusra Front/Al Qaeda/Islamc State zombie rolled out of its Turkish bases and overran the country in under two weeks.

The reasons for the swift collapse are not hard to understand, if you understand the region. Assad’s remaining forces were exhausted draftees no longer interested in dying for his regime; his Iranian allies – including their Hezbollah proxies – were causing him more trouble than they were worth; Putin is too wrapped up in Ukraine to offer more than token support; and his country has been effectively partitioned since 2011.

Assad saw what was coming in November, and sent his family to Russia “on a vacation”. He, himself, stayed behind long enough to try and fight is out – you never know, in warfare – but when it was obvious that it was over, he escaped, demonstrating that he was at least smarter than Muammar Gaddafi.

As a result, the region is now in chaos, and is on the verge of becoming a “Libya, 2.0” on the borders of Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq. Effectively, this has guaranteed at least another decade – or more – of warfare in the region. Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have though this was a good idea, but he is about to discover the truth of opening Pandora’s Box.

 

Africa

Africa remains a basket case, with wars, rumors of wars, and coups d’état all over the continent; there is another major war brewing, but that article is coming in January 2025. Although Russian influence was clearly on the rise in 2023 and 2024, the war in Ukraine has severely curtailed Russian operations on the continent, at least for the moment.

Yemen – which should technically be a part of the Middle East section, but is included here, because of its impacts on eastern Africa, saw the Houthis dealt a heavy blow to their confidence when neither Russia nor Iran were able to prevent Assad’s Syrian collapse, causing their co-religionist Hezbollah allies to atomize, in order to get out of the vice of Israel and a revived Islamic State…Whether or not this will cause them to back off their war against the world’s commercial shipping in the Red Sea remains to be seen.

Asia

Asia remains relatively quiet, compared to the rest of the world, with the only current major conflict of note being the “Tatmadaw” of Burma continuing to hang on by their fingernails, as the union of rebel movements sputters without effective outside support, while the military junta keeps trying to break bread with Communist China.

Of note, however, is that North Korea began trading human troops to Russia for ballistic missile technology, which is threatens a direct impact on the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.

Meanwhile, VISA – the credit card giant – has decided to embrace DEI fully, by violating the Logan Act in trying to force Japan to conform to the company’s morals. While the Japanese government has not yet reacted, the utterly tone-deaf head of VISA is very likely about to find out why that is a terrible idea.

Conclusion

The only relatively quiet spot in the world remains South America, where – despite a host of issues – large-scale violence remains almost unknown, compared to the rest of the planet.

It has been a tiring year, but – cautiously – things might be looking up.

Let’s hope no wingnut screws it up.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Why Yemen Is Destroying The West

Why Yemen Is Destroying The West

Michael Cessna November 15, 2024 0

 

 

 

 

 

Wars cannot end, until the enemy is defeated, and there is no stomach in the West for the necessary operations…

With the reelection of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency of the United States, even as Progressive, Left-wing pundits around the world launched into publicly televised hysterical meltdowns (that were subdued, compared to those of the many programmed victims of their psychological manipulations of the last few decades), heads of state around the world – the sane ones, at least – broadcast their congratulations to Trump.

In the Middle East, this was also true, for the most part. However, in both Iran and Yemen, reactions were mixed. Neither state is particularly happy about Trump’s victory, as both know that Trump is a diehard supporter of Israel, far more so than the ineffectual and vacillating Democrat administration of Joe Biden has been. This bodes ill for Trump’s immediate foreign policy options.

Since October 19, 2023, the Shi’a Muslim Houthi faction in Yemen has “done a yeoman’s work” in supporting the Hamas terrorist group that attacked and slaughtered defenseless civilians – including pregnant women – in their October 7th invasion of southern Israel that year.

While Yemen is physically separated from Israel and Gaza by a very considerable distance, one could be forgiven for assuming that the Houthis would only be able to offer kind words to Hamas. However, this is the 21st Century, and the Houthis are being supported by the Shi’a Muslim mullahs ruling Iran, to the north…and who have supplied the Houthis with not only Iran-designed derivatives of the ancient Soviet SCUD missiles, but with anti-ship missiles as well.

And it is that last group of weapons that is going to present Donald Trump with his most serious challenge, the first of a series of messes left for him to clean up, much as he found in 2017, when he had to pick up the pieces of Barack Obama’s eight-year long “bombing-fest”.

This time, though, Trump will have a far harder time. Trump’s first administration, as hard as Liberal news organs try to deny it, was marked as being the first Presidency in living memory to have not resulted in the United States becoming embroiled in any new military conflicts – every military action during the “Trump Years” of 2017-2021 were part of conflicts he inherited from Barack Obama.

The US and Western militaries in general, have been critically weakened as a result of the staggering incompetence of the last four years of mismanagement from Washington and NATO capitals. The aloof and disconnected-from-reality “ivory tower” political elites in the West have floundered as their intricate “house of cards” strategies for global dominance have collapsed, as those people they discounted as backwards, uneducated “camel jockeys”, simply declined to play by the script those elites had written for them.

Their first stumble was pushing Vladimir Putin’s Russia into invading Ukraine – the Western elites never imagined that Putin would actually invade – they assumed that he would either meekly acquiesce, or that he would launch a new Cold War, one that would boost the elites’ defense industry stock portfolios into orbit (literally)…The notion that Putin would actually commit to massive, “main force” combat on a scale not seen since 1990-1991 was never on their “bingo cards”.

Next came Africa, as local state armies – usually led by Western-trained officers (sparking delightfully daft conspiracy ravings from Left-wing talking heads) – in the “Coup Belt” of the Sahel Region decided that tossing out Western – primarily French – influence for good, via military action, was worth the risk. The elites were left slack-jawed to discover that what they had considered their racial and cultural inferiors had had enough of their paternalistic ravings, and told them to get out. So “uppity” has Africa gotten, that the Ugandan government publicly and messily refused to bend the knee to the United States over imposing visa restrictions on its officials over the country’s anti-LGBTQ policies – and had to watch as most African countries lined up behind the Central African state. Then, the Sahel nation of Niger – one of the most recent “Coup Belt” states – non-too politely told the US State and Defense departments to ‘pound sand’ over what they described as threats to the country if they did not immediately restore the corrupt government installed by French corporations – then told them that the DoD to remove the $100 million drone operations base at Agadez…To paraphrase a certain comic book-cum-movie character: “…Not a good plan, America…”

And then, there is Ukraine. It does not matter in the slightest, whether you support Ukraine, or Russia, or neither. That is literally irrelevant. All that matters, are three things:

  1. Despite obscene amounts of Western monetary and material support, Ukraine is losing the war. Deal with it.
  2. The nuclear saber rattling from both sides has brought the world closer to and intentional nuclear exchange than at any time in history.
  3. The United States and NATO defense establishments have demonstrated their categorical inability to supply even basic war materials – this is not Star Trek, and there are no replicators here

 

To this context, we must add the fact that North Korea – which was at least willing to listen to Trump, at some level – smelled weakness in Washington, and moved swiftly to capitalize on that weakness. (NB: The Freedomist covered this on its monthly subscription side, as well.)

…Which brings us back to Yemen.

Yemeni civil war map. Houthi areas are in green. February, 2024. Map credit: Ali Zifan. CCA/4.0 International.

 

Yemen is a truly ancient nation, with its recorded history stretching back at least 7,000 years, with much of that history revolving around the sea. Like most of the states and people’s in the region, Yemenis of all tribes and religious sects understand one of the core truisms of warfare: “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” (Attributed to Admiral Horatio Nelson.)

While some modern naval pundits have tried to dismiss this wisdom in the modern day – much as their recent ancestors though that “capabilities based planning” was a better idea than traditional strategic thinking – the current effort by Yemen’s Houthis has proven how true it really is, if one has the ability to think about warfare on multiple levels.

The Houthis have no defined “fort” to fight – the operate their missiles as a kind of “shell game”, shuttling them around the countryside, much as the original US strategy for the Minuteman Missile system of the 1980’s. That idea works, as sea-launched land-attack missiles have trouble finding those targets.

As a result, Houthi missiles fired into the Bab al Mandeb Strait have seriously damaged both world commerce, as well as local economies, with traffic through the Suez Canal dropping by c.65% overall, and with port calls to Red Sea ports falling by a staggering 85%. Naval missile attacks have done little to even slow the rates of attack in the region, much less stop them…because they can’t.

 

Added to this, has been the recent escalation in the Israel-Hamas war, first with the Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah launching multiple attacks into northern Israel, with the Israeli’s hitting back just as hard, if not harder.

Iran responded to these events by attacking Israel, several times. Now, as of November 15, 2024, Israel has attacked another Iranian nuclear facility.

But…What does this have to do with Yemen?

In fact, very little, at least at first glance. The problem is that Yemen is a fantastic foil for Iran against the United States and its allies: it forces Israel and those Western powers hostile to Iran to split their forces between theaters, while limiting their ability to shift naval forces. At the same time, the Houthis – and thus, Iran – have been able to critically damage the commercial system that the West depends on, and all without Iran becoming directly involved.

This situation has no solution, other than a very messy, and very bloody “boots on the ground” invasion of the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen…by Trump…With all that implies, given the last twenty-five years of war.

This is because neither the Houthis, nor the Iranians, are willing to actually negotiate any sort of peace agreement, unless Israel agrees to undue everything it has done in reply to Hamas and Hezbollah…Which is simply not going to happen.

Because of the failures of the Biden administration, small but hostile powers states have launched wars because they saw the weaknesses of the United States and the West, and sought to capitalize on that weakness…and they know that Trump will not be able to fix those problems before the 2026 mid-term elections in the US.

If one were a conspiracy theorist, one could almost think that this was a deliberate ploy to undermine a Trump victory.

But that’s just crazy-talk.

Right?

 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

 

Defense Industry Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Trump’s Achilles’ Heel

Defense Industry Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Trump’s Achilles’ Heel

Michael Cessna November 8, 2024 0

 

 

 

 

Introduction

This article is going to press on November 8th of 2024. Donald J. Trump as been confirmed to have won the US Presidential election be a decisive margin. While much is being made in some quarters about how “Daddy Trump” is going to fix everything overnight, the reality is that Trump will face a myriad of major diplomatic challenges on Day One of his new administration. While we could write multiple articles on every one of the many wars Trump will have to deal with – and we will discuss one of them next week – this week, we will talk about the most important issue.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed critical weaknesses in Western defense industrial capacity, while recent infrastructure incidents highlight the fragility of military logistics chains. These vulnerabilities raise serious questions about NATO’s ability to sustain high-intensity conflicts and maintain global military readiness, because they are not being addressed.

“Peace Through Strength” is a resounding cry, but it requires “strength” to make it work.

 

The Artillery Crisis

NATO’s inability to meet Ukraine’s artillery shell requirements has revealed a stark reality: Western defense industries are no longer configured for industrial-scale warfare. The conflict has consumed ammunition at rates not seen since World War II, with Ukraine firing approximately 6,000-8,000 artillery rounds per day, while Russia expends an estimated 15,000-20,000 rounds daily.

European and American ammunition plants, optimized for peacetime efficiency rather than wartime surge capacity, have struggled to increase production. Most Western facilities operate on a single-shift basis with aging equipment, lacking the workforce and infrastructure for rapid expansion. The situation is exacerbated by shortages of raw materials and specialized components, many of which come from a limited number of suppliers.

In contrast, Russia – which had correctly forecasted the coming decade’s events – quietly began classifying increasing amounts of its economic (and possibly population) data, beginning in 2014. Further, while the Western powers had deliriously wrapped up and eventually converted or bulldozed much of its war production capacity, the newly non-Soviet Russia did not: they mothballed their facilities. And, as tensions with the West began rising after the Donbas War began, they began to quietly bring those mothballed plants back online.

The reason for focusing so much on artillery production is that, far more than the production of drones, tanks or airplanes, artillery is the most important determiner of modern warfare capabilities, after Logistics infrastructure and the combat abilities of one’s infantry forces.

 

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

The recent collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, Maryland after being struck by the container ship MV Dali highlights another critical vulnerability in military logistics. Major ports and waterways are essential for moving military equipment and supplies, yet many rely on aging infrastructure. The Baltimore incident demonstrates how a single point of failure can disrupt both civilian and military shipping patterns across an entire region.

The Military Sealift Command (MSC) fast combat support ship USNS Supply (T-AOE 6) sails through the Atlantic Ocean, 2006. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 3rd Class Joshua Kinter. Public Domain.

Similar vulnerabilities exist across NATO’s logistics infrastructure:

  • Aging rail networks crucial for moving heavy military equipment
  • Limited redundancy in key shipping channels and ports
  • Concentrated dependence on specific facilities for military operations
  • Vulnerability of critical bridges and tunnels to both accidents and potential sabotage
  • Limited upgrades to handle increased loads

 

Supply Chain Complexity

Modern defense systems rely on intricate supply chains involving thousands of contractors and subcontractors. This complexity creates multiple potential points of failure:

 

Raw Materials

  • Critical mineral dependencies
  • Limited processing facilities
  • Potential supply disruptions from geopolitical tensions

Component Manufacturing

  • Specialized electronics producers
  • Precision machining capabilities
  • Quality control requirements

Assembly and Integration

  • Skilled workforce shortages
  • Facility capacity constraints
  • Security clearance requirements

 

The China Factor

Many of these vulnerabilities trace back to China’s quiet dominance in global supply chains. Critical raw materials, electronic components, and industrial chemicals often originate from Chinese sources. This dependency creates strategic risks, particularly in scenarios where China might decide to restrict exports or support adversaries.

While this has yet to significantly impact the war in Ukraine, it remains a distinct possibility…especially should a Trump diplomatic effort fail or stall – or expand.

 

Impact on Military Readiness

These supply chain vulnerabilities affect military readiness in several ways:

 

Reduced Training

  • Limited ammunition for training exercises
  • Delayed maintenance due to parts shortages
  • Restricted live-fire drills

Strategic Reserve Depletion

  • Ammunition stocks below minimum requirements
  • Extended replacement timelines
  • Reduced crisis response capability

Force Projection

  • Logistics bottlenecks limiting deployment options
  • Increased vulnerability to interdiction
  • Reduced sustained operation capability

 

Misplaced Priorities

Another serious consideration is the toxic culture of the long-ballyhooed “military-industrial complex“. That term is a tired trope that has been overused to the point of reducing it to a joke…However, it is very real, and is one of the major axes that is causing the downstream bottleneck that is choking the combat power of Western forces.

For generations, defense contractors have made squeezing as much taxpayer money as possible in technical “peacetime” as high a priority as possible, whether their products worked or not – the Sgt York and Dragon ATGM come immediately to mind. Making products like “dumb” (i.e., “unguided”) artillery ammunition and aircraft bombs is not considered as cost-effective, from a business perspective, as more technically complex – and thus, highly expensive – weapons systems.

The fact that these weapons cannot be produced anywhere near as quickly as modern combat demands – as demonstrated in Ukraine – is not part of the cost-benefit calculations of the commercial military-industrial complex.

 

Addressing the Challenges

Military planners are attempting to address these vulnerabilities through several initiatives:

 

Industrial Base

  • Investing in modernized production facilities
  • Developing workforce training programs
  • Creating redundant supply sources

Infrastructure

  • Identifying critical chokepoints
  • Developing alternative routing options
  • Improving facility protection

Stockpile Management

  • Reassessing minimum stock levels
  • Implementing more robust tracking systems
  • Developing new storage facilities

 

At the same time, those same military planners face the harsh reality that too many civilian leaders in Congress – both outgoing and incoming – received a large amount of cash that put them into a very cushy position, and that getting those same politicians to act against what defense contractors see as their own best interests is going to be an uphill battle, all the way. This will be even harder for Donald Trump, who has dared to speak the unspeakable, that peace needs to break out again.

 

The Near Term Outlook

The combination of industrial capacity limitations and infrastructure vulnerabilities presents a serious challenge to Western military capabilities, and especially to the incoming 47th President. Addressing these issues requires sustained investment and policy attention, potentially including:

  • Defense Industrial Base revitalization
  • Infrastructure hardening and redundancy
  • Supply chain diversification
  • Stockpile expansion
  • International cooperation on critical materials
  • And finally, reining in the military-industrial complex, whether they like it or not

 

The lessons from Ukraine and incidents like the Baltimore bridge collapse underscore the urgent need for comprehensive supply chain resilience in defense planning…They also show the dangers of thinking that business and war are analogous – misapplying the principle of Sun Tzu is actually far more dangerous than dismissing them.

 

 

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

  1. Julian Thompson (1994), Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict
  2. Thomas Ricks (2012), The Generals
  3. James F. Dunnigan (2003), How To Make War, 4th Edition
  4. James F. Dunnigan (1991), Shooting Blanks

 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Britain’s “Lost Decade” Economic Disaster & Its Impact On Global Security

Britain’s “Lost Decade” Economic Disaster & Its Impact On Global Security

Michael Cessna October 25, 2024 0

 

 

 

 

The United Kingdom’s descent from its position as a leading global financial center into economic turmoil represents one of the most dramatic shifts in modern economic history. While the roots of this decline can be traced to the 2008 global financial crisis, the combined shocks of Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Britain’s steadfast support of Ukraine has accelerated what many analysts now term Britain’s “Lost Decade.”

The Foundation Cracks: 2008-2016

The 2008 financial crisis hit London particularly hard, given its out sized role in global banking and finance. While other nations gradually recovered, Britain’s recovery was notably sluggish. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government’s austerity measures, implemented under Prime Minister David Cameron, may have prevented a sovereign debt crisis (while some 70 potential defaults currently exist), but came at the cost of reduced public services and infrastructure investment.

During this period, Britain’s armed forces faced significant budget cuts. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review disastrously led to significant reductions in personnel, the early retirement of the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal, and the scrapping of the Harrier jump-jet fleet. These decisions would later impact Britain’s ability to project power globally.

 

Brexit: The Self-Inflicted – With Help – Wound

The 2016 Brexit referendum marked a crucial turning point. The vote to leave the European Union triggered immediate economic consequences: the pound sterling plummeted, investment decisions were frozen, and London’s position as Europe’s financial capital began to erode. Major financial institutions started relocating operations to Dublin, Frankfurt, and Paris.

The protracted Brexit negotiations created years of uncertainty, depressing business investment and complicating trade relationships. The eventual Trade and Cooperation Agreement, while avoiding a “no-deal” scenario, still resulted in significant new barriers to trade with Britain’s largest market.

The reality was that Britain’s trade was significantly undermined by the European Union’s bitter and petty actions, as that body did not was to lose the major tax revenues that Britain was contributing, at a time when the EU was a whole was still reeling from the 2008 crisis. The “better option”, from the EU’s perspective, was to make it as hard for Britain as possible to “go it alone”.

What made these effects far worse, were a series of bungling failures by successive governments in London, from both sides of the political aisle. These poorly-considered actions have functionally flat-lined the British economy…and things are not improving.

 

Pandemic Paralysis

COVID-19 struck Britain particularly hard, both in human and economic terms. The UK experienced one of Europe’s highest death rates and deepest economic contractions. The government’s pandemic response, while unprecedented in scale, added substantially to national debt. The furlough scheme, while preventing mass unemployment, cost hundreds of billions of pounds.

The pandemic exposed and exacerbated existing economic weaknesses. Supply chain disruptions, combined with Brexit-related complications, led to shortages and inflation. The National Health Service, already strained by years of austerity, faced enormous pressure.

And, despite the government trying to “cook the books” by “revising” economic numbers, the British economy has still not recovered.

Ukraine Support and Energy Crisis

Britain’s robust support for Ukraine, while strategically important, has come at a significant economic cost. Military aid, combined with sanctions against Russia, contributed to spiraling energy costs and inflation. The situation has forced difficult choices between domestic spending and international commitments.

The energy crisis has highlighted Britain’s vulnerability to global supply shocks. Despite North Sea oil and gas resources, years of under-investment in energy infrastructure and storage capacity left the country exposed to price volatility.

Successive governments in London have learned the US government’s model of “borrow ’til you crash”, piling on mountains of debt to support Kiev’s flagging hopes of survival, as ‘victory’ is very much a malleable terms.

Impact on Global Security

Britain’s economic challenges have resulted in drastic and cascading effects on global security:

  1. Reduced Military Capability: Budget constraints have limited Britain’s ability to modernize its armed forces and maintain its traditional role in global security operations, something even the new Left-wing government of PM Keir Starmer could not ignore.
  2. NATO Implications: While Britain continues to meet NATO’s 2% GDP defense spending target, the declining value of the pound means this represents less actual military capability.
  3. Diplomatic Influence: Economic weakness has diminished Britain’s ‘soft power‘ and ability to influence global events through economic leverages.
  4. Intelligence Capabilities: Budget pressures have affected Britain’s renowned intelligence services, potentially impacting the “Five Eyes Alliance“.

Recruitment Crisis and Cultural Shift

The British military’s recruitment challenges reflect deeper societal changes. Traditional sources of military recruitment – working-class communities with strong patriotic traditions – have been eroded by demographic shifts, changing cultural attitudes and recently, the stunningly draconian response of the Starmer government to a sudden spate of riots initially linked – albeit wrongly – to racial violence. The Armed Forces’ 2022-23 recruitment targets were missed by approximately 40%, marking the worst recruitment crisis since the end of conscription in 1960, although recruiting numbers in the United Kingdom have been dropping steadily since at least 2010.

This recruitment crisis stems from multiple factors. Economic uncertainty has paradoxically reduced rather than increased military recruitment, as potential recruits seek more stable civilian careers. More significantly, surveys indicate a growing disconnect between younger Britons and traditional concepts of national service. The proportion of young people expressing “pride in being British” has declined significantly, particularly in urban areas, leading to even Left-leaning pundits to suggest that the British Left needs to “re-embrace patriotism”.

 

 

The military has attempted to address this through modernized recruitment campaigns, often focusing on personal development and technical skills rather than patriotic duty. However, these efforts have met with mixed success, as they compete against private sector opportunities and what military leaders describe as an “individualistic zeitgeist” among younger generations.

This staffing crisis has forced difficult choices about force structure and capabilities, significantly limiting Britain’s ability to maintain its global military commitments.

Economic Indicators

The scale of Britain’s economic challenges is reflected in key indicators:

  • Persistent low productivity growth
  • Declining real wages
  • Rising income inequality
  • Chronic trade deficits
  • High government debt-to-GDP ratio
  • Weakening pound sterling
  • Reduced foreign direct investment

Looking Forward

Britain’s path to economic recovery remains uncertain. The country retains significant advantages: a highly skilled workforce, world-class universities, and leadership in sectors like fintech and renewable energy. However, structural challenges persist:

  • Aging infrastructure
  • Regional economic disparities
  • Skills shortages in key sectors
  • Housing market instability
  • Trade relationship uncertainties
  • Energy security concerns

 

The implications of these issues for global security will depend largely on Britain’s ability to navigate these challenges while maintaining its international commitments and modernizing its military capabilities.

The real problem for British security, however, remains the same as in the United States Armed Forces: an increasing percentage of the primary recruiting demographic – the “under-30” age group – simply do not see the point in volunteering to serve their country in the military, if at all, as it seemingly offers no opportunities over the civilian world, and has demonstrated (as in the United States and Canada) a staggeringly callous attitude towards treating the long-term impacts of combat on the country’s veterans…And, also as in the United States, if this trend is not reversed, the alternatives are not things any government wants to consider.

 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

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