With all the craziness of the last six weeks, it’s easy to become enraptured by all the “glitz-bang-pow“, and to lose track of the truly important things…like internet access, for example.
Much of the crucial digital lifelines of the modern global economy lie largely unseen and unprotected beneath the oceans. Submarine cables — bundled fiber-optic threads wrapped in layers of protective materials — carry an estimated 99% of international data traffic, representing an estimated $10 trillion in daily financial transactions. Clearly, these cables are vital components of any national infrastructure…and, just as clearly, they are very high-priority targets in any war scenario. Despite their critical importance, these cables remain surprisingly vulnerable to both accidental damage and deliberate sabotage, creating an asymmetric vulnerability that security experts increasingly view as a critical national security concern.
Recent incidents have highlighted this vulnerability. In late 2023, and again in late 2024, multiple cables in the Baltic Sea were damaged within weeks of each other, including the Svalbard cable connecting Norway’s remote Arctic research station to the mainland. While officials initially cited “technical problems,” subsequent investigations pointed to deliberate actions, with suspicion falling on Russian vessels that had been tracked in proximity to the damaged sections. Similar incidents have occurred in the Mediterranean and Red Sea, where the timing and pattern of damage suggested coordinated action rather than accidental encounters with ship anchors or fishing equipment…which, given the immediate impacts, should be surprising to no one, as the war in Ukraine continues to rage.
The security implications extend far beyond temporary internet disruptions. Major financial centers like London, New York, and Singapore depend on millisecond-level transmission speeds for trading operations, with even brief outages potentially causing billions in economic damage. Military communications, intelligence sharing between allies, and diplomatic channels all rely on these same physical pathways, creating a strategic vulnerability that potential adversaries have clearly recognized.
Unlike traditional military targets, undersea cables present adversaries with an ideal gray-zone target. Damage can be plausibly denied as accidental, attribution is extremely difficult, and repairs can take weeks depending on the location and conditions. This provides hostile actors with the ability to cause significant disruption while remaining below the threshold of activities that would trigger conventional military responses.
The technical challenge of defending these cables is substantial. The global submarine cable network spans over 750,000 miles, often in international waters beyond territorial jurisdiction. Cable routes are publicly documented for maritime safety, making their locations easily accessible to potential saboteurs. Monitoring such vast distances presents an almost impossible surveillance challenge, especially in deep ocean areas where depths exceed 3,000 meters.
The “CS Dependable”, cable layer ship with a modern stern sheave design. Picture taken at the Port of Astoria, Oregon, 2006. CCA/3.0. Photo by Nsandel.
Of course, this has been happening since undersea cables were first laid in the 19th Century, most notably when the United States cut Spanish telegraph cables in both Cuba and the Philippines theaters of the Spanish-American War. During World War I, one of Britain’s first and most significant strategic moves came just hours after declaring war in August 1914, when the cable ship “CS Alert” severed Germany’s five transatlantic cables near the English Channel. This operation, codenamed Operation Telekom, effectively cut Germany’s direct communication links with the Americas and much of the world. Britain simultaneously took control of most neutral cable stations, forcing German diplomatic and military communications onto easily intercepted wireless channels or through cables that passed through British-controlled territory.
The British established “Room 40“, a specialized naval intelligence unit that interceded and decoded German messages, providing critical intelligence. The most famous success came with the interception and decryption of the Zimmermann Telegram in 1917, which revealed Germany’s attempt to entice Mexico into attacking the United States — a diplomatic catastrophe that helped bring America into the war.
In World War II, Britain expanded these capabilities with Operation ‘Cutting’. The Royal Navy again targeted German undersea cables, but added sophisticated tapping operations. Combined with the codebreaking work at Bletchley Park, these undersea operations provided crucial intelligence on German naval movements, particularly U-boat operations, significantly contributing to Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Modern cable attacks no longer require crude methods like physical cutting. Advanced submersibles can quickly and silently install tapping devices without severing cables, allowing for collection without detection. Both the Russian and Chinese navies are known to operate specialized submarines and surface ships equipped for undersea operations near critical cable infrastructure, including the Yantar, a Russian “research vessel” observed loitering near critical cable junctions in the Atlantic.
These strategic vulnerabilities are magnified by the concentration of key connection points. Cable landing stations — where submarine cables connect to terrestrial networks — represent critical sea-based chokepoints, with certain locations in Egypt, Malaysia, and Sicily serving as hubs for dozens of major cables. A modern, coordinated attack on multiple landing stations could severely disrupt global connectivity in ways that would overwhelm the limited redundancy built into the system.
Despite the growing awareness of these vulnerabilities, international legal protections remain inadequate. The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables provides limited safeguards, while the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea only offers general provisions against deliberate damage. Enforcement mechanisms are virtually non-existent in international waters, creating a legal gray zone that mirrors the operational one.
As tensions rise between major powers, enhancing resilience against cable disruption has become an urgent security priority. Proposed measures include increased naval patrols near critical infrastructure, enhanced monitoring through seabed sensors, diversification of cable routes, and hardening of physical infrastructure. However, the scale of the challenge means complete protection remains impossible, leaving this critical infrastructure as a persistent vulnerability in an increasingly contested global environment.
One thing people frequently fail to understand – an outgrowth of the increasing sociological separation of the civilian and military spheres – is that naval warfare is far more than dramatic gun battles at sea, determined amphibious assaults, and exciting launches of fighter planes from the decks of aircraft carriers.”War“, as such, has been a term too frequently applied outside of its true domain, diluting public understanding of its implications: Sure, “war” is scary and destructive in general, but there are plenty of avenues of attack that are certainly not part of the ‘war on poverty’. This is why the Imperial Japanese Navy shelled a beach in Santa Barbara, California in 1942…which came as a hell of a surprise to local residents, and which had some very unforeseen consequences that succeeded in damaging the United States – not enough to win the war, but enough to instill distrust, the more people thought about it.
People concerned for not only their physical, but financial, security, need to start relearning how militaries think, because while the civilian may not care much about warfare, warfare cares very much about you.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
As February of 2025 winds down, with all the manufactured hysteria from the political and social extreme-Left in the United States, and an increasingly nervous European Union facing the reality that the Trump administration is serious about not playing ‘patty-cake’ with them anymore, and with the increasingly dire situation in Central Africa, an observer could be forgiven for thinking that Asia is a calm reflecting pool…but things are stirring, and as angry as most states are at Communist Chinese posturing in the South China Sea, a different dragon has been stirring, that is worrying – or should be worrying – every nation in the region.
At the end of World War 2, the victorious American occupiers imposed a new constitution on Japan that “renounced war”. While certainly understandable, given the events of World War 2 in the Pacific, the notion of “renouncing war as a sovereign right of the state” was a creature mostly of Douglas MacArthur’s unbelievable ego. The end result was that the United States was forced to anchor defending Japan as a core concept of its strategy for the next six decades.
Map of Japanese offensive in Southeast Asia in 1941. United States Military Academy Department of History. Public Domain.
Restricted by Article 9 of its constitution, Japan maintained nothing more than a well-armed coast guard and a tiny army. This tiny “self defense force” (the “JSDF”), created only in 1954, was barely large enough to maintain internal order and disaster relief, much less actually “defend” the island nation against large and aggressive states like the USSR and Communist China…that was the job of the United States, because it was the US that hamstrung the Japanese state from effectively defending itself.
For most of the Cold War, this situation remained the status quo. Fortunately, no serious test of Japan’s defenses – or the US plan for the same – occurred. But, as the “Global War On Terror” (the “GWOT”) began to wind down with the end of George W. Bush Presidency and the ascension of Barack Obama, Tokyo suddenly noticed that the United States had become very lukewarm about it’s own defenses, and that there seemed to be a real reluctance in Washington to care very much about the defense of Asia. To be sure, there was a lot of talk about “pivoting towards China“, but there was not a lot of action. As recruiting numbers began falling in the post-GWOT period, the US Navy had to lay up more and more ships, as there were too few sailors to crew all the ships the Navy knew that it needed.
Because of these post-GWOT developments, Japanese leaders watched with increasing alarm as the United States seemed to increasingly care very little, in any real sense, about its long-time ally in the Philippines having to face off against the massive Chinese Communist state – and if the US was seemingly willing to abandon the Philippines to more than lip-service, what did that imply for Japan?
The only answer for Japan was rearmament.
But…What about Article 9? A large segment of the Japanese population – well-versed in the abuses and horrors of the Imperial military’s Shogun-like rule during the war years – were adamantly, even hysterically, opposed to any kind of change to Article 9. But Tokyo, not having any other options, began to take steps to rearm.
The Japanese Army and Air Force are, for the most part, capable and effective forces, if far too small for their missions. The Army is relatively easy to expand, while the Air Force would take more time, but still can expand in a viable timeframe. But the real problem was the Japanese Navy.
Naval forces are tremendously expensive entities, no matter their fighting capabilities. Building a force to significantly augment – or replace – the US Navy, even at a low level, required an entirely new take on Japan’s naval strategy…because that would require aircraft carriers, something Japan has not operated at any level since 1945.
Beginning in 2010, however, Japan began to do just that.
Japan’s recent transformation of its Izumo-class “helicopter destroyers” into aircraft carriers capable of operating F-35B strike fighters marks a significant shift in both Japanese defense policy and regional power dynamics. This development, while technically maintaining Japan’s constitutionally-mandated defensive posture, represents the country’s first carrier capability since World War II.
And, given the potential of carrier warfare – which Japan was the first to actually demonstrate – this naturally concerns any state within the range of Japanese shipping.
The modified Izumo and Kaga, each displacing around 24,000 tons, make them considerably smaller than America’s supercarriers but align with a growing trend toward light carriers, both among Asian navies and in other navies worldwide. The vessels’ new capability to operate F-35Bs provides Japan with significant power projection abilities, particularly valuable given the country’s island geography and increasing regional tensions.
More importantly, this capability serves as a “training test bed” for modern Japanese naval officers to relearn those skills that disappeared after 1945.
This naval evolution reflects the reality of Japan’s post-2010 strategic environment. China’s rapidly expanding naval capabilities, including the start of construction on multiple aircraft carriers, as well as attempts at building artificial island bases, have altered the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. North Korea’s continued missile development and nuclear program add another layer of complexity to these challenges.
The Indo-Pacific Region. Red circle/oval roughly depicts the Indian Ocean region. Blue circle/oval covers the Pacific region. Green oval covers ASEAN. Yellow overlay covers the Indo Pacific. 2020 image from Eric Gaba. CCA/4.0 International
The carriers also represent a significant psychological shift. Post-war Japan has deliberately avoided capabilities that could be seen as offensive weapons, especially aircraft carriers, but including both strategic bombers and long-range missiles. The decision to operate carriers, even if designated as “multi-purpose escort ships,” signals Japan’s growing comfort with maintaining military capabilities well beyond strictly defensive systems.
However, these vessels serve multiple roles beyond power projection. Their ability to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations proved valuable during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. In an era of increasing natural disasters and climate-related challenges, this flexibility adds significant value to Japan’s maritime capabilities.
The international reaction has been notably mixed. While the United States strongly supports Japan’s military modernization, China has previously expressed concern about what it perceives as Japanese remilitarization. Other regional nations, particularly those with historical grievances against Japan, watch these developments carefully, though many quietly welcome a stronger Japanese presence as a counterbalance to growing Chinese influence.
From a technical perspective, the F-35B’s capabilities significantly enhance these ships’ effectiveness, although the numbers the carriers can operate are very small. The aircraft’s stealth characteristics and advanced sensors, combined with its ability to operate from austere locations, provide Japan with new options for defending its remote island chains and maintaining maritime awareness across vast oceanic areas.
The carriers also enable closer integration with allied forces, particularly the U.S. Marine Corps and British Royal Navy, which operate similar F-35B aircraft. This interoperability enhances Japan’s ability to participate in multinational operations and strengthens its strategic partnerships beyond the U.S. alliance.
Japan’s perspective on its role in World War II, however, remains a source of both internal debate and international tension. Unlike Germany’s direct confrontation with its Nazi past, Japan’s approach to its wartime history has been more nuanced and, at times, contradictory.
The mainstream Japanese narrative acknowledges the war’s devastating impact while often framing Japan as both aggressor and victim. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with the firebombing of major cities, feature prominently in Japanese collective memory. However, discussions of Japan’s own wartime actions, particularly in China, Korea, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia, tend to be more muted in public discourse.
This selective historical memory manifests in ongoing controversies, such as debates over history textbooks’ treatment of events like the Nanjing Massacre or the comfort women issue. Official apologies have been made by various Japanese governments, but these are sometimes undermined by statements from individual politicians or visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are among those honored.
Younger generations of Japanese increasingly view the war through a different lens, focusing more on its lessons for peace and Japan’s postwar achievements. However, rising regional tensions, particularly with China, have led to renewed interest in military history and debates about Japan’s proper role in international security.
Although the Japanese government’s position generally emphasizes Japan’s post-war commitment to peace while avoiding detailed examination of wartime conduct, neighboring countries are very worried that the dragon of the Kanto Plain is reawakening, which is a thing all those states fear.
This current situation is almost a textbook care of “unintended consequences”, as a different path than a self-aggrandizing imposition of idiotic Utopianism would likely have made this step of Japanese rearmament more palatable to a nervous region.
Actions have consequences, and those consequences are usually very visible, if one cares enough to look ahead, and act responsibly.
The United States Army Special Forces faces a growing crisis that threatens the effectiveness of America’s elite military units. The drive to maintain special operations forces (SOF) numbers through direct recruitment programs has led to concerning patterns of casualties and reduced operational effectiveness, highlighting the dangers of shortcuts in developing elite warriors. Unfortunately, there is a great deal of generalization in the numbers that follow, because of the classified nature of Special Operations in general, but the trend is there.
The Traditional Path
Historically, becoming a Special Forces operator involved a carefully structured progression. Candidates typically served 3-5 years in conventional military units before applying to Special Forces training. This traditional pathway provided several crucial elements.
Older candidates tended to have developed their own knowledge of what physical training and development strategies worked best for them, more formulaic Army methods aside. This enabled them to understand how their bodies reacted to physical stress, which usually lowered the possibility of physical injuries. It also allowed a “leveling-off” in a soldier’s physical maturation, which also helped reduce injuries.
Group of Soldiers from ARVN with SFC Norman A. Doney, 5th S.F. Group, Vietnam, September 1968. United States Army Heritage and Education Center. Public Domain.
This also allowed the SF candidate to gain valuable experience in stress management, leadership, and technical skills. Likewise, the experience gained as a “regular” soldier provided a deeper understanding of military psychology and culture, providing valuable experience in how operations are typically run, with a “bottom-up” view that would offer the candidate vital experience in understanding the challenges they would face when isolated on operations.
The resulting teams of “Operators” were very well situated to a wide array of “unconventional” tasks, ranging from “deep” reconnaissance, to what is now termed “direct action missions”, to embedding as liaison teams with Coalition units during Operation Desert Storm, to acting in their original mission, by training “partner nation” forces, either from scratch or by refining their existing training.
In this older model, the candidate with three to five years of experience before entering Special Forces also allowed the members of the “Operational Detachment Alpha” (ODA) teams (the famous “A-Teams”) to have both a primary Military Occupational Specialty coming in through the door, but would also allow for them having acquired “side” experience, through which they could obtain secondary or “alternate” specialty training in diverse and unrelated field, meaning that a 12-man ODA actually had up to twenty-four (or more) technical specialties at hand, including backups, within their team.
The Rush to Fill Ranks
Following the 9/11 attacks, the demands on special operations units throughout the United States military structure led to a serious manpower shortage, as – despite (if not “because of”) battlefield successes – the existing special forces units quickly began to experience manning shortages, as casualties mounted and operational teams were exhausted by the rapid pace of operations. This would lead to the creation of programs to rapidly bring in fresh recruits to fill the gaps.
In the US Army’s case, this became the “18X (Special Forces Candidate)” program, allowing civilians to directly enlist into Special Forces training. The idea was that a candidate who met all the basic educational and fitness requirements for Army Special Forces could be enlisted and “fast-tracked” to SF training, running through Army Basic Training, A.I.T., then on to parachute training, before being sent to the actual Special Forces training. The result was physcally fit, highly motivated operators, who had “checked off” all the requisite boxes, but who lacked the depth of experience of those who had come before them. The result was something more akin to “elite assault infantry”, something more akin to the US Army Rangers, rather than “Special Forces”.
There is nothing wrong with the concept of the Rangers – but that concept is not the same thing as Army Special Forces…What follows is by no means an indictment of the candidates themselves, but of the wider Army command structure, who should have known better.
While the 18X program helped meet the immediate personnel needs for Army Special Forces, they have revealed some serious problems:
Physical Casualties
– Higher rates of training injuries
– Increased long-term physical damage
– More frequent stress fractures
– Earlier career-ending injuries
Psychological Impact
– Elevated PTSD rates
– Higher frequency of “burnout”
– Reduced stress tolerance
– Shorter operational careers
As noted above, veterans of conventional units brought crucial life experiences into their Special Forces careers that direct-enlistment recruits simply lack, because they have not had the time to learn and experience those life lessons that their predecessors had.
Going straight from training to high-intensity “operational” status is functionally sending out people who know how to pull a trigger, not someone who understands the nuances of how to react to their surroundings, nor how to deal with the stresses of everything going completely wrong at the first shots. Special Forces have to be able to switch instantly from shooting people, to working with survivors in the immediate area, as well as how to calmly and rationally coordinate with foreign military and police units in the aftermath, whether those are from the country the SF team is operating in, or from allied nations. These functions require both maturity and humility, which can only be developed over time – time that the 18X program cannot impart.
The Historical Record
The 77th Infantry Division’s World War 2 experience provides a damning historical precedent that the Army seemingly ignored when creating the 18X program. The 77th’s success – with its higher average age of 35 and consequently more mature decision-making abilities – demonstrated clear advantages in the complex, high-intensity combat of the Pacific theater. Despite facing some of the war’s most challenging battlefield conditions, the division’s older, more experienced from civilian life soldiers generally suffered lower casualty rates than younger-aged units in the same actions.
77th Infantry division troops during the Battle of Okinawa, May, 1945. US Army Archives. Public Domain.
This historical data – especially in light of the history of Special Forces operations from the 1950’s to the 1990’s – should have served as a clear warning against the 18X program’s entire premise. If older, more experienced soldiers performed better in conventional warfare, it follows that rushing young, inexperienced recruits directly into the even more complex and demanding world of special operations would be problematic, at the very least. The Army had empirical evidence from the 77th, reinforced from Vietnam to Desert Storm, that maturity and life experience were crucial force multipliers in challenging combat environments, especially for Special Forces, yet chose to disregard these lessons when designing the 18X program. The resulting higher casualty rates among direct-entry special operations personnel represent a preventable tragedy.
Statistical Reality
Recent studies indicate troubling trends among direct-entry special operators. Over 75% of musculoskeletal injuries among Special Forces are preventable. Unfortunately, the reality is that data collection for these kinds of statistical studies is extremely hazy in quality.
The real story lies in the fact that the 18X program is still in force as an active recruitment tool, indicating that either the US Army is having serious problems attracting applicants to one of its premier “Tier 1” formations (which would not be surprising, given the Army’s well known recruiting woes), or that the 18X program still needs to run, in order to keep the numbers flowing in.
Neither offers a comforting picture.
The Cost of Shortcuts
The financial and operational costs of these programs are significant: Higher washout rates – whether from medical, emotional or psychological reasons – waste contentious budget monies, and make teams harder to form, train and deploy.
This also makes operational deployments much more expensive, overall, while limiting the capabilities of the units deployed, due a general lack of experience, and an increase in the requirements for already heavily strained support operations.
The whole combines into a toxic soup that lowers morale, degrades mission capabilities, and results in frantic attempts by inexperienced political leadership to find workaround solutions that, frankly, aren’t.
U.S. soldiers load a simulated casualty on a UH-60 Black Hawk during a medical evacuation at Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif., May 17, 2011. Photo credit: Technical Sgt Chris Hibben, US Army. Public Domain.
Conclusion
The United States desperately needs an effective special operations establishment. While highly capable at their missions, the Rangers are not suited to replace Army Special Forces. But Army SF is locked into a vicious cycle, where they need to maintain numbers for operations, but have serious problems (not all of their own making) with bringing in fresh candidates. That may change in the next few years, but there is little light in this tunnel.
The effectiveness of America’s special operations forces depends on finding the right balance between meeting personnel needs and maintaining the high standards that make these units elite…but, much more telling, is the need for coherent leadership at the top of both the military and civilian establishments.
The reality of history is that the regular military services have long detested the very idea of “elite” formations, despite their demonstrated capabilities. In the civilian quarter, the highly toxic nature of civilian politics in the United States means that few serious veterans want anything to do with the civilian leadership establishment in any way, leading to an increasingly wide divergence in understanding of what military forces require to operate, nor of their true capabilities.
There are no easy answers to this last problem, but something needs to be done to fix it, because there is an ogre lurking in the background, that no one wants to see come back into reality.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Wars cannot end, until the enemy is defeated, and there is no stomach in the West for the necessary operations…
With the reelection of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency of the United States, even as Progressive, Left-wing pundits around the world launched into publicly televised hysterical meltdowns (that were subdued, compared to those of the many programmed victims of their psychological manipulations of the last few decades), heads of state around the world – the sane ones, at least – broadcast their congratulations to Trump.
In the Middle East, this was also true, for the most part. However, in both Iran and Yemen, reactions were mixed. Neither state is particularly happy about Trump’s victory, as both know that Trump is a diehard supporter of Israel, far more so than the ineffectual and vacillating Democrat administration of Joe Biden has been. This bodes ill for Trump’s immediate foreign policy options.
Since October 19, 2023, the Shi’a Muslim Houthi faction in Yemen has “done a yeoman’s work” in supporting the Hamas terrorist group that attacked and slaughtered defenseless civilians – including pregnant women – in their October 7th invasion of southern Israel that year.
While Yemen is physically separated from Israel and Gaza by a very considerable distance, one could be forgiven for assuming that the Houthis would only be able to offer kind words to Hamas. However, this is the 21st Century, and the Houthis are being supported by the Shi’a Muslim mullahs ruling Iran, to the north…and who have supplied the Houthis with not only Iran-designed derivatives of the ancient Soviet SCUD missiles, but with anti-ship missiles as well.
And it is that last group of weapons that is going to present Donald Trump with his most serious challenge, the first of a series of messes left for him to clean up, much as he found in 2017, when he had to pick up the pieces of Barack Obama’s eight-year long “bombing-fest”.
This time, though, Trump will have a far harder time. Trump’s first administration, as hard as Liberal news organs try to deny it, was marked as being the first Presidency in living memory to have not resulted in the United States becoming embroiled in any new military conflicts – every military action during the “Trump Years” of 2017-2021 were part of conflicts he inherited from Barack Obama.
The US and Western militaries in general, have been critically weakened as a result of the staggering incompetence of the last four years of mismanagement from Washington and NATO capitals. The aloof and disconnected-from-reality “ivory tower” political elites in the West have floundered as their intricate “house of cards” strategies for global dominance have collapsed, as those people they discounted as backwards, uneducated “camel jockeys”, simply declined to play by the script those elites had written for them.
Their first stumble was pushing Vladimir Putin’s Russia into invading Ukraine – the Western elites never imagined that Putin would actually invade – they assumed that he would either meekly acquiesce, or that he would launch a new Cold War, one that would boost the elites’ defense industry stock portfolios into orbit (literally)…The notion that Putin would actually commit to massive, “main force” combat on a scale not seen since 1990-1991 was never on their “bingo cards”.
Next came Africa, as local state armies – usually led by Western-trained officers (sparking delightfully daft conspiracy ravings from Left-wing talking heads) – in the “Coup Belt” of the Sahel Region decided that tossing out Western – primarily French – influence for good, via military action, was worth the risk. The elites were left slack-jawed to discover that what they had considered their racial and cultural inferiors had had enough of their paternalistic ravings, and told them to get out. So “uppity” has Africa gotten, that the Ugandan government publicly and messily refused to bend the knee to the United States over imposing visa restrictions on its officials over the country’s anti-LGBTQ policies – and had to watch as most African countries lined up behind the Central African state. Then, the Sahel nation of Niger – one of the most recent “Coup Belt” states – non-too politely told the US State and Defense departments to ‘pound sand’ over what they described as threats to the country if they did not immediately restore the corrupt government installed by French corporations – then told them that the DoD to remove the $100 million drone operations base at Agadez…To paraphrase a certain comic book-cum-movie character: “…Not a good plan, America…”
And then, there is Ukraine. It does not matter in the slightest, whether you support Ukraine, or Russia, or neither. That is literally irrelevant. All that matters, are three things:
Despite obscene amounts of Western monetary and material support, Ukraine is losing the war. Deal with it.
The nuclear saber rattling from both sides has brought the world closer to and intentional nuclear exchange than at any time in history.
The United States and NATO defense establishments have demonstrated their categorical inability to supply even basic war materials – this is not Star Trek, and there are no replicators here
To this context, we must add the fact that North Korea – which was at least willing to listen to Trump, at some level – smelled weakness in Washington, and moved swiftly to capitalize on that weakness. (NB: The Freedomist covered this on itsmonthly subscription side, as well.)
Yemen is a truly ancient nation, with its recorded history stretching back at least 7,000 years, with much of that history revolving around the sea. Like most of the states and people’s in the region, Yemenis of all tribes and religious sects understand one of the core truisms of warfare: “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” (Attributed to Admiral Horatio Nelson.)
While some modern naval pundits have tried to dismiss this wisdom in the modern day – much as their recent ancestors though that “capabilities based planning” was a better idea than traditional strategic thinking – the current effort by Yemen’s Houthis has proven how true it really is, if one has the ability to think about warfare on multiple levels.
The Houthis have no defined “fort” to fight – the operate their missiles as a kind of “shell game”, shuttling them around the countryside, much as the original US strategy for the Minuteman Missile system of the 1980’s. That idea works, as sea-launched land-attack missiles have trouble finding those targets.
Added to this, has been the recent escalation in the Israel-Hamas war, first with the Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah launching multiple attacks into northern Israel, with the Israeli’s hitting back just as hard, if not harder.
In fact, very little, at least at first glance. The problem is that Yemen is a fantastic foil for Iran against the United States and its allies: it forces Israel and those Western powers hostile to Iran to split their forces between theaters, while limiting their ability to shift naval forces. At the same time, the Houthis – and thus, Iran – have been able to critically damage the commercial system that the West depends on, and all without Iran becoming directly involved.
This situation has no solution, other than a very messy, and very bloody “boots on the ground” invasion of the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen…by Trump…With all that implies, given the last twenty-five years of war.
This is because neither the Houthis, nor the Iranians, are willing to actually negotiate any sort of peace agreement, unless Israel agrees to undue everything it has done in reply to Hamas and Hezbollah…Which is simply not going to happen.
Because of the failures of the Biden administration, small but hostile powers states have launched wars because they saw the weaknesses of the United States and the West, and sought to capitalize on that weakness…and they know that Trump will not be able to fix those problems before the 2026 mid-term elections in the US.
If one were a conspiracy theorist, one could almost think that this was a deliberate ploy to undermine a Trump victory.
But that’s just crazy-talk.
Right?
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
North Korea’s Strategic Pivot: Abandoning Reunification for Military Partnership
Amid the hysteria of the 2024 US Presidential election – seen by many on the world as a pivotal event in the world’s direction for the next generation, at least – there is an increasing amount of talk concerning North Korea’s increasingly militant actions. Most alarming among these is its deployment of combat troops to Ukraine, to aid the Russian war effort there, as that conflict grins through its third year.
The failure of the 2019 Hanoi Summit between then-US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un marked more than just another setback in US-DPRK relations. It represented a crucial turning point in North Korea’s strategic outlook, leading to its current role as a military supplier to Russia and its apparent abandonment of the long-held dream of peaceful reunification with South Korea.
The reasons for these cascading failures go back as far as 2003, and are the result of a warped view of ‘realpolitik‘, driven by open and naked profit motives which are completely divorced from reality.
The Pyongyang government’s abysmal mismanagement of the nation has resulted in a brutal prison state, routinely wracked by famines, and whose industrial base remains firmly in the 1970’s, if that. In addition, North Korean intelligence has been routinely kidnapping Japanese citizens since the 1970’s, to train their foreign intelligence operatives (i.e., “spies”) how to act as citizens of western countries.
However, in two critical area’s, the almost obscenely resource-rich North Korea has spared no expense: its nuclear weapons and space launch programs.
While derided by many for their technological backwardness, poor national management, and cultural isolation, in these two critical areas, North Korean capabilities are nothing to be laughed at.
Bolton’s astoundingly bad judgement is what caused Trump’s failure in Hanoi, a decision-tree so bad, it could be seen as a deliberate act of sedition. North Korea’s nuclear strategy has been fundamentally shaped by the fate of other authoritarian leaders who gave up their WMD programs. The overthrow and subsequent deaths of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003) and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (2011), among others, provided “Supreme Leader” Kim Jong Un with compelling evidence that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of regime survival.
The Hanoi Disaster
The 2019 Hanoi Summit failed largely because of fundamentally different expectations. The Trump administration, abysmally advised by the hysterical chickenhawk, then-National Security Advisor John Bolton, then-US President Donald Trump was led to believe that North Korea could be “persuaded” to follow a “Libya model” of denuclearization. This profound misreading of Kim’s priorities doomed the talks before they began.
Kim arrived in Hanoi seeking a gradual approach: partial denuclearization in exchange for significant sanctions relief. The American position – complete denuclearization before any meaningful sanctions relief – was a non-starter for a regime that had learned harsh lessons from history: Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s youthful leader, is well aware of the vicious, gruesome and bloodthirsty cackle of then- (2011) US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gadaffi: “We Came, We Saw, He Died”…after the Libyan dictator had completely caved to Western pressure to abandon his “weapons of mass destruction” programs nerly a decade before, only to have the United States and NATO openly destroy his regime. Muammar Gadaffi was one of the foulest excuses for a human being in modern history, but the West made an agreement with him, then happily broke it at the first opportunity.
Kim Jong Un may be a lot of things, but an idiot, he most certainly is not.
Strategic Reassessment
The Hanoi summit’s collapse triggered a comprehensive reassessment in Pyongyang of North Korea’s strategic position:
Nuclear Strategy
– Nuclear weapons development needed to be accelerated
– Its missile testing program needed rapid expansion
– It needed to publicly acknowledge its nuclear status
Diplomatic Posture
– Reduced emphasis on US negotiations
– Strengthened ties with China and Russia
– Dismissal of South Korean outreach
North Korea’s military-industrial complex, while technologically stalled in the 1970’s for the most part, maintains a massive production capacity for basic weapons systems. Its ability to manufacture artillery ammunition using Soviet-era specifications has made it an ideal supplier for Russia’s war effort, allowing Russian industry the ability to slow its own production to refine and retool, even as western arms industries remain stalled in their production of the same supplies. This partnership offers multiple benefits to Pyongyang:
Economic Advantages
– Hard currency earnings
– Technology transfer opportunities
– Sanctions circumvention
Military Benefits
– Combat experience for troops
– Modern battlefield observations
– Testing of equipment in actual combat
Strategic Gains
– Stronger ties with a permanent UN Security Council member
– Reduced international isolation
– Leverage against US pressure
Of these points, the second – giving its troops modern combat experience – is the most valuable to North korea in the short term. It it very difficult for a military that has not actually fought a war in decades to know what new tools and techniques it should try to implement; armed forces around the world are notoriously conservative (to the point of being hidebound) for a reason, although rarely to the level of North Korea.
Whatever the reality of the fighting in Ukraine, “blooding” North Korean troops there could give them a significant advantage over their South Korean adversaries in a future fight, as South Korean troops have not had any experience in the kind of war currently being fought in Ukraine, despite having a significant technological advantage over their northern opposition.
Abandoning Reunification
The shift away from even theoretical peaceful reunification represents a significant change in North Korean policy. Since the Korean War armistice in 1953, both Korea’s have maintained reunification as an official goal, though with vastly different visions of how it would occur.
This policy shift serves several purposes:
Solidifies Kim’s domestic position
Justifies increased militarization
Enables closer alignment with Russia and China
Reduces diplomatic constraints on aggressive actions
The successful satellite launches demonstrate North Korea’s growing mastery of several critical ICBM technologies, particularly multi-stage rocket separation and long-range guidance systems. The primary technical hurdle remaining for effective ICBM capability is reentry vehicle technology – protecting a nuclear warhead during its hypersonic return through the atmosphere. Russian assistance in this area likely on Kim’s shopping list for providing weapons and troops to Russian leader Vladimir Putin, as Russia possesses some of the world’s most advanced reentry technologies.
Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, 2024. Public Domain Photo from the Government of North Korea.
By early 2024, North Korea had already demonstrated progress in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) development through tests of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, which appears designed to carry multiple warheads. Their March 2024 test of a new solid-fuel ICBM suggested further advances in this capability. MIRV technology would allow a single missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads, each capable of hitting different targets. This dramatically increases both first-strike capability and the ability to overwhelm missile defense systems.
The combination of proven satellite launch capabilities, potential Russian reentry assistance, and advancing MIRV technology could enable North Korea to deploy a credible nuclear triad system, fundamentally altering the strategic balance in Northeast Asia.
Regional Implications
This strategic realignment has profound implications for Northeast Asian security:
South Korea
– Increased military tension
– Reduced diplomatic options
– Stronger US alliance imperative
Japan
– Enhanced missile defense urgency
– Strengthened US security ties
– Increased military spending justification
China
– Complicated regional balance
– Reduced influence over DPRK
– New strategic calculations needed
The acquisition by North Korea of a credible strategic nuclear capability would represent a catastrophic shift of world power.
Looking Forward
North Korea’s evolution from a state theoretically seeking peaceful reunification to an active military supplier in global conflicts represents a significant shift in Northeast Asian security dynamics. This transformation, rooted in the failures (whether accidental or deliberate) of past diplomatic initiatives and Kim Jong Un’s determination to ensure the survival of his regime, suggests a more militarily active and less diplomatically constrained North Korea in the years ahead.
As this article goes to press, the United States is some four days away from the 2024 Presidential election. There is no way to know what will happen if Donald Trump wins on November 5th – but the outcome of a Harris victory is starkly and painfully clear, because any response they make to Kim’s new course will be either completely incoherent, or wildly overblown.
Choose wisely.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The United Kingdom’s descent from its position as a leading global financial center into economic turmoil represents one of the most dramatic shifts in modern economic history. While the roots of this decline can be traced to the 2008 global financial crisis, the combined shocks of Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Britain’s steadfast support of Ukraine has accelerated what many analysts now term Britain’s “Lost Decade.”
The Foundation Cracks: 2008-2016
The 2008 financial crisis hit London particularly hard, given its out sized role in global banking and finance. While other nations gradually recovered, Britain’s recovery was notably sluggish. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government’s austerity measures, implemented under Prime Minister David Cameron, may have prevented a sovereign debt crisis (while some 70 potential defaults currently exist), but came at the cost of reduced public services and infrastructure investment.
The 2016 Brexit referendum marked a crucial turning point. The vote to leave the European Union triggered immediate economic consequences: the pound sterling plummeted, investment decisions were frozen, and London’s position as Europe’s financial capital began to erode. Major financial institutions started relocating operations to Dublin, Frankfurt, and Paris.
The protracted Brexit negotiations created years of uncertainty, depressing business investment and complicating trade relationships. The eventual Trade and Cooperation Agreement, while avoiding a “no-deal” scenario, still resulted in significant new barriers to trade with Britain’s largest market.
The reality was that Britain’s trade was significantly undermined by the European Union’s bitter and petty actions, as that body did not was to lose the major tax revenues that Britain was contributing, at a time when the EU was a whole was still reeling from the 2008 crisis. The “better option”, from the EU’s perspective, was to make it as hard for Britain as possible to “go it alone”.
What made these effects far worse, were a series of bungling failures by successive governments in London, from both sides of the political aisle. These poorly-considered actions have functionally flat-lined the British economy…and things are not improving.
Pandemic Paralysis
COVID-19 struck Britain particularly hard, both in human and economic terms. The UK experienced one of Europe’s highest death rates and deepest economic contractions. The government’s pandemic response, while unprecedented in scale, added substantially to national debt. The furlough scheme, while preventing mass unemployment, cost hundreds of billions of pounds.
The pandemic exposed and exacerbated existing economic weaknesses. Supply chain disruptions, combined with Brexit-related complications, led to shortages and inflation. The National Health Service, already strained by years of austerity, faced enormous pressure.
Britain’s robust support for Ukraine, while strategically important, has come at a significant economic cost. Military aid, combined with sanctions against Russia, contributed to spiraling energy costs and inflation. The situation has forced difficult choices between domestic spending and international commitments.
The energy crisis has highlighted Britain’s vulnerability to global supply shocks. Despite North Sea oil and gas resources, years of under-investment in energy infrastructure and storage capacity left the country exposed to price volatility.
Successive governments in London have learned the US government’s model of “borrow ’til you crash”, piling on mountains of debt to support Kiev’s flagging hopes of survival, as ‘victory’ is very much a malleable terms.
Impact on Global Security
Britain’s economic challenges have resulted in drastic and cascading effects on global security:
Reduced Military Capability: Budget constraints have limited Britain’s ability to modernize its armed forces and maintain its traditional role in global security operations, something even the new Left-wing government of PM Keir Starmer could not ignore.
NATO Implications: While Britain continues to meet NATO’s 2% GDP defense spending target, the declining value of the pound means this represents less actual military capability.
Diplomatic Influence: Economic weakness has diminished Britain’s ‘soft power‘ and ability to influence global events through economic leverages.
Intelligence Capabilities: Budget pressures have affected Britain’s renowned intelligence services, potentially impacting the “Five Eyes Alliance“.
Recruitment Crisis and Cultural Shift
The British military’s recruitment challenges reflect deeper societal changes. Traditional sources of military recruitment – working-class communities with strong patriotic traditions – have been eroded by demographic shifts, changing cultural attitudes and recently, the stunningly draconian response of the Starmer government to a sudden spate of riots initially linked – albeit wrongly – to racial violence. The Armed Forces’ 2022-23 recruitment targets were missed by approximately 40%, marking the worst recruitment crisis since the end of conscription in 1960, although recruiting numbers in the United Kingdom have been dropping steadily since at least 2010.
This recruitment crisis stems from multiple factors. Economic uncertainty has paradoxically reduced rather than increased military recruitment, as potential recruits seek more stable civilian careers. More significantly, surveys indicate a growing disconnect between younger Britons and traditional concepts of national service. The proportion of young people expressing “pride in being British” has declined significantly, particularly in urban areas, leading to even Left-leaning pundits to suggest that the British Left needs to “re-embrace patriotism”.
The military has attempted to address this through modernized recruitment campaigns, often focusing on personal development and technical skills rather than patriotic duty. However, these efforts have met with mixed success, as they compete against private sector opportunities and what military leaders describe as an “individualistic zeitgeist” among younger generations.
This staffing crisis has forced difficult choices about force structure and capabilities, significantly limiting Britain’s ability to maintain its global military commitments.
Economic Indicators
The scale of Britain’s economic challenges is reflected in key indicators:
Persistent low productivity growth
Declining real wages
Rising income inequality
Chronic trade deficits
High government debt-to-GDP ratio
Weakening pound sterling
Reduced foreign direct investment
Looking Forward
Britain’s path to economic recovery remains uncertain. The country retains significant advantages: a highly skilled workforce, world-class universities, and leadership in sectors like fintech and renewable energy. However, structural challenges persist:
Aging infrastructure
Regional economic disparities
Skills shortages in key sectors
Housing market instability
Trade relationship uncertainties
Energy security concerns
The implications of these issues for global security will depend largely on Britain’s ability to navigate these challenges while maintaining its international commitments and modernizing its military capabilities.
The real problem for British security, however, remains the same as in the United States Armed Forces: an increasing percentage of the primary recruiting demographic – the “under-30” age group – simply do not see the point in volunteering to serve their country in the military, if at all, as it seemingly offers no opportunities over the civilian world, and has demonstrated (as in the United States and Canada) a staggeringly callous attitude towards treating the long-term impacts of combat on the country’s veterans…And, also as in the United States, if this trend is not reversed, the alternatives are not things any government wants to consider.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the shadowy world of conflict financing, a new player has emerged: cryptocurrency. As digital currencies like Bitcoin – once derided by many as useless money pits – increasingly gain mainstream acceptance, they are also becoming a tool for those operating outside the law, including insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and sanctioned states. This technological shift is reshaping the economics of modern warfare and challenging traditional methods of tracking and interdicting illicit funds. Money makes serious violent conflicts and wars possible, and cryptocurrencies are increasingly the preferred go-to for all non-state actors in conflicts…and major nations are not far behind.
The Rise of Crypto in Conflict Zones
Cryptocurrency’s key features – decentralization, anonymity, and borderless transactions – make it an attractive option for groups operating in conflict zones. Unlike traditional banking systems, which can be easily monitored and controlled by governments, cryptocurrencies offer a degree of financial autonomy that’s unprecedented in the digital age. It also holds the potential to radically expand the democratization of warfare, a subject we touched on last week.
In recent years, there have been several high-profile cases of cryptocurrency being used in conflict zones. In 2019, Hamas – the militant group controlling Gaza, responsible for the October 7, 2023 assault into Israel – turned to Bitcoin to solicit donations, bypassing international restrictions on its financing. Similarly, in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have leveraged cryptocurrencies: volunteers supporting Ukrainian forces have raised over $200 million in crypto donations, while some Russian-backed separatist groups have also turned to digital currencies to evade sanctions.
Terrorism Financing Goes Digital
The shift from traditional financing methods to cryptocurrency is particularly evident in terrorism financing. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups have increasingly turned to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to fund their operations. These groups often use social media platforms to solicit donations, providing Bitcoin addresses where supporters can send funds anonymously.
The ease of creating online fundraising campaigns with cryptocurrency has led to a new phenomenon: the crowdfunding of terror. In 2019, a website linked to Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria raised Bitcoin donations for weapons and training. The campaign, which ran on the dark web, promised donors anonymity and the ability to support jihad from anywhere in the world.
This has extended into Asia, as well, as extensive NFT networks have been employed to both raise and transfer cryptocurrencies into fungible cash. Part of this fallout comes in the form of Afghanistan coming to the fore as a clearinghouse for crypto transfers to terror groups, as the lax controls of the ruling Taliban – who returned to power after the bungled and disastrous withdrawal of United States forces from the country in 2021 by the Biden-Harris administration – effectively closing off surveillance and enforcement efforts within the pariah state.
Challenges for Law Enforcement
This new landscape of crypto-enabled conflict financing poses significant challenges for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Tracking and intercepting cryptocurrency transactions is a complex task, requiring specialized skills and technologies that many agencies are still developing. A major part of this is the reality of the “dark web“, and its associated “darknet markets“. Outside of cryptocurrency transfers, these markets allow all manner of criminal activity, including human trafficking and child pornography, as well as illicit drug trades, all of which terror groups have no issue leveraging such tools.
The catch for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in tracking terrorists and other criminals through the “dark web” lays in the fact that although the core operating principle of the ‘dark web’ – so-called “onion routing” – was developed and patented by the US Navy in 1998, the very nature of the system developed to secure US military and government communications networks means that forcing access remotely is virtually impossible. In fact, the arrest by the FBI of the founder and main operator of the notorious “Silk Road” darknet market in 2013 (which led to his life sentence in 2015) did not involve traditional methods of hacking, but involved an agent infiltrating the “Silk Road” site as an administrator, and using “social engineering” techniques to narrow down Ulbricht’s location, and using his personal security mistakes to finally locate him…”Hacking” really had nothing to do with the takedown of the “Silk Road“, because it cannot be taken down by conventional methods of “hack-attack“.
The pseudonymous nature of most blockchain transactions using the “non-fungible token” protocol that makes cryptocurrencies viable, provides a veneer of anonymity, though it’s not impenetrable. Agencies like the FBI have had some success in tracing Bitcoin transactions related to ransomware attacks and other cybercrimes. However, newer “privacy coins” like Monero offer even greater anonymity, making them increasingly popular among those seeking to avoid detection.
Legal and jurisdictional issues further complicate matters. As cryptocurrency transactions usually cross international borders, questions are raised concerning which agencies have authority to investigate and prosecute any “criminal activity” based on a computer physically located in their countries, not least because a specific instance of criminal activity in one country is not necessarily such in another country, as was demonstrated in 2012, when Hungarian scam artists attempted to run an insurance fraud scheme in the wake of the Costa Concordia disaster. The lack of consistent regulations across countries creates loopholes that bad actors can exploit.
The Humanitarian Dilemma
Interestingly, the same features that make cryptocurrencies attractive for illicit financing also make them valuable for delivering humanitarian aid to conflict zones. In areas where traditional banking systems have broken down, or where governments restrict the flow of funds, cryptocurrencies can provide a lifeline for aid organizations.
For example, during Venezuela’s economic crisis, some aid groups turned to cryptocurrency to deliver assistance, bypassing the country’s dysfunctional financial system and strict currency controls. Similarly, in Afghanistan, some NGOs have explored using cryptocurrencies to continue operations after the Taliban takeover restricted traditional financial channels.
However, this humanitarian use of cryptocurrencies presents its own risks. The same channels used to deliver aid could potentially be exploited by militant groups to divert funds. This creates a complex balancing act for aid organizations and regulators alike, not least as crypto-financing is increasingly being seen as a negative, since it is a “hidden” method of finance.
Looking to the Future
As cryptocurrencies continue to evolve, so too will their impact on conflict financing. The development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and the increasing sophistication of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms will likely create new opportunities and challenges in this space.
Regulators and international bodies are scrambling to keep up. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, has issued guidelines for regulating virtual assets. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, especially given the rapid pace of technological change in the crypto world.
The impact of cryptocurrencies on global power dynamics is also worth considering. As digital currencies potentially weaken the effectiveness of economic sanctions, traditional forms of financial warfare may become less potent. This could lead to a shift in how nations project power and influence on the global stage.
Conclusion
The rise of cryptocurrency in conflict financing represents a significant shift in the landscape of modern warfare. While it offers new opportunities for bad actors to fund their activities, it also presents potential benefits in terms of delivering aid and fostering financial inclusion in unstable regions.
As we move forward, the challenge will be to develop adaptive policies and technologies that can mitigate the risks of crypto-enabled conflict financing while preserving the innovative potential of blockchain technology. This will require unprecedented cooperation between governments, financial institutions, and the tech sector.
The genie of cryptocurrency is out of the bottle, and its impact on conflict financing is here to stay. The responses to this challenge will shape the future of global security in the digital age.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Disclaimer: Although The Freedomist is dedicated to the notion of a free and open press, there are realities that we must negotiate in our coverage. This article is one of those cases. Herein, we will be discussing very controversial subjects – more so than in our regular articles – and we must acknowledge here, that we are deliberately leaving out some information for, frankly, legal concerns. While we are steadfastly in favor of our Readers being fully prepared for any instance or circumstance, we cannot help in that if we face crushing legal action. That is the reality of the world of 2024. “YOU are your own ‘first responder’.”
In the dense jungles of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, a revolution is unfolding. But this isn’t just a political uprising – it’s a testament to a global shift in the nature of warfare itself. The conflict in Myanmar exemplifies a broader trend: the democratization of military-grade capabilities. This phenomenon is reshaping conflicts worldwide, from the streets of Syria to the arid landscapes of North Africa.
The 3D-Printed Revolution
Factions of the Myanmar resistance movements have embraced technology in ways that would have been unimaginable just a decade ago. Anti-government rebels are using 3D printers to manufacture both components for weapons and drones, as well as complete firearms. This isn’t unique to Myanmar; across the globe, additive manufacturing is putting military-grade capabilities into the hands of non-state actors.
While the first 3D printed firearm, the “Liberator” developed by Defense Distributed of Austin, TX, in 2013 – was a crude, single-shot weapon created more as a protest against government overreach than as a practical weapons, that has now changed drastically. Internet based, open-source, online collaboration in real time allowed people around the world to rapidly develop and prototype ideas and leverage existing technologies…resulting in usable weapons that can be produced in a person’s garage, which requires minimal skill to complete.
The release of the FGC-9 in 2018-2019 radically reshaped the field, allowing the creation of a combat-capable weapon. The FGC-9, designed by Jacob Duygu, a Kurdish German gun designer (known on the internet as “JStark1809“, who died under questionable circumstances following a raid on his home by German police in 2021), is technically a “pistol caliber carbine” (or, “PCC”) that is one hundred percent 3D printed, down to the barrel and the bolt. The FGC-9 is now “combat proven” in Myanmar, with the weapons mostly being built in “guerrilla factories” across the border in Thailand, and smuggled into the fighting areas.
A photo of FGC-9 firearm unassembled components, 2020. Photo credit: JStark1809/Deterrence Dispensed. CCA/4.0
The fundamental difference between the FGC-9 and other “garage guns“, such as the WW2 STEN Gun or the weapons designs of Philip Luty in the 1990’s is that a person trying to build these weapons still needs at least minimal machine tooling and metal stock. In contrast, the FGC-9 needs plastic and powder-metal media, and a 3D printer capable of both running the required programs and curing the injected or sintered material, making it drastically harder to identify and control the flow of raw materials to guerrilla factories.
Likewise, if one looks around the internet hard enough, plans for heavier support weapons – everything from mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), up to surface-to-air missiles – can be found. We will not list those particular sources here, for two reasons: first, because of legal liability, and second, because that information should be available to those needing it – such as the rebels battling a brutal dictatorship in Myanmar – because the balance of the potential good outweighs the potential for evil: “bad actors” will find a way to commit violent acts no matter what impotent, even if well-intentioned, laws prohibiting the ownership of inanimate objects are passed.
And it is not just the weapons themselves that are being printed. The manufacture of ammunition via a 3D printing application of laser sintering technology is now capable of producing not simply projectiles (i.e., bullets), but producing propellant. While still in the early stages of development, this eliminates two of the four components required to manufacture conventional ammunition, leaving only the case and ignition primer needing manufacture.
And then, we come to drones. While drone warfare is definitely not the overwhelming and decisive factor that it has been made out to be over the last decade, it does offer some significant benefits to non-governmental forces. Drones selling for less than US$100 on Amazon are capable of conducting missions ranging from aerial reconnaissance to combat target servicing, whether by dropping explosives onto a target, or by crashing into a target such as a battle tank, like a latter-day Japanese kamikaze plane. Likewise, drone parts kits are available to build much larger drones, capable of carrying much heavier payloads.
Greenville, NC Police department’s DJI Matrice drone. 2022. Photo by Greenville Police Department. CC0/1.0 Public Domain.
The implications heralded by the combat deployment and use of the FGC-9, on top of the repurposing of civilian drone copters for combat, are profound. State monopolies on military hardware are eroding, and with them, long-held assumptions about the balance of power in conflicts.
From Homebrewed Tanks & Artillery To Navies & Air Forces
The democratization of military capabilities isn’t limited to high-tech solutions. Since the 1980’s, pickup trucks converted into mobile fighting platforms—often dubbed “technicals”—have become ubiquitous in small-scale conflicts. These improvised fighting vehicles represent a low-tech but highly effective form of military innovation.
In Syria, this concept has been taken to new extremes. Civilian defense groups of all factions have constructed homemade armored vehicles, resembling mini-tanks, using salvaged materials and ingenious engineering. These vehicles, while not a match for modern main battle tanks (even when armed with ATGM’s), have proven surprisingly effective in urban combat scenarios. Of course, the use of these “technicals“, even if only otherwise standard pickup trucks fitted with machine guns in their beds, provides a low-tech group with a fast-moving force that can swiftly achieve spectacular results, given the right conditions.
But combat vehicles are not limited to armed pickup trucks. Returning to Syria, various forces in the mid-2010’s began building so-called “Hell Cannons“. These improvised artillery pieces fired homemade projectiles made from large propane canisters, capable of packing an impressive payload of explosives. While slow to load and not particularly accurate, these weapons are capable of inflicting significant damage on any area where their shells land. And, if fired as a battery, they can somewhat mitigate their slow reloading speed, as these weapons are almost always mounted on trailers, allowing them to be swiftly displaced and re-positioned.
“Hell Cannon” in Syria, 2014. CC0/1.0 Public Domain.
Similarly, there has been a maturing of “improvised navies“. Beginning, in the modern era, with the “Tamil Tigers” extensive use of smallcraft, as well as leveraging civilian freighters as mobile sea bases, many navies – notably that of Iran – have embraced the widespread use of small, high-speed boats to both attack larger civilian vessels, but also to execute the normal range of of uses for such vessels, such as inshore patrol and policing (in small, poor nations), guerrilla supply along inshore and riverine areas, and the insertion of small teams of combat troops – much like large-state special forces – into remote areas to avoid interception. This has occasionally escalated to actual, theater-level amphibious campaigns.
In the America’s, “narco submarines” have been a continual headache for police and naval forces in several countries. While these vessels (most are not really ‘submarines‘…but some are) are not known to be used for covert insertions, they certainly can be. For the moment, however, the United States seems to still be blessed with the rule from before the 9/11 Attacks, that most of the terrorist and guerrilla groups in the world refrained from attacking targets inside the United States, as most of their funding came from ex-patriot donations from their communities of immigrants and refugees living here.
Crew of the Coast Guard cutter Stratton interdicting semi-submersible vessel on July 18 2015. USCG photo bu PO2 LaNola Stone. Public Domain.
But there is also a little talked about element: “DIY Air Forces“. Increasingly, in addition to drones, well-funded insurgent groups are leveraging lightweight civilian aircraft, including autogyros. While the legions of internet flag officers around the world laughed at the Communist Chinese idea of deploying autogyros for lightweight air assault…but, after the Hamas offensive that began on October 7th of 2023, only the truly stupid still laugh, as Hamas deployed airborne raiders (against, being fair, a group of unarmed teens and 20-somethings at a rave) via paragliders, which are essentially a parachute driven by a large fan worn by the user.
Technology is advancing, and the once-fanciful shticks used as stunts in movies from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, are no longer fantasy, but hard, capable combat systems that are affordable – and acquirable – by virtually anyone.
Training, Command, and Combat Control in the Digital Age
Perhaps one of the most striking examples of democratized military capabilities comes from recent conflicts, where non-state actors have rapidly established sophisticated command and control systems using off-the-shelf technology.
In the terrorist assault on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008, the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacker’s command group repurposed a commercial office as an improvised command center, and did so at short notice. Equipped with consumer-grade computers, open-source mapping software, and encrypted messaging apps, they coordinated dispersed, complex operations, including verifying assassination targets in real time, using Google to match pictures of victims to their names and titles via facial recognition technologies, with an efficiency that rivaled traditional military and police command structures.
More and more, new desktop software and smartphone-based apps are offering armed non-governmental actors the ability to use many of the same tools as far better funded national armed forces. These tools run the gamut, from translation apps to 3D mapping and planning tools that, hwiler perhaps not exactly ‘military spec’, are certainly ‘good enough’; in some cases, regular national forces use many of these same programs and apps, because the civilian developers simply build better tools.
But there is a deeper question: How are “rag-tag guerrillas” acquiring the training necessary to conduct these operations?
In the ‘old days’, this was mostly done via trial and error or via some group of experienced advisors, either from the national military, or from a ‘friendly’ foreign power; occasionally, desperate but well-funded groups would hire foreign mercenaries to train and lead their “popular liberation forces” in the field…But today, those blocked or otherwise unable to attend formal military training courses have an alternate: finding military training manuals online.
There are literally dozens of archival repositories scattered throughout the internet, loaded with declassified or never-classified military manuals from dozens of nations. These are frequently the current editions of manuals on a given subject. It is important to note that this is no substitute for a measured, supervised course of instruction. Leaders – especially military leaders – are not created overnight. However…in an environment where military leadership is suddenly needed, those individuals who see themselves as filling that role, can now tweeze out at least a reasonable series of academic learning.
But what about actual “field training“?
In previous decades of the late-20th Century, civilians attempting to provide themselves with military training usually resorted, to be frank, to the old children’s game pf “Army”, shouting “BANG!” at each other with rifles; in this, they were not too different from pre-World War 2 training, at least in the United States. The US military, obviously, radically reformed its training regimen after that war, to make its troops far better prepared for the next go-round.
Today, however, the increasing popularity of “combat games” such as AirSoft (or the older paintball) offer a facsimile of military training – neither as good, nor as consistent as a regular force – that is still sufficient to offer much more than a “first step”.
The Global Implications of Military-Sphere Democratization
The democratization of military capabilities is redrawing the maps of global power and conflict. Small nations and non-state actors now have access to capabilities once reserved solely to major powers and their proxies. This shift is forcing a reevaluation of traditional military doctrines and international relations:
Asymmetric Warfare Evolved: The line between state and non-state military capabilities is blurring, making conflicts more unpredictable and potentially more protracted.
Proliferation Challenges: Traditional arms control measures are struggling to adapt to a world where military capabilities can be ‘printed’ or improvised.
Ethics and Legality: The ease of accessing military capabilities raises complex ethical and legal questions about the conduct of war and the definition of combatants.
Innovation Acceleration: The decentralized nature of these developments is driving rapid innovation, often outpacing traditional military R&D cycles.
Global Security Landscape: As capabilities proliferate, the potential for conflict may increase, but so too might the barriers to large-scale war.
A Look Ahead
In this new landscape, the international community faces tough questions. How does the world manage the proliferation of military capabilities in an age of digital sharing and additive manufacture? Can international laws and norms adapt quickly enough to address these changes?
The democratization of military capabilities is not just changing how wars are fought; it’s changing who can fight them effectively and why they’re fought in the first place. As technology continues to evolve, so too will the face of warfare. The challenge for the global community is to navigate this new reality, seeking ways to harness its potential for defense and deterrence while mitigating its risks. The reality, however, is that the result of both the widespread dissemination of information, matched to blockchain technology, virtual private networks (VPNs), and additive manufacture, make controlling the flow of information virtually impossible.
In the jungles of Myanmar, the deserts of Syria, and countless other corners of the globe, the future of conflict is being written not just by states and their armies, but by individuals armed with ingenuity, determination, and increasingly, the tools to challenge traditional power structures. The world must take notice and adapt, for the genie of democratized military capability cannot be put back in the bottle.
At the same time, these tools are just that – tools. Tools are inanimate objects, and because of this, they have no independent intent. Tools are used for both good and evil actions, and those with the intent determine the direction and tone of the use of those tools – no matter where those tools are directed.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
As humanity’s presence in space grows, so too does the potential for conflict. The militarization of space – “space war”, if one prefers – was once the realm of science fiction, but is rapidly becoming a reality that promises to reshape global security dynamics in the 21st century.
The concept of space as a military domain is not new. Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, nations have recognized the strategic importance of space. Early military applications focused on reconnaissance and communication satellites, which have played crucial roles during the Cold War, and the wars of the 21st century. However, recent years have seen a dramatic acceleration in the development and deployment of military space capabilities.
Confrontation In Space
As far back as 1981, author G. Harry Stine, one of the founders of model rocketry in the United States, and a notable author of hard science and technology writings, as well as science fiction, laid down the basics of warfare in space in his book “Confrontation In Space“, defining the basic shape and dimensions of the battlespace, the most likely weapons that will be used, and outlining the early concepts of how combat in space would be waged.
There is no science fiction in this book, and no technobabble, just the hard realities of applying warfare “in the Black”, to reference a certain TV show, to the real world. Given the general nature of some of the space-war musings of the time that have since been declassified by official sources, Stine is a refreshingly sane and soberingly realistic voice.
The extent to which Stine’s work has influenced modern space battle planning is open to question; it should be a fundamental text, but given the current mission statement of the United States Space Force (USSF), that seems unlikely.
Today, the major players in space militarization are the United States, China, and Russia, with other nations like India and Japan also expanding their capabilities. These countries are investing heavily in a wide range of space-based military technologies. The United States, however, long one of the main innovators of space exploration, only established the USSF in 2019 as a separate branch of its armed forces, signaling the growing importance of space in military doctrine.
Current military space capabilities go far beyond simple reconnaissance. They include the creation and servicing of advanced communication networks (which underpins the basic operation of the internet), precision navigation systems like GPS and early warning systems to detect ballistic missile launches. However, in recent years, China, Russia, and the United States have all demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities, raising fears about the vulnerability of critical space infrastructure, demonstrating the ability of national actors to destroy satellites at will.
An artist’s illustration of the Soviet-era Istrebitel Sputnikov ASAT system, c.1986. US Government image. Public Domain.
Technological advancements are driving this new space race. The miniaturization of satellites has made it easier and cheaper to launch large constellations of small satellites, enhancing resilience and coverage, as well as opening the potential for true “surge capacity”, to rapidly launch replacement satellites to replace combat losses. In addition to rapid reconstitution of a damaged communications network, the need to replace combat-lost GPS satellites is a key function of satellite surge capacity, because most military vehicle and targeting systems rely on GPS for navigation in addition to combat. Reusable launch vehicles, pioneered by companies like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, have dramatically reduced the cost of accessing space, which has lowered the barrier to entry for military space programs.
Throwing Rocks
Fundamental to actual warfare in space is the development of dedicated weapons for use in the theater. While actual weapons have been fired in space, these weapons go far beyond lasers, high-powered microwave systems, or even the darling of recent science fiction shows, the “particle accelerator“. In fact, the most lethal weapons in space will likely be rocks: “mass drivers“, essentially an electromagnetic catapult, can accelerate iron-rich space rocks (as small as pebbles) to very high velocities, far faster than conventional bullets or cannon rounds. A hit from a very high-speed projectile of any nature could be a catastrophic damage source to any spacecraft, as current launch systems severely limit the weight of spacecraft, which in turn limits the amount of armor a vessel can carry, assuming that current armor would even be effective. While still largely theoretical, such weapons could revolutionize space warfare, and require careful thought and planning to employ.
In response to these emerging threats, nations are working to develop countermeasures and defensive strategies; most of these, it much be noted, are ‘passive’ in nature, as active countermeasures are currently ill defined. The strategies currently in development include hardening satellites against attacks, improving space situational awareness to detect threats, and developing rapid launch capabilities to quickly replace damaged or destroyed satellites.
Bright Light Boom
There is also the possibility – perhaps “likelihood” – that someone will eventually detonate a nuclear weapon as part of an actual battle in space. The main considerations in using these weapons in space begin with exactly where they are detonated. If a large enough warhead were detonated at a suitable altitude above the surface, it could – in theory – generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sufficient to overload and shutdown, if not outright destroy, any large-scale power grid. This phenomenon was first recognized in 1962 during the Starfish Prime test, when an unexpected EMP wave from the detonation knocked out power to parts of the city of Honolulu, Hawaii.
Photo of the Starfish Prime detonation in the skies over Honolulu, Hawaii, 1962. US Government photo. Public Domain.
Aside from the well-known, at least in a broad sense, radiation effects (which would likely be magnified in space, without an atmosphere to absorb them) and EMP concerns, the main damage-causing mechanism of a nuclear blast on Earth – blast effect, caused by the compression of the atmosphere by the detonation wave – would not be present, as there is no atmosphere in space that can be compressed into a destructive force.
For all that, however, work on “bomb-pumped lasers” and other exotic warhead designs such as Project Casaba-Howitzer (which used a nuclear weapon to create a shaped charge from material vaporized into plasma by the blast), largely came an end – at least publicly – at the end of the 1980’s, as it was clear that the Soviet Union was dying, and that the prospect of all-out nuclear war had rapidly begun to fade.
Pulse propulsion unit of project Orion vehicle, used as the basis for the Casaba-Howitzer warhead concept, 1964. NASA image. Public Domain.
As the possibility of actual open warfare in space continues to rear its head, it is a near-certainty that many of these old programs are being reexamined, using fresh data and better computer modeling…The possible side effects, however, remain.
Combat Logistics in Space Warfare
One of the most challenging aspects of space militarization is the issue of combat logistics. Unlike terrestrial warfare, where supply lines can be established and maintained relatively easily, space presents unique challenges for sustaining military operations.
The primary hurdle is the enormous energy requirement to launch materials into orbit. Every kilogram of supplies, whether fuel, ammunition, or replacement parts, comes with a very high price tag (over $2,000 per kilogram) and significant challenges to logistical load planning, in both loading and unloading at point of delivery. This makes traditional resupply methods impractical for sustained operations in-theater, as we understand the idea.
To address these issue, military planners are exploring several approaches. One concept is the development of in-orbit refueling capabilities. This would involve specialized “tanker” satellites capable of transferring fuel to other spacecraft, extending their operational lifespan and maneuverability.
A contour plot (not drawn to scale) of the effective potential of a two-body system, showing the 5 Lagrange points. NASA image. Public Domain.
Another area of focus is in-space manufacturing. Advanced 3D printing technologies – currently capable of making conventional ammunition-using select-fire weapons a factor in infantry combat – could allow for the production of spare parts or even small satellites directly in orbit, reducing the need for launches from Earth. Different avenues of research are exploring the possibility of mining asteroids or the Moon for resources, which could provide a sustainable source of materials and fuel for space-based operations.
Robotic servicing missions represent another potential tool in the box. These would involve unmanned spacecraft under direct, if remote, control, or completely autonomous systems guided by artificial intelligence, which would be capable of repairing, refueling, or upgrading other satellites or spacecraft, potentially extending their useful life and reducing the need for replacement of complete craft.
The concept of staging pre-positioned orbital depots is also being considered. These would be stockpiles of fuel, spare parts, and other critical supplies placed in strategic orbits, such as the Lagrangian points, ready to support military space operations as needed. In form, these might take the form of the old Skylab design, as – being the size of a 3-bedroom house – the design could hold a significant amount of material.
Artist’s concept illustration of the Skylab with the Command/Service Module docked to the Multiple Docking Adapter. 1972. NASA photo.
These logistical challenges and their potential solutions will play a crucial role in shaping the nature of future space warfare. The side that can most effectively sustain its space-based capabilities may gain a significant strategic advantage in any potential conflict extending into the space domain.
The Future
The future of space militarization remains uncertain, but several scenarios seem plausible. One possibility is the outbreak of a limited conflict in space, perhaps involving the destruction of key military or civilian satellites. This could have cascading effects on terrestrial military operations and civilian infrastructure.
Another scenario envisions the deployment of space-based weapons capable of striking targets on Earth. While technically challenging and currently prohibited by international treaty, such systems could offer significant strategic advantages.
A third possibility is the integration of space-based capabilities with terrestrial, air, and naval forces to create a seamless, multi-domain military force. This could enhance military effectiveness but also increase reliance on potentially vulnerable space assets.
As we look to the future, it’s clear that space will play an increasingly important role in military affairs. The challenge for the international community will be to balance the legitimate use of space for national security with the need to prevent a destabilizing arms race in orbit. Failure to do so could turn the final frontier into the next battlefield.
The period from 2020 onward has seen a significant escalation in tensions between Israel and its regional adversaries, primarily Iran and its proxy forces, Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the more distant Houthi’s of Yemen. This complex web of conflicts and alliances has continued to shape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, and has significantly escalated tensions, to the point of a realistic chance for a much-expanded war.
The long-standing animosity between Israel and Islamic revolutionary Iran began to intensify in the early 2020’s. Iran’s nuclear program remained a central point of contention, with Israel consistently opposing any deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear development; this attempt at preventing nuclear proliferation, however integral to Israel’s security as it may be, is also highly unrealistic; the assassination of top Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, widely attributed to Israel, marked a significant escalation, as this differed from the Israeli Mossad’s previous assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh in Dubai, as the killing of Fakhrizadeh happened within Iran itself.
In this context, Israel is now accused of the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political head, who was killed in his hotel room on July 31st, in an apparent drone attack. This, too, occurred in Iran, but in the capital of Tehran itself. While Israel is unarguably at war, following the Hamas offensive of Oct. 7, 2023, an assassination such as this – known as a “decapitation strike” in military parlance – happening in a technically-neutral country (even given the events of April of 2024), is doing Israel no favors internationally.
The Biden administration has proven itself ineffectual with its diplomatic efforts, demonstrating both weakness and incoherence, to the point of encouraging the ambition of the Iranian ruling mullahs.
The election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi (who was killed on May 19th, 2024 in a helicopter crash while returning from neighboring Azerbaijian) as Iran’s president in 2021 further complicated diplomatic efforts. Raisi’s administration took a more confrontational stance towards both Israel and the West, leading to increased concerns about regional stability.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah – the Iran-backed militant group that has controlled Lebanon’s southeastern Bekaa Valley since the mid-1980’s, remained a significant threat to Israel’s northern border. In 2020 and 2021, there were several minor skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border, though both sides managed to avoid a full-scale conflict.
Israel continued to conduct airstrikes in Syria, targeting what it claimed were Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. These operations aimed to prevent the group from obtaining advanced missile systems that could threaten Israeli cities.
In 2022, tensions further escalated when Israel and Lebanon engaged in U.S.-mediated negotiations over their maritime border, which involved disputed gas fields. Hezbollah threatened to attack Israeli gas installations if an agreement wasn’t reached, leading to a tense standoff that was eventually resolved through diplomacy. Now, following a rocket attack on the Israeli Druze community of Majdal Shams on 27 July that killed a number of Druze children, Israel is at the point of invading southern Lebanon to try and attrit Hezbollah’s ability to strike into Israel, much as it attempted in 2006. In this, the ineffectual Lebanese government can offer no resistance against an invasion, or even an “incursion”, and calling on Muslim countries for aid could easily trigger a new civil war in the unstable and bankrupt nation.
In the south, the situation in Gaza remained volatile, with periodic flare-ups of violence between Israel and Hamas, which has retained power in Gaza since 2006, when Hamas won Gaza’s first election – then made sure that no other elections occurred to challenge its grip on power. In May 2021, a significant escalation occurred when Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza fired thousands of rockets at Israel. Israel responded with extensive airstrikes on Gaza, resulting in a 11-day conflict that caused substantial casualties and damage. The aftermath of this short conflict saw increased international pressure for a long-term solution to the Gaza situation. However, progress remained elusive, with Hamas maintaining its control over Gaza and continuing to clash with Israeli forces, which would escalate dramatically on October 7th of 2023.
In 2022 and 2023, there were several smaller-scale exchanges of fire between Gaza militants and Israel. These incidents, while not escalating to the level of the 2021 conflict, served to maintain a state of tension and uncertainty in the region.
The ongoing civil war in Syria that began in 2011, and the unstable situation in Lebanon have provided fertile ground for proxy conflicts involving Israel, Iran, and their respective allies. Israel continued its policy of preventing Iranian entrenchment in Syria through targeted airstrikes, while Iran sought to maintain and expand its influence in the region.
The Abraham Accords, negotiated by US President Donald Trump and signed in 2020, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, altered the regional dynamics. This realignment put additional pressure on Iran and its allies, as Israel’s diplomatic and strategic position in the Middle East was greatly strengthened.
The conflict between these actors is increasingly playing out in the cyber domain. Both Israel and Iran have engaged in sophisticated cyber attacks against each other’s infrastructure, including attempts to disrupt nuclear facilities, water supplies, and electrical grids. For its own part, rumors persist that Israel was at least partly behind the deployment of the highly destructive STUXNET virus in 2010.
Covert operations, including assassinations and sabotage, have become more frequent – as with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh noted above – as the conflict has evolved. These actions, carried out with only the thinnest veneer of “plausible deniability“, have served to maintain tension without triggering open warfare; that situation, however, may be coming to an end.
The United States remains heavily involved in the region – building on its rocky, 20 years “War on Terror” – by supporting Israel while also attempting to prevent a widening conflict. The Biden administration’s efforts to re-engage with Iran on the nuclear issue met with – being charitable – mixed success, complicated by regional tensions and domestic politics in both the U.S. and Iran, as well as its own failings in the disastrous end to United States adventurism in Afghanistan. The Biden-Harris administration has consistently demonstrated that it cannot make any sort of definitive decision, one way or another, on the diplomatic front.
Russia and China also play significant roles in the Levantine conflict, with Russia maintaining its presence in Syria and with China increasing its economic and diplomatic engagement with Iran. In both cases, Moscow and Beijing figuratively smell blood in the water, as they sense the weakness in NATO [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO] as a whole, but also in the United States in particular, as the Biden-Harris team continues to flounder internationally.
The ongoing conflicts and tensions have had severe humanitarian consequences, particularly in Gaza and parts of Lebanon. International organizations repeatedly called for increased access to provide aid and for all parties to respect international humanitarian law. The ongoing war in Gaza following the October 7 massacre, as well as the Houthi strikes against Red Sea shipping, has only made the situation far worse, with Israel now resolved to end the Gaza question once and for all, leading to worsening violence and rhetoric directed against them in the West, with criticism coming from all sides, driving the Israeli mindset further into an “Us Alone Against The World” outlook.
As of early 2024, the situation remained tense and unpredictable. While full-scale war has been avoided so far, the risk of escalation into a much wider war – a war with the potential to draw in larger powers is increasingly possible. The interplay between Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas continues to be a major driving factor in regional instability, with implications extending far beyond the Middle East. The international community is attempting to remain engaged, seeking ways to reduce tensions and prevent a larger conflict, but face significant challenges due to systemic internal problems facing Western nations, crushing demographic issues with Communist China, and Russia’s seemingly interminable war in Ukraine.
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