Essays – Page 8 – The Freedomist

Cryptocurrency and Conflict Financing – Reshaping the Economics of Modern Warfare

Michael Cessna September 6, 2024

In the shadowy world of conflict financing, a new player has emerged: cryptocurrency. As digital currencies like Bitcoin – once derided by many as useless money pits – increasingly gain mainstream acceptance, they are also becoming a tool for those operating outside the law, including insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and sanctioned states. This technological shift is reshaping the economics of modern warfare and challenging traditional methods of tracking and interdicting illicit funds. Money makes serious violent conflicts and wars possible, and cryptocurrencies are increasingly the preferred go-to for all non-state actors in conflicts…and major nations are not far behind.

The Rise of Crypto in Conflict Zones

Cryptocurrency’s key features – decentralization, anonymity, and borderless transactions – make it an attractive option for groups operating in conflict zones. Unlike traditional banking systems, which can be easily monitored and controlled by governments, cryptocurrencies offer a degree of financial autonomy that’s unprecedented in the digital age. It also holds the potential to radically expand the democratization of warfare, a subject we touched on last week.

In recent years, there have been several high-profile cases of cryptocurrency being used in conflict zones. In 2019, Hamas – the militant group controlling Gaza, responsible for the October 7, 2023 assault into Israel – turned to Bitcoin to solicit donations, bypassing international restrictions on its financing. Similarly, in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have leveraged cryptocurrencies: volunteers supporting Ukrainian forces have raised over $200 million in crypto donations, while some Russian-backed separatist groups have also turned to digital currencies to evade sanctions.

Terrorism Financing Goes Digital

The shift from traditional financing methods to cryptocurrency is particularly evident in terrorism financing. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups have increasingly turned to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to fund their operations. These groups often use social media platforms to solicit donations, providing Bitcoin addresses where supporters can send funds anonymously.

The ease of creating online fundraising campaigns with cryptocurrency has led to a new phenomenon: the crowdfunding of terror. In 2019, a website linked to Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria raised Bitcoin donations for weapons and training. The campaign, which ran on the dark web, promised donors anonymity and the ability to support jihad from anywhere in the world.

This has extended into Asia, as well, as extensive NFT networks have been employed to both raise and transfer cryptocurrencies into fungible cash. Part of this fallout comes in the form of Afghanistan coming to the fore as a clearinghouse for crypto transfers to terror groups, as the lax controls of the ruling Taliban – who returned to power after the bungled and disastrous withdrawal of United States forces from the country in 2021 by the Biden-Harris administration – effectively closing off surveillance and enforcement efforts within the pariah state.

Challenges for Law Enforcement

This new landscape of crypto-enabled conflict financing poses significant challenges for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Tracking and intercepting cryptocurrency transactions is a complex task, requiring specialized skills and technologies that many agencies are still developing. A major part of this is the reality of the “dark web“, and its associated “darknet markets“. Outside of cryptocurrency transfers, these markets allow all manner of criminal activity, including human trafficking and child pornography, as well as illicit drug trades, all of which terror groups have no issue leveraging such tools.

The catch for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in tracking terrorists and other criminals through the “dark web” lays in the fact that although the core operating principle of the ‘dark web’ – so-called “onion routing” – was developed and patented by the US Navy in 1998, the very nature of the system developed to secure US military and government communications networks means that forcing access remotely is virtually impossible. In fact, the arrest by the FBI of the founder and main operator of the notorious “Silk Road” darknet market in 2013 (which led to his life sentence in 2015) did not involve traditional methods of hacking, but involved an agent infiltrating the “Silk Road” site as an administrator, and using “social engineering” techniques to narrow down Ulbricht’s location, and using his personal security mistakes to finally locate him…”Hacking” really had nothing to do with the takedown of the “Silk Road“, because it cannot be taken down by conventional methods of “hack-attack“.

The pseudonymous nature of most blockchain transactions using the “non-fungible token” protocol that makes cryptocurrencies viable, provides a veneer of anonymity, though it’s not impenetrable. Agencies like the FBI have had some success in tracing Bitcoin transactions related to ransomware attacks and other cybercrimes. However, newer “privacy coins” like Monero offer even greater anonymity, making them increasingly popular among those seeking to avoid detection.

Legal and jurisdictional issues further complicate matters. As cryptocurrency transactions usually cross international borders, questions are raised concerning which agencies have authority to investigate and prosecute any “criminal activity” based on a computer physically located in their countries, not least because a specific instance of criminal activity in one country is not necessarily such in another country, as was demonstrated in 2012, when Hungarian scam artists attempted to run an insurance fraud scheme in the wake of the Costa Concordia disaster. The lack of consistent regulations across countries creates loopholes that bad actors can exploit.

The Humanitarian Dilemma

Interestingly, the same features that make cryptocurrencies attractive for illicit financing also make them valuable for delivering humanitarian aid to conflict zones. In areas where traditional banking systems have broken down, or where governments restrict the flow of funds, cryptocurrencies can provide a lifeline for aid organizations.

For example, during Venezuela’s economic crisis, some aid groups turned to cryptocurrency to deliver assistance, bypassing the country’s dysfunctional financial system and strict currency controls. Similarly, in Afghanistan, some NGOs have explored using cryptocurrencies to continue operations after the Taliban takeover restricted traditional financial channels.

However, this humanitarian use of cryptocurrencies presents its own risks. The same channels used to deliver aid could potentially be exploited by militant groups to divert funds. This creates a complex balancing act for aid organizations and regulators alike, not least as crypto-financing is increasingly being seen as a negative, since it is a “hidden” method of finance.

Looking to the Future

As cryptocurrencies continue to evolve, so too will their impact on conflict financing. The development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and the increasing sophistication of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms will likely create new opportunities and challenges in this space.

Regulators and international bodies are scrambling to keep up. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, has issued guidelines for regulating virtual assets. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, especially given the rapid pace of technological change in the crypto world.

The impact of cryptocurrencies on global power dynamics is also worth considering. As digital currencies potentially weaken the effectiveness of economic sanctions, traditional forms of financial warfare may become less potent. This could lead to a shift in how nations project power and influence on the global stage.

Conclusion

The rise of cryptocurrency in conflict financing represents a significant shift in the landscape of modern warfare. While it offers new opportunities for bad actors to fund their activities, it also presents potential benefits in terms of delivering aid and fostering financial inclusion in unstable regions.

As we move forward, the challenge will be to develop adaptive policies and technologies that can mitigate the risks of crypto-enabled conflict financing while preserving the innovative potential of blockchain technology. This will require unprecedented cooperation between governments, financial institutions, and the tech sector.

The genie of cryptocurrency is out of the bottle, and its impact on conflict financing is here to stay. The responses to this challenge will shape the future of global security in the digital age.

*The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To*

The New Face of Warfare: Democratized Military Capabilities

Michael Cessna August 30, 2024

Disclaimer: Although The Freedomist is dedicated to the notion of a free and open press, there are realities that we must negotiate in our coverage. This article is one of those cases. Herein, we will be discussing very controversial subjects – more so than in our regular articles – and we must acknowledge here, that we are deliberately leaving out some information for, frankly, legal concerns. While we are steadfastly in favor of our Readers being fully prepared for any instance or circumstance, we cannot help in that if we face crushing legal action. That is the reality of the world of 2024. “YOU are your own ‘first responder’.”

In the dense jungles of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, a revolution is unfolding. But this isn’t just a political uprising – it’s a testament to a global shift in the nature of warfare itself. The conflict in Myanmar exemplifies a broader trend: the democratization of military-grade capabilities. This phenomenon is reshaping conflicts worldwide, from the streets of Syria to the arid landscapes of North Africa.

The 3D-Printed Revolution

Factions of the Myanmar resistance movements have embraced technology in ways that would have been unimaginable just a decade ago. Anti-government rebels are using 3D printers to manufacture both components for weapons and drones, as well as complete firearms. This isn’t unique to Myanmar; across the globe, additive manufacturing is putting military-grade capabilities into the hands of non-state actors.

While the first 3D printed firearm, the “Liberator” developed by Defense Distributed of Austin, TX, in 2013 – was a crude, single-shot weapon created more as a protest against government overreach than as a practical weapons, that has now changed drastically. Internet based, open-source, online collaboration in real time allowed people around the world to rapidly develop and prototype ideas and leverage existing technologies…resulting in usable weapons that can be produced in a person’s garage, which requires minimal skill to complete.

The release of the FGC-9 in 2018-2019 radically reshaped the field, allowing the creation of a combat-capable weapon. The FGC-9, designed by Jacob Duygu, a Kurdish German gun designer (known on the internet as “JStark1809“, who died under questionable circumstances following a raid on his home by German police in 2021), is technically a “pistol caliber carbine” (or, “PCC”) that is one hundred percent 3D printed, down to the barrel and the bolt. The FGC-9 is now “combat proven” in Myanmar, with the weapons mostly being built in “guerrilla factories” across the border in Thailand, and smuggled into the fighting areas.

*A photo of FGC-9 firearm unassembled components, 2020. Photo credit: JStark1809/Deterrence Dispensed. CCA/4.0*

The fundamental difference between the FGC-9 and other “garage guns“, such as the WW2 STEN Gun or the weapons designs of Philip Luty in the 1990’s is that a person trying to build these weapons still needs at least minimal machine tooling and metal stock. In contrast, the FGC-9 needs plastic and powder-metal media, and a 3D printer capable of both running the required programs and curing the injected or sintered material, making it drastically harder to identify and control the flow of raw materials to guerrilla factories.

Likewise, if one looks around the internet hard enough, plans for heavier support weapons – everything from mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), up to surface-to-air missiles – can be found. We will not list those particular sources here, for two reasons: first, because of legal liability, and second, because that information should be available to those needing it – such as the rebels battling a brutal dictatorship in Myanmar – because the balance of the potential good outweighs the potential for evil: “bad actors” will find a way to commit violent acts no matter what impotent, even if well-intentioned, laws prohibiting the ownership of inanimate objects are passed.

And it is not just the weapons themselves that are being printed. The manufacture of ammunition via a 3D printing application of laser sintering technology is now capable of producing not simply projectiles (i.e., bullets), but producing propellant. While still in the early stages of development, this eliminates two of the four components required to manufacture conventional ammunition, leaving only the case and ignition primer needing manufacture.

And then, we come to drones. While drone warfare is definitely not the overwhelming and decisive factor that it has been made out to be over the last decade, it does offer some significant benefits to non-governmental forces. Drones selling for less than US$100 on Amazon are capable of conducting missions ranging from aerial reconnaissance to combat target servicing, whether by dropping explosives onto a target, or by crashing into a target such as a battle tank, like a latter-day Japanese kamikaze plane. Likewise, drone parts kits are available to build much larger drones, capable of carrying much heavier payloads.

*Greenville, NC Police department’s DJI Matrice drone. 2022. Photo by Greenville Police Department. CC0/1.0 Public Domain.*

The implications heralded by the combat deployment and use of the FGC-9, on top of the repurposing of civilian drone copters for combat, are profound. State monopolies on military hardware are eroding, and with them, long-held assumptions about the balance of power in conflicts.

From Homebrewed Tanks & Artillery To Navies & Air Forces

The democratization of military capabilities isn’t limited to high-tech solutions. Since the 1980’s, pickup trucks converted into mobile fighting platforms—often dubbed “technicals”—have become ubiquitous in small-scale conflicts. These improvised fighting vehicles represent a low-tech but highly effective form of military innovation.

In Syria, this concept has been taken to new extremes. Civilian defense groups of all factions have constructed homemade armored vehicles, resembling mini-tanks, using salvaged materials and ingenious engineering. These vehicles, while not a match for modern main battle tanks (even when armed with ATGM’s), have proven surprisingly effective in urban combat scenarios. Of course, the use of these “technicals“, even if only otherwise standard pickup trucks fitted with machine guns in their beds, provides a low-tech group with a fast-moving force that can swiftly achieve spectacular results, given the right conditions.

But combat vehicles are not limited to armed pickup trucks. Returning to Syria, various forces in the mid-2010’s began building so-called “Hell Cannons“. These improvised artillery pieces fired homemade projectiles made from large propane canisters, capable of packing an impressive payload of explosives. While slow to load and not particularly accurate, these weapons are capable of inflicting significant damage on any area where their shells land. And, if fired as a battery, they can somewhat mitigate their slow reloading speed, as these weapons are almost always mounted on trailers, allowing them to be swiftly displaced and re-positioned.

*“Hell Cannon” in Syria, 2014. CC0/1.0 Public Domain.*

Similarly, there has been a maturing of “improvised navies“. Beginning, in the modern era, with the “Tamil Tigers” extensive use of smallcraft, as well as leveraging civilian freighters as mobile sea bases, many navies – notably that of Iran – have embraced the widespread use of small, high-speed boats to both attack larger civilian vessels, but also to execute the normal range of of uses for such vessels, such as inshore patrol and policing (in small, poor nations), guerrilla supply along inshore and riverine areas, and the insertion of small teams of combat troops – much like large-state special forces – into remote areas to avoid interception. This has occasionally escalated to actual, theater-level amphibious campaigns.

In the America’s, “narco submarines” have been a continual headache for police and naval forces in several countries. While these vessels (most are not really ‘submarines‘…but some are) are not known to be used for covert insertions, they certainly can be. For the moment, however, the United States seems to still be blessed with the rule from before the 9/11 Attacks, that most of the terrorist and guerrilla groups in the world refrained from attacking targets inside the United States, as most of their funding came from ex-patriot donations from their communities of immigrants and refugees living here.

*Crew of the Coast Guard cutter Stratton interdicting semi-submersible vessel on July 18 2015. USCG photo bu PO2 LaNola Stone. Public Domain.*

But there is also a little talked about element: “DIY Air Forces“. Increasingly, in addition to drones, well-funded insurgent groups are leveraging lightweight civilian aircraft, including autogyros. While the legions of internet flag officers around the world laughed at the Communist Chinese idea of deploying autogyros for lightweight air assault…but, after the Hamas offensive that began on October 7th of 2023, only the truly stupid still laugh, as Hamas deployed airborne raiders (against, being fair, a group of unarmed teens and 20-somethings at a rave) via paragliders, which are essentially a parachute driven by a large fan worn by the user.

Technology is advancing, and the once-fanciful shticks used as stunts in movies from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, are no longer fantasy, but hard, capable combat systems that are affordable – and acquirable – by virtually anyone.

Training, Command, and Combat Control in the Digital Age

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of democratized military capabilities comes from recent conflicts, where non-state actors have rapidly established sophisticated command and control systems using off-the-shelf technology.

In the terrorist assault on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008, the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacker’s command group repurposed a commercial office as an improvised command center, and did so at short notice. Equipped with consumer-grade computers, open-source mapping software, and encrypted messaging apps, they coordinated dispersed, complex operations, including verifying assassination targets in real time, using Google to match pictures of victims to their names and titles via facial recognition technologies, with an efficiency that rivaled traditional military and police command structures.

More and more, new desktop software and smartphone-based apps are offering armed non-governmental actors the ability to use many of the same tools as far better funded national armed forces. These tools run the gamut, from translation apps to 3D mapping and planning tools that, hwiler perhaps not exactly ‘military spec’, are certainly ‘good enough’; in some cases, regular national forces use many of these same programs and apps, because the civilian developers simply build better tools.

But there is a deeper question: How are “rag-tag guerrillas” acquiring the training necessary to conduct these operations?

In the ‘old days’, this was mostly done via trial and error or via some group of experienced advisors, either from the national military, or from a ‘friendly’ foreign power; occasionally, desperate but well-funded groups would hire foreign mercenaries to train and lead their “popular liberation forces” in the field…But today, those blocked or otherwise unable to attend formal military training courses have an alternate: finding military training manuals online.

There are literally dozens of archival repositories scattered throughout the internet, loaded with declassified or never-classified military manuals from dozens of nations. These are frequently the current editions of manuals on a given subject. It is important to note that this is no substitute for a measured, supervised course of instruction. Leaders – especially military leaders – are not created overnight. However…in an environment where military leadership is suddenly needed, those individuals who see themselves as filling that role, can now tweeze out at least a reasonable series of academic learning.

But what about actual “field training“?

In previous decades of the late-20th Century, civilians attempting to provide themselves with military training usually resorted, to be frank, to the old children’s game pf “Army”, shouting “BANG!” at each other with rifles; in this, they were not too different from pre-World War 2 training, at least in the United States. The US military, obviously, radically reformed its training regimen after that war, to make its troops far better prepared for the next go-round.

Today, however, the increasing popularity of “combat games” such as AirSoft (or the older paintball) offer a facsimile of military training – neither as good, nor as consistent as a regular force – that is still sufficient to offer much more than a “first step”.

The Global Implications of Military-Sphere Democratization

The democratization of military capabilities is redrawing the maps of global power and conflict. Small nations and non-state actors now have access to capabilities once reserved solely to major powers and their proxies. This shift is forcing a reevaluation of traditional military doctrines and international relations:

Asymmetric Warfare Evolved: The line between state and non-state military capabilities is blurring, making conflicts more unpredictable and potentially more protracted.
Proliferation Challenges: Traditional arms control measures are struggling to adapt to a world where military capabilities can be ‘printed’ or improvised.
Ethics and Legality: The ease of accessing military capabilities raises complex ethical and legal questions about the conduct of war and the definition of combatants.
Innovation Acceleration: The decentralized nature of these developments is driving rapid innovation, often outpacing traditional military R&D cycles.
Global Security Landscape: As capabilities proliferate, the potential for conflict may increase, but so too might the barriers to large-scale war.

A Look Ahead

In this new landscape, the international community faces tough questions. How does the world manage the proliferation of military capabilities in an age of digital sharing and additive manufacture? Can international laws and norms adapt quickly enough to address these changes?

The democratization of military capabilities is not just changing how wars are fought; it’s changing who can fight them effectively and why they’re fought in the first place. As technology continues to evolve, so too will the face of warfare. The challenge for the global community is to navigate this new reality, seeking ways to harness its potential for defense and deterrence while mitigating its risks. The reality, however, is that the result of both the widespread dissemination of information, matched to blockchain technology, virtual private networks (VPNs), and additive manufacture, make controlling the flow of information virtually impossible.

In the jungles of Myanmar, the deserts of Syria, and countless other corners of the globe, the future of conflict is being written not just by states and their armies, but by individuals armed with ingenuity, determination, and increasingly, the tools to challenge traditional power structures. The world must take notice and adapt, for the genie of democratized military capability cannot be put back in the bottle.

At the same time, these tools are just that – tools. Tools are inanimate objects, and because of this, they have no independent intent. Tools are used for both good and evil actions, and those with the intent determine the direction and tone of the use of those tools – no matter where those tools are directed.

The Final Frontier of Combat Operations: The Escalating Militarization of Space

Michael Cessna August 23, 2024

Beginnings

As humanity’s presence in space grows, so too does the potential for conflict. The militarization of space – “space war”, if one prefers – was once the realm of science fiction, but is rapidly becoming a reality that promises to reshape global security dynamics in the 21st century.

The concept of space as a military domain is not new. Since the launch of Sputnik in 1957, nations have recognized the strategic importance of space. Early military applications focused on reconnaissance and communication satellites, which have played crucial roles during the Cold War, and the wars of the 21st century. However, recent years have seen a dramatic acceleration in the development and deployment of military space capabilities.

Confrontation In Space

As far back as 1981, author G. Harry Stine, one of the founders of model rocketry in the United States, and a notable author of hard science and technology writings, as well as science fiction, laid down the basics of warfare in space in his book “Confrontation In Space“, defining the basic shape and dimensions of the battlespace, the most likely weapons that will be used, and outlining the early concepts of how combat in space would be waged.

There is no science fiction in this book, and no technobabble, just the hard realities of applying warfare “in the Black”, to reference a certain TV show, to the real world. Given the general nature of some of the space-war musings of the time that have since been declassified by official sources, Stine is a refreshingly sane and soberingly realistic voice.

The extent to which Stine’s work has influenced modern space battle planning is open to question; it should be a fundamental text, but given the current mission statement of the United States Space Force (USSF), that seems unlikely.

Today, the major players in space militarization are the United States, China, and Russia, with other nations like India and Japan also expanding their capabilities. These countries are investing heavily in a wide range of space-based military technologies. The United States, however, long one of the main innovators of space exploration, only established the USSF in 2019 as a separate branch of its armed forces, signaling the growing importance of space in military doctrine.

Current military space capabilities go far beyond simple reconnaissance. They include the creation and servicing of advanced communication networks (which underpins the basic operation of the internet), precision navigation systems like GPS and early warning systems to detect ballistic missile launches. However, in recent years, China, Russia, and the United States have all demonstrated anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities, raising fears about the vulnerability of critical space infrastructure, demonstrating the ability of national actors to destroy satellites at will.

*An artist’s illustration of the Soviet-era Istrebitel Sputnikov ASAT system, c.1986. US Government image. Public Domain.*

Technological advancements are driving this new space race. The miniaturization of satellites has made it easier and cheaper to launch large constellations of small satellites, enhancing resilience and coverage, as well as opening the potential for true “surge capacity”, to rapidly launch replacement satellites to replace combat losses. In addition to rapid reconstitution of a damaged communications network, the need to replace combat-lost GPS satellites is a key function of satellite surge capacity, because most military vehicle and targeting systems rely on GPS for navigation in addition to combat. Reusable launch vehicles, pioneered by companies like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, have dramatically reduced the cost of accessing space, which has lowered the barrier to entry for military space programs.

Throwing Rocks

Fundamental to actual warfare in space is the development of dedicated weapons for use in the theater. While actual weapons have been fired in space, these weapons go far beyond lasers, high-powered microwave systems, or even the darling of recent science fiction shows, the “particle accelerator“. In fact, the most lethal weapons in space will likely be rocks: “mass drivers“, essentially an electromagnetic catapult, can accelerate iron-rich space rocks (as small as pebbles) to very high velocities, far faster than conventional bullets or cannon rounds. A hit from a very high-speed projectile of any nature could be a catastrophic damage source to any spacecraft, as current launch systems severely limit the weight of spacecraft, which in turn limits the amount of armor a vessel can carry, assuming that current armor would even be effective. While still largely theoretical, such weapons could revolutionize space warfare, and require careful thought and planning to employ.

In response to these emerging threats, nations are working to develop countermeasures and defensive strategies; most of these, it much be noted, are ‘passive’ in nature, as active countermeasures are currently ill defined. The strategies currently in development include hardening satellites against attacks, improving space situational awareness to detect threats, and developing rapid launch capabilities to quickly replace damaged or destroyed satellites.

Bright Light Boom

There is also the possibility – perhaps “likelihood” – that someone will eventually detonate a nuclear weapon as part of an actual battle in space. The main considerations in using these weapons in space begin with exactly where they are detonated. If a large enough warhead were detonated at a suitable altitude above the surface, it could – in theory – generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) sufficient to overload and shutdown, if not outright destroy, any large-scale power grid. This phenomenon was first recognized in 1962 during the Starfish Prime test, when an unexpected EMP wave from the detonation knocked out power to parts of the city of Honolulu, Hawaii.

*Photo of the Starfish Prime detonation in the skies over Honolulu, Hawaii, 1962. US Government photo. Public Domain.*

Aside from the well-known, at least in a broad sense, radiation effects (which would likely be magnified in space, without an atmosphere to absorb them) and EMP concerns, the main damage-causing mechanism of a nuclear blast on Earth – blast effect, caused by the compression of the atmosphere by the detonation wave – would not be present, as there is no atmosphere in space that can be compressed into a destructive force.

For all that, however, work on “bomb-pumped lasers” and other exotic warhead designs such as Project Casaba-Howitzer (which used a nuclear weapon to create a shaped charge from material vaporized into plasma by the blast), largely came an end – at least publicly – at the end of the 1980’s, as it was clear that the Soviet Union was dying, and that the prospect of all-out nuclear war had rapidly begun to fade.

*Pulse propulsion unit of project Orion vehicle, used as the basis for the Casaba-Howitzer warhead concept, 1964. NASA image. Public Domain.*

As the possibility of actual open warfare in space continues to rear its head, it is a near-certainty that many of these old programs are being reexamined, using fresh data and better computer modeling…The possible side effects, however, remain.

Combat Logistics in Space Warfare

One of the most challenging aspects of space militarization is the issue of combat logistics. Unlike terrestrial warfare, where supply lines can be established and maintained relatively easily, space presents unique challenges for sustaining military operations.

The primary hurdle is the enormous energy requirement to launch materials into orbit. Every kilogram of supplies, whether fuel, ammunition, or replacement parts, comes with a very high price tag (over $2,000 per kilogram) and significant challenges to logistical load planning, in both loading and unloading at point of delivery. This makes traditional resupply methods impractical for sustained operations in-theater, as we understand the idea.

To address these issue, military planners are exploring several approaches. One concept is the development of in-orbit refueling capabilities. This would involve specialized “tanker” satellites capable of transferring fuel to other spacecraft, extending their operational lifespan and maneuverability.

*A contour plot (not drawn to scale) of the effective potential of a two-body system, showing the 5 Lagrange points. NASA image. Public Domain.*

Another area of focus is in-space manufacturing. Advanced 3D printing technologies – currently capable of making conventional ammunition-using select-fire weapons a factor in infantry combat – could allow for the production of spare parts or even small satellites directly in orbit, reducing the need for launches from Earth. Different avenues of research are exploring the possibility of mining asteroids or the Moon for resources, which could provide a sustainable source of materials and fuel for space-based operations.

Robotic servicing missions represent another potential tool in the box. These would involve unmanned spacecraft under direct, if remote, control, or completely autonomous systems guided by artificial intelligence, which would be capable of repairing, refueling, or upgrading other satellites or spacecraft, potentially extending their useful life and reducing the need for replacement of complete craft.

The concept of staging pre-positioned orbital depots is also being considered. These would be stockpiles of fuel, spare parts, and other critical supplies placed in strategic orbits, such as the Lagrangian points, ready to support military space operations as needed. In form, these might take the form of the old Skylab design, as – being the size of a 3-bedroom house – the design could hold a significant amount of material.

*Artist’s concept illustration of the Skylab with the Command/Service Module docked to the Multiple Docking Adapter. 1972. NASA photo.*

These logistical challenges and their potential solutions will play a crucial role in shaping the nature of future space warfare. The side that can most effectively sustain its space-based capabilities may gain a significant strategic advantage in any potential conflict extending into the space domain.

The Future

The future of space militarization remains uncertain, but several scenarios seem plausible. One possibility is the outbreak of a limited conflict in space, perhaps involving the destruction of key military or civilian satellites. This could have cascading effects on terrestrial military operations and civilian infrastructure.

Another scenario envisions the deployment of space-based weapons capable of striking targets on Earth. While technically challenging and currently prohibited by international treaty, such systems could offer significant strategic advantages.

A third possibility is the integration of space-based capabilities with terrestrial, air, and naval forces to create a seamless, multi-domain military force. This could enhance military effectiveness but also increase reliance on potentially vulnerable space assets.

As we look to the future, it’s clear that space will play an increasingly important role in military affairs. The challenge for the international community will be to balance the legitimate use of space for national security with the need to prevent a destabilizing arms race in orbit. Failure to do so could turn the final frontier into the next battlefield.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

G. Harry Stine (1981), Confrontation in Space
Julian Thompson (1994), Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict
Thomas Ricks (2012), The Generals
James F. Dunnigan (2003), How To Make War, 4^th Edition
James F. Dunnigan (1991), Shooting Blanks

The Carrier Battle Group: America’s “Big Stick” Of Power Projection

Michael Cessna August 16, 2024

Introduction

Earlier this week, the United States accelerated the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and its carrier battle group to the Middle East – an operation which was already in progress to relieve the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and its own battle group of escorting warships, who have been on station in the region for months – in response to signs that the increasingly unstable regime in Iran may attempt to significantly widen its proxy war against the state of Israel which began on October 7 of last year.

The Good Ol’ Days

The origin of the aircraft carrier battle group takes its origins from the world-spanning naval warfare of World War II, primarily from its operations in the Pacific Ocean. The devastating Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7th, 1941, demonstrated the power of carrier-based aviation and the vulnerability of battleships, marking a fundamental shift in naval strategy, as the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed the United States Navy’s main battle force in the attack. The United States Navy – stripped of its battleship fleet by the sneak attack on its Hawaiian base, and whose Asiatic Fleet was functionally neutralized in the opening stages of the war by staggeringly unbelievable levels of incompetence and mismanagement – was forced to continue the fight with only three aircraft carriers, something it had never seriously considered as a possibility.

Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island shortly after the beginning of the Pearl Harbor attack. IJN photo, via the US Navy. Public Domain.

As the war raged on, the U.S. Navy quickly adapted, forming diverse, multi-ship task forces centered on its massive aircraft carriers. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in 1942 proved the effectiveness of this approach, with American carriers dealing a decisive blow to the Japanese fleet, while remaining largely protected by much smaller destroyers and destroyer-escorts, which both shot down attacking Japanese aircraft, and sometimes absorbed bombs and torpedoes meant for the carriers. As the war progressed, these carrier task forces became increasingly sophisticated, with hard-learned doctrine and techniques using destroyers primarily for anti-submarine warfare and cruisers studded with heavy automatic cannons for air defense, even at close range.

Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns on a Mk 12 quadruple mount firing on board USS Hornet (CV-12), circa February 1945, probably during gunnery practice. Photo credit: Lt. Cmdr. Charles Kerlee, USN. Public Domain.

Into the Cold

In the post-war era, the advent of jet aircraft and guided missiles led to further refinements to both aircraft carriers themselves, but also in their organization and tactics. The introduction of the angled flight deck and steam catapults (these are now being replaced with electromagnetic catapults on the new Gerald R. Ford-class carriers) in the 1950s enhanced carrier operations, while the development of guided missile destroyers and cruisers improved the group’s air defense capabilities, at least in theory. Modern navies, however, would get a severe reality check in 1982, as the very modern British Royal Navy was badly hammered by the second-tier air force of Argentina in the savage (especially allowing for its relatively small size) Battle of San Carlos, causing a sobering reassessment by all navies of their own capabilities and tactics. (On a historical side note, the Falklands War also saw the destruction of the ARA General Belgrano, the former USS Phoenix (CL-46), a Brooklyn-class cruiser from World War 2, which had survived the Pearl Harbor attack, to be sunk by a British attack submarine some forty years later.)

*A Standard Missile-3 is launched from the Japanese Aegis Destroyer JS Kongo (DDG 173), 2007. US Navy photo. Public Domain.*

The Cold War saw the carrier battle group evolve into one of – if not the primary – key instruments of power projection. The nuclear-powered USS Enterprise (CVN-65), commissioned in 1961, heralded a new era of endurance for carrier operations. However, this would be tempered with the realization that while the range of the carrier itself was now measured in decades, instead of miles, it was still restricted by the ranges of its gas-turbine engined escort vessels, and the constant need for resupply of everything from food to bombs, spare parts and fuel for its aircraft wing. The development of the Aegis combat system in the 1980s (and its associated ballistic missile defense component) would significantly enhance the group’s air defense capabilities, while continuous development of anti-submarine and anti-mine technologies further protected the carrier and its escorts. These capabilities did not come without cost, however: hard lessons were learned from the attacks on the USS Stark, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, and the bombing of the USS Cole. These lessons continue to be learned, but the takeaway is that naval warfare – like all warfare – is not a video game, despite breathlessly giddy news stories to the contrary.

In the realm of anti-submarine warfare, the US Navy pioneered the modern use of armed combat drones in warfare, when it deployed the QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter), built by Gyrodyne, in 1959.

*In the Persian Gulf, a port quarter view of the guided missile frigate USS STARK (FFG-31) listing to port after being hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles, 18 May 1987. Public Domain.*

The Dawn of the Millennium and the GWOT

The post-Cold War period has seen carrier battle groups involved in numerous conflicts, from the 1990-91 Gulf War to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The groups have also played crucial roles in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Today’s carrier battle groups, while retaining their core structure developed over some fifty years, continue to evolve to meet new challenges. The integration of stealth aircraft, more advanced unmanned systems, and advanced, internet-based networking and cyberwar capabilities ensures that the carrier battle group will remain a fundamental cornerstone of naval power projection for the rest of the 21st Century.

Laying at the heart of the United States Navy’s global power projection capabilities, the carrier battle group (CVBG), also known as a carrier strike group (CSG) is a formidable assembly of warships and aircraft, centered around a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, representing one of the most potent concentrations of military might ever to sail the world’s oceans. Usually comprising an aircraft carrier, a single guided missile cruiser for air defense, at least two LAMPS-capable warships (focusing on anti-submarine and surface warfare), and one or two anti-submarine destroyers or frigates, such battle groups frequently deploy more combat power than that possessed by most individual nations in the world.

The cornerstone of any carrier battle group is the aircraft carrier itself. As of 2024, the US Navy operates eleven nuclear-powered carriers, primarily of the Nimitz class, with the newer Gerald R. Ford class gradually being introduced into service. These floating airfields, crewed by between 4,000 and 5,000 sailors, displace approximately 100,000 tons and can carry an air wing of 60-75 aircraft.

The air wing of a 21st Century US aircraft carrier typically consists of:

F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets: Multirole fighters capable of air superiority and strike missions.
EA-18G Growlers: Electronic warfare aircraft for jamming enemy radar and communications.
E-2D Hawkeyes: Airborne early warning and control aircraft.
MH-60R/S Seahawk helicopters: For anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and utility missions.
F-35C Lightning II: The Navy’s newest stealth multirole fighter, gradually being integrated into carrier air wings.

*E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft conduct a test flight near St. Augustine, FL, 2009. US Navy photo. Public Domain.*

Surrounding the carrier are several Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers and destroyers. These ships form a protective screen around the carrier and provide a wide range of capabilities:

Ticonderoga class cruisers: Usually one or two per battle group, these ships specialize in air defense but are also capable of land attack and anti-ship warfare.
Arleigh Burke class destroyers: Typically three to four per group, these versatile warships can perform anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare missions.

Both classes of ships are equipped with the Aegis combat system, which integrates powerful radars with various close-in and long-range weapon systems, allowing for sophisticated air and missile defense capabilities.

Although not always visible, one or two nuclear-powered attack submarines often operate in conjunction with a carrier battle group. These could be Los Angeles-, Virginia-, or Seawolf-class nuclear-powered submarines. Their primary roles include:

Gathering intelligence
Providing an unseen protective screen against enemy submarines
Potential land-attack capabilities with Tomahawk cruise missiles

A carrier battle group also includes several support ships crucial for sustained operations:

Supply ships: Usually one or two fast combat support ships (T-AOE) or a combination of fleet oilers (T-AO) and dry cargo ships (T-AKE) to replenish fuel, ammunition, and supplies.
Hospital ships: While not typically part of the regular battle group, these can be attached for humanitarian missions or in anticipation of major combat operations.

*Royal Australian Navy ship HMAS Sirius (OR-266) and amphibious transport dock USS Juneau (LPD-10) conducts a replenishment at sea (RAS), 2007. US Navy photo. Public Domain.*

An entire battle group, such as that outlined above, is under the command of a Rear Admiral (lower half), who typically serves as the Commander, Carrier Strike Group (CCSG). The CCSG and their staff coordinate the activities of all ships and aircraft in the group, ensuring they work together as a cohesive fighting unit.

A fully equipped US carrier battle group is ideally positioned to:

Project power far from American shores, with the ability to strike targets hundreds of miles inland.
Establish air superiority over a wide area.
Conduct sustained air operations, launching over 100 sorties per day.
Provide a visible deterrent to potential adversaries.
Respond rapidly to crises anywhere in the world.
Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

The versatility of the carrier battle group allows it to transition quickly from peacetime presence to crisis response to full-scale war fighting. This is no more true than in its mission of supporting assault landings by combat units (MAGTF’s) of the United States Marine Corps, which remains a part of the Department of the Navy. The US Navy’s ten Amphibious Ready Groups are able to quickly insert up to 6,000 US Marines quickly, at multiple points along a hostile shoreline, ranging well inland, if necessary…as long as the naval squadron can get to the area quickly enough – hence, the acceleration of the USS Abraham Lincoln and her CVBG to the Levant.

As of 2024, the US Navy continues to adapt its carrier battle groups to meet evolving threats:

Anti-ship ballistic missiles: The development of these weapons, particularly by China, has led to increased emphasis on integrated air and missile defense capabilities.
Unmanned systems: The Navy continues to explore the integration of unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles to extend the reach and capabilities of the battle group.
Cyber warfare: Increased focus on protecting the battle group’s networks and exploiting adversary vulnerabilities in the digital domain.
Distributed lethality: Spreading offensive capabilities across more platforms in the battle group to complicate enemy targeting.

Conclusion

The Navy is continuously evolving the concept of the carrier battle group. Some areas of focus include:

The integration of directed energy weapons for close-in defense.
Development of long-range anti-ship missiles to counter peer competitors.
Exploration of smaller, more numerous carriers to distribute capabilities.
Enhanced networking capabilities to better integrate with joint and allied forces.

The US carrier battle group remains a cornerstone of American military power projection, and will continue to do so well into the 21st Century, and likely beyond. Its ability to bring a flexible, sustained, and potent military presence to any region of the world makes it a unique and invaluable strategic asset. As geopolitical tensions and technological advancements continue to shape the global security landscape, and as unrest continues to disrupt the trade vital to the modern world, the carrier battle group will continue to evolve, maintaining its role as a key instrument of US national security policy, as well as protecting the civilized world at large.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Estate of Wayne P Hughes Jr. USN (Ret.) & Robert P. Girrier (2018), Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3rd Ed
Patrick Degan (2003), Flattop Fighting in World War II
Paul S. Dull (2007), A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945
Thomas Ricks (2012), The Generals
James F. Dunnigan (2003), How To Make War, 4^th Edition
James F. Dunnigan (1991), Shooting Blanks

Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran: Fiddling In The Fire

Michael Cessna August 9, 2024

The period from 2020 onward has seen a significant escalation in tensions between Israel and its regional adversaries, primarily Iran and its proxy forces, Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the more distant Houthi’s of Yemen. This complex web of conflicts and alliances has continued to shape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, and has significantly escalated tensions, to the point of a realistic chance for a much-expanded war.

The long-standing animosity between Israel and Islamic revolutionary Iran began to intensify in the early 2020’s. Iran’s nuclear program remained a central point of contention, with Israel consistently opposing any deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear development; this attempt at preventing nuclear proliferation, however integral to Israel’s security as it may be, is also highly unrealistic; the assassination of top Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, widely attributed to Israel, marked a significant escalation, as this differed from the Israeli Mossad’s previous assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh in Dubai, as the killing of Fakhrizadeh happened within Iran itself.

In this context, Israel is now accused of the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political head, who was killed in his hotel room on July 31st, in an apparent drone attack. This, too, occurred in Iran, but in the capital of Tehran itself. While Israel is unarguably at war, following the Hamas offensive of Oct. 7, 2023, an assassination such as this – known as a “decapitation strike” in military parlance – happening in a technically-neutral country (even given the events of April of 2024), is doing Israel no favors internationally.

The Biden administration has proven itself ineffectual with its diplomatic efforts, demonstrating both weakness and incoherence, to the point of encouraging the ambition of the Iranian ruling mullahs.

The election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi (who was killed on May 19th, 2024 in a helicopter crash while returning from neighboring Azerbaijian) as Iran’s president in 2021 further complicated diplomatic efforts. Raisi’s administration took a more confrontational stance towards both Israel and the West, leading to increased concerns about regional stability.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah – the Iran-backed militant group that has controlled Lebanon’s southeastern Bekaa Valley since the mid-1980’s, remained a significant threat to Israel’s northern border. In 2020 and 2021, there were several minor skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border, though both sides managed to avoid a full-scale conflict.

Israel continued to conduct airstrikes in Syria, targeting what it claimed were Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. These operations aimed to prevent the group from obtaining advanced missile systems that could threaten Israeli cities.

In 2022, tensions further escalated when Israel and Lebanon engaged in U.S.-mediated negotiations over their maritime border, which involved disputed gas fields. Hezbollah threatened to attack Israeli gas installations if an agreement wasn’t reached, leading to a tense standoff that was eventually resolved through diplomacy. Now, following a rocket attack on the Israeli Druze community of Majdal Shams on 27 July that killed a number of Druze children, Israel is at the point of invading southern Lebanon to try and attrit Hezbollah’s ability to strike into Israel, much as it attempted in 2006. In this, the ineffectual Lebanese government can offer no resistance against an invasion, or even an “incursion”, and calling on Muslim countries for aid could easily trigger a new civil war in the unstable and bankrupt nation.

In the south, the situation in Gaza remained volatile, with periodic flare-ups of violence between Israel and Hamas, which has retained power in Gaza since 2006, when Hamas won Gaza’s first election – then made sure that no other elections occurred to challenge its grip on power. In May 2021, a significant escalation occurred when Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza fired thousands of rockets at Israel. Israel responded with extensive airstrikes on Gaza, resulting in a 11-day conflict that caused substantial casualties and damage. The aftermath of this short conflict saw increased international pressure for a long-term solution to the Gaza situation. However, progress remained elusive, with Hamas maintaining its control over Gaza and continuing to clash with Israeli forces, which would escalate dramatically on October 7th of 2023.

In 2022 and 2023, there were several smaller-scale exchanges of fire between Gaza militants and Israel. These incidents, while not escalating to the level of the 2021 conflict, served to maintain a state of tension and uncertainty in the region.

The ongoing civil war in Syria that began in 2011, and the unstable situation in Lebanon have provided fertile ground for proxy conflicts involving Israel, Iran, and their respective allies. Israel continued its policy of preventing Iranian entrenchment in Syria through targeted airstrikes, while Iran sought to maintain and expand its influence in the region.

The Abraham Accords, negotiated by US President Donald Trump and signed in 2020, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, altered the regional dynamics. This realignment put additional pressure on Iran and its allies, as Israel’s diplomatic and strategic position in the Middle East was greatly strengthened.

The conflict between these actors is increasingly playing out in the cyber domain. Both Israel and Iran have engaged in sophisticated cyber attacks against each other’s infrastructure, including attempts to disrupt nuclear facilities, water supplies, and electrical grids. For its own part, rumors persist that Israel was at least partly behind the deployment of the highly destructive STUXNET virus in 2010.

Covert operations, including assassinations and sabotage, have become more frequent – as with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh noted above – as the conflict has evolved. These actions, carried out with only the thinnest veneer of “plausible deniability“, have served to maintain tension without triggering open warfare; that situation, however, may be coming to an end.

The United States remains heavily involved in the region – building on its rocky, 20 years “War on Terror” – by supporting Israel while also attempting to prevent a widening conflict. The Biden administration’s efforts to re-engage with Iran on the nuclear issue met with – being charitable – mixed success, complicated by regional tensions and domestic politics in both the U.S. and Iran, as well as its own failings in the disastrous end to United States adventurism in Afghanistan. The Biden-Harris administration has consistently demonstrated that it cannot make any sort of definitive decision, one way or another, on the diplomatic front.

Russia and China also play significant roles in the Levantine conflict, with Russia maintaining its presence in Syria and with China increasing its economic and diplomatic engagement with Iran. In both cases, Moscow and Beijing figuratively smell blood in the water, as they sense the weakness in NATO [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO] as a whole, but also in the United States in particular, as the Biden-Harris team continues to flounder internationally.

The ongoing conflicts and tensions have had severe humanitarian consequences, particularly in Gaza and parts of Lebanon. International organizations repeatedly called for increased access to provide aid and for all parties to respect international humanitarian law. The ongoing war in Gaza following the October 7 massacre, as well as the Houthi strikes against Red Sea shipping, has only made the situation far worse, with Israel now resolved to end the Gaza question once and for all, leading to worsening violence and rhetoric directed against them in the West, with criticism coming from all sides, driving the Israeli mindset further into an “Us Alone Against The World” outlook.

As of early 2024, the situation remained tense and unpredictable. While full-scale war has been avoided so far, the risk of escalation into a much wider war – a war with the potential to draw in larger powers is increasingly possible. The interplay between Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas continues to be a major driving factor in regional instability, with implications extending far beyond the Middle East. The international community is attempting to remain engaged, seeking ways to reduce tensions and prevent a larger conflict, but face significant challenges due to systemic internal problems facing Western nations, crushing demographic issues with Communist China, and Russia’s seemingly interminable war in Ukraine.

The Militarization of the Poles: Future Warfare On The Frozen Frontier

Michael Cessna August 2, 2024

Amid the ongoing chaos of in the world of 2024, other areas of military research and development continue apace. Despite nearly thirty years of warfare in the arid climates of the Middle east, as climate change reshapes the Arctic and Antarctic landscapes, these once-forbidding regions are being strenuously studied as new arenas for potential conflict. Polar warfare, long considered a niche aspect of military strategy, is now gaining prominence as nations vie for resources and strategic advantages in these harsh environments.

*Arctic region (orthographic projection) with national borders and land highlighted. 2023. Credit: Heraldry, Isochrone. CCA/3.0.*

The Arctic, in particular, has become a focal point of international interest. With an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas, the region is attracting attention from both Arctic and non-Arctic nations. As ice coverage over the poles recedes, new shipping routes are opening up, promising shorter transit times between Europe and Asia. These developments have spurred a renewed focus on developing and improving military capabilities suited to polar conditions.

*The Antarctic Continent, 1928 map. Credit: New York Times. Public Domain.*

The challenges of warfare in polar regions are numerous and unique. Extreme cold, unpredictable weather, and long periods of darkness or constant daylight create a hostile environment for both personnel and equipment. Standard military gear often fails in these conditions, necessitating specialized cold-weather equipment and extensive training for troops.

One of the primary concerns in polar warfare is cold-weather logistics. The vast, often empty expanses of the Arctic and Antarctic make supply lines long and vulnerable. Fuel consumption increases dramatically in cold weather, and equipment requires constant maintenance to prevent freezing and malfunction. These factors make theater sustainment a critical aspect of polar military operations.

Naval operations in polar regions present their own set of challenges. Ice-covered waters require specially designed ships with reinforced hulls. Icebreaker ships become crucial assets, not just for clearing paths but also for projecting power and maintaining presence in these regions. Submarines, long seen as the ideal platform for under-ice operations, are gaining renewed importance in polar strategy.

The USCG Healy (WAGB-20) breaks ice around the Russian-flagged tanker Renda 250 miles south of Nome, Alaska, Jan. 6, 2012. DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Sara Francis, U.S. Coast Guard. Public Domain.

Air power in polar regions is complicated by the lack of established airfields and the effects of cold on aircraft systems. However, long-range patrol aircraft and drones are becoming increasingly important for surveillance and maintaining situational awareness over vast Arctic expanses. While the US Navy has only recently resumed carrier operations north of the Actic Circle after a near-thirty year absence, there has a been a steady, if quiet, push to improve operational capabilities for ship-based aviation going on for the last decade or so.

Ground operations in polar environments also require specialized training and equipment. Troops require specialized – and thus, very expensive – training in cold-weather survival techniques and must be able to operate vehicles and weapons in the extreme environments they will encounter. White-out conditions, crevasses, and unstable ice make movement treacherous, requiring expert navigation skills and fast reactions. These aspects of arctic warfare were brought into sharp focus during the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982, when an attempt to insert a Special Air Service (SAS) team onto Fortuna Glacier on the island of South Georgia, went disastrously wrong, although fortunately without fatalities.

The role of technology in polar warfare cannot be overstated. Satellite communications, crucial for modern military operations, can be unreliable at extreme latitudes. GPS systems also face challenges, necessitating the development of alternative navigation methods. Advanced sensors capable of operating in harsh conditions are becoming increasingly important for detection and targeting in the polar environment.

Several nations are actively developing their polar warfare capabilities. Russia, with the world’s longest Arctic coastline, has been particularly active in militarizing its northern regions. The country has reopened Soviet-era Arctic bases and is developing new icebreakers, including nuclear-powered vessels, as well as hypersonic missiles adapted to the Arctic environment. The United States, Canada, and Nordic countries are also enhancing their Arctic capabilities, conducting regular exercises in the region.

In the Antarctic, while the Antarctic Treaty System prohibits military activity, nations maintain a presence through scientific research stations. However, the potential for future conflict cannot be ignored, particularly as the treaty comes up for potential revision in 2048. The Islamic Republic of Iran, however, is attempting to establish its own presence on the continent, claiming both “property rights” on the continent, as well as stating that the terms of the 1959 treaty system do not apply to them, as they were never signatories to that treaty. It remains to be seen what, if anything, may come of this apparent (hopefully) chest-thumping.

Remaining in the forefront of the Treaty System’s signatories is “Operation Highjump“, now remembered in popular media mostly for various conspiracy theories. In fact, the United States sent a massive force, Task Force 68, totaling some seventy ships, including the aircraft carrier USS Philippine Sea (CV-47), acting as the flagship. Whatever the actual reasons for the expedition, the ability of the United States to operate in the extremes of the Antarctic was one of the factors that ultimately lead to the establishment of the Treaty System a decade later.

A U.S. Navy personnel use a bulldozer to clear a path to facilitate transport of supplies from ships during Operation Highjump in Antarctica. Note the supply ships USS Yancey (AKA-93), right, and USS Merrick (AKA-97) in the background. US Navy photo, c.1947. Public Domain.

The geopolitical implications of increased military activity in polar regions are significant. There are concerns that the Arctic could become a new theater of great power competition, potentially destabilizing the current international order. The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for Arctic nations, has so far managed to maintain cooperation on issues like search and rescue and environmental protection. However, military matters are explicitly excluded from its mandate.

Environmental concerns add another layer of complexity to polar warfare. The fragile ecosystems of the Arctic and Antarctic are particularly vulnerable to pollution and disturbance. Military activities, from exercises to potential conflicts, could have severe and long-lasting impacts on these environments.

As nations develop their polar warfare capabilities, there is a growing need for international dialogue and agreements to prevent militarization from spiraling into conflict. Transparency in military activities, joint exercises focused on common challenges like search and rescue, and agreements on resource exploitation could help maintain stability in these regions. These needs for dialog and agreement, however, will only be effective if strengthened by realistic enforcement protocols, something that has been studiously avoided since 1959.

The future of polar warfare will certainly be shaped by technological advancements: autonomous systems capable of operating in extreme conditions to reduce the risks to human personnel; advanced materials science to provide better cold-weather gear and more resilient equipment; improved satellite and communication technologies could enhance command and control capabilities in these remote regions. These form only the tip of research that can be applied to the issue at hand.

Climate change – from whatever source – will continue to play a crucial role in shaping the polar battlespace. As ice coverage decreases, new areas will become accessible for military operations. However, this also means that the environment will be in constant flux, requiring adaptable strategies and equipment.

As the polar regions become more accessible and strategically important, military planners worldwide are grappling with the unique challenges of potential conflicts in these extreme environments. The combination of harsh conditions, valuable resources, and geopolitical tensions makes the Arctic and Antarctic potential flash-points for future conflicts. As technology advances and climate change reshapes these landscapes, the nature of polar warfare will continue to evolve, presenting both challenges and opportunities for nations with interests in these regions.

War happens everywhere. You either prepare for war in any environment, or you cede that environment to whoever gets there first.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Kathleen H. Hicks (2016), Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe
Klaus Dodds and Mark Nuttall (2015), The Scramble for the Poles: The Geopolitics of the Arctic and Antarctic
James Kraska, Editor (2013), Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change
Shelagh D. Grant (2010), Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America
Brian Garfield (1995), Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians

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Did Joe Biden Plot to Assassinate Trump?

Bill Collier July 31, 2024

By William Collier, Publisher

The attempted assassination of Donald Trump on top of the brutal illegal lawfare waged against him and the uneven playing field set by every major institution captured and weaponized by Democrats against Republicans, is causing many to question whether this was a lone wolf or something more sinister.

Do I think this assassination was a setup? Possibly, though my working theory at the moment is that some official on the Secret Service detail to Trump hates him and allowed the holes, as opposed to it coming from some cabal of the White House. Accusing the sitting President of such a thing is a very high bar to climb over and I don’t think there is anything approaching evidence to support that.

Nonetheless, the language of hatred, divorce language as my brother Paul calls it, being used by every major corporation, government agency, and the entire infotainment and education industry from top to bottom, against the right has been such one needs no conspiracy to kill, one merely waits for the effects of such language to set off some lone wolf weirdo looking for fame.

At least 30% of the country so hates the right and thinks that they are all Nazis that they would endorse violence against them, in my estimation based on various polls on political attitudes. The people who call the shots in every major institution, in the Democratic Party, in the infotainment and education industry, and even the courts and law enforcement, are all guilty as charged in terms of fomenting this kind of thing. This unofficial, unorganized, cabal of ruling class establishment types who despise any opposition to their plans for a global corpostate regimen of some kind are happy to see their opponents harmed in political violence which they foment but can deny having a hand in.

President Biden, for instance, repeated the claim Trump said if he doesn’t win there will be a bloodbath, as if he is threatening violence, when it’s clear he used a common term and was talking about the bloodbath in the auto industry if the Chinese remain unchecked to flood our market with their cheap cars. By stating this lie, Biden continues to stoke the flames and one cannot escape the conclusion this has an intended aim: to moment more political violence while denying their responsibility for it through a claim their fingerprints aren’t on it.

A typical argument people use when one side resorts to cancel culture, lawfare, and inciting violence is to say they can’t stand on their record or their ideas, so they try to win be default, through creating an unfair playing field in which their political opponents have all the disadvantages built in before any election campaign begins, let alone the elections themselves. While it would be wrong to say the Democratic Party gad a monopoly on such things, it remains a fact that this strategy of invalidating and unlawfully disqualifying or otherwise suppressing their opponents and their supporters is the go-to strategy for the Democratic Party. In fact, lawfare and inciting violence are at present the main thrust of the Democratic Party’s war on freedom and drove to absolute power.

Biden’s ongoing repetition of lies meant to paint Trump and Republicans as Hitler and thus incite violence against them with this hyperbolic exaggeration of policy disagreements belies any claim the Democratic Party and this Administration bear no guilt here. They didn’t, we think, literally plan this but when gapes in coverage were apparent they did nothing and when this young man decided he wanted to seek fame and prove what a good shot he is, he chose a “hated” person who, morally, according to the false caricature presented by Biden et al, deserved this.

After a review of the videos from the scene, it is clear someone in charge wasn’t interested in stopping this assassination attempt before it got started. Nobody in authority got on the mic to call for removing Trump due to the threat, and we have video of the would-be assassin crawling into position. He probably was rushed, but he is free to take him as they film him and try to get the attention of law enforcement.

It is impossible at this time to conclude this gap of coverage and the non response to a threat, the killer was seen on site for 26 minutes before the shooting and the team meant to provide overwatch was inside the building he was on, was not intentional by someone. We need to know who had the ball, as they say in aircraft carriers, to call the shots in response to this threat: that person deserves to be investigated for possibly intentionally letting the former President remain unnecessarily in danger.

This is not a conspiracy theory. There is AMPLE and overwhelming evidence this threat was known, seen, reported, and even video taped on phones prior to the act and during the act. We literally have video of people yelling and of law enforcement not responding at all, not one bit!

Some will protest against impugning the “men and women in law enforcement”, but the truth is the truth and the truth is we cannot afford to not ask such a question and to run a thorough investigation to prove or disprove that theory, unless of course we want to see more of this happening in the future.

We also cannot discount and must point out the way the Biden administration has been promoting conspiracy theories on par with the blood libel used against the Jews, who a sizeable plurality of the Democratic Party’s base absolutely hate, and their divorce language is indeed beyond the pale and part of the blame for what happened.

Thus Biden et al foment hatred with lies and over the top exaggerations, all while impugning motive and intent grossly, and Biden staffers on the Secret Service detail who likely hate Trump and believe he is Hitler think it is their patriotic duty to let this all unfold.

Is this true?

We don’t know and all who might fall under suspicion here are innocent until proven guilty. We do know what we can see.

We can see the lies and exaggerations and how the Democrats daily vilify Republicans and try to incite violence against them. We can see that all the institutions captured by the left do the same, every day, even to the point we have indoctrinated political hacks infiltrating schools and colleges not to teach but to corrupt and ultimately abuse their charges and turn them into wokesters, cancel culture extremists, and antichristian freedom haters.

We can see how this shooter was spotted and reported, indeed a local cop climbs up the ladder and retreats without calling this in and saying, “move the President now!” We can see how this was not covered, how the overwatch team was relegated to inside the building and how evidently they couldn’t hear the crowd outside telling there is an armed man on the roof!

It is not disputed that these videos are real. What they show is that no level of incompetence can answer the question, “why was Trump’s security cordon so seriously compromised and why did law enforcement ignore the people pointing out a clearly visible bad guy with a gun crawling on the roof and not warn the President to duck for cover?”

We cannot afford to give the benefit of the doubt to investigating this crime and to consider the very real probability that this was the result not just of a lone wolf but a systemic bigotry and blood libel heaped on Republicans and that this led some official on charge to compromise the security cordon and ignore the threat the same way we now believe the Nazis did with the insane Dutch communist who wanted to burn down the Reichstag.

This by no means should be read as saying the people in charge of either that whole detail or just that location within the security cordon are guilty of knowingly trying to support an assassination attempt by getting out of the way. It should be read as we must take this as a real possibility and seriously investigate it from that line of thought. Additionally, it should be read as a rebuke to Biden and his persistent divorce language, based on lies and exaggerations.

We must expunge the rot in this country where an ideology of violence and despotism has captured a major political party and every major institution. This rot of authoritarianism and depravity must be addressed with courage and determination, while not allowing ourselves to do that which we oppose, namely divorce talk, fomenting political violence, lawfare, corruption, and the such.

The assassination attempt was the primary responsibility of the attacker, who is now in hell forever as he deserves to be. Guilt mostly lies with him. Second, we have every reason to believe we must investigate a very real possibility that an official allowed this to unfold deliberately because they hate Donald Trump and have had that irrational hatred and fear of “Trumphitler” drilled into them by Biden, the entire Democratic Party machine, and every major institution captured by a godless, hateful, totalitarian ideology that has also captured most of the Democratic Party leadership.

Biden is responsible broadly for the climate of violence and fear, the irrational hatred, and the continued use of lies and exaggerations to delegitimize anyone who isn’t a neo-communist woke alt-gendered antichristian anti-white bigot willing live an atomized life as an a-gendered, isolated, non-differentiated cog in the corpostate machinery as a slave. Biden elevates the worse in us, including child molestation under the trans banner, to destroy the fabric of our civilization and transform us into a totalitarian corpostate that is a province within a global empire run by a few dozen shot callers at the top.

To be clear, I am speaking of the elemental, innermost, core essentials which underlie the Democratic Party platform, although I doubt Biden et al seriously think they will get or even want a dictatorship. They are shallow and following the agit-prop surface virtue-signals of a deeper agenda of which they may have little real awareness. In this case, I am describing the probable outcomes of the Democratic Party platform if everything they want was made law and policy and was enforced strictly.

When you come from a place of arrogance, despotism, depravity (especially sexual in this culture), and bigotry against whole demographic groups in your own country, the fruits are always bad even of your followers are merely supporting your surface things, wanting to have your utopian promises, or seeking to avoid the boogeyman fears you have inspired in them.

Elements of all these things can always be found in every movement, avoiding them and trying to purge them has been a major problem for every movement forever. But, while we can point to some Republicans being the same way, by the by most Republicans in office now, as opposed to before 2010, are not willing to tolerate such “otherfication”, not even of Biden et al! Trump calls Biden incompetent for his actions and foolish in his policies, he doesn’t call him Hitler or a “threat to democracy”, code for dictatorship and Nazism.

The fact we are a Union of free and constitutional republics wherein most people are relatively autonomous in their free associations and communities and not a unitary democracy as a dictatorship of the majority of votes counted has not been lost on the left: they are in rebellion in trying to transform America into an authoritarian faux democracy akin to the USSR, albeit not exactly as Democrats are not actively Marxist.

The so-called ‘stakeholder capitalism’ of the WEF is a weird corporate-state partnership of the topmost shot-callers in government and business/finance who desire quite literally to rule the world and every institution in every country according to their vision of a single worldwide regimen, not necessarily a one-world government but essentially that in de facto power. This is just feudalism for the 21st century, nothing more, dressed up in terms like equity, inclusion, climate change, and the such to lull the masses into uncritical acceptance. It is neo-communist because it does ultimately involve a more planned economy than we have now, under the guise of climate change fears, because it is anti-capitalist*, and because its imposition is ultimately by force.

(*Most people do not understand what capitalism is and think it is profit over people, it is not, it is an economic system using capital as a means of assigning ownership to engage in a free market that ultimately has as its aim the elimination of poverty.

Neocommunism is not the same as classical communism, it uses the corporate world and extols fat cats as heroes of their movement, it is a partnership between corporate behemoths run by the few, the topmost bureaucracy in the administrative state who think they should run the show as unelected technocrats, and elected politicians who want that cozy sinecure with all its benefits and who will sell their vote to the corpostate machinery for a pittance.

Democrats are neo-communist foot soldiers for the corpostate establishment, and some Republicans are as well, and all these groups within the whole corpostate umbrella, left and right, wanted Trump gone in the worse possible way simply because a win by him slows or even stops them. They fear what he will do if he wins and are willing to risk a conflagration that destroys the world rather than allow him a fair chance on an even playing field. Their rhetoric and lies, their ongoing lawfare to be able to say Trump is a felon after that illegal kangaroo trial, all show they wanted this and continue to want this, so why when a chump with a gun shows up on a weird mission to prove he is a real marksman would they stop it I’d they alone were in the way?

It may be too soon to accuse a specific person of standing aside and thereby being complicit through intentional negligence, but it is something we must investigate using that ad our operating theory, which must be proven or disproven to the general satisfaction of the honest world. It is definitely not near a point of accusing Biden or the Democrats of planning this, but it is obviously clear and well-known they are invoking divorce language and are culpable in terms of fomenting the violence we are seeing carried out. No serious person thinks Biden doesn’t want to end Trump, his illegal lawfare against him makes that obvious, and his Party’s inability to use reason, rational thinking, or truth on a level playing field with his opponents in a civil manner proves they have little choice but to engage in “undemocratic” and illegal actions to throttle the opposition and cheat to win.

Democrats aren’t Hitler or Stalin and most sincerely do not want or believe their policies would result in a dictatorship. They are convinced by their own propaganda so hard that they think their extraordinary illegal actions and fomenting violence then standing aside to let some lone wolf try to kill a Republican is justified because Republicans are so evil.

Call it arrogance, hubris, or stupidity, but the Biden administration, the Democratic Party, and almost every major corporation and public institution, the entire infotainment and education industry, are captured by World Economic Forum types and their wacko global neo-communist feudalism, this depraved authoritarian ideology based on a fever dream of world dominion by a few dozen shot-callers at the top.

Elimination of one’s political opponents by smearing them into being hated, lawfare aimed at hobbling them, control of the discourse through official and corporate controls over the means of communication and networking, control over the press rooms through antichristian and anti-Republican bigotry, and, yes, fomenting political violence are all signs the Democratic Party is not an American political party but a globalist neo-communist party run by and for the topmost shot-callers on the planet, many of whom are not Americans.

Did Biden order the hit on Trump?

No.

He didn’t have to. All he has to do is appoint people who hate Republicans as much as he does on their protection details and continue to demonize the Republicans until some unhinged idiot seeking fame ceases an opening and opens fire. Thus, the ultimate blame for this, and for the murder of an innocent man and the serious harm done to two other people, cannot but be laid on the corpostate establishment, of which Biden is their puppet and the Democrats their minions.

Directed-Energy Weapons (DEWs): The Future of Warfare?

Michael Cessna July 26, 2024

Long a staple of science fiction, Directed-Energy Weapons (DEWs) are rapidly becoming a reality in modern warfare. These advanced weapons emit focused energy in the form of lasers, microwaves, or particle beams, promising to revolutionize military operations. While experiments with directed energy began as early as the 1930s, the term “LASER” (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation) only emerged in 1960 with the invention of the first laser by American engineer and physicist Theodore Maiman.

*Theodore Maiman, on the 25th anniversary of the invention of the laser, 1985. Los Angeles Reader Photo. CCA/4.0 International.*

Since Maiman’s groundbreaking work, laser technology has revolutionized numerous fields. In our daily lives, lasers are ubiquitous, found in CD/DVD players, barcode scanners, fiber-optic communications, and various medical treatments. From precision measurements to advanced manufacturing processes, the impact of laser technology on modern society is difficult to overstate.

Military applications of laser technology have been equally transformative. As early as 1962, the U.S. military began developing laser-guided targeting systems. By 1967, Texas Instruments had developed the world’s first laser-guided, “smart” bomb, the BOLT-117. This innovation marked a significant shift in air warfare, moving from mass bombing raids with high casualty rates to precise, targeted strikes that minimize collateral damage. The ability to guide munitions with pinpoint accuracy has not only increased military effectiveness but also reduced civilian casualties and collateral damage in combat zones.

*BOLT-117 aircraft bomb in the Hill Air Force Base Museum. Photo by Wikimedia User Wilson44691. CCA/1.0 Universal.*

In the realm of surveillance and reconnaissance, LIDAR (LIght Detection And Ranging) technology, first developed in the 1960s, has proven invaluable. LIDAR can create highly detailed 3D maps, even penetrating dense vegetation to reveal hidden structures. This capability has profound implications for both military operations and civilian applications. In warfare, LIDAR allows for precise terrain mapping and the detection of camouflaged targets. In the civilian sector, it’s crucial for autonomous vehicle navigation, urban planning, and environmental monitoring.

Despite these advancements, the development of combat-ready DEWs has faced significant challenges. The U.S. Navy’s AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System, installed on the USS Ponce (LPD-15) in 2014, was the first publicly deployed DEW. Designed to counter small UAVs, missiles, and boats, it represented a milestone in DEW development. However, issues with recharge times and beam coherence led to its replacement in favor of the Lockheed-Martin HELIOS (High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance) system – currently fitted to the destroyer USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51).

*The U.S. Navy’s AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System (LaWS) aboard USS Ponce (LPD-15) Laser while deployed to the Arabian Gulf in 2014. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams. Public Domain.*

The HELIOS system represents a significant leap forward in DEW technology. With double the power output of its predecessor, it promises improved performance against a wider range of threats. The system’s integration with the Aegis Combat System on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers demonstrates the Navy’s commitment to incorporating DEWs into its existing defense architecture.

U.S. Navy fire control team aboard operate the AN/SEQ-3 Laser Weapon System (LaWS) aboard USS Ponce (LPD-15) during an operational demonstration in the Arabian Gulf in 2014. U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams. Public Domain.

The primary obstacles in DEW development are bulk and power requirements. While progress has been made in reducing system size, power technology lags behind. The slow recharge times of capacitors remain a significant hurdle, though ongoing research promises future improvements. Scientists and engineers are exploring various solutions, including advanced battery technologies, super-capacitors, and even compact nuclear power sources for future DEW systems.

Another challenge facing DEW development is atmospheric interference. Lasers, in particular, can be affected by moisture, dust, and other particulates in the air, potentially reducing their effectiveness over long distances. Adaptive optics and beam control technologies are being developed to mitigate these issues, allowing for more consistent performance in varied environmental conditions.

Despite these challenges, the potential benefits of DEWs are substantial. In conventional warfare, ammunition can occupy up to 50% of an army’s logistical capacity. DEWs could significantly reduce this burden, revolutionizing military logistics. With theoretically unlimited “ammunition” as long as power is available, DEWs could dramatically extend the operational capabilities of military units in the field.

Moreover, as space becomes an increasingly important military domain, the low mass-to-effect ratio of DEWs makes them particularly attractive for orbital and anti-satellite operations. Traditional kinetic weapons are less suitable for space warfare due to the risk of creating debris fields that could endanger friendly assets. DEWs offer the potential for “clean” space combat, disabling enemy satellites without creating hazardous space debris.

The strategic implications of DEWs extend beyond their direct combat applications. Their potential to alter the balance of power has sparked a global race in DEW development. Nations worldwide are investing heavily in this technology, recognizing its transformative potential in future conflicts. This has led to concerns about a new arms race, with countries striving to gain a technological edge in directed energy systems.

As DEW technology matures, it raises important questions about the nature of future warfare. Will the advent of these weapons make conflicts more or less likely? How will they affect military strategies and international relations? The potential for DEWs to serve as both offensive and defensive systems complicates traditional notions of deterrence and military balance.

Furthermore, the development of DEWs has implications for international law and arms control agreements. Current treaties may need to be revised to account for these new weapons, which don’t fit neatly into existing categories of conventional or non-conventional arms. The potential for DEWs to cause temporary or permanent blindness in humans has already led to restrictions on certain types of laser weapons under the Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons.

The ethical considerations surrounding DEWs are also significant. While they have the potential to reduce collateral damage compared to conventional explosives, concerns remain about their long-term effects on human targets and the environment. The possibility of DEWs being used for crowd control or as non-lethal weapons such as the Active Denial System (ADS) also raises questions about potential abuse and human rights implications.

In addition to combat applications, DEWs have potential uses in other areas of defense. For example, high-powered microwaves could be used to disable electronic systems, providing a non-kinetic option for neutralizing enemy capabilities. This could be particularly useful in urban environments or situations where minimizing physical damage is crucial.

Research into DEWs is also driving advancements in related fields. The development of high-energy lasers, for instance, has led to improvements in materials science, optics, and power systems that have applications beyond the military sphere. These technological spillovers could have significant impacts on civilian industries and scientific research.

In conclusion, while the path to operational DEWs has been long and costly, the potential payoff appears to justify the investment. As technology continues to advance, we can expect to see more DEW systems deployed in various military contexts. Their development represents not just a new class of weapons, but potentially a paradigm shift in how wars are fought and deterred.

As we stand on the brink of this new era in military technology, the implications for global security and warfare are profound and far-reaching. The successful integration of DEWs into military arsenals could reshape battlefield dynamics, alter strategic calculations, and influence geopolitical relationships. However, realizing the full potential of these weapons will require overcoming significant technical hurdles and addressing complex ethical and legal questions.

War is space is coming. That it has not yet happened is more due to luck than anything else; international pronouncements to the contrary, functional anti-satellite weapons have been long-deployed, although they have not been used in an active conflict to date. In space warfare, mass-to-fuel ratios will be the dominant factors: anything that reduces mass is well worth the developmental expenses. Destructive laser weapons systems, while not yet “ready for primetime“, are almost to the point of active deployment to the battlefield.

The story of directed-energy weapons is still being written, and the coming decades will likely see rapid advancements in this field. As with any transformative military technology, the ultimate impact of DEWs will depend not only on their technical capabilities but also on how they are employed and regulated in the complex landscape of international relations and conflict. The age of energy weapons is upon us, and its effects will resonate far beyond the battlefield.

It is not “war cheerleading” to promote the development of new weapons systems – like it or not, for all of the research on these weapons in the West, there are plenty of other nations which are working just as hard on the same systems, for the same reason.

The Digital Battlefield: The Evolution and Global Impact of Information Warfare

Michael Cessna July 19, 2024

NOTE: As we take this article to press – on Friday, July, 19, 2024 – a major cyber event is developing, affecting Windows OS machines running the CrowdStrike antivirus software. At press time, it remains unclear as to whether this is a simple software glitch, or if it is a deliberate attack.

One of the most popular terms in the military sphere of late is “information warfare” (IW)…but, what is that, really? Simply out, information warfare is the use of information and communication technologies to gain competitive advantages over opponents. In short, it is the use of broad categories of inforamtion gain advantages.

For propaganda centuries, competing states have used various forms of propaganda (well before the term was invented in the 1920’s), it was not until World War One that Edward Bernays developed the first rudimentary principles of what would become the modern fields of psychological operations (psyops), propaganda, and what I term “directed deep-fake operations“.

With the rise to dominance of increased connectivity and a vastly enlarged reliance on digital systems, for everything from simple communications to to critical financial transaction systems, information warfare is now a critical, and growing component of national security. Finding ways to “attrit” such systems, whether via a more stealthy, long-term approach of systems infiltration or through a sudden, all-out assault, is now a major focus of top-tier national armed forces.

Like all of the many areas of warfare, modern information warfare has its unique shapes, spaces and requirements. Information warfare is now far more than creative fake newspapers, propaganda posters and leaflets:

A. Cyberattacks and hacking target critical government and military systems.
B. Disinformation and propaganda are used to spread false or misleading information, specifically targeted to influence public opinion.
C. Social media manipulation uses platforms from Facebook and Instagram, to TikTok and Minds to amplify directed messages of misinformation and fake news in order to create “echo chambers“, which pigeonhole unwary readers into believing a wholly fictional version of reality.
D. Critical to these operations are the use of “deep-fakes” and AI-generated content to create convincing fake videos and audio to mislead or discredit. These videos originally began by digitally grafting the faces of various celebrities onto pornographic videos – because Rule 34 is real – and moved on to spoofing major media and political figures…these tools have only improved in recent years.

There are, of course, many actors involved in making this type of warfare viable. Variously, there are three basic groups actively engaging in these operations: state-sponsored groups deployed by governments to run campaigns designed to influence foreign populations by reshaping their views via mainstream and social media spaces; these also frequently serve to destabilize adversary powers. This is one of the many responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency’s “meme division”.

Non-state actors (terrorist groups, “hacktivists”, and other organizations, best lumped together as “anarchists”) use the same information warfare tactics as the state-sponsored groups, but use them for strictly criminal, money-making scams, or as mercenary groups to supplement the state groups in their operations, as has happened in recent years, specifically with Iran’s response to the STUXNET attack of 2010, that seriously damaged Iran’s nuclear material enrichment facility in the city of Natanz.

The main tools being used to facilitate the various operational avenues of attack in information warfare are “bots” and “troll farms”. These vectors employ automated accounts and organized groups spreading content and engaging in online discussions, that are increasingly being driven by ever-improving Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms.

Aside from the social media manipulaton sphere, which is best defined as a “soft attack strategy”, the primary attack modes use viruses and “hostile” AI to target critical infrastructure systems to attempt to disrupt power grids, financial systems, hospital operations, local police and fire response systems, water distribution and treatment systems, and other vital services. This is, in fact, the door that was opened by the STUXNET attacks, because that virus – rather than directly attacking the core programming, specifically targets the programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which allow the automation of electromechanical processes such as those used to directly control machinery and various industrial processes, including gas centrifuges for separating nuclear material, as happened in Iran in 2010.

Globally, various hostile vector systems are used to influence national elections, by attempting to sway voter opinions unnaturally and to undermine electoral processes, although this requires a targetable infrastructure in the target country that allows for manipulation of votes and vote counting through electronic means. Economically, consequences include manipulation of both local and global markets, theft of crucial intellectual property, and significant disruption of business operations, both at the street level, but also the operations of major, “blue chip” companies.

Socially, a dedicated “soft strike” IW campaign can exacerbate even long-dormant divisions within a country and its societies. the exacerbation of existing tensions and/or the creation of new conflicts within populations can have horrifying consequences; Rwanda and the breakup of Yugoslavia, while not directly the result of IW campaigns, come immediately to mind. Information Warfare campaigns often result – intentionally, or not – a serious erosion of trust through declining confidence in media, government institutions, and information sources.

Counter-measures and defensive strategies, to date, are haphazard, with their effects being difficult to measure accurately. Government initiatives, such as the creation of cybersecurity agencies and information warfare units, are themselves frequently seen as suspiciious by those government’s own populations, as are various “media literacy” programs, that seek to educate the public in how to identify and resist disinformation. In this, of course, the governmental responses are fighting against frequently subtle and hard-to-argue points, limiting their effectiveness.

In the private sector, responses such as the development of AI-powered detection tools and enhanced security measures are ongoing. However, these tools and their value remain murky, as the companies deploying them are loathe to talk about them in public, as their very existence depends on those tools remaining secret.

International cooperation through the sharing of intelligence and joint operations to combat threats is also hard to measure, for the simple fact that those measures are also hazy in their effects, at least for the general public, as intelligence agencies and armed forces – for reasons similar to the private sector – are loathe to reveal their operations publicly.

As Information Warfare continues to adapt to new technologies and societal changes, the paramount importance of highly responsive adaptability means that defensive strategies must constantly evolve to meet new threats, in real-time. Global cooperation is needed for nations and corporations to establish norms and combat information warfare effectively. In this, these groups will need to find methods to share their defense strategies…which is a very difficult thing to do for thee groups, even on a good day.

Additional Resources

Edward L. Bernays (1928), Propaganda
James F. Dunnigan (1996), Digital Soldiers

The Era of Hybrid Warfare – Reality Or Buzzword?

Michael Cessna July 11, 2024

All too frequently, people resort to pithy and catchy buzzwords and phrases to disguise the fact that they really have no idea what to say, but have to say something. We’ve all heard examples: “streamline virtual portals”, “strategize cross-media interfacing“, “maximize enterprise users“, etcetera, etcetera, ad nausea. Sadly – we’re way past ‘alarming’ – militaries, especially in the West, are no different.

For military forces in most parts of the world, sounding trendy is necessary to keep money flowing from their civilian leadership. Thus, at budget time, military leaders tend to appear in front of civilian bureaucrats – most of whom know absolutely nothing practical about anything ‘military’ – with new and scarily indefinable concepts to keep the money spigot turned on. In this, while the military generals and colonels are technically lying, they are doing so because whatever threats their nation may be facing, those threats are not changing very much or very quickly (mostly), but politicians live to be “ahead of the game”, and tossing out buzzwords on the Sunday morning talk show circuit to show how up-to-date they are. And don’t be fooled: the politicians the generals hate the most are not civilians, but those military veterans who go into politics, because they are far less susceptible to Buzzword Bingo.

But, I digress.

Of late, one of the major buzz-terms has been “Hybrid Warfare”. Sounds concerning, right? But what is “hybrid warfare”, exactly? The official NATO definition is, itself, loaded with buzz terms. Simply out, “hybrid warfare” is the combination of “conventional warfare” (i.e., the current war in Ukraine) with all the other stuff: guerrilla warfare, psychological operations and propaganda, “information warfare” (itself, a buzzword), low-level drone warfare, and on and on…essentially, the combination of all the means of waging war, if deployed all at once or even in pieces, is “hybrid warfare”. If this sounds familiar, that’s because it is: this term perfectly describes everything from World War Two to the US and French wars with Vietnam, to Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the recent “GWOT” (Global War On Terror).

*USAF aircraft of the 4th Fighter Wing (F-16, F-15C and F-15E) fly over Kuwaiti oil fires, set by the retreating Iraqi army during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. US Air Force photo. Public Domain.*

The reason this is particular buzzword is relevant, however, is because – as was pointed out in 1940 – effective combat technology has migrated down to the level of the common citizen. Knowledge is like that: if you know how to do a thing, getting the tools and materials is not overly difficult…as Western forces have discovered to their regret over the last quarter-century or so: if you’re wondering why the recent series of wars have been inconclusive, this is one of the main reasons.

Key Components of Hybrid Warfare

The basic components of hybrid warfare can be defined by the following:

Conventional military operations

Traditional military force deployments, and/or shows of military strength have formed the basis of recorded warfare throughout history. When the average person thinks of “war“, this is what they think of: serried ranks of troops in uniform, gobs of artillery and armored vehicles, big, fast-moving jets, and all the other “stuff”.

*Warfare. Collage – various sources, public domain.*

Irregular warfare and insurgency

The use of proxies and non-state actors on a regular basis is a relatively new phenomenon, at least when done with any degree of reasoned planning and execution. Arming rebels, insurgents and guerrillas – or jihadist’s – has been done forever and a day, but today, in the glare of news cameras hungry for bloody story meat, the practice is frequently regularized, and given a sheen of legitimacy…whether it is competently done or not.

Another buzzword feature associated with this idea is that of “asymmetric warfare“. This is a “weasel term“, as it essentially means anything the enemy does that seems irrational, but that works in a combat environment. This can be anything from tunneling under perimeter of a “forward operating base” (FOB), to adding peanut oil to conventional engines, something the British SOE and the American OSS did in Europe during WW2.

Military establishments and their (mostly) civilian masters have come to depend absolutely on computer technologies, including the internet. As a result, cyber attacks and information warfare are now serious problems.

Hacking and disruption of critical infrastructure – who remembers the STUXNET virus? – demonstrated both the terrifying levels of damage that a simple computer virus could wreak on highly dangerous manufacturing processes, but also the equally terrifying scale of the potential response.

In like manner, “disinformation” campaigns and social media manipulation, once laughed at by many people, have proven to be an important component on the new battlefield. The ‘edgy’ memes shared over social media, however, are the equivalent to the paper pamphlets of past decades, the crucial difference being that this kind of media can reach a far wider audience, and do so far faster than conventional radio or television spots. For all that, however, the main impact of disinformation campaigns has actually been to undermine the public perception of government in general, as governing bodies around the world – peopled by many who lack any real understanding of technology – desperately try to restrict both free speech as well as social media access, to the extent of developing “caged” social media platforms which they then restrict their citizens to using exclusively, on penalty of arrest. The end result is a rapidly growing distrust of all forms of government.

Economic pressure and sanctions

Likewise, the old standbys of economic pressure and trade sanctions are beginning to fail, because there is too much money to be made getting around the sanctions. Even targeted economic measures against key sectors within a hostile state can be overcome, if that state either has friendly economic partners willing to either openly ignore the sanctions, or at least are willing to turn a blind eye to the smuggling.

Cases in point, both Russia and Iran, while both suffering economic hardships initially, have both rebounded quickly, to the point that Rosoboronexport – Russia’s state arms dealer – is working three shifts to produce mountains of military vehicles, equipment and ammunition to supply not only the war in Ukraine, but to fulfill export orders to multiple countries (unlike the West), leaving the failures of the West’s total lack of strategic vision laid bare. The brutal government of Iran, too – like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – is doing perfectly well for itself; the welfare of their citizenry is irrelevant, as long as they can limit access to news, and can keep the populace at work.

Communist China, with an economy on life support and teetering on the brink of collapse, has been desperately trying to build an international infrastructure based on their “Belt & Road Initiative” to gain enough clout to create exploitable economic dependencies…which, if the collapse of French dominance in the Sahel region of Africa is indication, is a whole different kind of losing strategy.

Conclusion

The challenges for National Defense in responding to “total warfare“, or “unrestricted warfare” are vast. Far aside from the legal and ethical considerations, are the strains placed on both traditional military and governmental structures, and – most critically – the increasingly negative perception of those institutions, as they flail helplessly, deploying tools and strategies that they do not understand.

And of course, lurking in the background lay the twin threats of A.I. and biotech. As the capabilities of AI increase rapidly, deploying a hostile AI against an “enemy” populace, while likely to be very effective, can easily backfire, sparking a whole host of “science fiction”-like scenarios none of them good.

Far more worrying, is the possibility of very high-tech biological warfare. Conspiracy theories about the recent coronavirus pandemic aside, the potential certainly exists for the truly deranged to deploy a “slate-wiper” virus that they believe will kill just enough people to let them achieve their goals…the problem being, of course, that viruses have a nasty habit of rapidly mutating, rendering vaccines and inoculations against them completely ineffective.

This is not a case of “give peace a chance” – throughout history, there are plenty of madmen, and equally mad states – who take “soft” attitudes as an opportunity to strike.

We can’t tell you what is going to happen. All we can do is try to warn you.

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

David Kilcullen (2011), The Accidental Guerrilla
Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui (2015),Unrestricted Warfare
Thomas Ricks (2012), The Generals
James F. Dunnigan (2003), How To Make War, 4^th Edition
James F. Dunnigan (1991), Shooting Blanks

The Rise of Crypto in Conflict Zones

Terrorism Financing Goes Digital

Challenges for Law Enforcement

The Humanitarian Dilemma

Looking to the Future

Conclusion

The 3D-Printed Revolution

From Homebrewed Tanks & Artillery To Navies & Air Forces

Training, Command, and Combat Control in the Digital Age

The Global Implications of Military-Sphere Democratization

A Look Ahead

Beginnings

Confrontation In Space

Throwing Rocks

Bright Light Boom

Combat Logistics in Space Warfare

The Future

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Introduction

The Good Ol’ Days

Into the Cold

The Dawn of the Millennium and the GWOT

Conclusion

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

NOTE: As we take this article to press – on Friday, July, 19, 2024 – a major cyber event is developing, affecting Windows OS machines running the CrowdStrike antivirus software. At press time, it remains unclear as to whether this is a simple software glitch, or if it is a deliberate attack.

Additional Resources

Key Components of Hybrid Warfare

Conclusion

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

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