April 22, 2026

Essays

The AML-90: The Little Truck That Could, Soldiers On

 

 

Since the earliest days of people hanging armor plates and machine guns onto motor vehicles, “armored cars” have formed an essential component of military’s around the world. The better versions are small(-ish), cheap, fast, reasonably dependable and armed enough to defend themselves, as their crews sent recon reports via their radios.

But sometimes, something special appears.

Introduced in 1959, the AML- series (Auto Mitrailleuse Légère, or “Light Machine Gun Car”), manufactured until 1987 by the French company Panhard (who have been making automobiles since 1890), is small, even by armored car standards, at 16’9″x12’5″x6’6″, and weights in right at six tons.

AML-60, armed with the 60mm Brandt gun-mortar.

Initially, it was armed as a light, fast, highly-mobile mortar carrier, carrying a 60mm Brandt gun-mortar and a pair of the uniquely French MAS AA-52 NF-1 machine guns. However, although the little armored car was an immediate hit with French troops in Algeria, as that conflict wound down, there was less of a need for a mobile mortar carrier. As foreign buyers began looking at the design, it was the Apartheid-era South African Army who asked if Panhard could give the little truck a heavier punch.

And thus, the AML-90 was born.

Mounting a DEFA D921 90mm/3.54in rifled cannon, this new vehicle was fully capable of engaging and destroying the main battle tanks of the 1960’s. As the years wore on, even though its 90mm cannon could not keep pace with developments in tank armor, its high-explosive (HE) projectiles remain fully capable to destroying most vehicles smaller than a tank or modern IFV. Even the US Army’s the United States Army Research Laboratory acknowledged in 1979 (PDF link) that the AML “operated effectively in Beirut” and noted that “the ease with which the Panhard is driven and repaired, and the absence of tracks, provide the mobility desirable in an urban environment.

An AML-90 (R) of the Lebanese Army, Beirut, Lebanon, 1982

And it was simple, in the extreme – AML hulls were assembled from only 13 welded pieces. Thirteen. In the early 1980’s, an upgrade to the AML-90 Lynx became available, offering a new turret loaded with a modified D921 main gun and up-rated range-finding equipment and night-vision gear.

Bottom: Original H-90 turret.
Top: Lynx 90 turret incorporating a new commander’s cupola, sights, searchlight, and a laser rangefinder.

The AML-90 and its somewhat lesser known variants were sold all over the world, albeit mostly in Africa, where they proved very effective when used for their intended roles. As just one example, when France conducted a series of operations during the Chadian-Libyan Conflict, only three vehicles were reportedly lost in action, apparently to RPG fire, despite several engagements versus Libyan tanks. While not completely immune to land mines, the AML’s were not known to fall prey to them very often.

Although withdrawn from French service in 1991 (replaced by the Panhard ERC and AMX-10RC vehicles), the AML – in most of its forms – continues to soldier on, around the world, with the last foreign sales being completed in 1999.

An Iraqi AML-90 light armored car, captured during Operation Desert Storm. USMC photo.

Are there better vehicles, today? Absolutely. The AML, by modern standards, is cramped, has neither NBC protection, nor any real “comfort” items modern forces take for granted, and has poor armor. But still…until it comes against those better vehicles, the AML remains cheap and effective — even sixty-odd years later.

“Old” does not necessarily mean “useless”…A thing that more military’s in the world would do well to learn.

How To Nip A Totalitarian Agenda In The Bud Before It Is Too Late

If your political foe calls you a great Satan, understand that unless you match or exceed their rhetoric, the public will tend to think the more sensationalist claims are true. Moreover, if your foe calls you a great Satan and this is patently false, then take this both as projection and equate this to murderous intent.

(Note: some measure of this is always evident at almost all times, but what is at issue here is the pervasiveness, loudness, and sensationalism of such claims and rheorical assaults aimed at delegitimization and even criminalization of any substantial part of your movement.)

The public gravitate toward epic batttles between implacable foes, not tame debates in response to vicious attacks by the other side.

Lopsided battles in which one side tries to be polite to one who is being violent and beyond the pale hold little interest. The assumption is that the louder and more violent must necessarily be right because average people would never make such outlandish claims and act so reprehensible without cause.

Hence to perhaps over-quoted bit about “the big lie”, telling it loudly and repeatedly until it is believed.

If the Ukes had not been so vicious and violent in their response to the Orc invasion out of Russia and Byelorus, for instance, the general public would have lost interest. Nobody adores a weakling. But notice, the Ukes have only done limited attacks on the Russian homeland itself for fears of escalating this into a nuclear war.

In politics, of course, the term “violent” is not literal. It is a spirit and energy. Like where it says it the Sacred text: the Kingdom of God suffers violence and the violent take it by force. When one side demonizes over the top, the only response is to return the favor in spades, assuming all their demonizations are projection and represent intent.

To drive this point home: it is ALWAYS reasonable to assume that whatever lies are used to defame your side are a projection of the true character and intent of the other side. When the other party openly deems any part of your movement traitors or something like that, then dialog must end and peaceful street actions must begin in a visible way that forces the public to choose a side.

Abandon any notion that any attack on perhaps a less seemly element of your movement is not actually a precursor to a general attack on the totality of your movement.

Once matters go to a stage where “legal” devices, abuses of power, are targeting individuals and using sensationalist claims and hyperbolic exaggeration to actually raid homes and arrest people, the response must be to assume all of your side are in the crosshairs. This is the kind of dangerous measures that actually lead to real violence when the organs of power come with guns to harrass or even imprison their opponents.

The political party or movement that cannot mass people for protests and civil disobedience to protect its own members, even those it may not heartily embrace, will soon face extinction. Illegal abuses of power targeting a few people who may be skirting the edge of propriety but who have not substantively broken the law, must be deemed an illegal persecution of the whole movement.

The only response would include protests, mass demonstrations, and even crippling work stoppages aimed at causing as much of a OR nightmare and and as much economic pain as possible on the oppressive party. But a peaceful albeit overwhelming response is needed with the aim of deescalation: using violence can tip things over the edge and lead to a lose-lose scenario for your entire country.

Essentially, match and exceed their rhetoric, or accusations, understanding that it is reasonable to assume the worst lying smears are actual projection and represent serious mal intent. But do not escalate with physical violence when peaceful demonstrations and/or work stoppages can be availed.

Lifeblood of War: Supply, Recovery and Salvage

 

Supply and logistics (in the most basic of terms, the act of moving supplies) is the chief mechanic that drives warfare, the current conflict in Ukraine being a prime example of the principle in action. In the words of Major General Julian Thompson, CB, OBE (commander of 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands War), supply and logistics are, quite literally, the “Lifeblood of War.”

To give our non-military readers a very basic overview, the better to understand the problem, let’s take a brief look at the framework of supply in the military sphere.

Warfare destroys and wastes whatever it touches – both people and equipment. People can be recovered (where that can be possible) through medical treatment and counseling.

But what about equipment?

Kansas Army National Guard Soldiers work to package and stage personal protective equipment. (U.S. Army Photo by Sgt. Ian Safford, 105th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

Everything a military force needs – the “beans, bullets and band-aides,” if you like – can be categorized, ordered, received, inventoried, issued and turned back in at will. The trouble is getting all of those actions to work in sync, on time, and (hopefully) in something close to the right amounts. For the most part, your humble author is happy to stick with the US Armed Forces system, not simply because it is what I am used to, but because it is more precise than comparable systems, while also not being overly cluttered.

Oshkosh M-978 fuel servicing trucks line a holding area during Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) training, part of exercise Ocean Venture ’92. An M-901 TOW vehicle is parked to the left. US Navy photo.

The US Armed Forces “Classes of Supply” are as follows:

  • Class I Rations – Subsistence (food and drinking water), gratuitous (free) health and comfort items
  • Class II Clothing And Equipment – individual equipment, tentage, some aerial delivery equipment, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment
  • Class IIIPOL – Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) (package and bulk): Petroleum, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components, and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal
  • Class IVConstruction materials, including installed equipment and all fortification and barrier materials
  • Class VAmmunition of all types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators, pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and associated items
  • Class VIPersonal demand items (such as health and hygiene products, soaps and toothpaste, writing material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, alcohol, and cameras—nonmilitary sales items)
  • Class VIIMajor end items such as missile and rocket launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, some parachute systems and vehicles
  • Class VIIIMedical material (equipment and consumables) including repair parts particular to medical equipment
    **Class VIIIa – Medical consumable supplies not including blood & blood products
    **Class VIIIb – Blood & blood components (whole blood, platelets, plasma, packed red cells, etc.
  • Class IXRepair parts and components to include kits, assemblies, and sub-assemblies (repairable or non-repairable) required for maintenance support of all equipment
  • Class X – Material to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic development (not included in Classes I through IX)
  • Miscellaneous – Water, salvage, and captured material
Saraktash scrap-heap. By “Imankulov”, under CCA/3.0 Unported.

My only real complaint about this list is the last item, because the only true “miscellaneous” items are truly ‘scrap‘ materials. Thus, I use the following, in addition:

Class XINon-potable Water

Class XIICaptured/Recovered Material

Of these, “Class XI” (Non-potable water), is the simplest: Non-potable (i.e., non-drinkable) water is fine for washing equipment, fire-fighting and for flushing out waste.

An Iraqi AML-90 light armored car captured during Operation Desert Storm. A captured ZPU-23-4 anti-aircraft machine gun is at right. USMC photo.

Class XII (Captured/Recovered Material) are the various detritus that can be scraped up from a battlefield, including enemy material. The process for handling this class of gear (whether from a friendly, liberated, requisitioned or enemy source) is as follows:

  • a. The materiel is brought into a receiving yard, where it is identified, categorized and assessed for serviceability. Anything of direct and immediate interest to Intelligence goes straight to them. For everything else, we move on to…
  • b. Type Classification and Field Stock Number Registry: Materiel recovered and brought in should have a tag applied to them, then be classified with a temporary Stock Number, first, using the Supply Classifications as listed above to categorize the item. Then, after applying a two-digit number for the supply class, add one of the following qualifiers after the class to the item tag:
    • (x) – Material recovered from allied/friendly military sources
      (y) – Captured/Liberated enemy material
      (z) – “DIY”, improvised, ad hoc or requisitioned from civilian sources

Then, add the appropriate qualifier from the following list:

  • (A) – Ready To Issue; the item can be issued immediately, with minimal servicing and/or repainting. It should be tagged, and placed into an appropriate storage slot
  • (B) – PM Required; minor maintenance/clean-up required prior to reissue. This should be forwarded to the appropriate maintenance queue
  • (C) – Major Repairs Required; the item is repairable, but is dead-lined until it can be repaired. This should also be forwarded to the appropriate maintenance queue
  • (D) – Sub-Assembly Salvageable; the complete item is too damaged to reissue as a complete unit, but can be broken down into its constituent sub-assemblies (i.e., brake drums, alternators, engines, various major components, etc.) to issue in order to repair other items. This process should be commenced immediately, using either unit specialists, or civilians hired on contract.
  • (E) – Scrap; the item is damaged to the point where it can no longer be used. This material should be towed or set out of the way, and should either be returned to a manufacturing area for re-smelting/recovery, or sold off. Depending on the material, it may be able to be repurposed into engineering barrier or shelter material.

This hypothesized “Class XII” was actually a major activity of the US Army‘s Quartermaster Corps in World War 2, at least in the European Theater, as it created a not-insignificant cost-saving for the United States. (Learn more here: YouTube 1 and YouTube 2)

Un-Preparedness — How Popular Media Worsen The Effects Of Disasters…

…And The Start Of A Solution

This is more an essay than a quick article. The views hear-in are those of the author, alone.

As a certain writer once said, there is nothing wrong with fearing pain, deprivation and hardship…and I agree. Hence, I am a “survivalist” (rr, “prepper“, if you prefer). No — I don’t have the elaborate underground bunker (I wish!), and no, I do not sit on a mountain of supplies (again, I wish!), but the attitude is there.

I think about it. I plan for it. I continually assess and reassess my options.

No, not just the ubiquitous “government martial law” thing — although that is part of it (to the “no common sense” side of the barn: why do you think the Department of Homeland Security bought over 20 years worth of ammunition [based on the US Army estimating that it was expending c.70 million (rifle) rounds per year from 2004-2008], and almost 3,000 armored, “landmine-resistant”, combat trucks?)

A view of the Kibumba refugee camp, 1994. U.S. National Archives.

…No, I’m talking about more mundane things — you know, like Hurricane Sandy? Or Katrina. Guess who stayed in “temporary” shelters for months? Guess who waited up to 2 weeks (or more) for any help to arrive?

So I wondered: where does this come from? Why have I always been concerned about massive damage, and massive dislocations of society? Am I weird? Disturbed?

Well – I grew up in California, so…Yeah — pretty much…And for all the Californio’s reading this: How many of you remember the “earthquake exercises” we used to do? You know the ones: Do you know where the key is, to turn off the gas in case of an earthquake? So the house doesn’t explode? Did you make up earthquake kits in school? Bottles of water, before it was fashionable, and cans of Chef-Boy-Ar-Dee and Campbell’s Pork-n-Beans, squirreled away in corners of the house, so that at least one or two would be sure to survive a big shaker?

…Then, of course, it was the early 80’s. And yes — I’ve been at this since the early 80’s. I’ve already made all the mistakes you need to avoid.

So, what is the point of all this?


Recently, in the last few years, there has been a rise in “reality” programming of so-called “prepper” shows, chief among them, National Geographic Channel’s “Doomsday Preppers“, where the show visits various “survivalists” – or “preppers” – and documents their ideas and strategies. Other shows work on a similar format.

The only problem is, the entire thrust of most of these programs is to demonize anyone involved in “prepping” as a paranoid freak, resulting in many people shaking their heads, and turning away from the very idea of carrying more than a tire iron and a set of jumper cables in their car.

This is a disastrous situation, one that magnifies the already terrible effects of a disaster – be it natural or man-made – by planting the seed in people’s minds that it is “crazy” to prepare for a disaster.

How do these shows do this? By highlighting one of two conditions, and magnifying them far out of proportion, for the “Wow!” effect: the shows seek the most extreme survivalists, and seek to show either their “vast” resources or their “extreme” views, or both. Normal, rational people see these views as either unattainable or dangerous and frightening, and stay away from the entire idea…

…Which is usually about the time a major disaster befalls them.

In fact, disaster preparation is much like insurance — a person does not get home insurance because they intend to destroy their home, they get it, in case some disaster (earthquake, fire, flood, hurricane, a car driving through the front wall, etc.) might happen at some point.

Preparing to mitigate the effects of an extreme disaster is no different.

US Navy Lifeboat Survival Kit, c.1943. US Navy photo.

For all that, there are a lot of well-meaning people out there trying to prepare for “Disaster ‘X'”, who are wasting precious resources, money, brain sweat, real sweat and time operating along a very poor planning cycle.

First, there has to be a clear understanding of what I call the “Survival Breadbox” — an interactive rectangle of arrays of items that define capabilities. Most people approach the Box neither knowing what it is, nor really understanding it, and only perceive it in a disjointed fashion; in fact, failure to understand the Box is why many preppers give up, as it looks far too complicated and frustrating. However, once you understand the Box, you can start planning effectively, and – most importantly – successfully implementing those plans.

The reason I describe the Box as an “interactive rectangle” is because there are four points to it…

  1. The “EEK”
  2. The Week-Long 72-Hour Window
  3. The Cantonment
  4. The Panoply

The reason these are in a rectangle, rather than a hierarchy, is that they feed off of each other, and operate together to form a cohesive whole — you can function without one of the corners for a while, but you had better address it, and FAST, before you run into a situation where you.

One of the most common mistakes preppers make is to plan for “Disaster ‘X’“…only to have “Disaster ‘L’” show up. I tend to take this from the point of view that anything that significantly disrupts the nation’s logistical infrastructure for more than a week is the “worst case”.

Roadway damage, Oslo, MN, May, 2009. FEMA photo.

Why? Because the country functions on its logistical infrastructure — you might garden, but how many reading this grow their own cotton, harvest it, process it, and make clothing out of it? How many people reading this can go out to a local store, and buy a metal object that was made locally, that went straight from raw ore to a finished product, “locally” being defined as “within 100 miles from where you live”?

Based on that, chances are good that the person reading this got every single thing in their house from off of a truck, something that was made somewhere else, and rather far away…including the food in your fridge. And if the system that makes all that flow smoothly is disrupted, everything will quickly get seriously out of whack, as every business requires a steady flow of widgets to function — and even if the place that makes Widget A still functions, and can get its product to its customer, that Widget is useless without the other 30 or 30,000 widgets that make the final product work.

Most preppers recognize this at some level, and don’t know what to do about it…so they try hard to ignore it…

Let’s look at each point in the Box.

First, is the “EEK” — the “Escape and Evasion Kit“. This is almost always currently referred to as a “bug-out bag“, or a “Get Out Of Dodge” (GOOD) kit. I casually detest both terms. Why? Because they put people in the wrong mindset.

If you are “bugging out” or “getting out of Dodge“, this implies that you will have some warning, so it might be appropriate to take “whatever you can carry“…

…Folks – you’re not packing to go hiking at Aspen. So why, oh, WHY do you carry five ways to start a fire? This isn’t the Scouts.

If you actually need to use a kit like this, things have gone ‘BLOOEY‘ in a major and surprising way, and you suddenly need to get from Point A to Point B — on foot. Now, if the ‘BLOOEY‘ has happened, just how many other people do you think are going to be trying to get to an area somewhere near Point B?

Then WHY ARE YOU DRAWING ATTENTION TO YOURSELF WITH A FIRE? Worse – COOKING?! People who are scared and hungry will come after you like a moth to a flame. Why? Because sound, light, and smell all carry a LONG way, and while someone alone might not want to risk a confrontation on Day 1, what about Day 2? Or Day 4? What happens when their children are hungry, and you don’t have enough food to share?

Now, the truly selfless will try to help as many as they can, as quickly as they can – and that’s a good thing…under normal circumstances. What happens when things are no longer ‘normal‘? What happens when you have to decide between the children of a person you’ve never met, and your own children? Not as easy a question, now, is it?

Ain’t moral dilemma’s great?

First rule of the EEK: Do NOT draw attention to yourself.

Second rule of the EEK: Travel light!

What should be in an EEK? Everyone will customize it, but try this yardstick: if your EEK won’t fit into a common student backack, you have too much stuff in it…

  • A military-spec rain poncho
  • A first aid kit
  • A multitool and/or a Swiss Army Knife
  • A 4″ lock blade Knife
  • Two methods of purifying water that do NOT involve fire
  • At least one quart-sized water bottle (like a Gatorade bottle or a military-style canteen)
  • 100′ of 550 “parachute cord
  • A roll of duct tape
  • A three-day supply of food

Now, most preppers have seen this before, and are thinking that is waaaay too light for three days. Yet, you can in fact carry a three days of food in a small day pack, if you are using USCG Ration packs…you don’t even need to carry too many extra condiments.

As well, let us not discuss the person with the fifteen knives (seriously — the video will leave you slack-jawed) in their kit.

Remember: The EEK is supposed to get you from Point A to Point B, on foot, in 3 – 5 day’s time. Planning on anything else means that you need to use the next tier…

Next, we’ll look at the “Week-Long 72-Hour Kit“.

Preppers frequently talk about the “3 day’s worth of supplies“. I’m not entirely sure why. In fact, the only reference I know of about this time-frame comes from a now-outdated FEMA flyer…Refer to Hurricane Sandy.

This is your “standard” disaster kit. It is intended to help you survive-in-place until help arrives. FEMA says “a few days”; 5 is realistic; 14-90 days is not a bad idea.

Note that this is not intended for you to carry — the amount of supplies and equipment is too great to carry on your back, and if you plan on being on the road for longer than three days to reach your cantonment (q.v.)…you need a better plan.

The only “prepper”-type features you will likely see in this kit are 55-gallon water barrels (based on 5 gallons of water, per person, per day; yes, you can get by with one gallon per person/day, but you won’t like it) and various types of stoves, grills or Dutch Ovens for cooking without electricity or gas.

And speaking of water, make sure to not simply store a few bottles of it – you need ways to purify it, preferably ways that do not involve fire. These methods involve bleach (16 drops to the gallon, per FEMA), or some sort of filtration system…As an aside, you should really look into your local laws concerning the capture and retention of rainwater — you may be both alarmed, amazed, horrified and outraged at just what some of these laws actually say. Forewarned, etc.

One of the advantages in this, similar to the Cantonment, is that you can eat what you are accustomed to eating normally, albeit with different cooking methods. If you’ve never tried to make rice on a Weber Grill — you need to get on that.

Since you’re not planning on moving, you also do not need to worry overmuch about things like cold storage, unless you take medications that require refrigeration. For that, you may want to look into either a solar PV power station, or a small gasoline-powered generator, to run a portable fridge.

Since you’re already at home, you don’t really need to acquire too much in the way of “special” foods, although you do want to make sure that you maintain a 5 – 14 day stockpile of food, minimum, of the kind of foods that will keep for a long time. (Hint: The expiration dates on canned goods are there for two reasons: to get you to rotate stock, and to absolve the manufacturer of legal responsibility if you are stupid enough to eat from a bulging or stinky can.)

Properly sealed canned goods, in cans that are not badly dented, will keep and be both edible and nutritious (I did NOT say “Will remain tasty”!) for up to 10 years; however, this DOES NOT apply to high-acidity foods like tomatoes.

Another important aspect of this kit that is shared by the Cantonment is the easy access to distraction materials — i.e., books and games.

What?

Role-playing dice set.

Hey, if a disaster has happened, and things are in the process of going back to normal, you are going to have a lot of downtime; it’s not like you’re going to be at work. Without power, your laptop/device batteries will die out fast, and roll-up PV panels only go so far. So…Have “distraction tools” ready to hand: boardgames, cards, RPG’s (the paper and pencil kind), and most importantly, BOOKS.

Third, we’ll look at the “Cantonment“.

This is a word derived from military use to describe a permanent or semi-permanent installation. In the early 80’s, when big-S ‘Survivalism’ was in the public consciousness, this was called the “Survival Retreat”.

The main idea goes like this: You have a workaday life and home in The Big City…but you have a “cabin in the woods”, or a patch of undeveloped land that you pull an RV onto to “camp” every now and then. However, you realize that if anything truly terrible happens, and things go south with a quickness, staying in the Big City is a B-A-D idea. The Retreat, or Cantonment, is the place you are going to “take a sudden vacation” to as things go ‘BLOOEY!’ In the event of a sudden-onset disaster, you may find yourself using the EEK, above – or even the Panoply, below – to ‘exfiltrate’ (i.e., “Get the F— OUT, NOW!“) out of the City.

Does that sound paranoid to you? You certainly don’t seem to think that it is, if you’re still reading this, this far in…That’s because you are likely old enough – or at least Net-savvy enough – to re-watch the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and/or the Rodney King Riots in Los Angeles to realize that, if things go south badly, even if order gets restored eventually, what condition are you going to be in, if you try to “stick it out” at home?

Now – just imagine what will happen when “…order will not be restored for ‘some time’…maybe as long as three to six months“. (That, incidentally, is a verbatim quote that I got once, I kid you not, not from any wild-eyed, ‘tin-foil-hat’ person, but from an executive of a major international corporation, in a public meeting…)

The Cantonment is a piece of property set out “in the sticks” (which is different, depending on who you talk to). It could be a bare spot of land, an empty-appearing field with a bunker buried underneath, or it could be an actual “Summer/Winter Home“…But one well-stocked, with a good deal of supplies socked away.

Whatever Cantonment model you choose, its location should not be more than one half-tank plus 10 gallons of gas in your primary vehicle in distance from your home; for most people, this equals about 400 miles, at the low end. Really, you shouldn’t be driving more than 200 miles if things are breaking down, unless you are making the Cantonment your full-time residence.

Whatever the case, the Cantonment needs to have some kind of land on it, even a measly quarter-acre. This is because, when things go ‘BLOOEY!’, you will need to get a ‘Victory Garden‘ going, and fast…

Victory Garden, 1943. Library of Congress.

Note that I said ‘Victory GARDEN‘. Singular. You might be able to plant two or three plots, maximum, but unless you already know what it’s like…don’t plan on being a “farmer”. If you haven’t worked the job, you have absolutely NO idea how back-breaking of a job it truly is. You need to get on the gardening bandwagon now, if you haven’t, already.

One thing most people thinking about a Cantonment do not think of is ‘community’. Believe me – ‘No Man Is An Island’ is the name of the game, here. You, the ‘significant other’, two kids and the dog do not an effective defense force make. Get to know your neighbors – NOW – and try to get a good idea of where they stand and what they plan to do. If they plan on sticking around, bring them in gently, and ply them with their favorite “tasty beverage”. If things are going to hell, friendly neighbors with a joint plan beat the heck out of the alternative.

This brings us, at long last, to the fourth point: the Panoply.

The US Army Soldier Protection System, 2019. US Army photo.

The word ‘panoply’ comes from the Greek word ‘panopilia‘ (πανοπλία), meaning literally, “all arms“. The Panoply was the complete ‘fighting kit’ of the ancient Greek fighting man, the Hoplite. It included his weapons (spear, sword and dagger), his armor (shield, cuirass, and greaves), his sandals if he wore any, and all the rest of the gear he wore on the march.

…”Oh, no! Here we go, with the “militia” rant! I KNEW it was coming!”

Yes. And?

Look — I appreciate the idea that people generally do not wish to do violence to their fellow human beings. I get that. Really. However, I hate to be the bearer of bad tidings, but a whole lot of your fellow humans to not feel the same way — make them hungry, tired and scared, and it will be infinitely worse.

We haven’t even started discussing already-organized gangs.

One of the basic principle of Western culture is the concept that a free person should “armed, and trained to arms“. That idea has been much-criticized recently, mostly by a certain sector that enjoys the freedom to criticize such “outmoded notions” while hiding behind the guns of those who do not subscribe to the idea of “situational ethics“.

Okay so, politics aside, what is in the modern Panoply? Well, at first glance, it will look a lot like the EEK, but there are important differences, differences that are based on psychology.

The panoply is about one thing, and one thing, only: fighting. While the EEK is designed to help you flee, the panoply is intended to make you orders of magnitude more effective at defense than simply standing in your doorway with a double-barreled 12gauge.

I’m not overly worried about the anti-gunners who read this, who are already frothing at the mouth — one of two things applies to these folks: a) you’re kidding yourselves, and you are just going to learn the hard way, or b) if the ‘BLOOEY!’ happens, you won’t last long enough to have to worry about it.

There’s no point in couching that with an apologia, either — it is what it is. You will either make the (very minimal) effort to save your own life, or you won’t. I have no input on that, whatsoever. That’s all on you.

I sincerely hope that no one else’s life is dependent upon your choice.

If you’re reading this, and you live in the US or Canada, you have a very limited time (especially if you live in Canada) to get the ‘big-ticket’ items that you require, because there are a LOT of people out there in positions of authority who want to remove your ability to obtain these things. That’s not politics — that’s on the news, if you care to watch it at all.

So, let’s get the ‘big tickets’ out of the way, first. What do you need: a rifle, a pistol, or a shotgun?

I’m going to take this from the premise that the reader has little-to-no experience with firearms as they read this — so all of the “gun guru’s” out there, yes, I appreciate that you have an opinion, but this is MY article…write your own.

If you have only limited experience with firearms, stay away from handguns of any type, at least at first — pistols take a great deal of training and practice to use effectively, and even after shooting from the age of 5, I do not consider myself to be any kind of expert.

“Long guns” – rifles and shotguns – are MUCH easier to learn, and arguably more effective at what you are trying to use them for: pistols are ultra-short range weapons, and are suitable only for last-ditch self defense. Yes, I know a lot of people carry concealed handguns legally — I don’t carry at all, as a matter of personal choice — and that police and some Special Forces units carry them as a primary “offensive” armament…But take a good, long look at where those folk’s targets are: within 50 feet, and usually a LOT closer.

This is something you REALLY want to avoid. Trust me, here.

Small Arms, Panama, 1989. USMC photo.

A shotgun would be a good place to start, but there are some disadvantages: while it does use a variety of ammunition types, its range is usually limited to about 100 yards, maximum (and usually under 40 yards with any accuracy, for most people), and shooting accurately requires a lot of practice to master.

Rifles, on the other hand, require comparatively less time to become proficient with. Also, they are accurate all the way out to 300-1,000 or more yards, depending on exactly what you are carrying…And no, you’re probably not going to need anything that shoots more than 300-500 yards — unless you get good enough to make the long ranges work.

So — what to buy, in a rifle? An AR-type? An AK-type?

The answer is — something simple. Something that is fun to shoot, is reliable, reasonably accurate ‘as is’, with no mechanical modifications, that uses a commonly available caliber.

The later-production AR-15’s (the ones with the 20-inch barrels…just trust me, here – copious amounts of “adult beverages” are needed for that technical of a discussion) are perfectly fine — as are the AK-47’s…but don’t limit your options. There are plenty of fine weapons out there that are not AR’s or AK’s, that will more than fill your needs. Don’t turn your nose up at a bolt-action rifle, or an SKS carbine because some pundit called them “outdated antiques”.

Once you have a firearm, you need to practice with it. That may seem obvious, but people raised on a steady diet of “first-person” shooting games seem to think that firearms are like USB connections – pick it up, and just “become accurate”. No…Just…No — Remember: The “…train to arms” part means that you need to TRAIN with whatever weapon you obtain.

After you decide on a rifle, you need ammunition, and not just ammunition to train with.

Ammunition comes in boxes or cases — rifle ammo comes in 20-round boxes, pistol ammo in 50-round boxes; cases generally run from 500 rounds (for shotguns) to one or two thousand rounds for rifles, depending on caliber and manufacturer.

I won’t get into reloading, here, although the economics of reloading your own ammunition will quickly become apparent to the new shooter, especially if your weapons are in heavy or odd calibers.

Loaded M-16 magazines, 2017. US Army photo.

In general, for a rifle, you’re going to need about 600 rounds “ready” — about 200 rounds to carry with the rifle, plus two more reloads; this also includes magazines sufficient to carry those 600 rounds…Think about that, the next time someone wants to restrict magazine sizes, Stephen King notwithstanding [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCSySuemiHU]. This is the bare minimum, but if you started off by buying a 1000-round case, that leaves you c.400 rounds to start practicing with.

After that? It depends on your wallet, how much you intend to practice, and exactly what you’re preparing for.

After that comes “gear”. A lot of this looks remarkably like the EEK, and there is, in fact, a great deal of overlap between the two.

The BASIC kit for the Panoply looks something like this…

  • A rifle
  • 200 ‘ready’ rounds for the above rifle, with another 400 as a ‘ready reserve’
  • A military-spec rain poncho
  • A first aid kit – i.e., something intended for combat, that has more than just Band Aids and a triple antibiotic in it
  • Two methods of purifying water that do NOT involve fire
  • At least one quart-sized water canteen or bladder, and preferably two or more
  • 100′ of 550 paracord
  • A multitool and/or a Swiss Army Knife
  • A 4″ lock blade
  • A machete, hatchet, and/or a military entrenching tool
  • A three-day supply of food
  • A large, preferably milspec, backpack
  • Some type of “load bearing equipment” to distribute the ammunition and magazines (if your rifles uses magazines – see “bolt action rifles“, the “SKS” or the “M1 Garand“) more evenly across your body.

Should you buy camouflage uniforms? If you intend to operate with a unit of some type, it’s a good idea, because it makes it that much easier to identify your friends. Uniforms are not about some arcane, male power fantasy — like a shovel, they are a practical tool, nothing more.

What camo is ‘best’? Whatever works for your environment — ex-US “Woodland BDU” is excellent, if a little on the common side, although Vietnam-era Tigerstripe is usually better. The current rage is for digital pattern camo or the newer Multicam pattern. Really, it depends on your environment, and common sense: don’t wear a desert pattern in the Tennessee forest, and don’t wear Woodland BDU in the desert.

Do you need a gas mask? If you live within 5 miles of an operating railroad line, you do — those tanker cars aren’t carrying milk, and when a train derails and they start evacuating, they’re doing it for a reason.

If you can afford body armor — BUY some. If not — you’re going to have to take your chances without it. Practical, affordable body armor in the firearm era didn’t exist before the early 70’s, so you’ll be in good company.

And BOOTS — Ye GAWDS, but don’t forget GOOD boots! If you have to spend $200 on a pair of boots, but they are the best thing out there…DO IT! You feet will thank you later.

…Despite what some people will try to tell you, there is no hard and fast rule about gear and equipment — the regular military makes it easy: you wear/carry what you are issued. When you’re not in the regular military, you have to customize as a matter of course — find what works for you, by going to an Army-Navy surplus store (or even the local ‘Chinese Consulate‘…a.k.a., “Walmart“) and trying things on before you plonk down the hard cash for this stuff.

Good night, good luck, keep your powder dry.

Four Tires and an Engine – The Basics of Armed Force

“Unconventional thinking” is one People are fond of creating pithy shortcuts and analogies. When it comes to “Things Military,” here is one of mine:

Military forces are like a conventional automobile – they need four tires, sitting on the ground in unison, or the car doesn’t go very far. Think of it as a Venn diagram, if the car analogy doesn’t work. Moving on…The four “tires” of the military are:

 

Catania, Sicily (Jan 15, 2003) – U.S. Marines stand prepare Meal’s Ready to Eat (MRE) for shipment. U.S. Navy photo.

1. Food – No matter how well-equipped or trained your troops may be, if they have no food, they will be unable to fight within seven days. Period. Troops need an absolute minimum of 2,800 calories (and preferably 3,500-3,600) – weighted towards carbohydrates – per day, in order to function effectively in combat. Without food, troops can function for three to five days, maximum. After that, their effectiveness rapidly falls off, until they will not be able to walk; that phase takes between eight and eleven days, and they will be dizzy and on the verge of incoherent after about six or seven days. There are examples of people “surviving” or “lasting” for two or more weeks without food — but those people were confined to bed, minimizing all physical exertion, and required constant care. In the case of hunger-strikers, after two weeks, they will be too weak to lift a glass of water to their lips. In situations where this has happened in the past, the medical remediation starts with small amounts of rice milk, with recovering taking weeks, at the very least.

Food. Because it is existential, few people give it any thought. You, on the other hand, can never let food drift too far from a military unit’s calculations.

 

Oil Field, Saratoga, Texas, 1908.

2. POL/Fodder (POL/F) – Modern armed forces, be they military, paramilitary or police, rely on powered systems at some level. Whether for vehicles, generators, stoves or fodder for animals (mules, yaks and camels are still used for military pack transport around the world), POL/F supplies are absolutely critical to operations. Neglect your POL/F, and your troops will be reduced to marching, carrying only what extra supplies they can carry on pack frames, or that they can drag behind them on hand carts…and then, their food requirements will skyrocket (see #1, above), requiring them to carry less operational weapons and supplies (i.e., mortars, mortar bombs, rockets and their launchers, artillery munitions, etc) in favor of the extra food needed – assuming, of course, that the operational weapons can even be carried or dragged by the troops.

Whether you intend – or are forced – to use bicycles, POL/F is a factor that you can never neglect, if you expect to function effectively in an operational environment.

 

Rows and rows of shells are stored upright in a New Zealand ammunition dump during World War I near Acheux, France.

3. Munitions – Another existential within the modern military sphere – and thus, frequently ignored – “munitions” are everything that physically strikes the enemy: ammunition of all kinds, knives, grenades, etc. If you are not careful in planning or accounting for the amount of ammunition you both have and need, your troops will very quickly burn through everything they have, leaving them – quite literally – with nothing but knives, sharp sticks, rocks and harsh language…that quip is only funny when no one is shooting at you.

 

Bridge radios of Irish offshore patrol ship LÉ Róisín (P51) photographed in Helsinki.

4. Communications – Without a radio communications system, you are limited to runners, bugles and whistles (all of which are still in use, in places) and the limit of the range of your voice. That is fine, at the lowest tactical levels, but those have long been rendered impractical for anything above platoon level, as the speed and scope of military operations has increased. There is also the issue of communications security, including codes and ciphers. It is an in-depth issue, far too complex to fully address here, but it is nonetheless something the prospective user needs to get a handle on early.

 

The Pennsylvania National Guard’s First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry during a parade to mark the U.S. Army’s 237th anniversary in 2012. US Army photo.

5. Motivation – Finally, Motivation is the engine of the “military automobile.” Nothing outlined above, nothing in this document, and nothing in any conventional manual you will ever find, means anything if your troops are not motivated to strive, struggle and sacrifice for the Cause, whatever that cause might be. None of it matters, if your troops are not willing to use the tools at hand effectively, if at all. They will sit down when they think you can’t see them; they will desert if they think that they can get away with it; and they will run the first time someone shoots at them in earnest.

These are the five things you can never shortcut. The minute you think you can get away with short-sheeting these points, you’re losing.

Analysis: What is a ‘Military Base,’ Exactly?

We all hear about them on the news: Those places where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are housed and trained; where they form up to deploy to some remote space on a map that most of us had never heard of a week ago…

But — what is a ‘base’, exactly?

Here at The Freedomist, we covered one aspect of this question some time ago, but this article will take a broad overview of the question at large.

Aside from castles or fortresses, “bases” come in a vast array of forms. Certain histrionics aside, a “military base” can come in almost literally any form. There are massive bases, such as Fort Bliss, in Texas or the Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, which are larger than some states, but there are also tiny installations that are also bases, such as Marine Barracks, Washington D.C., which is a mere 6 acres (2.4 ha) in size, and has been in continuous use since 1801. As a result, a base can take almost any shape.

At the same time, size comparisons obscure the question. A different way to think about a “generic” base, however, would be to consider it as a collection of components. Generally speaking, a “base” – while it may have a specific purpose – is where troops can be housed and trained for combat; where they can do at least basic levels of maintenance on weapons and equipment; and where supplies sufficient for a unit to deploy (in theory) can be safely and securely stored.

The training component is the hard part here, because even with the many advances in “virtual” training that have taken place in the last thirty-odd years, troops still need to actually fire live ammunition thought their weapons; short of actual nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, nothing focuses training like the dangers of live-fire. When we are dealing with classes of personal weapons, firing ranges of fifty to five hundred yards or meters in length may well be sufficient. Once we move into longer-ranged weapons – heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, tank cannons and actual artillery – the ranges quickly become very long range.

But…short of that? Let’s do a thought experiment.

We will start with a large open field. A road, perhaps a highway or freeway, runs along one side of the field. Imagine one to four multi-story motels, clustered together; nearby, is a small, two-story office building. To one side, there is a gas/convenience station, and a large chain-style restaurant. There are one or two warehouses, a full-service garage, a few large parking lots filled (hopefully) with large and heavy vehicles. There are a scattering of other buildings, including one that is very “blockish”-looking building surrounded with barbed wire; there might even be a fire station. There is likely a shooting range, one hundred to five hundred yards/meters in length. If the unit’s home nation is relatively wealthy – and wise – there may be a small housing development across the road from the actual base, with family homes for married troop’s whose families live with them. None of the buildings are very “upscale”; most would be described with uncharitable snobbery as “drab” or even “ramshackle” or “brutalist” if someone wanted to be nasty. That would be the effect of government contracting restrictions.

What was just described above are the very basic facilities for an infantry battalion of 700-1,000 troops. There would be a few more buildings if the unit is more specialized, but the above description represents a generic enough core. Drop, say, another dozen or so of these areas close together, add an actual hospital, a large supermarket nestled next to a department store (if they’re not combined), a branch bank, a few more gas stations and regional-scale airport that can handle C-130-type aircraft, a few very long-distance (say, two to five miles in range) and you have a base suitable for a brigade-to-division scale unit – anything from eight to sixteen thousand troops.

Reserve or militia units can get away with one or two buildings, with a large and fenced-off parking lot, as long as they keep personal weapons and a basic load or two of ammunition at home…However, these units are going to be extremely limited in what operations they can carry out.

In sum, most military bases are not too dissimilar from a small town – except, of course, for the weapons, uniforms and intent. Aside from the occasional museum, most military installations /are/ drab, dreary and uninviting, and not places most people would want to live in for very long. But that dividing line, that willingness to tolerate minimalist living environments because their belief in the greater good, is best described in a paraphrase of the words of neoconservative essayist and film critic Richard Grenier

“People sleep peacefully in their beds at night only because rough people stand ready to do violence on their behalf.”

Analysis: Tools of the Trade – The Return of Industrial Warfare


Originally, this article was going to be considerably different, until research suddenly swerved in a different direction. That direction is to reinforce a fundamental military truth:

Artillery was, is, remains and will remain, the “King of Battle.”

The original concept for this article was an examination of towed 120mm mortar systems, specifically as used by the United States Marine Corps. However, the Marine Corps has divested itself of the M327 “Expeditionary Fire Support System” (EFSS) 120mm Towed Mortar, in favor of the UVision HERO-120 ‘Loitering Munition’.

While retaining the “Dragon Fire II” vehicle-mounted 120mm mortar, the reading on the rationale behind these decisions stands testament to an unacceptable failure by the military establishment in the United States to focus on reality.

Since combat operations commenced in Afghanistan in 2001, the US military in general has drilled down to a focus almost exclusively on “counterinsurgency operations” (COIN). Although pointedly left unsaid in public, this is a reaction to the fact that the US military establishment essentially abandoned COIN operations in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, to focus exclusively on the perceived threat of a Soviet invasion to Western Europe, and the assumed nuclear exchanges that would follow. In the aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorating into guerilla conflicts, the US military swung the pendulum 180° in the opposite direction from the 1980’s.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Francis Fukuyama foolishly proclaiming the “End of History”, although rarely spoken out loud, military forces were seen as almost redundant anachronisms in many quarters, and should be reduced both in scale and capabilities, rendering them as something like heavily-armed police forces, with the occasional, movie-ready SWAT teams for hostage rescue. Combat operations like the first Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom were seen as aberrations, large operations against technologically inferior despot forces with lots of heavy (if antiquated) weapons and gear, and lots of troops, who – if not very well-trained or motivated – at least had plenty of simple weapons, and who would require somewhat more force than the international equivalent of a beat cop holding up their hand and saying “HALT!” in a loud voice.

Enter Russia.

While we are not going to delve too deeply, here, into the politics of this year’s Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia is currently – by their own counts (which should, of course, always be taken with a large grain of salt) – running an average of c.580 fire missions per day. Assuming that these missions are run according to Russian military doctrine, each of these missions are a “battery shoot” involving a battery of four to six weapons. Roughly 30% of these would be rocket artillery, mostly from BM-21 ‘Grad’ type rocket systems, with the remainder fired by conventional “tube” artillery [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artillery]. Using the most conservatively realistic figures, this equals approximately 7,000 conventional artillery rounds being fired.

Per day.

This come out to over 200,000 rounds in a 30-day period.

In contrast, the Western democracies have “bet the farm” on weapon accuracy, developing “precision everything” in mortar, rocket and conventional artillery rounds. They chose this route, because the conventional news media is ecstatic over images of dead civilians, which is much more likely when using “dumb” weapons. Needless to say, such casualty-limiting precision comes at a price: the M982 “Excalibur” 155mm precision-guided artillery round costs anywhere from US$68,000 to $175,000 per round (depending on who is counting).

In the West, conventional “dumb” artillery rounds cost between US$300 and $1,000 each. This, of course, begs the question: is “smart” better than “dumb“?

Certainly – if you can afford it. Can the West?

Currently, following the defense budget cuts in FY2022 by the Biden administration, artillery ammunition procurement is being cut by some 36%. In the very best case scenario, this means that the United States currently produces enough ammunition in a calendar year for anywhere between ten days and three weeks of combat firing, based – again – on the most conservative take on Russian claims of artillery fire missions and estimated rates of ammunition expenditure in Ukraine. And the United States is sending ammunition to Ukraine to go along with the 155mm howitzers and other weapons we are already supplying.

And the US is not alone. In 2021, the British Army conducted a large-scale, “main force” wargame where they completely exhausted national stocks of critical ammunition – at the national level – in eight days. Similarly, only about 2,100 units of the vaunted Javelin missile are produced each year – and the Ukrainians are claiming to fire “hundreds” of Javelins daily, leaving the US defense industry scrambling to bring new production streams online. The FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile is in a similar situation.

Worse still, Russia is known to have fired over 1,000 “cruise missiles” since invading the Ukraine proper in February of 2022. Even given the highly questionable reports of those firings’ performance, it is clear that the Russian industrial base is still more than capable of supplying the weapons and ammunition to the firing lines (the logistical aspects of this are an entirely different subjects).

In contrast, the US currently purchases 110 Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM) for the MLRS and HIMARS systems, 500 AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) and 60 venerable BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles annually for FY2022, meaning that in six months, Russia has fired more than the US’s total production of similar systems.

It is vital to keep in mind, again, that the technical accuracy and reliability of the Russian arsenal is not the question, here. The fact is that they are able to maintain production and consumption rates of comparatively “dumb” systems – and firing something at the enemy is better than firing nothing, because you’re waiting on resupply.

The conclusion here is clear: the West is functionally trying to counter Russian aggression from a hospital bed, while ignorant children are playing with its life support equipment.

This is not 1939, and the West is no longer the “Arsenal of Democracy.” Ukraine is paying, and will continue to pay, a heavy price for trusting the modern-day Western states…and unless something is done quickly, the people of the West may well pay that price, as well – assuming that we do not pay an even heavier price.

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

Analysis: Tools Of The Trade – Apples And Oranges

As First-World States Amp Up Their High Tech, The Opposition Sticks To Basics

An F-35 Lightning II prepares to take off, Luke Air Force Base, AZ – USAF photo by Sr Airman Devante Williams; Public Domain

Over the last hundred years or so, uncountable amounts of money have been spent by various countries, to develop ever more sophisticated weapons and vehicles, many times, almost literally reinventing the wheel. The latest gargantuan expenditures that come to mind are the M1 Abrams tank, the Zumwalt destroyer and the F-35b airplane.

And yet, the most ubiquitous, most-used, most flexible and most cherished series of combat vehicles in the world is the humble Toyota Hilux, and its close cousin, the Toyota Land Cruiser, used around the world by all manner of armed forces, regular and otherwise.

Iranian soldiers with a BGM-71 TOW missile during the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988

Why this should be so, is of great discomfort to both defense companies and armies, around the world. The reason defense companies are worried is that the civilian Toyota vehicles are “good enough” for most combat vehicle applications. They are simple, rugged, durable, easy to understand and operate, and – most importantly – cheap.

Roll-on/roll-off ferry terminal at Queenscliff, Victoria, 1993.

On the military side, these are also concerns, but the military – by necessity – goes deeper: the very ubiquitous nature of the vehicles (driven by market, not military forces), in addition to their built-in ruggedness, makes it supremely difficult to both identify and attrit an asymmetric enemy’s mobile infrastructure without attacking civilian targets at the same time.

Mongol horseman, 14th Century

It has long been known that light vehicles equate to light cavalry. Unfortunately, historically, conventional militaries have always had a distinctly difficult time dealing with forces that can master the techniques of light cavalry campaigns.

U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. Haiti, circa 1919.

Similarly, it has long been recognized that simple, robust weapons systems give unconventional forces near-parity of effectiveness at the “boots on the ground” level of combat. As long ago as 1940, in the US Marine Corps – in its “Small Wars Manual”  – recognized that as technology developed, and lightweight, fully automatic weapons spread, the tactics the manual outlined would be rendered obsolete.

AK-74 assault rifle

Modern small arms development has essentially hit a plateau in the years since 1946. Once the move to self-loading rifles was complete, what remained were alterations to ergonomics and attachments. The weapons could be massed produced with a very high degree of mechanical simplicity built in…This, of course, resulted in the development of the near-universal AK-series of assault rifles in the hands of both urban and rural guerrilla forces, as well as the later tribal militias, to say nothing of its continued use by regular armed forces throughout the world.

Adding to the difficulty for conventional armies is the widespread deployment of highly effective, yet almost laughable uncomplicated, heavy support weapons at the squad level, primarily the RPG-7 and the General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).

An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier fires an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, Helmand province, Afghanistan, May 20, 2013. USMC photo.

The RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, while becoming less capable against frontline combat vehicle armor, is still more than capable against light vehicles, light or hasty fortifications, and even some aircraft. A robust and simple design, the RPG-7 is a valuable weapon in any force’s arsenal, and is widely available.

PKM Machine Gun

Likewise, the Soviet-designed PKM GPMG is another simple, robust and highly capable weapon system, easily a match for anything produced by the West.

Of course, except for the Toyota pickup trucks, the two things that the above weapons all have in common is that they are both products of Cold War-era Soviet Army design bureaus, and were handed out in vast numbers to many armies and guerrilla groups as the Cold War ground on.

And yet, their effects remain.

Adding to the problem is the impact of remotely piloted drone technology, especially drones modified to drop small munitions on target. Coupled to cheap and reliable internet access and radio technology, as well as the wide dissemination of both automated and manual secure encryption methods, armies trying to chase down irregular, terrorist and/or guerrilla forces today have issues far outside the scope of previous generations.

The challenge for both conventional forces, defense companies, and perhaps especially the political leadership of First World powers, frankly, is to find a way to equip the large security forces necessary to ensure a counterbalance to terrorist groups that operate like multinational corporations, while not cutting off their noses to spite their faces, by bankrupting the countries they are trying to sell their products to.

Perspective : The Bloodthirsty Peacenik – A Short Retrospective of the Path to Savagery, From The City of Light to the Rebirth of the Caliphate

In general, people tend like good things. This should be self-evident: good food, good sex, good booze (in no particular order), so…anything ‘good’ should be, well, “good” – right? Like – peace, for instance.

Right?

I mean, war is all about violence, blood, horror, terror, crippling and debilitating injuries and very tragic and untimely death, all of which are really bad things…So…Less war must be good.

Right?

Today, we will examine a tiny sliver of that question.

Paris Street in Rainy Weather, 1877, Gustave Caillebotte.

In 1856, in an attempt to “limit the scourge of war”, a collection of European nations’ representatives gathered in Paris, France and signed a convention, the “Paris Declaration“, that eliminated the practice of “privateering“, or “legalized piracy in time of war.”

Letter of marque given to Robert Sutton de Clonard for the privateer Comte d’Artois, 1780.

The mechanism of this decision was simple: the Admiralty court system that adjudicated the “condemnation” and auctioning of “prizes of war” were disestablished, more or less overnight, removing the purpose of issuing “Letters of Marque and Reprisal“…and freeing – it was hoped – merchant shipping from the scourge of “legalized plunder“…

…But what was the real effect of this declaration?

Prior to 1856 – for roughly 400 years, in a formal sense – Western nations had deliberately evolved the system of prize-capture to avoid the cost of keeping excessively large (and very expensive) fleets manned when there was no war going on. Since merchant ships were generally alone in dangerous waters anyway, it only made sense to build cargo ships that carried weapons comparable to warships, and by extension, to utilize those same ships in time of war.

Thus, as an adjunct to the very common practice on land of hiring part-time professional soldiers – i.e., mercenaries – to flesh out an army, armed merchantmen were offered commissions to supplement regular navies, until those navies could get their actual warships fully crewed. After ferrying troops and supplies, many of these armed merchantmen struck out at the merchant ships of the enemy, striking targets of opportunity, capturing enemy vessels, hauling them to friendly (or even neutral), to sell off the cargoes and the ships themselves (sometimes at a staggering profit), as well as ransoming the prisoners.

The Ranger, Private Ship of War, with her Prizes. By Nicholas Pocock, 1780

After 1856, this all changed.

As the United States (which did not sign the Paris Declaration) was to discover to its horror, the dismantling of the prize system removed any incentive to capturing ships intact — where shipping companies (previously, at least) had the chance of buying their captured vessels back, once there was no possibility of easily selling off a captured prize, there was no reason to not strip the surrendered ships of useful supplies and destroy them after capture. The crews were either abandoned on remote islands to uncertain (and very unpleasant) fates, or tossed ashore in the first non-hostile port the ship came to, with nothing but the clothes on their backs…if they were that lucky.

Four years after the Declaration, the various States that formed the Confederacy attempted to leave the Federal Union, sparking the four-year long American Civil War. Among its many disadvantages, the Southern Confederacy did not really have a maritime tradition, as their northern opponents did. As a result, lacking hard currency or deep economic capital internally, their few attempts at issuing Letters of Marque were dismal failures, as limited cash in a bottled market could not chase what should have been lucrative captures.

“The Alabama destroying the Texan Star, or Martaban, in the Malacca Straits – The Kwan-Tung, Chinese War-Steamer, in the distance. From a sketch by Commander Allen Young, Royal Navy.” London Illustrated News, April 2, 1864, p. 320. Public Domain

At which point, the Confederate government unleashed the Confederate Navy. The result was apocalyptic.

In a series of brutal cruises, Confederate Navy corsairs slashed and burned their way through the United States’ merchant fleets; the US Pacific whaling fleet (supplying vital supplies of whale oil in a pre-petroleum society) was almost completely destroyed. Indeed, by 1864 most US-flagged merchant ships were laid up in US ports, as crews flatly refused to leave port under US colors, because of the danger of prowling rebel raiders; not even ruinous insurance rates could entice crews to sea. To remain solvent, many American merchant investors had to sell their vessels to foreign companies in a buyers market, just to maintain some form of capitol flow. The US merchant fleet would not fully recover its position in the world’s shipping arena until after World War 2.

Other countries – and their navies – noticed.

A battleship squadron of the German High Seas Fleet; the far right vessel is the battlecruiser SMS Von der Tann, 1917.

The basic requirements of naval warfare had not changed, the future writings of US Navy Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan notwithstanding: an enemy nation’s merchant marine still had to be neutralized. This meant larger navies, with many more fighting ships in commission, at all times, since merchant ships could no longer, by about 1890, be easily converted into viable warships (since they could no longer be used as warships, there was no reason to design them with warship guns and armor). But, because technology was also expanding — both the fight between the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (the former USS Merrimack) in 1862, as well as the Austro-Italian Battle of Lissa in 1866 marking the first engagements between “armored” (or, “ironclad”) naval warships and fleets — this began a race to develop ever-bigger guns, better armor, faster and more fuel-efficient engines…and the armies, jealous of the navies’ lavish funding, also took note. But, with few major wars (only one, really) between industrial states taking place between 1875 and 1914, no one really paid attention…except, of course, the builders of naval artillery and warships.

Photograph of U-111, a German Submarine.

Come the end 1914, with the land war in Western Europe lurching into a blood-soaked, trench-bound stalemate, enforced by machine guns and more field artillery than anyone had ever seen before, Imperial Germany turned to widely deploying previously experimental or unseen weapons – specifically, the submarine and poison gas.

While there had been a slow and steady development of submarines in the previous decades, few officers of the day took them seriously as anything but scouts for battle fleets. But, once the German High Seas Fleet’s inability to blockade Britain became clear, the Kaiser unleashed his U-Boat fleet.

British 55th (West Lancashire) Division troops blinded by gas, 10 April 1918. 

The slaughter was tremendous, as merchant ship crews began dying in huge numbers, and mind-boggling amounts of ship tonnage was sent to the bottom. Britain was almost starved of war-making material, and actually began to experience food shortages. In the next round, in 1940, Britain very nearly did lose its war — and American and British merchant seamen died by the thousands…On land, the role of the machine gun and poison gas is better known. The never-ending quest to one-up to other guy was in full force.

“The battle between the Aisne and Marne: German ammunition column, teams and horses with gas masks when passing a gasified forest.”

On land, with the stalemate and slaughter of trench warfare enforced by machine guns, the German High Command was induced to take what for them was a radical (and, by their own admission, distasteful) action: allowing scientists, led by Fritz Haber, the chemist who perfected the extraction of ammonia from atmospheric nitrogen, to develop what had been annoyingly dangerous byproducts of industrial chemical processes into deadly weapons that killed indiscriminately…and ultimately, led directly to the Zyklon-B of Hitler’s gas chambers.

Ultimately, the quest for “more is not only better, it is vital” led directly to the atomic bomb. Although its destructive force was not truly understood at first, even after its effects were understood in their full horror, their development continued apace, leading to the culmination of destruction: the “Tsar Bomba” of the Soviet Union.

However, nothing happens in a vacuum — while states, and the armies and navies that served them, raced frantically to find faster, broader and more efficient ways to kill each other, those nations’ populations paid attention…and learned the unintended lesson:

Life is cheap, fragile, and easily thrown away — and if governments don’t care about the lives of their individual citizens, why should the citizens care about the lives of an “enemy” people?

Kill ’em all – let God sort ’em out.

Right?

Right?

Terrorists, 2020

…..Welcome to the so-called Islamic Caliphate of the 21st Century – and why not? They are merely responding to the stimuli they have been presented and raised with. They don’t have naval fleets, or fleets of airplanes — but they do have knives and cameras, and fear and horror are ancient and basic weapons. Doubly so, when they pay their troops in loot and slaves…just like the “good ol’ days.” And, in an era where humans can be easily enticed to volunteer to function as “squishy cruise missiles“, the addition of real horror to simple terrorism follows a direct course from that origin point.

So…the next time someone cries “Peace! PEACE!“, it may be instructive to wonder why there was no peace in the first place.

It is also instructive to remember that sometimes, “peace” is another word for “surrender“.

Jai Hind – A Brief Overview of India’s Army

 

 

 

NOTE TO THE READER: The following is a necessarily brief overview of a top-tier national military force. The opinions expressed are those of the author, and are based solely on “open-source” research. This is the first of a series on national military forces that may not be well-known to the general reader.

Additionally, a version of this article was previously published online, on May 29, 2017, by this author, at the former “Military Gazette” web page (now defunct). This version has been edited and updated, and is published here with the agreement and consent of the editorial staff, as well as this author.

 

 




 

Introduction

The modern Indian armed forces date from 1947, but trying to write even a general overview of the military history of India is far beyond the scope of an article such as this. Indeed, this article can give only the barest overview; thus, any holes that appear are unintentional, and were left out for the sake of brevity.

Postcard captioned “Gentlemen of India marching to chasten German Hooligans” in English and French, 1914

India did not lack for professionalism in armed forces when it gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947. Indeed, Indian forces had been fighting under British direction for well over 200 years, since at least 1774AD. Interestingly, this makes the modern Indian Army slightly older than its United States counterpart. Indian troops from across the subcontinent have repeatedly proven themselves the equal – if not the superior – to both British and European armed forces. India’s success as an independent state is directly attributable to the professionalism of both its Civil Service, and its Armed Forces, part of the latter being the subject of this article.

At the time of the Partition of India, the various British Imperial Indian forces were divided between between India and Pakistan; other than the inevitable disruption caused to organizational structures, both new countries inherited highly professional forces, as well as school structures and defense industries. As a result, Indian forces performed very well in their first tests, and ensured India’s continued existence as a nation.

 

Indian soldiers of the 9th Battalion, Sikh Infantry test-firing a handgun aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) – US Navy photo

Although there would be missteps later on, India’s national integrity has never been seriously threatened over the course of the last seventy years, in stark contrast to many other former European colonies, who seem continually on the brink of complete and utter collapse.

With a total of over 5.137million troops – counting Active, Reserve and Paramilitary – India possesses the fourth-largest armed force in the world, ahead of even the People’s Republic of China, and the second-largest Active Duty force, overall, ahead of the United States. Below, we will briefly glance at India’s army, and will then assess its strategic capabilities.

 

 

The Indian Army – “Service Before Self”

 

Comprising some eighty percent of India’s national forces, the Army is a modern force, striving to upgrade its capabilities to keep pace with the more “public” militaries, such as those of the United States, Britain, France and Germany. However, those states are not India’s adversaries – those slots are taken up primarily by Pakistan and the PRC.

India, by and large, neither starts wars – directly or indirectly – nor seeks conflicts. In the past, however, India has faced attacks from both Pakistan and the PRC; in the former case, several times.

 

Indian army infantry vehicles move onto the firing range at Camp Bundela, India Oct. 26, 2009 – US Army photo

Like most states, the core of India’s armed forces is its infantry. Indian infantry have long been regarded as among the toughest and most capable in the world. India, like the United States, uses a modified “regimental system” within its army, with regiments such as the Madras, the Gurkha’s, and the Sikh Light Infantry (among many, many more) having long and distinguished histories, but those regiments primarily provide well-trained battalions to the Army’s divisional structures (some forty divisions, in fourteen corps), as part of the seven major commands that the Army is structured into, rather than deploy as complete units on the battlefield. These divisions, except for certain specialized units – such as mountain, parachute and several special forces units – are mingled with tanks and artillery to form cohesive battlefield units.

The Army’s F-INSAS program is a development project aimed at reequipping the individual soldier with an advanced suite of combat systems. This program, modeled on the US Army’s zombie-like “Future Force Warrior” program (that has been killed and resurrected so many times, it is now hard to keep track of the various iterations), is perhaps over-ambitious.

Lance Naik (Lance Cpl.) Fateh Singh, of the 4th Rajput Battalion of the Indian Army confirms the zero of his INSAS assault rifle, Donnelly Training Area, Fort Greely, Alaska, 2007 — US Army photo

However, the Indian Army demonstrated in 2016 that it has the intestinal and institutional fortitude to make choices that would embarrass other forces, in its acknowledgement that its 5.56x45mm INSAS rifle (no relation to the aforementioned program) simply wasn’t working. The Indian Army’s 2016 requirement is one of the clearest signs, yet, that the end of the “intermediate cartridge” ballistic dead-end is near, as the Army requirement acknowledged the need for a “full-power” (in this case, the venerable 7.62x51mm) cartridge for frontline service.

As a result, the Indian Army inked deals to both purchase and manufacture the AK-203 rifle in 7.62x39mm (a total of 670,000 – 70,000 directly from Russia, with the remainder to be manufactured under license) in Uttar Pradesh, while also purchasing slightly modified SIG Sauer 716 G2 Patrol rifles in 7.62mmNATO for more specialized units. Simultaneously, a deal for over 16,000 Israeli-made NG-7 ‘Negev’ Light Machine Guns – also in 7.62x51mm NATO – was let in 2019, with the first batch of 6,000 arriving in India in early 2021.

While arguments can certainly be made over some of the choices made in the Army’s reequipping strategy, real armies always strive to stay out on the edge of technological development, while also keeping hold of tools and doctrines that have been proven to work, before adopting newer – but untested – concepts. Truly professional forces are able to acknowledge when they have taken a wrong turn, and move forward to fix the issue…That’s a lesson the US military would benefit from remembering.

 

Army Air

One of the challenges for the Army is its somewhat limited organic aircraft and helicopter assets. As it took the common page from other modern forces, India from the beginning separated its air forces from its ground forces. And, also like many modern armies, the result has been very spotty application of close air support (CAS) to the ground forces. Like all air forces, the Indian Air Force tries, but it is hampered in its efforts by both budgetary constraints and the associated need to focus on that service’s core missions. India is not alone in this issue; the US military discovered the problems inherent in this type of division with its own “Key West Agreement” in 1948, a confused decision that would cause delays and confusions that would impact combat operations well into the 1970’s.

Mi-35 Hind helicopter, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009 – US Air Force photo

While the Indian Army Aviation Corps maintains a perfectly serviceable fleet of light utility airframes, they struggle with one of the endemic problems of interservice rivalry: while the Indian Air Force (IAF) has perhaps twenty perfectly capable Mi-35 attack craft, and have purchased some 22 AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and 15 CH-47F from Boeing, and have over four-hundred Mi-17V-5’s in service, the lack of dedicated airmobile formations within the Indian Army remains curious, if not worrisome, given that disasters have directly resulted from the lack of a massed airmobile component.

 

 

Artillery and Armor

 

Arjun Mk II MBT, live demonstration, 2016 – photo by Indian Navy

 

On the brighter side, the Arjun Mk II MBT has finally matured. After a rough start to its development cycle, and serious problems in its earlier version, as well as major cost overruns and an epically long (37 years, to be exact) development cycle, the Arjun has matured into a frontline weapon that is in the top tier of combat vehicles. The only real hurdle to its full-scale deployment, as with virtually every army, is money. On the other hand, its deployment, while slow, has finally allowed India to retire its 1940’s-era T-55’s. At the same time, the Defense Ministry settled on a modernizaton and upgrade program for its Soviet-era T-72’s and T-90’s, the better to avoid too unevenly improving systems.

 

Pinaka MBRL’s on parade, 2011

India’s burgeoning economy, however, has allowed plans to significantly modernize its artillery park to move forward with speed. Systems like the Dhanush howitzer, developed to replace the Haubits FH77/B units acquired from Sweden in the 1980’s; the excellent M1954 (M-46) 155mm model, as upgraded by Soltam, of one of the best artillery pieces ever built, with a maximum unassisted range of 27km/16.77mi, and an assisted range of 38km/23.61mi; rounding off the new purchases is the indiginously developed, truck-mounted Pinaka multiple rocket launcher (similar to the US ‘HIMARS‘), designed to replace the BM-21’s and ‘Smerch’ 9K58’s acquired from the Soviet Union. Something DRDO may want to look at is the EVO-105, which the Freedomist recently reviewed.

A serious problem, however, is in India’s IFV park. The ‘Abhay’ (Sanskrit: अभय, “Fearless”) IFV is still in “development hell” (although the incorporation of the 40mm Bofors L/70 gun is an inspired choice for a main weapon of this type). While DRDO has informed Russia that they intend to pursue an Indian IFV, rather than purchase the BMP-3, the Indian Army is stuck, in the meanwhile, with the abysmal BMP-2. The BMP series, generally speaking, has a well-deserved reputation as the worst of the IFV field: its limited range, cramped compartments, horrible ride and poor armor are legendary…well, perhaps “notorious” is a better term. Armor – as has been decisively proven – cannot operate without infantry support, and infantry need something more than a “battle taxi”, as good as the M113 might be. The original models of the US Marine Corps’ LAV-series is another off-the shelf option that would be far superior to the BMP-series.

 

Combat Support

 

Ashok Leyland Stallion 4×4’s of the Indian Army, Himalaya region, 2010

India’s motorized military support is firmly anchored on three vehicles: the Ashok Leyland Stallion Mk III & IV, the Maruti Gypsy, and the Tatra 815, although the Tatra 815 is slowly being replaced by newer vehicles. These are all solid, highly capable vehicles, supplemented by smaller numbers of more specialized frames, easily the equal of other nation’s vehicle parks in capacity and reliablity.

As well, mine protected vehicles such as the venerable and battle-tested South African Casspir and the domestically-produced Aditya are entering the vehicle pools in increasing numbers, in ackowledgement of the growing threat of IEDs.

 

Strategic Forces

India, as is well-known, maintains a nuclear arsenal and an ongoing development plan. This arsenal is currently estimated at between 150 and 300 devices. Currently, the known weapons available to be deployed are the short-range Prithvi-I and the intermediate-range Agni-III, with longer-range land-based weapons and MIRVs under development. The K-15 Sagarika SLBM, now operational, is now deployed aboard the INS Arihant…and awaiting sister ships.

Country’s first under-water- launched Missile B05 (Sagarika) was successfully flight tested from Bay of Bengal off the coast of Visakhapatnam.

This developmental pace is surprising only to people who lack a grounding on India’s regional security situation. A nuclear deterrent is definitely something taken seriously by the People’s Republic of China. But the main focus is India’s long-time enemy, Pakistan. While the nuclear program was originally more of a prestige program than an operational imperative, increasing instability in the Muslim world, coupled to both Pakistan and Iran’s nuclear programs, as well as both 9/11 and the 2008 Mumbai attack have transformed the nuclear program into a real and pressing project: India has serious reasons to maintain a nuclear arsenal…which is a very serious range issues that need to be solved, lest they get out of hand.

Tactically, however, the main question is the true state of the Indian military’s nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) program for allowing individual troops to operate in such environments.

 

 

Conclusion

The Indian Army is a highly capable, well-disciplined and professional force, with a very long, and honored history. It has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of both making hard decisions, as well as admitting its errors, at least to a greater extent than many other top-tier forces. If the Indian Army has any weaknesses, they lay in procurement, which is something the force does not have full control over, although a critical need for a real airmobile component is its worst issue; there are very cogent reasons why virtually all modern militaries have abandoned parachute infantry as primary “first in” forces, in favor of heliborne formations.

The Army well understands that it needs to modernize its forces – too long tied into less-than-capable (to be polite), Soviet-era systems – a task made significantly easier by the increasingly close relationship to Western militaries, militaries that recognize the danger of an unstable, nuclear-armed Pakistan, as well as an increasingly bellicose China.

Armies exist to buy time through intimidation, for political leaders to avoid conflict. But those forces, for their intimidation strategies to work, must be capable of actually following through on their promise of ability.

Ultimately, the Indian Army succeeds in this quite admirably.

 

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