Michael Cessna is a former Active Duty United States Marine, a long-time personal protection specialist, security and defense analyst, military subjects instructor, general information researcher and amateur historian. He has been contributing security and defense writing since 2015.
Since November 18th of 2024, residents in most parts of the state of New Jersey and parts of Greater New York City have been terrorized by an increasing number of mass sightings of what have been variously described as either UFO’s or drones which are reportedly, “the size of SUV’s“. The issue is so bad, some people are actually calling for Elon Musk to do something about it (what, exactly, Musk would be expected to do on his own, no one is quite clear).
Naturally, people in the vicinity are increasingly terrified, as not only do they not know what is happening, it appears to all intents and purposes that the United States government, and specifically its law enforcement and regulatory agencies, as well as the armed forces, apparently not only have no idea what these are, either, nor who is even responsible for addressing the flights.
Despite repeated assurances that the drones – or whatever they are – “pose no apparent threat” to national security or American citizens (despite reportedly flying over a number of military installations in New Jersey), the general public, including major-network news presenters who live in the area, are flatly not buying the official story, and are loudly demanding action.
These calls have become much more serious in the wake of statements made on December 11 by New Jersey Congressional Representative Jeff Van Drew (R-NJ, 2nd District) to FOX News commentator Harris Faulkner that the drones were operating from an “Iranian mothership” operating off the coast, and that the drones needed to be shot down.
There are multiple weird things going on, here – what is actually happening?
The main issue is not so much that “mystery” drones are operating in US airspace, as that has been going on since at least late-2023 (and no, we’re not talking about the balloons), but that no one in the government seems to know what is going on, nor who is responsible for even initiating action…and this, some twenty-three years after 9/11.
All kinds of theories have been put forward, from extraterrestrial aliens doing extraterrestrial alien things, to the Russians, the Iranians or the Chinese. The US government is publicly unconcerned, assuring people that there is no danger from the drones, even though they claim that they have no idea where the drones are coming from, nor who is operating them.
One feature that seems to be a major point of focus, concerns the size of the drones, as they are frequently described as being “the size of an SUV”. This naturally alarms people, given the media’s obsession with miniature drones being used in combat from the Middle East to the Ukraine. However, the mainstream media once again has failed its consumers in never presenting a coherent narrative. In this case, it is the fact that “SUV-sized” drone aircraft have been around for a long time, almost since the advent of ‘heavier than air flight’ began some 120 years ago. In this specific case, we are talking about the “QH-50 DASH“, in the image below.
A QH-50C DASH drone with two torpedoes on the Gearing-class destroyer USS Joseph P. Kennedy (DD-850). UN Navy Photo. Public Domain.
The DASH was a remotely piloted (RPV) anti-submarine helicopter designed in the late-1950’s, and deployed to the Navy beginning in 1963. It had a combat radius of about 70 nautical miles (c.80 miles on land), and could carry a payload of around 900 pounds. That translates into a lotof explosive ordnance, if someone wanted to load them with such.
Now, we are not implying that someone is flying QH-50’s over New Jersey; however, the DASH is a sixty-five year old design, and there have been more than a few technological improvements since then.
Likewise, there is little to be gained by a foreign power in conducting surveillance flights of this type over US territory – the risk versus return ratio is just not workable, especially given the notoriously poor security at many installations in the US. Such operations are an open invitation to legitimate military action, which would turn the United States into the victim, something none of the country’s adversaries want.
So – What, then, is happening over New Jersey, and which is now apparently spreading from New York, south all the way to Maryland?
Really, there are only three options:
The drones are some sort of extraterrestrial craft – i.e., “little green men” – flying around, scaring the bejeesus out of people, and the government is clamming up, to try and keep the public from full-scale, panicked hysteria…which isn’t working.
These are drones from some hostile/adversary nation, flying from some kind of “mothership” operating offshore. If this is the case, the US government as a whole have revealed themselves to be utterly and completely incompetent, and totally incapable of protecting the nation, in spite of twenty-three or so years of obscene amounts of money being spent on “defense”, after the largest and deadliest terror attack in US history.
That these drones are being flown by an agency of the US government.
…And increasingly, it may be that last option which may be true.
Within the US defense and intelligence budgetary offices, there is a phenomenon known as the “Special Access Program” (SAP). These “black budget” operations are never reported to Congress in any open session, and only rarely under certain circumstances (the “Unacknowledged Special Access Program“, or “U-SAP“) to those members of Congress with a direct “need to know”.
The rationale behind this option is that the failings being exposed by the US government response to these incursions did not happen overnight. Filings of this magnitude only develop over long stretches of time. There is a chance – admittedly, a long chance – that certain parties inside the US defense and/or intelligence communities have become disgusted at these fundamental security failures by the “above-ground” government, in spite of their constant – if secret – demands for reform, and have decided to force the issue, as the Biden-Harris administration is on the way out…
…At least, that is the “best case” situation, because the first two options are infinitely worse than #3.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
On December 4th, the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) of United Healthcare, Brian Thompson, was killed outside the New York Hilton Midtown in Manhattan. With stunning video evidence readily available, a manhunt for the killer began that continues as this article goes to press. Calling the killing a “premeditated attack” (meaning, “assassination“), many “experts” quickly weighed in on aspects of the killing…but, in the wider world, something very interesting began to happen:
While there was certainly sympathy directed towards Thompson’s survivors (who were at their home in Minnesota at the time), there was virtually no sympathy directed towards Thompson himself. And, given that the shooter apparently inscribed the words “Delay”, “Deny” and “Defend” – believed to be a reference to a recent book about how to fight back against insurance companies denying insurance claims, it would seem that a broad cross-section of public opinion has now openly turned against corporate leadership, at least in the United States.
There are two parts to this story, at present: the technical aspects, and the wider controversy over corporate leaders. We will start with the technical side.
Much has been made of the shooter’s supposed skills, especially his use of a suppressor on his weapon (insert pithy quip about how well gun control seems to be working in New York, State and City); you can view the video of the incident here if you choose to do so, to make your own decision.
The first aspect one would normally examine is the shooter’s motive. As that person is not yet in custody – and the police’s supposed knowledge of the shooter’s identity may well not be who they think it is – judging their motives and mindset is problematic, at best. That said, it is clear that the shooter acted very calmly as he executed his attack. While that could be attributed to drugs used to calm his system, his subsequent actions would tend to argue that he was a calm, collected and focused actor.
However calm he may have been, however, his technical shooting skills were terrible.
The shooter did manage to approach from behind Thompson, having apparently been lying in wait for his target to walk out of the hotel; this would seem to indicate that there may have been someone inside the hotel observing Thompson walking towards the entrance, who could have been talking to the shooter, advising him of Thompson’s movements.
When the shooting starts, a number of things come immediately to into focus. While the shooter’s aim seemed to be reasonably good, definitely striking Thompson in the back, the shooter clearly did not know very much about suppressed weapons, as his weapon clearly jams on every shot, as it is not matched at all to the weapon he is using. Despite some pundits commenting in an attempt to show their “deep” knowledge of firearms, the pistol was neither a Welrod, nor a VP-9. Unlike in the movies, jams with handguns fitted with suppressors are extremely common unless the pistol, suppressor and ammunition are all carefully balanced.
Welrod Pistol, Parham Airfield Museum, Suffolk. Museum of the British Resistance Organisation. Photo Credit: Gaius Cornelius. CCA/4.0
Next are the apparent “messages” left on the shell casings ejected onto the sidewalk. There are two ways to look at this: either the shooter was personally disgruntled at Thompson – for whatever reason – and wanted to “send a message” or, conversely, was trying to offer a distraction to police; neither is the hallmark of a “professional hitman“, as it offers too much evidence on the casings through handling.
Finally, is the shooter’s escape plan. After mortally wounding Thompson, the shooter fled across the street in front of the hotel, where he retrieved an e-bike, and was last seen entering Central Park, and while the e-bike was quickly located, there was no sign of the shooter, again as this article goes to press.
This, despite breathless claims, is no sign of “professionalism” – it’s just common sense, as there are few cameras in Central Park, allowing the shooter to dump the e-bike and very likely much of his incriminating gear before disappearing. And, being blunt, attacks like this rarely result in arrest.
Overall, whatever the shooter’s motives were, he is no “professional hitman“, even allowing for the possibility of working with a co-conspirator. At best, he is a “movie pro” – someone who has watched a lot of movies and YouTube videos, and maybe even read a couple of books, and probably visited a shooting range once or twice.
At best.
But the deeper part of this story is in the public reaction to this killing.
Normally, when some prominent figure meets a sudden end, even if that figure is strongly disliked – even hated – there is usually some sympathy from the wider public, even if they wished that person to have survived in order to face prison. But not here.
The general reaction to Thompson’s assassination – based on comments on various platforms and news sites – while usually not exactly “gleeful” in nature, certainly offer him no sympathy, and precious little for his family, which is rather extraordinary, in itself. This related directly to the company he headed, and his actions as its head.
Thompson was in New York City to speak at a shareholder meeting which was expected to get very ugly, as it appears that Thompson and other United Healthcare executives had concealed an insider trading investigation being conducted by the US Federal Department of Justice (DOJ). The allegations centered around Thompson and other executives dumping company stocks at a profit before word of the investigation got out, causing UHC’s stock to lose a good deal of its value.
But things like this happen a lot; one need only recall the ENRON scandal of 2001. Running a stock scam at a major corporation isn’t usually going to generate enough hatred to actually kill people, especially when the stock hasn’t yet tanked completely. This hatred of insurance companies in general, and particularly of United Healthcare, has been building for a long time.
In fact, United Healthcare is well-known in the medical insurance industry as having one of the highest denial rates of all insurers; this author speaks from personal experience, as I used to work for a company that helped hospitals dispute medical insurance claim denials. UHC was the company I dealt with the most.
Given the insurance actions surrounding the COVID pandemic alone, being denied – or having a loved one being denied – on a desperately needed healthcare claim would be more than enough to send someone over an edge sufficient to want to make a very loud and targeted statement…like assassinating a healthcare insurance CEO in public.
Businesses exist to make money. We all get that – well, at least the rational people get it. And making money often involves cutting costs, including expenditures. We get that, too. But, there is limit to how deep those cost cuttings need to go – and healthcare is only the most visible industry where overly aggressive “economy measures” are generally seen.
Corporate board members throughout the business community in general, should take note of this situation. The 21st Century is turning out to be a very tumultuous time, and their customers are becoming increasingly fed up with the normal corporate antics.
This article is no “clarion call” for people to act out against business leader – quite the opposite, in fact. It is intended to point out that the best way to keep these things from happening is not bodyguards and ineffectual laws to limit access to guns, but to try and not give desperate people the idea that actions like this are their only way to gain relief…or at least revenge.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The United States Army Special Forces faces a growing crisis that threatens the effectiveness of America’s elite military units. The drive to maintain special operations forces (SOF) numbers through direct recruitment programs has led to concerning patterns of casualties and reduced operational effectiveness, highlighting the dangers of shortcuts in developing elite warriors. Unfortunately, there is a great deal of generalization in the numbers that follow, because of the classified nature of Special Operations in general, but the trend is there.
The Traditional Path
Historically, becoming a Special Forces operator involved a carefully structured progression. Candidates typically served 3-5 years in conventional military units before applying to Special Forces training. This traditional pathway provided several crucial elements.
Older candidates tended to have developed their own knowledge of what physical training and development strategies worked best for them, more formulaic Army methods aside. This enabled them to understand how their bodies reacted to physical stress, which usually lowered the possibility of physical injuries. It also allowed a “leveling-off” in a soldier’s physical maturation, which also helped reduce injuries.
Group of Soldiers from ARVN with SFC Norman A. Doney, 5th S.F. Group, Vietnam, September 1968. United States Army Heritage and Education Center. Public Domain.
This also allowed the SF candidate to gain valuable experience in stress management, leadership, and technical skills. Likewise, the experience gained as a “regular” soldier provided a deeper understanding of military psychology and culture, providing valuable experience in how operations are typically run, with a “bottom-up” view that would offer the candidate vital experience in understanding the challenges they would face when isolated on operations.
The resulting teams of “Operators” were very well situated to a wide array of “unconventional” tasks, ranging from “deep” reconnaissance, to what is now termed “direct action missions”, to embedding as liaison teams with Coalition units during Operation Desert Storm, to acting in their original mission, by training “partner nation” forces, either from scratch or by refining their existing training.
In this older model, the candidate with three to five years of experience before entering Special Forces also allowed the members of the “Operational Detachment Alpha” (ODA) teams (the famous “A-Teams”) to have both a primary Military Occupational Specialty coming in through the door, but would also allow for them having acquired “side” experience, through which they could obtain secondary or “alternate” specialty training in diverse and unrelated field, meaning that a 12-man ODA actually had up to twenty-four (or more) technical specialties at hand, including backups, within their team.
The Rush to Fill Ranks
Following the 9/11 attacks, the demands on special operations units throughout the United States military structure led to a serious manpower shortage, as – despite (if not “because of”) battlefield successes – the existing special forces units quickly began to experience manning shortages, as casualties mounted and operational teams were exhausted by the rapid pace of operations. This would lead to the creation of programs to rapidly bring in fresh recruits to fill the gaps.
In the US Army’s case, this became the “18X (Special Forces Candidate)” program, allowing civilians to directly enlist into Special Forces training. The idea was that a candidate who met all the basic educational and fitness requirements for Army Special Forces could be enlisted and “fast-tracked” to SF training, running through Army Basic Training, A.I.T., then on to parachute training, before being sent to the actual Special Forces training. The result was physcally fit, highly motivated operators, who had “checked off” all the requisite boxes, but who lacked the depth of experience of those who had come before them. The result was something more akin to “elite assault infantry”, something more akin to the US Army Rangers, rather than “Special Forces”.
There is nothing wrong with the concept of the Rangers – but that concept is not the same thing as Army Special Forces…What follows is by no means an indictment of the candidates themselves, but of the wider Army command structure, who should have known better.
While the 18X program helped meet the immediate personnel needs for Army Special Forces, they have revealed some serious problems:
Physical Casualties
– Higher rates of training injuries
– Increased long-term physical damage
– More frequent stress fractures
– Earlier career-ending injuries
Psychological Impact
– Elevated PTSD rates
– Higher frequency of “burnout”
– Reduced stress tolerance
– Shorter operational careers
As noted above, veterans of conventional units brought crucial life experiences into their Special Forces careers that direct-enlistment recruits simply lack, because they have not had the time to learn and experience those life lessons that their predecessors had.
Going straight from training to high-intensity “operational” status is functionally sending out people who know how to pull a trigger, not someone who understands the nuances of how to react to their surroundings, nor how to deal with the stresses of everything going completely wrong at the first shots. Special Forces have to be able to switch instantly from shooting people, to working with survivors in the immediate area, as well as how to calmly and rationally coordinate with foreign military and police units in the aftermath, whether those are from the country the SF team is operating in, or from allied nations. These functions require both maturity and humility, which can only be developed over time – time that the 18X program cannot impart.
The Historical Record
The 77th Infantry Division’s World War 2 experience provides a damning historical precedent that the Army seemingly ignored when creating the 18X program. The 77th’s success – with its higher average age of 35 and consequently more mature decision-making abilities – demonstrated clear advantages in the complex, high-intensity combat of the Pacific theater. Despite facing some of the war’s most challenging battlefield conditions, the division’s older, more experienced from civilian life soldiers generally suffered lower casualty rates than younger-aged units in the same actions.
77th Infantry division troops during the Battle of Okinawa, May, 1945. US Army Archives. Public Domain.
This historical data – especially in light of the history of Special Forces operations from the 1950’s to the 1990’s – should have served as a clear warning against the 18X program’s entire premise. If older, more experienced soldiers performed better in conventional warfare, it follows that rushing young, inexperienced recruits directly into the even more complex and demanding world of special operations would be problematic, at the very least. The Army had empirical evidence from the 77th, reinforced from Vietnam to Desert Storm, that maturity and life experience were crucial force multipliers in challenging combat environments, especially for Special Forces, yet chose to disregard these lessons when designing the 18X program. The resulting higher casualty rates among direct-entry special operations personnel represent a preventable tragedy.
Statistical Reality
Recent studies indicate troubling trends among direct-entry special operators. Over 75% of musculoskeletal injuries among Special Forces are preventable. Unfortunately, the reality is that data collection for these kinds of statistical studies is extremely hazy in quality.
The real story lies in the fact that the 18X program is still in force as an active recruitment tool, indicating that either the US Army is having serious problems attracting applicants to one of its premier “Tier 1” formations (which would not be surprising, given the Army’s well known recruiting woes), or that the 18X program still needs to run, in order to keep the numbers flowing in.
Neither offers a comforting picture.
The Cost of Shortcuts
The financial and operational costs of these programs are significant: Higher washout rates – whether from medical, emotional or psychological reasons – waste contentious budget monies, and make teams harder to form, train and deploy.
This also makes operational deployments much more expensive, overall, while limiting the capabilities of the units deployed, due a general lack of experience, and an increase in the requirements for already heavily strained support operations.
The whole combines into a toxic soup that lowers morale, degrades mission capabilities, and results in frantic attempts by inexperienced political leadership to find workaround solutions that, frankly, aren’t.
U.S. soldiers load a simulated casualty on a UH-60 Black Hawk during a medical evacuation at Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif., May 17, 2011. Photo credit: Technical Sgt Chris Hibben, US Army. Public Domain.
Conclusion
The United States desperately needs an effective special operations establishment. While highly capable at their missions, the Rangers are not suited to replace Army Special Forces. But Army SF is locked into a vicious cycle, where they need to maintain numbers for operations, but have serious problems (not all of their own making) with bringing in fresh candidates. That may change in the next few years, but there is little light in this tunnel.
The effectiveness of America’s special operations forces depends on finding the right balance between meeting personnel needs and maintaining the high standards that make these units elite…but, much more telling, is the need for coherent leadership at the top of both the military and civilian establishments.
The reality of history is that the regular military services have long detested the very idea of “elite” formations, despite their demonstrated capabilities. In the civilian quarter, the highly toxic nature of civilian politics in the United States means that few serious veterans want anything to do with the civilian leadership establishment in any way, leading to an increasingly wide divergence in understanding of what military forces require to operate, nor of their true capabilities.
There are no easy answers to this last problem, but something needs to be done to fix it, because there is an ogre lurking in the background, that no one wants to see come back into reality.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the maze of American military law, an oddity has persisted for over a century – the concept of the “unorganized militia.” This peculiar term, which first appeared in federal law in 1916, represents a significant but largely unnoticed downgrade in how we think about civilian military capability in the United States.
The term currently appears in law as part of Title 10, Section 246 of the US Code, which divides the militia into two classes: the “organized militia” (consisting of the National Guard and Naval Militia) and the “unorganized militia” (everyone else who meets certain criteria). At first glance, this might seem like simple administrative categorization, but there’s a deeper problem here – one that touches on important questions about military preparedness and constitutional rights.
The issue? The term “unorganized militia” is, fundamentally, an oxymoron, or, a self-contradictory statement. A “militia,” by definition, is a military formation. How can a military formation be unorganized? It’s like saying “unorganized organization” – the terms are inherently contradictory. This isn’t just semantic nitpicking; it represents a fundamental shift in how American law views civilian military capability.
Before 1916, the terminology was different and more sensible. The Dick Act of 1903, which laid the groundwork for the modern National Guard, used the term “Enrolled Militia” for citizens who weren’t part of the National Guard. Some states, like Texas, currently use the term “Reserve Militia.” Both terms implied potential for activation and organization – they suggested a genuine reserve of military manpower that could be called upon if needed.
The shift to “unorganized militia” wasn’t just a change in words; it represented a degradation of the entire concept. An “enrolled” or “reserve” force suggests capability and readiness; an unorganized one suggests…well, nothing much at all. This change coincided with the post-World War II era’s emphasis on maintaining a peacetime draft, and it has been argued that the new terminology was deliberately chosen to legitimize selective service as a “selective activation of the unorganized militia,” while simultaneously seeking to limit the organization of an armed force under the auspices of the Federal Government, but which could be subverted by anti-government agitation.
If this sounds like a “fringe” conspiracy theory, it most certainly is not. Writing in 1989, US Army four-star general John R. Galvin pointed out that the Massachusetts Militia – the force that fought and won the Battles of Lexington & Concord in 1775 – were only able to do so because the militiamen had almost uniformly “un-elected” their Loyalist officers in 1774, and had spent the next year training relentlessly and assembling supplies for the coming war.
General John Galvin, US Army, 1991. Official photograph. Phoot credit: Russell Roederer. Public Domain.
No government is ever comfortable giving potential opponents the time, materials and ability to organize against them, especially when those potential opponents are their own citizens.
There are other peculiarities in the current law. For instance, it appears in Title 10 of the US Code, which governs federal military forces, yet describes itself as the “Militia of the United States,” rather than the “Militia of the Several States.” This creates a puzzling jurisdictional issue – the federal government defines this body as a “militia,” but provides no mechanism for forming or organizing it; meanwhile, the states are solely able to organize their own militia formations (meaning, the state governments alone, not their citizens), confirmed in that authority by the 1886 Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Presser (which decision, incidentally, also invalidates virtually all restrictive gun control measures), yet few states even make an attempt to do so, limiting themselves to maintaining their State National Guard commands and, in some states, to “State Guard” formations, some of which may even be provided with arms by the State…Yet, no state has any provision to muster a “militia” in the sense of one as described in the US Code – if you visit the government website of your county of residence, and can find a link telling you when and where to muster for your county militia, please let this author know.
The law also contains certain oddities in age restrictions that conflict with current military practice. It limits militia service to male citizens of ages 17-45, yet the National Guard accepts prior service members up to age 64 (per Section 313 of Title 32). This means that those with prior military service are automatically still “in service” in the “Militia of the United States“, if they are under the age of sixty-five, generally without them being informed of this status before enlisting in Federal Service, creating a very “interesting” series of potential legal issues, all by itself.
With recent Supreme Court decisions emphasizing historical analysis in Second Amendment cases (particularly New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen), the time might be right to challenge this legal framework. A return to the concept of an “Enrolled Militia” or “Reserve Militia” could provide a foundation for a more practical system of civilian military capability, one that is not simply “military” in nature, but one that could enhance disaster response to major natural disasters.
One possible reform would involve creating a “US Militia Coordinating Office” staffed by retired field-grade officers from the Army and Marine Corps, providing local oversight in each county while maintaining federal coordination. This would bridge the gap between state and federal authority while creating a practical framework for organizing civilian military capability when needed.
The current system, with its contradictory terminology and practical limitations, seems increasingly out of step with both historical precedent and modern needs. As the Hamas attack on Israeli civilians that began on October 7, 2023 showed, the world remains a dangerous place, and when the local police and regular military cannot respond, or are overwhelmed, it is the average Citizen who has to step into the breach.
That is laid out in the Tenth Amendment, if you’d care to read that.
As we face evolving security challenges, it is past time to reconsider how we structure and organize civilian military capability in America. The answer might lie not in new innovations, technology, or tools, but in returning to the more practical and legally sound concepts of our past.
If the Federal and State governments have issues with this, maybe it is also time to replace the individuals in those governments with people who understand that American Citizens are not the enemy – unless the government makes them so.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Wars cannot end, until the enemy is defeated, and there is no stomach in the West for the necessary operations…
With the reelection of Donald J. Trump to the Presidency of the United States, even as Progressive, Left-wing pundits around the world launched into publicly televised hysterical meltdowns (that were subdued, compared to those of the many programmed victims of their psychological manipulations of the last few decades), heads of state around the world – the sane ones, at least – broadcast their congratulations to Trump.
In the Middle East, this was also true, for the most part. However, in both Iran and Yemen, reactions were mixed. Neither state is particularly happy about Trump’s victory, as both know that Trump is a diehard supporter of Israel, far more so than the ineffectual and vacillating Democrat administration of Joe Biden has been. This bodes ill for Trump’s immediate foreign policy options.
Since October 19, 2023, the Shi’a Muslim Houthi faction in Yemen has “done a yeoman’s work” in supporting the Hamas terrorist group that attacked and slaughtered defenseless civilians – including pregnant women – in their October 7th invasion of southern Israel that year.
While Yemen is physically separated from Israel and Gaza by a very considerable distance, one could be forgiven for assuming that the Houthis would only be able to offer kind words to Hamas. However, this is the 21st Century, and the Houthis are being supported by the Shi’a Muslim mullahs ruling Iran, to the north…and who have supplied the Houthis with not only Iran-designed derivatives of the ancient Soviet SCUD missiles, but with anti-ship missiles as well.
And it is that last group of weapons that is going to present Donald Trump with his most serious challenge, the first of a series of messes left for him to clean up, much as he found in 2017, when he had to pick up the pieces of Barack Obama’s eight-year long “bombing-fest”.
This time, though, Trump will have a far harder time. Trump’s first administration, as hard as Liberal news organs try to deny it, was marked as being the first Presidency in living memory to have not resulted in the United States becoming embroiled in any new military conflicts – every military action during the “Trump Years” of 2017-2021 were part of conflicts he inherited from Barack Obama.
The US and Western militaries in general, have been critically weakened as a result of the staggering incompetence of the last four years of mismanagement from Washington and NATO capitals. The aloof and disconnected-from-reality “ivory tower” political elites in the West have floundered as their intricate “house of cards” strategies for global dominance have collapsed, as those people they discounted as backwards, uneducated “camel jockeys”, simply declined to play by the script those elites had written for them.
Their first stumble was pushing Vladimir Putin’s Russia into invading Ukraine – the Western elites never imagined that Putin would actually invade – they assumed that he would either meekly acquiesce, or that he would launch a new Cold War, one that would boost the elites’ defense industry stock portfolios into orbit (literally)…The notion that Putin would actually commit to massive, “main force” combat on a scale not seen since 1990-1991 was never on their “bingo cards”.
Next came Africa, as local state armies – usually led by Western-trained officers (sparking delightfully daft conspiracy ravings from Left-wing talking heads) – in the “Coup Belt” of the Sahel Region decided that tossing out Western – primarily French – influence for good, via military action, was worth the risk. The elites were left slack-jawed to discover that what they had considered their racial and cultural inferiors had had enough of their paternalistic ravings, and told them to get out. So “uppity” has Africa gotten, that the Ugandan government publicly and messily refused to bend the knee to the United States over imposing visa restrictions on its officials over the country’s anti-LGBTQ policies – and had to watch as most African countries lined up behind the Central African state. Then, the Sahel nation of Niger – one of the most recent “Coup Belt” states – non-too politely told the US State and Defense departments to ‘pound sand’ over what they described as threats to the country if they did not immediately restore the corrupt government installed by French corporations – then told them that the DoD to remove the $100 million drone operations base at Agadez…To paraphrase a certain comic book-cum-movie character: “…Not a good plan, America…”
And then, there is Ukraine. It does not matter in the slightest, whether you support Ukraine, or Russia, or neither. That is literally irrelevant. All that matters, are three things:
Despite obscene amounts of Western monetary and material support, Ukraine is losing the war. Deal with it.
The nuclear saber rattling from both sides has brought the world closer to and intentional nuclear exchange than at any time in history.
The United States and NATO defense establishments have demonstrated their categorical inability to supply even basic war materials – this is not Star Trek, and there are no replicators here
To this context, we must add the fact that North Korea – which was at least willing to listen to Trump, at some level – smelled weakness in Washington, and moved swiftly to capitalize on that weakness. (NB: The Freedomist covered this on itsmonthly subscription side, as well.)
Yemen is a truly ancient nation, with its recorded history stretching back at least 7,000 years, with much of that history revolving around the sea. Like most of the states and people’s in the region, Yemenis of all tribes and religious sects understand one of the core truisms of warfare: “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” (Attributed to Admiral Horatio Nelson.)
While some modern naval pundits have tried to dismiss this wisdom in the modern day – much as their recent ancestors though that “capabilities based planning” was a better idea than traditional strategic thinking – the current effort by Yemen’s Houthis has proven how true it really is, if one has the ability to think about warfare on multiple levels.
The Houthis have no defined “fort” to fight – the operate their missiles as a kind of “shell game”, shuttling them around the countryside, much as the original US strategy for the Minuteman Missile system of the 1980’s. That idea works, as sea-launched land-attack missiles have trouble finding those targets.
Added to this, has been the recent escalation in the Israel-Hamas war, first with the Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah launching multiple attacks into northern Israel, with the Israeli’s hitting back just as hard, if not harder.
In fact, very little, at least at first glance. The problem is that Yemen is a fantastic foil for Iran against the United States and its allies: it forces Israel and those Western powers hostile to Iran to split their forces between theaters, while limiting their ability to shift naval forces. At the same time, the Houthis – and thus, Iran – have been able to critically damage the commercial system that the West depends on, and all without Iran becoming directly involved.
This situation has no solution, other than a very messy, and very bloody “boots on the ground” invasion of the Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen…by Trump…With all that implies, given the last twenty-five years of war.
This is because neither the Houthis, nor the Iranians, are willing to actually negotiate any sort of peace agreement, unless Israel agrees to undue everything it has done in reply to Hamas and Hezbollah…Which is simply not going to happen.
Because of the failures of the Biden administration, small but hostile powers states have launched wars because they saw the weaknesses of the United States and the West, and sought to capitalize on that weakness…and they know that Trump will not be able to fix those problems before the 2026 mid-term elections in the US.
If one were a conspiracy theorist, one could almost think that this was a deliberate ploy to undermine a Trump victory.
But that’s just crazy-talk.
Right?
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
This article is going to press on November 8th of 2024. Donald J. Trump as been confirmed to have won the US Presidential election be a decisive margin. While much is being made in some quarters about how “Daddy Trump” is going to fix everything overnight, the reality is that Trump will face a myriad of major diplomatic challenges on Day One of his new administration. While we could write multiple articles on every one of the many wars Trump will have to deal with – and we will discuss one of them next week – this week, we will talk about the most important issue.
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has exposed critical weaknesses in Western defense industrial capacity, while recent infrastructure incidents highlight the fragility of military logistics chains. These vulnerabilities raise serious questions about NATO’s ability to sustain high-intensity conflicts and maintain global military readiness, because they are not being addressed.
“Peace Through Strength” is a resounding cry, but it requires “strength” to make it work.
The Artillery Crisis
NATO’s inability to meet Ukraine’s artillery shell requirements has revealed a stark reality: Western defense industries are no longer configured for industrial-scale warfare. The conflict has consumed ammunition at rates not seen since World War II, with Ukraine firing approximately 6,000-8,000 artillery rounds per day, while Russia expends an estimated 15,000-20,000 rounds daily.
European and American ammunition plants, optimized for peacetime efficiency rather than wartime surge capacity, have struggled to increase production. Most Western facilities operate on a single-shift basis with aging equipment, lacking the workforce and infrastructure for rapid expansion. The situation is exacerbated by shortages of raw materials and specialized components, many of which come from a limited number of suppliers.
In contrast, Russia – which had correctly forecasted the coming decade’s events – quietly began classifying increasing amounts of its economic (and possibly population) data, beginning in 2014. Further, while the Western powers had deliriously wrapped up and eventually converted or bulldozed much of its war production capacity, the newly non-Soviet Russia did not: they mothballed their facilities. And, as tensions with the West began rising after the Donbas War began, they began to quietly bring those mothballed plants back online.
The reason for focusing so much on artillery production is that, far more than the production of drones, tanks or airplanes, artillery is the most important determiner of modern warfare capabilities, after Logistics infrastructure and the combat abilities of one’s infantry forces.
Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
The recent collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, Maryland after being struck by the container ship MV Dali highlights another critical vulnerability in military logistics. Major ports and waterways are essential for moving military equipment and supplies, yet many rely on aging infrastructure. The Baltimore incident demonstrates how a single point of failure can disrupt both civilian and military shipping patterns across an entire region.
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) fast combat support ship USNS Supply (T-AOE 6) sails through the Atlantic Ocean, 2006. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 3rd Class Joshua Kinter. Public Domain.
Similar vulnerabilities exist across NATO’s logistics infrastructure:
Aging rail networks crucial for moving heavy military equipment
Limited redundancy in key shipping channels and ports
Concentrated dependence on specific facilities for military operations
Vulnerability of critical bridges and tunnels to both accidents and potential sabotage
Limited upgrades to handle increased loads
Supply Chain Complexity
Modern defense systems rely on intricate supply chains involving thousands of contractors and subcontractors. This complexity creates multiple potential points of failure:
Raw Materials
Critical mineral dependencies
Limited processing facilities
Potential supply disruptions from geopolitical tensions
Component Manufacturing
Specialized electronics producers
Precision machining capabilities
Quality control requirements
Assembly and Integration
Skilled workforce shortages
Facility capacity constraints
Security clearance requirements
The China Factor
Many of these vulnerabilities trace back to China’s quiet dominance in global supply chains. Critical raw materials, electronic components, and industrial chemicals often originate from Chinese sources. This dependency creates strategic risks, particularly in scenarios where China might decide to restrict exports or support adversaries.
While this has yet to significantly impact the war in Ukraine, it remains a distinct possibility…especially should a Trump diplomatic effort fail or stall – or expand.
Impact on Military Readiness
These supply chain vulnerabilities affect military readiness in several ways:
Reduced Training
Limited ammunition for training exercises
Delayed maintenance due to parts shortages
Restricted live-fire drills
Strategic Reserve Depletion
Ammunition stocks below minimum requirements
Extended replacement timelines
Reduced crisis response capability
Force Projection
Logistics bottlenecks limiting deployment options
Increased vulnerability to interdiction
Reduced sustained operation capability
Misplaced Priorities
Another serious consideration is the toxic culture of the long-ballyhooed “military-industrial complex“. That term is a tired trope that has been overused to the point of reducing it to a joke…However, it is very real, and is one of the major axes that is causing the downstream bottleneck that is choking the combat power of Western forces.
For generations, defense contractors have made squeezing as much taxpayer money as possible in technical “peacetime” as high a priority as possible, whether their products worked or not – the Sgt York and Dragon ATGM come immediately to mind. Making products like “dumb” (i.e., “unguided”) artillery ammunition and aircraft bombs is not considered as cost-effective, from a business perspective, as more technically complex – and thus, highly expensive – weapons systems.
The fact that these weapons cannot be produced anywhere near as quickly as modern combat demands – as demonstrated in Ukraine – is not part of the cost-benefit calculations of the commercial military-industrial complex.
Addressing the Challenges
Military planners are attempting to address these vulnerabilities through several initiatives:
Industrial Base
Investing in modernized production facilities
Developing workforce training programs
Creating redundant supply sources
Infrastructure
Identifying critical chokepoints
Developing alternative routing options
Improving facility protection
Stockpile Management
Reassessing minimum stock levels
Implementing more robust tracking systems
Developing new storage facilities
At the same time, those same military planners face the harsh reality that too many civilian leaders in Congress – both outgoing and incoming – received a large amount of cash that put them into a very cushy position, and that getting those same politicians to act against what defense contractors see as their own best interests is going to be an uphill battle, all the way. This will be even harder for Donald Trump, who has dared to speak the unspeakable, that peace needs to break out again.
The Near Term Outlook
The combination of industrial capacity limitations and infrastructure vulnerabilities presents a serious challenge to Western military capabilities, and especially to the incoming 47th President. Addressing these issues requires sustained investment and policy attention, potentially including:
Defense Industrial Base revitalization
Infrastructure hardening and redundancy
Supply chain diversification
Stockpile expansion
International cooperation on critical materials
And finally, reining in the military-industrial complex, whether they like it or not
The lessons from Ukraine and incidents like the Baltimore bridge collapse underscore the urgent need for comprehensive supply chain resilience in defense planning…They also show the dangers of thinking that business and war are analogous – misapplying the principle of Sun Tzu is actually far more dangerous than dismissing them.
North Korea’s Strategic Pivot: Abandoning Reunification for Military Partnership
Amid the hysteria of the 2024 US Presidential election – seen by many on the world as a pivotal event in the world’s direction for the next generation, at least – there is an increasing amount of talk concerning North Korea’s increasingly militant actions. Most alarming among these is its deployment of combat troops to Ukraine, to aid the Russian war effort there, as that conflict grins through its third year.
The failure of the 2019 Hanoi Summit between then-US President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un marked more than just another setback in US-DPRK relations. It represented a crucial turning point in North Korea’s strategic outlook, leading to its current role as a military supplier to Russia and its apparent abandonment of the long-held dream of peaceful reunification with South Korea.
The reasons for these cascading failures go back as far as 2003, and are the result of a warped view of ‘realpolitik‘, driven by open and naked profit motives which are completely divorced from reality.
The Pyongyang government’s abysmal mismanagement of the nation has resulted in a brutal prison state, routinely wracked by famines, and whose industrial base remains firmly in the 1970’s, if that. In addition, North Korean intelligence has been routinely kidnapping Japanese citizens since the 1970’s, to train their foreign intelligence operatives (i.e., “spies”) how to act as citizens of western countries.
However, in two critical area’s, the almost obscenely resource-rich North Korea has spared no expense: its nuclear weapons and space launch programs.
While derided by many for their technological backwardness, poor national management, and cultural isolation, in these two critical areas, North Korean capabilities are nothing to be laughed at.
Bolton’s astoundingly bad judgement is what caused Trump’s failure in Hanoi, a decision-tree so bad, it could be seen as a deliberate act of sedition. North Korea’s nuclear strategy has been fundamentally shaped by the fate of other authoritarian leaders who gave up their WMD programs. The overthrow and subsequent deaths of Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003) and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (2011), among others, provided “Supreme Leader” Kim Jong Un with compelling evidence that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantee of regime survival.
The Hanoi Disaster
The 2019 Hanoi Summit failed largely because of fundamentally different expectations. The Trump administration, abysmally advised by the hysterical chickenhawk, then-National Security Advisor John Bolton, then-US President Donald Trump was led to believe that North Korea could be “persuaded” to follow a “Libya model” of denuclearization. This profound misreading of Kim’s priorities doomed the talks before they began.
Kim arrived in Hanoi seeking a gradual approach: partial denuclearization in exchange for significant sanctions relief. The American position – complete denuclearization before any meaningful sanctions relief – was a non-starter for a regime that had learned harsh lessons from history: Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s youthful leader, is well aware of the vicious, gruesome and bloodthirsty cackle of then- (2011) US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the death of Libyan dictator Muammar Gadaffi: “We Came, We Saw, He Died”…after the Libyan dictator had completely caved to Western pressure to abandon his “weapons of mass destruction” programs nerly a decade before, only to have the United States and NATO openly destroy his regime. Muammar Gadaffi was one of the foulest excuses for a human being in modern history, but the West made an agreement with him, then happily broke it at the first opportunity.
Kim Jong Un may be a lot of things, but an idiot, he most certainly is not.
Strategic Reassessment
The Hanoi summit’s collapse triggered a comprehensive reassessment in Pyongyang of North Korea’s strategic position:
Nuclear Strategy
– Nuclear weapons development needed to be accelerated
– Its missile testing program needed rapid expansion
– It needed to publicly acknowledge its nuclear status
Diplomatic Posture
– Reduced emphasis on US negotiations
– Strengthened ties with China and Russia
– Dismissal of South Korean outreach
North Korea’s military-industrial complex, while technologically stalled in the 1970’s for the most part, maintains a massive production capacity for basic weapons systems. Its ability to manufacture artillery ammunition using Soviet-era specifications has made it an ideal supplier for Russia’s war effort, allowing Russian industry the ability to slow its own production to refine and retool, even as western arms industries remain stalled in their production of the same supplies. This partnership offers multiple benefits to Pyongyang:
Economic Advantages
– Hard currency earnings
– Technology transfer opportunities
– Sanctions circumvention
Military Benefits
– Combat experience for troops
– Modern battlefield observations
– Testing of equipment in actual combat
Strategic Gains
– Stronger ties with a permanent UN Security Council member
– Reduced international isolation
– Leverage against US pressure
Of these points, the second – giving its troops modern combat experience – is the most valuable to North korea in the short term. It it very difficult for a military that has not actually fought a war in decades to know what new tools and techniques it should try to implement; armed forces around the world are notoriously conservative (to the point of being hidebound) for a reason, although rarely to the level of North Korea.
Whatever the reality of the fighting in Ukraine, “blooding” North Korean troops there could give them a significant advantage over their South Korean adversaries in a future fight, as South Korean troops have not had any experience in the kind of war currently being fought in Ukraine, despite having a significant technological advantage over their northern opposition.
Abandoning Reunification
The shift away from even theoretical peaceful reunification represents a significant change in North Korean policy. Since the Korean War armistice in 1953, both Korea’s have maintained reunification as an official goal, though with vastly different visions of how it would occur.
This policy shift serves several purposes:
Solidifies Kim’s domestic position
Justifies increased militarization
Enables closer alignment with Russia and China
Reduces diplomatic constraints on aggressive actions
The successful satellite launches demonstrate North Korea’s growing mastery of several critical ICBM technologies, particularly multi-stage rocket separation and long-range guidance systems. The primary technical hurdle remaining for effective ICBM capability is reentry vehicle technology – protecting a nuclear warhead during its hypersonic return through the atmosphere. Russian assistance in this area likely on Kim’s shopping list for providing weapons and troops to Russian leader Vladimir Putin, as Russia possesses some of the world’s most advanced reentry technologies.
Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, 2024. Public Domain Photo from the Government of North Korea.
By early 2024, North Korea had already demonstrated progress in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) development through tests of the Hwasong-17 ICBM, which appears designed to carry multiple warheads. Their March 2024 test of a new solid-fuel ICBM suggested further advances in this capability. MIRV technology would allow a single missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads, each capable of hitting different targets. This dramatically increases both first-strike capability and the ability to overwhelm missile defense systems.
The combination of proven satellite launch capabilities, potential Russian reentry assistance, and advancing MIRV technology could enable North Korea to deploy a credible nuclear triad system, fundamentally altering the strategic balance in Northeast Asia.
Regional Implications
This strategic realignment has profound implications for Northeast Asian security:
South Korea
– Increased military tension
– Reduced diplomatic options
– Stronger US alliance imperative
Japan
– Enhanced missile defense urgency
– Strengthened US security ties
– Increased military spending justification
China
– Complicated regional balance
– Reduced influence over DPRK
– New strategic calculations needed
The acquisition by North Korea of a credible strategic nuclear capability would represent a catastrophic shift of world power.
Looking Forward
North Korea’s evolution from a state theoretically seeking peaceful reunification to an active military supplier in global conflicts represents a significant shift in Northeast Asian security dynamics. This transformation, rooted in the failures (whether accidental or deliberate) of past diplomatic initiatives and Kim Jong Un’s determination to ensure the survival of his regime, suggests a more militarily active and less diplomatically constrained North Korea in the years ahead.
As this article goes to press, the United States is some four days away from the 2024 Presidential election. There is no way to know what will happen if Donald Trump wins on November 5th – but the outcome of a Harris victory is starkly and painfully clear, because any response they make to Kim’s new course will be either completely incoherent, or wildly overblown.
Choose wisely.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The United Kingdom’s descent from its position as a leading global financial center into economic turmoil represents one of the most dramatic shifts in modern economic history. While the roots of this decline can be traced to the 2008 global financial crisis, the combined shocks of Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Britain’s steadfast support of Ukraine has accelerated what many analysts now term Britain’s “Lost Decade.”
The Foundation Cracks: 2008-2016
The 2008 financial crisis hit London particularly hard, given its out sized role in global banking and finance. While other nations gradually recovered, Britain’s recovery was notably sluggish. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government’s austerity measures, implemented under Prime Minister David Cameron, may have prevented a sovereign debt crisis (while some 70 potential defaults currently exist), but came at the cost of reduced public services and infrastructure investment.
The 2016 Brexit referendum marked a crucial turning point. The vote to leave the European Union triggered immediate economic consequences: the pound sterling plummeted, investment decisions were frozen, and London’s position as Europe’s financial capital began to erode. Major financial institutions started relocating operations to Dublin, Frankfurt, and Paris.
The protracted Brexit negotiations created years of uncertainty, depressing business investment and complicating trade relationships. The eventual Trade and Cooperation Agreement, while avoiding a “no-deal” scenario, still resulted in significant new barriers to trade with Britain’s largest market.
The reality was that Britain’s trade was significantly undermined by the European Union’s bitter and petty actions, as that body did not was to lose the major tax revenues that Britain was contributing, at a time when the EU was a whole was still reeling from the 2008 crisis. The “better option”, from the EU’s perspective, was to make it as hard for Britain as possible to “go it alone”.
What made these effects far worse, were a series of bungling failures by successive governments in London, from both sides of the political aisle. These poorly-considered actions have functionally flat-lined the British economy…and things are not improving.
Pandemic Paralysis
COVID-19 struck Britain particularly hard, both in human and economic terms. The UK experienced one of Europe’s highest death rates and deepest economic contractions. The government’s pandemic response, while unprecedented in scale, added substantially to national debt. The furlough scheme, while preventing mass unemployment, cost hundreds of billions of pounds.
The pandemic exposed and exacerbated existing economic weaknesses. Supply chain disruptions, combined with Brexit-related complications, led to shortages and inflation. The National Health Service, already strained by years of austerity, faced enormous pressure.
Britain’s robust support for Ukraine, while strategically important, has come at a significant economic cost. Military aid, combined with sanctions against Russia, contributed to spiraling energy costs and inflation. The situation has forced difficult choices between domestic spending and international commitments.
The energy crisis has highlighted Britain’s vulnerability to global supply shocks. Despite North Sea oil and gas resources, years of under-investment in energy infrastructure and storage capacity left the country exposed to price volatility.
Successive governments in London have learned the US government’s model of “borrow ’til you crash”, piling on mountains of debt to support Kiev’s flagging hopes of survival, as ‘victory’ is very much a malleable terms.
Impact on Global Security
Britain’s economic challenges have resulted in drastic and cascading effects on global security:
Reduced Military Capability: Budget constraints have limited Britain’s ability to modernize its armed forces and maintain its traditional role in global security operations, something even the new Left-wing government of PM Keir Starmer could not ignore.
NATO Implications: While Britain continues to meet NATO’s 2% GDP defense spending target, the declining value of the pound means this represents less actual military capability.
Diplomatic Influence: Economic weakness has diminished Britain’s ‘soft power‘ and ability to influence global events through economic leverages.
Intelligence Capabilities: Budget pressures have affected Britain’s renowned intelligence services, potentially impacting the “Five Eyes Alliance“.
Recruitment Crisis and Cultural Shift
The British military’s recruitment challenges reflect deeper societal changes. Traditional sources of military recruitment – working-class communities with strong patriotic traditions – have been eroded by demographic shifts, changing cultural attitudes and recently, the stunningly draconian response of the Starmer government to a sudden spate of riots initially linked – albeit wrongly – to racial violence. The Armed Forces’ 2022-23 recruitment targets were missed by approximately 40%, marking the worst recruitment crisis since the end of conscription in 1960, although recruiting numbers in the United Kingdom have been dropping steadily since at least 2010.
This recruitment crisis stems from multiple factors. Economic uncertainty has paradoxically reduced rather than increased military recruitment, as potential recruits seek more stable civilian careers. More significantly, surveys indicate a growing disconnect between younger Britons and traditional concepts of national service. The proportion of young people expressing “pride in being British” has declined significantly, particularly in urban areas, leading to even Left-leaning pundits to suggest that the British Left needs to “re-embrace patriotism”.
The military has attempted to address this through modernized recruitment campaigns, often focusing on personal development and technical skills rather than patriotic duty. However, these efforts have met with mixed success, as they compete against private sector opportunities and what military leaders describe as an “individualistic zeitgeist” among younger generations.
This staffing crisis has forced difficult choices about force structure and capabilities, significantly limiting Britain’s ability to maintain its global military commitments.
Economic Indicators
The scale of Britain’s economic challenges is reflected in key indicators:
Persistent low productivity growth
Declining real wages
Rising income inequality
Chronic trade deficits
High government debt-to-GDP ratio
Weakening pound sterling
Reduced foreign direct investment
Looking Forward
Britain’s path to economic recovery remains uncertain. The country retains significant advantages: a highly skilled workforce, world-class universities, and leadership in sectors like fintech and renewable energy. However, structural challenges persist:
Aging infrastructure
Regional economic disparities
Skills shortages in key sectors
Housing market instability
Trade relationship uncertainties
Energy security concerns
The implications of these issues for global security will depend largely on Britain’s ability to navigate these challenges while maintaining its international commitments and modernizing its military capabilities.
The real problem for British security, however, remains the same as in the United States Armed Forces: an increasing percentage of the primary recruiting demographic – the “under-30” age group – simply do not see the point in volunteering to serve their country in the military, if at all, as it seemingly offers no opportunities over the civilian world, and has demonstrated (as in the United States and Canada) a staggeringly callous attitude towards treating the long-term impacts of combat on the country’s veterans…And, also as in the United States, if this trend is not reversed, the alternatives are not things any government wants to consider.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the realm of military technology, few developments are as controversial or potentially game changing as autonomous weapons systems. These are weapons that can seek out, select and engage targets without human intervention, using artificial intelligence to make literal life-and-death decisions on the battlefield. As nations race to develop these systems, we find ourselves at a crossroads, weighing the strategic advantages against profound ethical concerns.
Defining Autonomous Weapons Systems
Autonomous weapons systems (AWS) range from AI-powered drones to robotic sentries and even potential future systems that could operate entirely independently of human control. The key feature is their ability to use sensors and algorithms to identify, target, and engage enemies without direct human authorization. This marks a significant shift from remote-controlled or semi-autonomous systems that still rely on human decision-making for lethal actions.
Significantly, the key difference between a drone or missile and an AWS is not hardware, but software – any sufficiently capable, computer-controlled platform can be loaded with an AWS algorithm, and no one would be the wiser, unless the unit was captured.
Strategic Advantages
The potential military benefits of AWS are significant:
Reduced Risk to Human Personnel: By replacing human soldiers in dangerous situations, AWS could significantly reduce military casualties.
Enhanced Speed and Precision: AI can process information and react much faster than humans, potentially increasing the speed and accuracy of military operations.
24/7 Operation: Unlike human soldiers, autonomous systems don’t need rest, allowing for continuous operation.
Cost-Effectiveness: Over time, AWS could potentially reduce the personnel costs associated with maintaining large standing armies.
Overcoming Human Limitations: AWS wouldn’t be subject to human failings like fear, fatigue, or emotional decision-making in combat situations.
Ukrainian bomb-armed “octocopter”. Photo Credit: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, via armyinform.com.ua. CCA/4.0 Int’l
Ethical Dilemmas
However, the development of AWS raises serious ethical concerns:
Lack of Human Judgment: Can an AI truly understand the context and nuances of a combat situation? There are fears that AWS might not be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians in complex scenarios. While this has always been a concern in relation to artillery and air strikes, both of those combat avenues have a presumably responsible human operator[s] at the top of the decision-making tree.
Accountability Issues: If an autonomous weapon makes a mistake, who is held responsible? The programmer, the manufacturer, or the military commander who deployed it?
Lowered Threshold for Conflict: With reduced risk to personnel, nations might be more willing to enter into armed conflicts, potentially increasing global instability.
Potential for Escalation: The speed of AI decision-making could lead to rapid escalation of conflicts before humans have a chance to intervene.
Hacking and Misuse: There are serious concerns about the potential for AWS to be hacked or fall into the wrong hands, with catastrophic consequences. Note that this potential is not limited to national entities, but can easily extend to non-governmental groups and individualsm as AWS algorithms are, at their core, simply computer programs, which can be endlessly duplicated and sent around the world via the internet, human couriers or just conventional “snail mail” services. The distinct danger out uncontrollable proliferation is not something to be blithely dismissed.
The Global Debate
The international community is grappling with how to approach AWS. Some nations and organizations are calling for a preemptive ban on “killer robots”, arguing that the risks outweigh any potential benefits. Others advocate for regulation and careful development, believing that AWS are inevitable and it’s better to shape their development than to futilely try to prevent it.
The United Nations has been a focal point for these discussions, with several meetings of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) dedicated to debating potential regulations or bans on AWS. However, reaching a consensus has proven challenging, with major military powers often resistant to strict limitations.
Current State of Development
While fully autonomous weapons systems are not yet deployed in combat, many nations are actively developing precursor technologies. For example:
The US Navy’s Sea Hunter, an autonomous ship designed for anti-submarine warfare
Israel’s Harpy drone, which can autonomously detect and attack radar systems
Russia’s claimed development of AI-controlled missiles
‘Sea Hunter’ autonomous anti-submarine drone sails in formation during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022, July 28. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Aleksandr Freutel. Public Domain.
While not fully autonomous, these systems represent significant steps toward AWS and demonstrate the ongoing interest in this technology among world powers.
Central to these concerns is the Kargu-2. Now combat-proven in the wreckage of Libya, in the hands of both Turkish “peacekeepers” and their local allies, the Kargu – despite official denials by Turkey, has shown that AWS systems are capable of performing lethal strikes with full autonomy is certainly possible.
STM Kargu-2, a portable rotary wing kamizake drone produced in Turkey. Photo credit: Armyinform.com.ua. CCA/4.0 Int’l
The Human Element
One of the core debates surrounding AWS is the role of human judgment in warfare. Proponents argue that removing human emotions like fear and anger from combat decisions could lead to more ethical outcomes. Critics counter that human empathy and moral reasoning are essential in making complex battlefield decisions.
The concept of “meaningful human control” has emerged as a potential middle ground, suggesting that while systems may have some autonomous functions, humans should retain ultimate control over lethal decisions. This is not an academic debate, because of the fundamental reality of all computer systems: Computers do not “care“, and neither does Artificial Intelligence. An AI combat system’s job is to attack what it can identify as an “enemy“, and if the last c.150 years of warfare have taught us anything, it is that every single person, regardless of gender or age, is a potential threat to be dealt with.
War is bad enough, as it is. We don’t need to allow it to be worse.
Future Implications
The widespread adoption of AWS could fundamentally change the nature of warfare. Some potential implications include:
Shifts in military strategy and tactics to account for the capabilities and limitations of AWS
Changes in the global balance of power, as nations with advanced AI capabilities gain military advantages
Potential arms races in AI and autonomous systems
New forms of conflict, including potential battles between opposing autonomous systems
The need to develop military training, techniques and procedures (TTP’s) to address the certainty that AWS algorithms will proliferate into the hands of terror groups.
Conclusion
Autonomous weapons systems represent both a remarkable technological achievement and a profound ethical challenge. As we stand on the brink of a new era in warfare, the decisions we make about the development and use of AWS will have far-reaching consequences for global security, international law, and the very nature of armed conflict.
The path forward will require careful consideration, robust international dialogue, and a commitment to balancing technological progress with ethical responsibility. As AWS continue to evolve, it’s crucial that policymakers, military leaders, ethicists, and the public engage in public and informed discussions about how to navigate this complex landscape.
Ultimately, the question we face is not just about the capabilities of machines, but about our own humanity – what role do we want human judgment to play in matters of life and death, and how can we ensure that the pursuit of military advantage doesn’t come at the cost of our ethical principles?
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the ever-evolving landscape of modern warfare, a seemingly new player has emerged, that has been punching well above its weight class: the small, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), or “drone”. These compact, agile, and increasingly affordable devices are revolutionizing battlefield tactics, offering capabilities that were once the domain of larger, more expensive military assets.
The Rise of the Miniature Air Force
Gone are the days when drones were solely the purview of well-funded militaries. While unmanned, remotely-piloted military drones are certainly nothing new, having been used in combat as far back as World War 2, and while used on a large scale as recently as the six-week long Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, it is important to realize that many of the recent uses of drones were not “revolutionary” in any way. In fact, Azerbaijan’s use of drones was essentially a copy of the US and Coalition air force’s campaign against Saddam Hussein’s capital in Baghdad, in 1991.
A Naval Forces of Ukraine Bayraktar TB2 from the Turkish company Baykar Defense; CCA/4.0 Int’l
Today, however, it is the comparatively cheap, off-the-shelf commercial drones, often modified specifically for military use, which have become almost ubiquitous on battlefields around the world. From the conflict in Ukraine to the wars in the Middle East, small drones began making their presence felt as early as 2015.
These miniature flying machines come in various shapes and sizes, from hand-launched fixed-wing craft to multi-rotor copters that can take off and land vertically. What they lack in size, they make up for in versatility and sheer numbers. This is driven by their low cost (as low as $40, as of late 2024), and ease of use, as their control interfaces are based on either popular video game controllers, or on smartphone app interfaces, again often mimicking video game apps.
Drone hand controller unit, 2022. Photo Credit: South Carolina Air National Guard. Public Domain.
Revolutionizing Reconnaissance
While “kamikaze” and bomb-dropping drones are certainly newsworthy, perhaps the most significant impact of small drones repurposed for military use has been in the realm of reconnaissance. Traditionally, gathering intelligence on enemy positions often required putting soldiers in harm’s way or relying on expensive satellite imagery. Now, a soldier as far down as the squad level (8-13 troops) can launch a drone from a safe position and get real-time video feedback of enemy locations, fortifications, and movements.
This capability has significantly democratized battlefield intelligence. Now, even small units can now have their own “eye in the sky,” providing unprecedented situational awareness. The psychological impact is also significant – the constant buzz of drones overhead can be deeply unnerving for opposing forces, never knowing when they’re being watched…or targeted.
South Carolina Air National Guard Conducts Drone Fly Over of Runway Construction, 2022. Photo Credit: South Carolina Air National Guard. Public Domain.
From Eyes to Claws: The Weaponization of Small Drones
While reconnaissance remains a primary function, small drones are increasingly being weaponized. In some conflicts, commercial drones have been modified to drop small explosive payloads, usually modified hand grenades or rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) rounds, and do so with surprising accuracy. This last has, in fact, been used frequently on Ukrainian battlefields to counter the threat posed by main battle tanks. This has allowed for precise (if small scale) strikes on localized high-value targets without risking pilot’s lives or using expensive guided missiles.
A significant factor in this, is the timeliness of engagement, as a local unit with armed drones can act to engage a target far faster than it could using the old methods of calling back to an artillery or missile base, in order to adjust and coordinate fires; while that can – and is – still done with more conventional artillery, the weaponized drone – under the command of a leader literally shoulder to shoulder with the operator – can engage a group of targets much faster than before.
The low cost and expendable nature of these drones also enable swarming tactics. A swarm of small, explosive-laden drones, whether operating as kamikaze’s or under positive control, can overwhelm older, conventional defenses designed to counter larger, conventional threats. This asymmetric capability allows smaller forces to challenge larger, better-equipped opponents.
Leveling the Playing Field
Perhaps the most profound impact of small drones is how they’re leveling the playing field in asymmetric conflicts. Non-state actors and smaller military forces can now possess capabilities that were once the exclusive domain of major powers. A few thousand dollars worth of drones can now threaten millions of dollars worth of military hardware, and can frighten and demoralize professional troops who lack the knowledge, skills, training or equipment to effectively deal with this type of threat.
This democratization of air power is forcing a rethink of traditional military doctrine. Heavy armor, once the king of the battlefield, is increasingly vulnerable to drone-spotted artillery or direct drone attacks; current ad hoc armor strategies to counter drone strikes have only “sort of” worked. Air superiority, traditionally achieved through fighter jets and large drones, now also requires countering swarms of much smaller, harder-to-detect UAV’s. If anything, this threat is much harder for conventional armies to deal with.
The Counter-Drone Challenge
As small drones reshape offensive tactics, they’re also spawning a new field of counter-drone technology. Militaries around the world are racing to develop effective countermeasures, from electronic warfare systems that can jam drone controls to directed energy weapons that can shoot them out of the sky. Some novel approaches include training eagles to intercept drones, using large nets to capture them, or deploying “hunter-killer” drones to pursue and neutralize hostile UAV’s. Obviously, these advanced systems – while they may work for the moment – are breathtakingly expensive for the threats they are envisioned to be deployed against.
The challenge is significant – how do you economically counter a threat that might cost only a few hundred dollars per unit?
The Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Missile (C-RAM) gun fires flares during a weapons test at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, Jan. 31, 2010. USAF Photo by Senior Airman B. Bateman. Public Domain.
While conventional systems such as the combat-proven C-RAM and the venerable ZSU-23-2 can be fitted with proximity-fuzed warheads and self-destruct systems to help prevent “friendly fire” incidents, the dollar gap – something that always looms large in the conduct of war – is still far too wide for these systems to be truly cost-effective in combat. Likewise, conventional rifles are nearly useless against drones, as their projectiles – while perfectly suitable against a human-sized target – are nearly impossible to use against a fast-moving target roughly the size of a human hand.
A salvo from the ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun, 2021. Photo by: Ministry of Defense of Russia via mil.ru. CCA/4.0
Is there a better option?
Shotguns vs. Drones: A Low-Tech Solution to a High-Tech Threat
While militaries and defense contractors pour millions into developing advanced counter-drone technologies, one surprisingly effective tool has emerged from a much older era of warfare: the conventional shotgun.
The oldest model of personal firearm in history, shotguns have been continuously used in combat since the invention of gunpowder. As early as the 1980’s, if not before, conventional 12-gauge pump-action shotguns were mounted under the barrels of rifles such as the M-16, usually as supplementary weapons for police SWAT units to use in blasting open locked doors during raids; in fact, a Mossberg 500 was mounted under an M-16 look-alike in the 1987 movie “Predator“. Although terribly front-heavy, this sort of “combination weapon” does have its uses, when in trained hands.
The KAC MasterKey mounted under the barrel of an M4 assault rifle. 2009 photo by DrBaker of M4Carbine.net. Public Domain.
Militaries around the world have used shotguns for both combat and recreation. The shooting sports of “trap” and “skeet” are particularly relevant here, as both are based on hitting very small, fast moving targets with little lead-time.
Boatswain’s Mate Seaman Alonzo Bender, left, fires a 12-gauge shotgun during a skeet shoot on the flight deck of the amphibious dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor (LSD 52), in 2010. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael Russell. Public Domain.
Shotguns offer several advantages in countering small drones:
Widespread Availability: Most military and law enforcement units already have shotguns, making them an immediately accessible solution.
Ease of Use: Soldiers are often already trained in shotgun use, and even if they are not, only minimal additional training is required.
Wide Dispersal Pattern: The ever-widening spread of shotgun pellets after they leave the muzzle increases the likelihood of hitting a small, fast-moving target.
Cost-Effective: Compared to expensive electronic warfare systems or laser weapons, shotgun shells are incredibly cheap.
Low Collateral Damage: Unlike missiles or explosives, shotgun pellets have a limited range, reducing risks to surrounding areas.
Real-World Applications
Several militaries have already employed shotguns against drones. U.S. forces in Syria and Iraq have used them to down small ISIS drones, while developments continue to seek out solutions to develop anti-drone ammunition for conventional weapons. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, Russian companies are developing specialized anti-drone shotguns for the battlefield. And all the while, the inability of most military forces to convince their civilian-staffed governments – most of whom have no military experience at all – that going back to older designs continues to leave expensively trained and equipped troops vulnerable on the battlefield.
Despite their advantages, shotguns are not a perfect solution:
Limited Range: Effective range is typically less than 100 meters, requiring the threat to be relatively close.
Manual Targeting: Unlike automated systems, shotguns require a human operator to spot and shoot the drone.
Multiple Shots: Often, multiple shots are needed to down a drone, especially if it’s a larger or more robust model.
Environmental Factors: Wind, obstacles, and poor visibility can significantly affect accuracy.
Escalation Risks: In some scenarios, using firearms against drones could be seen as an escalation, particularly in sensitive diplomatic situations.
Still, shotguns do at least offer a fast solution to the close-range defense problem, when the alternatives are foot-long autocannon rounds or worse, anti-aircraft missiles to deal with what is essentially a lethal child’s toy.
Conclusion: Small Size, Big Shift
While the proliferation of small drones on the battlefield represents a significant shift in military tactics and strategy, they are like most developments: there is a lot of flash and thunder early on, but military forces that are actually competent will quickly adapt, and find countermeasures. All the same, these diminutive devices are rewriting the rules of military engagement, challenging long-held assumptions about military power, and forcing a reevaluation of everything from equipment procurement to tactical doctrine.
As technology continues to advance, making drones smaller, smarter, and more capable, their impact on warfare is only likely to grow. The military forces that can best adapt to this new reality – leveraging the strengths of small drones while effectively countering their threats – will hold a significant advantage on the battlefields of the future.
In the grand chess game of global conflict, the smallest pieces on the board are proving that size isn’t everything. The age of the small drone has arrived, and with it, a new era of warfare where the tiny can have a truly outsized impact.
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