Mercenaries have been around a long time – clearly, because this is Part 4 of a series concerning them, directly. In recent decades, post-9/11, the rise of “Private Military Companies” (PMC’s) has seen a return to “corporate armies” on a level not seen since the Renaissance in Europe. And taking the lead in the modern marketplace, are the swarm of former soldiers from the South American nation of Colombia…who, somewhat surprisingly, have demonstrated a trait not seen on any scale since the widespread return of mercenaries in the 1960’s: a willingness to fight on both sides of a conflict, much like their forebears, the mostly-German Landsknechts of the wars of the 14th and 15th Centuries.
The Landsknechts emerged in late 15th century Germany as elite mercenary infantry, initially formed under Emperor Maximilian I of the Holy Roman Empire. Inspired by the success of Swiss pikemen, Maximilian sought to create a comparable force loyal to German interests rather than relying on Swiss mercenaries who, often served France.
These professional soldiers revolutionized military organization through their distinctive structure and combat approach. Unlike traditional medieval armies, Landsknechts were highly disciplined, well-trained units specializing in pike and sword tactics. They typically fought in deep, dense formations called gevierte Ordnung (squared order), which proved highly effective against both cavalry and infantry.
A unique characteristic that set Landsknechts apart from other mercenary groups was their willingness to fight against other Landsknecht units. While Swiss mercenaries refused to face other Swiss in battle, considering it dishonorable, Landsknechts had no such compunctions. This led to some of the bloodiest encounters of the period, as Landsknecht units on opposing sides would fight with particular ferocity, each seeking to prove their superior skill and maintain their reputation.
Landsknechts were notorious for their flamboyant appearance and lifestyle. Their distinctive dress, featuring slashed doublets, elaborate codpieces, and multicolored hose, became a defining feature of Renaissance military fashion. This extravagant style reflected both their high pay and their status as elite warriors.
Their military effectiveness made them sought-after throughout Europe. Landsknechts served in most major conflicts of the period, including the Italian Wars and the Habsburg-Valois Wars, often fighting against their fellow Landsknechts when employed by opposing powers. Their reputation for loyalty to their employer (while under contract) and battlefield effectiveness made them highly valued, though their demands for high pay and tendency toward looting made them expensive to maintain.
Their decline began in the late 16th century as warfare evolved. The increasing importance of firearms and the development of more standardized national armies gradually reduced the role of mercenary pike formations. However, their legacy influenced military organization and culture well into the modern era, particularly in areas of discipline, unit cohesion, and the professional soldier concept.
In the modern day, starting in the early 1960’s, mercenaries continued to play the same roles they had always played, albeit on a lower tier, as either individuals or as pale clones of nationally mustered formations like the French Foreign Legion…until, that is, the 9/11 attacks.
Following those attacks, mercenary corporations – mostly those not operating with the pseudo-approval by a national government, like Sandline International, ArmorGroup and Vinnell – exploded into being. Following the “false start” model of Executive Outcomes in the 1990’s, companies like Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and Aegis Defence Services swung into action, grabbing as much market share as they possibly could.
Controversies immediately began. Many PMCs, notably Blackwater – who was certainly not alone – tended to have a very loose interpretation of “rules of engagement“, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties. Likewise, PMC casualties were also heavy, with almost 3,700 having been killed by early 2023, compared to 4,419 US troops deaths; however, that figure is somewhat misleading, as confirmed US combat deaths were 3,482, as of 2025. This is complicated by the fact that many contractor deaths went unreported (in order to avoid life insurance payouts to survivors), so the figures on PMC deaths in action are essentially a “best guess” estimate.
And most of those deaths did not come from the United States. Economically disadvantaged ex-soldiers and -police in many “3rd World” nations eagerly jumped at the chance to make a considerable amount of money in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, even though they were not paid at any kind of rate close to their American or European counterparts. Among these were the Colombians.
Colombia has effectively been at war since 1964. Between a long-running guerrilla war against communist revolutionaries and the never-ending war against the cocaine cartels, including the rise of the “narco submarine“, the Colombian armed forces have become one of the finest counterinsurgency forces on the planet. This has come, however, at the price of military conscription.
However, while the Colombian military has a regular influx of fresh conscripts, and those conscripts do become very skilled, there is little need for those skills on the civilian job market in the country. This, coupled to Colombia’s not-unusual condition lack of veteran services post-conscription, results in a large number of highly trained soldiers with nothing to do, and few salable job skills, making the country a prime recruiting location for mercenary recruiters, both reputable and otherwise.
As a result, Colombian veterans have emerged as significant players in the global mercenary market, their expertise forged in decades of counter-insurgency operations and drug war combat. These soldiers, many trained by U.S. special forces during Plan Colombia, combine advanced military skills with extensive real-world combat experience, making them highly sought after by various employers worldwide.
The 2021 assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse first brought international attention to this phenomenon. Several former Colombian military personnel were implicated in the operation, highlighting both their availability for complex military operations and the networks facilitating their recruitment. The incident revealed how these veterans’ skills could be deployed for both state and non-state actors.
In Yemen’s civil war, Saudi Arabia actively recruited Colombian veterans to serve alongside their forces. The Saudis specifically sought out Colombian personnel for their experience in counter-insurgency operations and urban warfare. These mercenaries were particularly valued for their ability to train local forces while also participating in direct combat operations.
The Mexican drug cartels have also tapped into this pool of expertise, hiring Colombian veterans as military trainers and tactical advisors. These former soldiers bring sophisticated military knowledge to criminal organizations, teaching advanced combat techniques, tactical planning, and military discipline. Their experience in Colombia’s drug war makes them particularly valuable to cartels seeking to professionalize their armed wings. This dichotomy – soldiers trained to fight drug cartels turning around and training them – is the first example since Executive Outcomes of this sort of reversal.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created new opportunities for Colombian mercenaries, with veterans finding employment on both sides of the conflict. Russia actively recruited through various channels, offering significant pay and potential citizenship. Meanwhile, Ukraine also attracted Colombian veterans to join their foreign legion, appealing to their anti-communist backgrounds and offering combat roles…and frequently end up fighting each other.
This issue on both sides of the Ukraine war, which has now killed at least 300 Colombian mercenaries on both sides, is that the war in Ukraine is vastly different from anything they have experience in. Ukraine is a “big war”, where tanks, artillery, combat drones and air attacks are common on both sides. As experienced as Colombian ex-soldiers might be in counterinsurgency or “direct action missions“, they have neither the training nor the experience to fight in this sort of environment, leading to many desperately trying to leave the theater, no matter which side they are fighting for.
The phenomenon reflects several key factors: Colombia’s large pool of combat-experienced veterans, relatively low domestic salaries for retired military personnel, and the extensive international networks developed during Colombia’s own conflicts. Many of these veterans received advanced training from U.S. special forces during their service, making them particularly attractive to employers seeking professional military expertise.
Their presence in an increasing number of conflicts has raised concerns anew about accountability and the privatization of warfare. While some operate through legitimate private military contractors, others work through more informal networks, making their activities harder to track and regulate. The situation has prompted discussions about the need for better international oversight of mercenary activities and the responsibilities of states in monitoring their former military personnel’s post-service activities.
Mercenaries, like warfare, are not going away any time soon. But the real takeaway from this is that, be they Colombians or Landsknechts, needing to hire mercenaries shows a distinct failure of a nation’s will – France does not need its Foreign Legion to survive, although that body has certainly helped the nation over the decades. But, if your people will not fight for you, maybe you should rethink what you are doing as a nation.
