Military vehicles develop slowly, and not in very predictable ways. Most of the time, the requirements for a military vehicle are largely divorced from what manufacturers actually come up with. However, sometimes, the stars align, and magic actually happens.
Case in point: the M113.
M113 crew firing their .50-caliber machine gun during South Vietnamese training exercise. US Army photo by PFC J.C. Rivera. Public Domain.
As World War 2 developed, the United States developed the M3 Half-Track, an odd – but highly effective – hybrid, with a wheeled front axel much like a truck, in front, with a “tracked” rear drive system that used what amounted to a very large rubber tire, stretched over a huge span.
While very strange, the M3 proved highly effective at everything from delivering infantry right behind the tanks, to light artillery, anti-aircraft and logistics, doubtless why some 38,000 ended up being produced. But, the half-track wasn’t perfect, and by the beginning of the 1950’s, the Army needed a replacement.
The M113 Armored Personnel Carrier stands as one of the most widely produced and utilized armored vehicles in military history, with its operational footprint spanning over six decades and more than 80 countries worldwide. The M113 is the unlikely gold standard for “battle taxis” arounf the world.
Since its introduction by Food Machinery Corporation (later United Defense) in 1960, the M113 has become synonymous with versatility, reliability, and adaptability in military operations across diverse theaters and conflict zones. While it can technically carry 11 troops, plus its 2-man crew, most current operators use an 8- or 9-man squad.
Originally developed to meet the U.S. Army’s requirement for a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier, one light enough to be air dropped, the M113 quickly demonstrated its value well beyond its initial design parameters. Two prototypes were initially produced, the aluminium-hulled T113 and the steel-hulled T114. The aluminum hull construction provided substantial weight savings compared to steel alternatives while maintaining adequate protection against small arms fire and artillery fragments. In contrast, the steel hulled design, owing to the severe weight restrictions set by the design targets, offered no greater protection than the aluminum hull. This lightweight design enabled the vehicle to achieve speeds of up to 42 mph on roads and maintain mobility across various terrains, from jungle environments to desert conditions.
US Army infantrymen armed with M16A1 rifles unload from an M113 armored personnel carrier during a training exercise, 1985. US Army photo. Public Domain.
The Vietnam War marked the M113’s combat debut and established its reputation for durability under harsh conditions. American forces employed thousands of M113s in Southeast Asia, where the vehicle’s amphibious capabilities proved invaluable in the Mekong Delta‘s waterlogged terrain. The “Green Dragon,” as it became known, served not only as a troop transport but also as a command post, ambulance, and fire support platform. Its aluminum armor, while initially questioned, demonstrated remarkable resistance to mines and improvised explosive devices, contributing to crew survivability rates that exceeded expectations.
International adoption of the M113 family has been unprecedented in armored vehicle history. Countries ranging from NATO allies to Middle Eastern nations, Asian powers, and African states have incorporated various M113 variants into their military arsenals. Australia, for instance, has operated M113s since the 1960’s and continues upgrading these platforms for modern operations. Similarly, nations like Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have maintained M113 fleets for decades, a testament to the platform’s capabilities in severe environments showing its enduring utility and cost-effectiveness.
The M113’s modular design has facilitated extensive variant development, with over 40 different “official” configurations currently documented. These include the M106 mortar carrier, M577 command post vehicle, M901 Improved TOW Vehicle, and M163 Vulcan Air Defense System; one variant, the M752, was built to launch the MGM-52 Lance tactical missile, which could launch nuclear warheads. This adaptability has allowed military forces to maximize their investment by utilizing a common chassis for multiple mission requirements, simplifying logistics, maintenance, and training procedures.
Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment drive an M-163 20mm Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system to a refueling area during Operation Desert Shield, c.1990-1991. US Army photo by SPC. Samuel Henry. Public Domain.
Production numbers underscore the M113’s global impact, with over 80,000 units manufactured across multiple production lines in the United States and licensed manufacturing facilities internationally. Countries including Italy, Turkey, and South Korea have produced their own variants, often incorporating indigenous modifications to meet specific operational requirements. This distributed production model has enhanced the platform’s accessibility and sustainability for allied nations.
Contemporary operations continue to validate the M113’s relevance in modern warfare. During conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, various nations deployed upgraded M113 variants equipped with enhanced armor packages, digital communication systems, and improved weapon stations. The platform’s relatively low signature and proven mechanical reliability have made it suitable for peacekeeping missions, border patrol duties, and domestic security operations.
The M113’s influence extends beyond traditional military applications. Law enforcement agencies, particularly SWAT teams and tactical units, have adopted surplus M113s for high-risk operations. Emergency services have converted these vehicles for disaster response, leveraging their mobility and protection in hazardous environments. This civilian adaptation demonstrates the platform’s fundamental design soundness and operational flexibility.
Modernization programs worldwide continue extending the M113’s service life well into the 21st century. Upgrade packages typically include improved armor protection, digital battlefield management systems, enhanced powertrains, and modernized weapon systems. Countries like Australia have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in comprehensive M113 upgrade programs, indicating long-term confidence in the platform’s viability.
Canadian Air-Defense, Anti-Tank System (ADATS), built on an M113 chassis, on display during the Royal Nova Scotia International Tattoo, 2008. Photo by Jonathon A.H., 2008. CCA/3.0
The M113’s legacy encompasses not only its direct military impact but also its influence on subsequent armored vehicle development. Design principles established with the M113 – including aluminum construction, amphibious capability, and modular architecture – have informed modern infantry fighting vehicle development programs worldwide.
Today, despite being supplemented or replaced by newer platforms in some applications, the M113 remains actively deployed across numerous conflict zones and operational theaters. Its combination of proven reliability, operational versatility, and cost-effectiveness ensures continued relevance in military inventories globally.
The M113’s near-seven decades of service represents an exceptional achievement in military vehicle design, establishing standards for durability and adaptability that continue influencing contemporary armored vehicle development. This enduring success reflects not merely engineering excellence but also a fundamental understanding of operational requirements that transcend technological generations.
Try as it has, the US Army has not been able to completely retire the M113, although it has, yet again, announced its imminent demise. Why is this the case? After all, the M113 was designed in the 1950’s, right? well, so was the AR-15, from which we got both the M16 and the M4, neither of which have been fully replaced, either.
The answer, then, is:
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the military sphere, there is a great deal of ribbing and catcalling, both between different services of a nation’s armed forces, but also between the forces of different countries. For the most part, this ribbing is good-natured fun, especially when it is based on actual reality.
However, there has been a highly toxic level of mocking applied to the armed forces of France, a situation that has been getting worse over the last forty years.
The jokes abound – the beret being designed to facilitate surrender by not getting in the way of raising one’s hands; the notion of French tanks having more reverse gears than forward one; the idea that French genes could not be improved after World War 1 because American troops widely used prophylactics; and the idea that French rifles are excellent as surplus…because they were “only dropped once“…something applied to the Army of South Vietnam, as well.
It’s one thing, to make these jokes in actual jest. It is another thing entirely, when they become statements. Then, it’s no longer funny, but suicidally insulting.
In fact, the French military has maintained a track record of success on the battlefield for centuries. The source of these juvenile statements of inability only date from the Franco-Prussian War, and its catastrophic cost to the country. The military’s troubles in World War 1 came from holding the Imperial German Army at bay for three years, at a cost of 1.4 million casualties.
While the disaster of the openingof World War 2 led to France’s conquest by Nazi Germany, France’s military plan was not a bad plan, just a plan poorly executed…and the British did not do very well, then, either. The collapse of France’s colonial empire after World War 2 did come from overly ambitious military plans formed by not understanding that colonial warfare had changed…something the United States also failed to grasp, in the exact same place as Dien Bien Phu, a decade prior.
The fact is that, for all of it’s messy problems in the last century, the French military remains one of the most capable armed forces on the planet – if their leaders allow their generals to do their jobs.
The French Army’s reputation for military professionalism, despite its dramatic fluctuations over the past two centuries, has created a complex narrative that defies simple description. From the revolutionary fervor of the Napoleonic era to the post-WW2 colonial campaigns and modern peacekeeping operations, France’s military has continually demonstrated both exceptional competence and notable – but recoverable – failures that continue to shape perceptions today.
The Napoleonic Foundation
The modern French Army’s professional identity was forged in the crucible of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). Napoleon’s Grande Armée established standards of tactical innovation, logistical organization, and battlefield leadership that influenced military thinking across Europe, down to today. The army’s meritocratic promotion system, revolutionary at the time, created a professional officer corps based on ability rather than aristocratic birth. This period saw the development of combined arms tactics, the corps system, and sophisticated staff work that demonstrated clear military professionalism.
Vive l’Empereur! Charge of the 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807. 1891 painting by Édouard Detaille. Art Gallery of New South Wales. Public Domain.
However, even during this golden age, the French military exhibited characteristics that would later prove problematic. The cult of offensive action (offensive à outrance) and the emphasis on élan over methodical planning became deeply embedded in French military culture, later contributing to both spectacular victories and catastrophic defeats.
19th Century Trials and Adaptations
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 exposed serious deficiencies in post-Napoleonic French military professionalism. Poor intelligence, inadequate logistics, and outdated tactical thinking led to decisive defeat and the collapse of the Second Empire. The subsequent creation of the Third Republic saw significant military reforms, including the establishment of improved staff colleges and the modernization of equipment and tactics.
The colonial period (1830s-1960s) presents a particularly complex chapter in French military professionalism. The conquest of Algeria, the expansion into West and Equatorial Africa, and campaigns in Indochina demonstrated considerable tactical adaptability and logistical capability over vast distances. French colonial forces also developed expertise in irregular warfare, cultural adaptation, and civil-military cooperation that proved valuable in diverse environments, although these advantages rarely translated into warfare on the European continent, which was common to all the major European powers.
Yet this same period saw the development of what critics term “colonial habits” – reliance on superior firepower against less-equipped opponents, acceptance of harsh methods, and a certain detachment from metropolitan oversight that would later create problems in conventional conflicts.
World War I: Staying Power
The Great War stretched French military professionalism to its limits. Initial disasters, including the failure of Plan XVII and massive casualties from adherence to offensive doctrine, gave way to remarkable adaptation under pressure. The French Army demonstrated institutional learning capacity, rapidly developing new tactics for trench warfare, integrating new technologies, and maintaining cohesion through four years of unprecedented carnage.
French infantry pushing through enemy barbed wire, 1915. Agence de presse Meurisse. Public Domain.
The performance of French commanders like Ferdinand Foch and Philippe Pétain, along with the army’s ability to absorb and integrate lessons from the battlefield, demonstrated core professional competencies. However, the trauma of the war also reinforced defensive thinking that would prove problematic in the next conflict.
1940: Collapse and Recovery
The defeat of 1940 represents perhaps the most significant challenge to claims of French military professionalism. Despite having numerically superior and often technically advanced equipment, the French Army was comprehensively outmaneuvered by German forces employing innovative combined arms tactics. Analysis reveals multiple professional failures: inadequate intelligence, poor communications, inflexible command structures, and outdated operational concepts.
Yet the same period saw examples of French military professionalism in different contexts. The Free French forces under Charles de Gaulle, though small, maintained military traditions and eventually contributed significantly to the liberation of France. The French Resistance, while not strictly military, demonstrated tactical innovation and operational security that impressed Allied observers.
Colonial Wars and Professional Dilemmas
The post-war colonial defeats in Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962) present perhaps the most controversial chapters in assessing French military professionalism. In Indochina, French forces demonstrated remarkable tactical competence in difficult conditions, developing techniques counterinsurgency and showing considerable adaptability. However, strategic failures and political constraints ultimately led to defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
The Algerian War proved even more problematic. While French forces achieved significant tactical successes against the FLN, the conflict saw disturbing breakdowns in professional conduct, including widespread use of torture and involvement in attempted coups against the civilian government. The Battle of Algiers (1956-1957) exemplified this tension between tactical effectiveness and questionable methods.
Since 1962, the French Army has undergone a significant revamping of its professional nature. The end of conscription in 1996 created an all-volunteer force with higher educational standards and improved training. French forces have demonstrated competence in various international operations, from peacekeeping in the Balkans to counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region of Africa.
Operations like Serval (2013) and Barkhane (2014-2022) in Mali showcased French capabilities in rapid deployment, intelligence gathering, and coordination with international partners. These operations demonstrated institutional learning from previous colonial experiences while maintaining focus on legitimate military objectives.
And it is here, that a more detailed look at Operation Serval is instructive on just how adaptable French forces can be.
Strategic Challenges of Operation Serval (2013)
Operation Serval presented the French military with a complex array of strategic challenges that tested every aspect of modern expeditionary warfare capabilities. The intervention in the war in Mali, launched on January 11, 2013, required France to project power across 4,000 kilometers into the heart of the Sahel region under severe time constraints and with limited initial international support.
Geographical and Logistical Complexity
Mali’s vast territory — larger than France and Germany combined — posed immediate strategic challenges. The northern regions under jihadist control encompassed over 800,000 square kilometers of desert and semi-arid terrain with minimal infrastructure. French forces faced the fundamental problem of securing lines of communication across this enormous space while maintaining operational tempo against a mobile enemy well-adapted to the local environment.
The logistical challenge proved particularly acute given Mali’s landlocked position and limited transportation infrastructure. France had to establish supply chains through multiple African partners, primarily using bases in Ivory Coast, Chad, and Niger. The single major airfield at Bamako created a critical vulnerability, while the absence of reliable road networks forced heavy reliance on air transport for sustained operations. This logistical complexity demanded unprecedented coordination between French forces, African partners, and international allies.
Map of the conflict in Northern Mali, c.2013, by WikiUser Orionist. CCA/3.0.
Time Sensitivity and Strategic Surprise
Perhaps the most critical challenge was the compressed timeline. Intelligence indicated that jihadist forces were preparing to advance south toward Bamako, Mali’s capital, potentially within days of the French decision to intervene. This left no time for the deliberate planning and force buildup typical of major military operations. French planners had to balance the immediate need to halt jihadist momentum with the longer-term requirement to establish sustainable operations across northern Mali.
The rapid deployment requirement meant accepting significant strategic risks. Initial French forces numbered fewer than 1,000 troops — inadequate for controlling territory, but sufficient to provide a rapid response capability. This created a dangerous window where French forces operated with minimal reserves while still building combat power in theater.
Coalition Building Under Pressure
France faced the delicate challenge of building international legitimacy while maintaining operational flexibility. The African Union had authorized the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), but this force remained months from deployment. France needed to demonstrate that Serval was not another unilateral European intervention in Africa, while simultaneously retaining command authority essential for rapid operations.
The diplomatic challenge extended to securing overflight rights, basing agreements, and logistics support from multiple African and European partners. Each agreement required careful negotiation to balance French operational needs with partner nation sensitivities about sovereignty and post-colonial relationships.
French officer making contact with the population in southern Mali. 2016 photo by WikiUser TM1972. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
Enemy Adaptation and Asymmetric Threats
The jihadist coalition in northern Mali presented a sophisticated opponent that combined conventional capabilities with insurgent tactics. Groups like AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) had years to prepare defensive positions and supply caches across the region. They possessed advanced weaponry captured from Libyan stockpiles, including anti-aircraft systems that threatened French air operations.
More challenging was the enemy’s ability to blend into local populations and exploit grievances against the Malian government. French forces had to distinguish between ideological jihadists and local groups with legitimate political grievances, while avoiding civilian casualties that could undermine popular support for the intervention.
Strategic Success Despite Constraints
Despite these formidable challenges, Operation Serval achieved its strategic objectives within weeks. French forces halted jihadist advances, secured major population centers, and degraded enemy capabilities sufficiently to allow AFISMA deployment. The operation demonstrated sophisticated understanding of modern warfare’s political dimensions—achieving military objectives while building conditions for successful transition to international peacekeeping forces.
The strategic challenges of Serval illustrate the complexity of contemporary expeditionary operations and highlight the French military’s capacity for rapid, effective intervention in challenging operational environments. This success provides compelling evidence of institutional competence that deserves recognition in serious strategic analysis.
Contemporary Assessment
Today’s French Army exhibits many characteristics of a professional military force: clear command structures, standardized training, integration with NATO allies, and adherence to international laws of war. However, debates continue about the persistence of certain cultural traits from earlier periods, particularly regarding operations in former colonial territories.
The French military’s professional reputation ultimately rests on its demonstrated capacity for adaptation, institutional learning, and technical competence across diverse operational environments. While historical controversies remain, the modern force has largely addressed the systemic issues that plagued earlier generations, creating a military organization that generally meets contemporary standards of professionalism.
Conclusion
The French military faces challenges, to be sure. But other, larger forces – usually with highly inflated perceptions of their own ability – face whose same challenges, as all armed forces try to navigate the swirling tempest of the emerging “One-N-Twenty“.
Don’t write off an army because of some bumps over the course of several centuries: You make mistakes, too.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Illicit drugs are everywhere. Since at least the Imperial Chinese attempts at curbing the British opium trade, governments have – for one reason or another – tried to end, or at least restrict as far as possible, the flow of drugs they find objectionable. From cannabis to cocaine, and opium/heroin to fentanyl, massive, militarized law enforcement structures have been built up, to try and end the trade.
For the most part, these efforts have failed.
The problem are the iron laws of supply and demand, and the Streisand Effect: If you overreact to the problem, people get curious as to why…and when trust in government is problematic, that urge becomes obsessive. And in an environment of induced artificial scarcity, imposed by efforts to ban “Bad Thing X” – be that drugs or alcohol – both demand for that substance, as well as its price tends to skyrocket…and the harder law enforcement cracks down, the more creative the suppliers get in bringing their product to market.
Case in point: The “narco submarine“. We discussed the “big-state” military aspects of leveraging narco-sub technology last year, but now we take a deeper dive into the flip-side of the “big-state” use of this ecosystem.
The evolution of narco-submarine technology from crude, semi-submersible craft to sophisticated vessels capable of trans-Atlantic voyages represents more than just an escalation in drug trafficking capabilities—it signals a potential paradigm shift in how insurgent and terrorist organizations could maintain covert supply networks across vast distances.
Trans-Atlantic range narco submarine in Aldán, Cangas, Galicia, Spain, 2019, following its capture by Spanish authorities. Photo by Estevoaei. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine has long emphasized the critical importance of disrupting enemy supply lines. However, the emergence of advanced narco-submarines, some capable of carrying multi-ton payloads across oceanic distances while remaining largely undetected, introduces a new variable into this equation. These vessels, originally developed by South American drug cartels to transport cocaine, have demonstrated remarkable sophistication in recent seizures, featuring diesel-electric propulsion, advanced navigation systems, and even air-independent propulsion capabilities.
The implications now extend far beyond narcotics. Intelligence assessments suggest these platforms could theoretically transport weapons, explosives, communications equipment, or even personnel across traditional maritime security perimeters. Unlike conventional smuggling methods that rely on commercial shipping or aircraft — both heavily monitored — narco-submarines operate in the vast expanses of international waters where detection remains extraordinarily difficult.
This point cannot be overstated: While the “old school” methods have long been known, and control measures developed to address them, the rise of covert submarine logistics at the small(ish) scale is a titanic problem, because almost any coastal beach, inlet or swamp is now a potential delivery point. While traditional inseriton methods like rough airstrips or road checkpoints can be easily identified, the sheer scale and unimproved nature of naval landing avenues severely hamstrings surveillance efforts – airstrips, roads and even drop zones are almost comically easy to identify, especially when they are not on official maps as crossing or entry points. Beaches, however, are everywhere.
Recent interdictions have revealed vessels with ranges exceeding 6,000 nautical miles, sufficient to connect South American manufacturing bases with conflict zones in Africa, the Middle East, or even Europe. The technical expertise required to construct these platforms has proliferated through criminal networks, with evidence suggesting construction techniques and blueprints have spread beyond their Colombian and Ecuadorian origins.
A primary case study of even non-submersible combat logistics support to an insurgent force comes from Mozambique, in 2020-2023:
The Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado demonstrated sophisticated maritime capabilities between 2020-2023 that transformed what began as a land-based rebellion into a complex amphibious threat. Ansar al-Sunna militants systematically leveraged traditional dhow boats and small craft to create covert supply networks that proved nearly impossible for Mozambican security forces to interdict.
The insurgents’ capture of the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 marked a strategic watershed, providing direct access to established heroin trafficking routes from the Makran Coast. Intelligence assessments suggest the group began “taxing” drug shipments landed from dhows, creating a maritime revenue stream that complemented traditional funding sources. This convergence of insurgent logistics and narcotics trafficking created a self-reinforcing cycle — drug money funded operations while operational control over landing sites enabled further revenue collection.
The tactical sophistication was remarkable. Insurgents used coordinated land-sea assaults, arriving simultaneously from multiple vectors to overwhelm defensive positions. They demonstrated proficiency with maritime navigation, successfully conducting what were functionally full-on amphibious operations across the island chains of the Quirimbas archipelago. Perhaps most concerning, they showed adaptive capabilities — after reportedly sinking a Mozambican patrol boat with an RPG-7, they captured additional vessels to expand their maritime fleet.
The geographic advantages were substantial. Cabo Delgado’s extensive coastline, numerous islands, and traditional reliance on dhow-based trade provided perfect cover for covert supply operations. The insurgents exploited the fact that legitimate maritime commerce — fishing, inter-island transport, and traditional trade — created background noise that masked military supply movements. With limited Mozambican naval capabilities and virtually no maritime patrol presence, the ocean became an uncontested highway for insurgent logistics.
For insurgent groups, the strategic value is clearly compelling. As the World War 2 OSS demonstrated, traditional arms trafficking routes face increasing scrutiny from international security partnerships and advanced surveillance systems. Port security measures, while effective against conventional smuggling, are largely irrelevant to vessels that can surface miles offshore and transfer cargo to smaller craft or coastal staging areas.
The financial model also aligns with insurgent economics. Drug trafficking organizations have demonstrated willingness to treat narco-submarines as expendable assets — vessels are often scuttled after single-use missions. This operational approach could extend to insurgent logistics, where the strategic value of delivered materiel outweighs platform preservation.
Counter-narcotics operations have struggled with these platforms despite significant resource investments. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that even with enhanced detection capabilities, the vast majority of narco-submarine transits remain undetected. This detection challenge would be magnified in insurgent applications, where hostile groups’ operational security might be even tighter and cargo manifests wouldn’t trigger the same intelligence indicators as bulk narcotics shipments.
The convergence of criminal and insurgent networks is not theoretical — established precedents exist in regions where these organizations share operational space and mutual interests. The DEA has linked 19 of 43 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations to some aspect of the global drug trade, demonstrating that such collaborations are already occurring. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) provided a decades-long example of how insurgent groups can leverage drug trafficking networks to fund operations and maintain supply lines, activities that continue with the FARC’s splinter factions.
Perhaps most concerning is the adaptive nature of this technology. Each interdiction reveals new innovations: improved stealth characteristics, enhanced range capabilities, and increasingly sophisticated construction techniques. The rapid evolution suggests that by the time security services develop effective countermeasures, the threat may have already evolved beyond current detection and interdiction capabilities.
This potential weaponization of narco-submarine technology by hostile non-state actors represents a convergence of criminal innovation and insurgent logistics that could fundamentally challenge existing maritime security frameworks and force a reassessment of how covert supply networks might operate in an era of advanced surveillance.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
With the US Presidential election over, and Donald Trump about to be sworn in for the second time, many of the wars in the Middle East, as well as the war in Ukraine, seem to have paused for a moment, waiting to see what Trump will do. With the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and the resulting complete re-shape of the power dynamics in the region, the world seems to be waiting to see if peace will break out.
With a possible ceasefire in Gaza, this may seem likely. However, there is another theater to the Middle East, and that conflict may very well be the next explosion from the region…and, while it may sound like hyperbole, this burgeoning conflict could potentially result in a real nuclear nightmare.
That place is a familiar spot on the map: Afghanistan.
With the disastrous collapse of the United States presence in the country in the summer of 2021, the Taliban returned to power in the country, and quickly tried to assume the mantle of a legitimate government. Of course, being the Taliban, that was not in the cards, as the Taliban continue with their deranged policies in governance, and are increasingly being undermined by “ISIS-K“, who quickly entrenched in the post-US Afghanistan after their initial teething troubles in the region, and now use their territories as a base to launch international attacks on nations it considers itself to be at war with.
Aside from the Taliban’s shift in income – destroying opium poppy fields, while moving heaven and earth to step up the production of methamphetamines and fentanyl (which both require less processing than opium-into-heroin, and is cheaper to make per kilo) – they are starting to try and play the “Galtieri Card” to increase their support by dredging up Afghanistan’s long-standing ax to grind: the Durand Line.
Old Wounds
The Durand Line, which established the current Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 1893, through an agreement between British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, has remained a source of tension and conflict in the region for over a century. This arbitrary border, drawn by British diplomat Sir Mortimer Durand – in an era when the opiate Laudanum use was rampant among European elites – cut through traditional Pashtun tribal territories, effectively dividing the Pashtun people between what would become Afghanistan and Pakistan. This status makes the Durand Line the local equivalent to the hated Sykes-Picot Agreement that created the 20th Century borders farther west, carving up the corpse of the Ottoman Empire.
Durand Line Border Between Afghanistan and Pakistan. CIA Image, 2007. Public Domain.
From its inception, the legitimacy of the Durand Line has been contested. Successive Afghan governments have historically argued that the agreement was signed under duress and was meant to be temporary, lasting only 100 years. The Pashtun tribes, who had historically moved freely across these territories, never accepted the border’s legitimacy, viewing it as an artificial division of their ancestral lands.
Following the partition of India in 1947, Afghanistan became the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, citing the Durand Line dispute. Afghanistan’s position has consistently been that the agreement was with British India, not its successor state, Pakistan, and thus was voided after partition. This led to several border clashes in the 1950s and 1960s.
The rise of the Taliban, which is predominantly Pashtun in composition, added new complexity to the dispute. During their first period of rule (1996-2001), the Taliban, while focused on internal control, never officially recognized the Durand Line. Their perspective was influenced by both Pashtun nationalism and their vision of an Islamic emirate that transcended colonial-era borders.
The porous nature of the border has had significant strategic implications. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), the border’s ambiguity allowed mujahideen fighters to move between Afghanistan and safe havens in Pakistan. This pattern repeated during the U.S.-led intervention (2001-2021), with Taliban fighters utilizing the same cross-border mobility.
After returning to power in 2021, the Taliban maintained their historical opposition to the Durand Line. Tensions escalated when Pakistan attempted to fence parts of the border, leading to several armed confrontations between Taliban and Pakistani forces. The Taliban’s position reflects both Pashtun nationalist sentiments and practical considerations – the border’s porosity benefits their strategic interests and traditional trading routes.
The dispute has broader implications for regional stability. The unresolved border issue complicates counter-terrorism efforts, enables cross-border militant movements, and affects economic development in the border regions. For the Pashtun communities living along both sides of the line, the border remains largely theoretical, with daily life involving regular cross-border movement for trade, family connections, and seasonal migration.
Recent years have seen periodic skirmishes along the border, with both Taliban forces and Pakistani military engaging in limited conflicts over fencing attempts and border control measures. These tensions are growing, and if left unchecked, threaten the safety of the globe itself.
Unstable Nukes
Pakistan, however, is an animal of a completely different stripe. While a Sunni-Islamic state like Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Pakistan remains unique, as the only Muslim nation in the world with a nuclear arsenal, including the capability to launch that arsenal. What has been worrying every nation in the world with any ounce of sense, is that Pakistan has spent most of the last fifteen years on the razor’s edge of civil war.
The Taliban’s territorial claims in dispute of the Durand Line would carve out a significant chunk of Pakistan, and it is open to question how loyal much of the Pakistani Army might remain to Islamabad, given their reportedly Assad-Syria levels of morale (at the 4 minute mark).
Clearly then, this is a worry, as a collapse of the government of Pakistan throws open the question of the nation’s nuclear arsenal…but then, another player is at this particular table:
India
Thinking About The Unthinkable
When British India was partitioned, what is now modern India came into being, along with Pakistan. As a majority-Hindu state, religiously speaking, with an estimated 80% of the population being of the Hindu faith. And – as Hindus and Muslims have a long history of violent clashes, so too have India and Pakistan in the modern day.
While that may seem to be a simple historical note, the situation is complicated by the fact that India, too, is a nuclear power, equally capable of launching nuclear weapons, and – given its post-partition conflicts with its Muslim neighbor to the north – is not about to stand by and watch Pakistan’s nuclear force fall into the hands of a group like the Taliban – or ISIS-K – which views nuclear weapons as essentially VERY large hand grenades…
If that sounds like me saying that India has a plan to secure that foreign arsenal, that’s because that is exactly what I am saying: after Pakistani intelligence’s almost-certain collusion in the 2008 terror attack on the Indian city of Mumbai, India would be absolute fools to have not created and staged a plan to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons…and that, post-2008 India certainly is not.
Conclusion
In this context, it should not be too difficult to see the potential disaster looming. While Trump may, indeed, have plans in place to solve the Gaza and Ukraine wars on Day 1, Afghanistan and Pakistani unrest is another matter, entirely. In addition to our reporting on the potential of a war between Morocco and Algeria of the Western Sahara (a subscriber exclusive), Afghanistan trying desperately to “war” their way out of failed-state status could well lead to a nuclear disaster of the first order…and the repercussions of that, no one can legitimately predict with any accuracy.
Look to your personal safety and security.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
As we close out the year of 2024, it has certainly been a monumental year. Movements have waxed and waned, politicians have been both humiliated and nearly assassinated, business leaders have actually been removed from the field, nations have fallen, wars continue, and security flaws have been exposed. This article will close out the year; the next article will be in the first week of January.
Pretty standard stuff, really…except that many of these events this year have been truly significant.
The United States
Starting with the proverbial elephant in the room, Donald J. Trump – the 45th President of the United States – was reelected to the Presidency by a very comfortable margin over his primary challenger, the thoroughly un-electable Vice President Kamala Harris. Trump’s re-election was secured following his survival of an assassination attempt on July 13th, in Butler, Pennsylvania, where the former President missed death on live television by literally millimeters; innocent bystanders were not so lucky. The image of a blood-spattered Trump being hustled away from the target zone by Secret Service agents while shouting “Fight, fight, fight!” has joined the Zapruder film in the minds of a new generation of Americans of what political violence actually looks like.
But it was not the attempt itself that secured Trump’s victory: it was the response from the Biden White House to the assassination attempt – especially in its agencies frankly unbelievable responses to the events, including washing down the crime scene within hours of the attempt, and cremating the shooters remains before any proper autopsy or toxicology screen could be done on the remains. The other issue was the gleeful responses from a wide swath of the political Left in the United States, alternately cheering the attempt and whining over the assassin missing his mark (although he didn’t).
A wounded President Trump at the Republican National Convention’s final night. Photo credit by Tim Kennedy. CCA/2.0
Reasonable and rational Americans were shocked and disgusted by the extreme Left’s responses, and began moving away from the Biden camp in earnest…which quickly led to shocking replacement of Biden on the Democrat Party ticket by Kamala Harris within days of the failed attempt. Harris was confirmed as the Democrat candidate without a voting process allowing other candidates to present themselves to party members as options…the end result was an election that flipped the leadership of the US again, by a comfortable margin.
The reason for concentrating on the US election so much, is that it represents a sea-change in US politics, not simply concerning domestic policies, but in international policies. This is both a blessing and a curse for the incoming administration, as the world is tired of the United State’s 50% chance of a 180° swing in its policies every four years.
On top of all of this, is the widespread outpouring of frankly disgusting sexual angst from the Left over the alleged assassin of United Healthcare CEO Brian Thompson. Once again, we were “treated” to deranged lunatics fawning over a potential killer, and the mainstream media promotes this view, in a desperate attempt to ignore the real reasons why sympathy for a murdered healthcare CEO is nearly impossible to find.
And finally, no end-of-2024 recap for the United States would be complete without talking about the waves of drones that have been plaguing the East Coast since November, which we covered last week. Short answers:
Aliens don’t use FAA-approved navigation light patterns, and
If a nuclear weapon, nuclear waste, or chemical anything had been lost in New Jersey, drones would be in the sky 24/7, and every flavor of law enforcement and the military would be out in the streets, armed to the teeth, and being highly hostile to anyone who looked at them sideways, until they found the missing cargo. Instead, we have seen the US Government, Inc. display a level of incompetence at such a staggering level, it boggles the imagination, as – 23 years after 9/11 – “mystery drones” are operating with impunity inside US airspace, at low altitude, and no one in the government has any idea who is responsible for making a decision on what to do about it, and no one is willing to take responsibility for acting in good faith.
Gnaw on that, for a while.
Europe
Europe continues to descend into failed-state status, as continual squabbling and inefficiencies in the structure of the European Union are crushing the economy of Europe as a whole, while “Great” Britain is desperately trying to outdo its continental neighbors in becoming a drug-addled, comic-opera version of Charlie Chaplains “The Great Dictator“, and France’s Emmanuel Macron is desperate to prove that he is not a literal “Momma’s Boy” by alternately trying to either start World War 3 by sending French and NATO forces into direct combat against Russia, while trying to revive its flagging influence on a continent that is past-done with France trying to be the colonial overlord with a nice face.
Of course, this includes the war in Ukraine, where Russia’s Vladimir Putin is hanging on long enough for Trump to step in and kill support to the absolute donkeys leading the lions of the Ukrainian forces. The Ukraine has only held as long as it has, because the general character of the “spear-carriers” in the literal trenches is as good as it is – it all fails, though, when you get above the level of the battlefield that is in range of Russian artillery.
The Middle East
The big news in the Middle East as the year closes is obviously the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. After ruling the country since 1971, Bashar Assad was forced to flee into exile in Russia after “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) a revived Al Nusra Front/Al Qaeda/Islamc State zombie rolled out of its Turkish bases and overran the country in under two weeks.
The reasons for the swift collapse are not hard to understand, if you understand the region. Assad’s remaining forces were exhausted draftees no longer interested in dying for his regime; his Iranian allies – including their Hezbollah proxies – were causing him more trouble than they were worth; Putin is too wrapped up in Ukraine to offer more than token support; and his country has been effectively partitioned since 2011.
Assad saw what was coming in November, and sent his family to Russia “on a vacation”. He, himself, stayed behind long enough to try and fight is out – you never know, in warfare – but when it was obvious that it was over, he escaped, demonstrating that he was at least smarter than Muammar Gaddafi.
As a result, the region is now in chaos, and is on the verge of becoming a “Libya, 2.0” on the borders of Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq. Effectively, this has guaranteed at least another decade – or more – of warfare in the region. Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan may have though this was a good idea, but he is about to discover the truth of opening Pandora’s Box.
Africa
Africa remains a basket case, with wars, rumors of wars, and coups d’état all over the continent; there is another major war brewing, but that article is coming in January 2025. Although Russian influence was clearly on the rise in 2023 and 2024, the war in Ukraine has severely curtailed Russian operations on the continent, at least for the moment.
Yemen – which should technically be a part of the Middle East section, but is included here, because of its impacts on eastern Africa, saw the Houthis dealt a heavy blow to their confidence when neither Russia nor Iran were able to prevent Assad’s Syrian collapse, causing their co-religionist Hezbollah allies to atomize, in order to get out of the vice of Israel and a revived Islamic State…Whether or not this will cause them to back off their war against the world’s commercial shipping in the Red Sea remains to be seen.
Asia
Asia remains relatively quiet, compared to the rest of the world, with the only current major conflict of note being the “Tatmadaw” of Burma continuing to hang on by their fingernails, as the union of rebel movements sputters without effective outside support, while the military junta keeps trying to break bread with Communist China.
Of note, however, is that North Korea began trading human troops to Russia for ballistic missile technology, which is threatens a direct impact on the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.
Meanwhile, VISA – the credit card giant – has decided to embrace DEI fully, by violating the Logan Act in trying to force Japan to conform to the company’s morals. While the Japanese government has not yet reacted, the utterly tone-deaf head of VISA is very likely about to find out why that is a terrible idea.
Conclusion
The only relatively quiet spot in the world remains South America, where – despite a host of issues – large-scale violence remains almost unknown, compared to the rest of the planet.
It has been a tiring year, but – cautiously – things might be looking up.
Let’s hope no wingnut screws it up.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the shadowy world of conflict financing, a new player has emerged: cryptocurrency. As digital currencies like Bitcoin – once derided by many as useless money pits – increasingly gain mainstream acceptance, they are also becoming a tool for those operating outside the law, including insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and sanctioned states. This technological shift is reshaping the economics of modern warfare and challenging traditional methods of tracking and interdicting illicit funds. Money makes serious violent conflicts and wars possible, and cryptocurrencies are increasingly the preferred go-to for all non-state actors in conflicts…and major nations are not far behind.
The Rise of Crypto in Conflict Zones
Cryptocurrency’s key features – decentralization, anonymity, and borderless transactions – make it an attractive option for groups operating in conflict zones. Unlike traditional banking systems, which can be easily monitored and controlled by governments, cryptocurrencies offer a degree of financial autonomy that’s unprecedented in the digital age. It also holds the potential to radically expand the democratization of warfare, a subject we touched on last week.
In recent years, there have been several high-profile cases of cryptocurrency being used in conflict zones. In 2019, Hamas – the militant group controlling Gaza, responsible for the October 7, 2023 assault into Israel – turned to Bitcoin to solicit donations, bypassing international restrictions on its financing. Similarly, in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, both sides have leveraged cryptocurrencies: volunteers supporting Ukrainian forces have raised over $200 million in crypto donations, while some Russian-backed separatist groups have also turned to digital currencies to evade sanctions.
Terrorism Financing Goes Digital
The shift from traditional financing methods to cryptocurrency is particularly evident in terrorism financing. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups have increasingly turned to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to fund their operations. These groups often use social media platforms to solicit donations, providing Bitcoin addresses where supporters can send funds anonymously.
The ease of creating online fundraising campaigns with cryptocurrency has led to a new phenomenon: the crowdfunding of terror. In 2019, a website linked to Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria raised Bitcoin donations for weapons and training. The campaign, which ran on the dark web, promised donors anonymity and the ability to support jihad from anywhere in the world.
This has extended into Asia, as well, as extensive NFT networks have been employed to both raise and transfer cryptocurrencies into fungible cash. Part of this fallout comes in the form of Afghanistan coming to the fore as a clearinghouse for crypto transfers to terror groups, as the lax controls of the ruling Taliban – who returned to power after the bungled and disastrous withdrawal of United States forces from the country in 2021 by the Biden-Harris administration – effectively closing off surveillance and enforcement efforts within the pariah state.
Challenges for Law Enforcement
This new landscape of crypto-enabled conflict financing poses significant challenges for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Tracking and intercepting cryptocurrency transactions is a complex task, requiring specialized skills and technologies that many agencies are still developing. A major part of this is the reality of the “dark web“, and its associated “darknet markets“. Outside of cryptocurrency transfers, these markets allow all manner of criminal activity, including human trafficking and child pornography, as well as illicit drug trades, all of which terror groups have no issue leveraging such tools.
The catch for law enforcement and intelligence agencies in tracking terrorists and other criminals through the “dark web” lays in the fact that although the core operating principle of the ‘dark web’ – so-called “onion routing” – was developed and patented by the US Navy in 1998, the very nature of the system developed to secure US military and government communications networks means that forcing access remotely is virtually impossible. In fact, the arrest by the FBI of the founder and main operator of the notorious “Silk Road” darknet market in 2013 (which led to his life sentence in 2015) did not involve traditional methods of hacking, but involved an agent infiltrating the “Silk Road” site as an administrator, and using “social engineering” techniques to narrow down Ulbricht’s location, and using his personal security mistakes to finally locate him…”Hacking” really had nothing to do with the takedown of the “Silk Road“, because it cannot be taken down by conventional methods of “hack-attack“.
The pseudonymous nature of most blockchain transactions using the “non-fungible token” protocol that makes cryptocurrencies viable, provides a veneer of anonymity, though it’s not impenetrable. Agencies like the FBI have had some success in tracing Bitcoin transactions related to ransomware attacks and other cybercrimes. However, newer “privacy coins” like Monero offer even greater anonymity, making them increasingly popular among those seeking to avoid detection.
Legal and jurisdictional issues further complicate matters. As cryptocurrency transactions usually cross international borders, questions are raised concerning which agencies have authority to investigate and prosecute any “criminal activity” based on a computer physically located in their countries, not least because a specific instance of criminal activity in one country is not necessarily such in another country, as was demonstrated in 2012, when Hungarian scam artists attempted to run an insurance fraud scheme in the wake of the Costa Concordia disaster. The lack of consistent regulations across countries creates loopholes that bad actors can exploit.
The Humanitarian Dilemma
Interestingly, the same features that make cryptocurrencies attractive for illicit financing also make them valuable for delivering humanitarian aid to conflict zones. In areas where traditional banking systems have broken down, or where governments restrict the flow of funds, cryptocurrencies can provide a lifeline for aid organizations.
For example, during Venezuela’s economic crisis, some aid groups turned to cryptocurrency to deliver assistance, bypassing the country’s dysfunctional financial system and strict currency controls. Similarly, in Afghanistan, some NGOs have explored using cryptocurrencies to continue operations after the Taliban takeover restricted traditional financial channels.
However, this humanitarian use of cryptocurrencies presents its own risks. The same channels used to deliver aid could potentially be exploited by militant groups to divert funds. This creates a complex balancing act for aid organizations and regulators alike, not least as crypto-financing is increasingly being seen as a negative, since it is a “hidden” method of finance.
Looking to the Future
As cryptocurrencies continue to evolve, so too will their impact on conflict financing. The development of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and the increasing sophistication of decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms will likely create new opportunities and challenges in this space.
Regulators and international bodies are scrambling to keep up. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, has issued guidelines for regulating virtual assets. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen, especially given the rapid pace of technological change in the crypto world.
The impact of cryptocurrencies on global power dynamics is also worth considering. As digital currencies potentially weaken the effectiveness of economic sanctions, traditional forms of financial warfare may become less potent. This could lead to a shift in how nations project power and influence on the global stage.
Conclusion
The rise of cryptocurrency in conflict financing represents a significant shift in the landscape of modern warfare. While it offers new opportunities for bad actors to fund their activities, it also presents potential benefits in terms of delivering aid and fostering financial inclusion in unstable regions.
As we move forward, the challenge will be to develop adaptive policies and technologies that can mitigate the risks of crypto-enabled conflict financing while preserving the innovative potential of blockchain technology. This will require unprecedented cooperation between governments, financial institutions, and the tech sector.
The genie of cryptocurrency is out of the bottle, and its impact on conflict financing is here to stay. The responses to this challenge will shape the future of global security in the digital age.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Disclaimer: Although The Freedomist is dedicated to the notion of a free and open press, there are realities that we must negotiate in our coverage. This article is one of those cases. Herein, we will be discussing very controversial subjects – more so than in our regular articles – and we must acknowledge here, that we are deliberately leaving out some information for, frankly, legal concerns. While we are steadfastly in favor of our Readers being fully prepared for any instance or circumstance, we cannot help in that if we face crushing legal action. That is the reality of the world of 2024. “YOU are your own ‘first responder’.”
In the dense jungles of Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, a revolution is unfolding. But this isn’t just a political uprising – it’s a testament to a global shift in the nature of warfare itself. The conflict in Myanmar exemplifies a broader trend: the democratization of military-grade capabilities. This phenomenon is reshaping conflicts worldwide, from the streets of Syria to the arid landscapes of North Africa.
The 3D-Printed Revolution
Factions of the Myanmar resistance movements have embraced technology in ways that would have been unimaginable just a decade ago. Anti-government rebels are using 3D printers to manufacture both components for weapons and drones, as well as complete firearms. This isn’t unique to Myanmar; across the globe, additive manufacturing is putting military-grade capabilities into the hands of non-state actors.
While the first 3D printed firearm, the “Liberator” developed by Defense Distributed of Austin, TX, in 2013 – was a crude, single-shot weapon created more as a protest against government overreach than as a practical weapons, that has now changed drastically. Internet based, open-source, online collaboration in real time allowed people around the world to rapidly develop and prototype ideas and leverage existing technologies…resulting in usable weapons that can be produced in a person’s garage, which requires minimal skill to complete.
The release of the FGC-9 in 2018-2019 radically reshaped the field, allowing the creation of a combat-capable weapon. The FGC-9, designed by Jacob Duygu, a Kurdish German gun designer (known on the internet as “JStark1809“, who died under questionable circumstances following a raid on his home by German police in 2021), is technically a “pistol caliber carbine” (or, “PCC”) that is one hundred percent 3D printed, down to the barrel and the bolt. The FGC-9 is now “combat proven” in Myanmar, with the weapons mostly being built in “guerrilla factories” across the border in Thailand, and smuggled into the fighting areas.
A photo of FGC-9 firearm unassembled components, 2020. Photo credit: JStark1809/Deterrence Dispensed. CCA/4.0
The fundamental difference between the FGC-9 and other “garage guns“, such as the WW2 STEN Gun or the weapons designs of Philip Luty in the 1990’s is that a person trying to build these weapons still needs at least minimal machine tooling and metal stock. In contrast, the FGC-9 needs plastic and powder-metal media, and a 3D printer capable of both running the required programs and curing the injected or sintered material, making it drastically harder to identify and control the flow of raw materials to guerrilla factories.
Likewise, if one looks around the internet hard enough, plans for heavier support weapons – everything from mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), up to surface-to-air missiles – can be found. We will not list those particular sources here, for two reasons: first, because of legal liability, and second, because that information should be available to those needing it – such as the rebels battling a brutal dictatorship in Myanmar – because the balance of the potential good outweighs the potential for evil: “bad actors” will find a way to commit violent acts no matter what impotent, even if well-intentioned, laws prohibiting the ownership of inanimate objects are passed.
And it is not just the weapons themselves that are being printed. The manufacture of ammunition via a 3D printing application of laser sintering technology is now capable of producing not simply projectiles (i.e., bullets), but producing propellant. While still in the early stages of development, this eliminates two of the four components required to manufacture conventional ammunition, leaving only the case and ignition primer needing manufacture.
And then, we come to drones. While drone warfare is definitely not the overwhelming and decisive factor that it has been made out to be over the last decade, it does offer some significant benefits to non-governmental forces. Drones selling for less than US$100 on Amazon are capable of conducting missions ranging from aerial reconnaissance to combat target servicing, whether by dropping explosives onto a target, or by crashing into a target such as a battle tank, like a latter-day Japanese kamikaze plane. Likewise, drone parts kits are available to build much larger drones, capable of carrying much heavier payloads.
Greenville, NC Police department’s DJI Matrice drone. 2022. Photo by Greenville Police Department. CC0/1.0 Public Domain.
The implications heralded by the combat deployment and use of the FGC-9, on top of the repurposing of civilian drone copters for combat, are profound. State monopolies on military hardware are eroding, and with them, long-held assumptions about the balance of power in conflicts.
From Homebrewed Tanks & Artillery To Navies & Air Forces
The democratization of military capabilities isn’t limited to high-tech solutions. Since the 1980’s, pickup trucks converted into mobile fighting platforms—often dubbed “technicals”—have become ubiquitous in small-scale conflicts. These improvised fighting vehicles represent a low-tech but highly effective form of military innovation.
In Syria, this concept has been taken to new extremes. Civilian defense groups of all factions have constructed homemade armored vehicles, resembling mini-tanks, using salvaged materials and ingenious engineering. These vehicles, while not a match for modern main battle tanks (even when armed with ATGM’s), have proven surprisingly effective in urban combat scenarios. Of course, the use of these “technicals“, even if only otherwise standard pickup trucks fitted with machine guns in their beds, provides a low-tech group with a fast-moving force that can swiftly achieve spectacular results, given the right conditions.
But combat vehicles are not limited to armed pickup trucks. Returning to Syria, various forces in the mid-2010’s began building so-called “Hell Cannons“. These improvised artillery pieces fired homemade projectiles made from large propane canisters, capable of packing an impressive payload of explosives. While slow to load and not particularly accurate, these weapons are capable of inflicting significant damage on any area where their shells land. And, if fired as a battery, they can somewhat mitigate their slow reloading speed, as these weapons are almost always mounted on trailers, allowing them to be swiftly displaced and re-positioned.
“Hell Cannon” in Syria, 2014. CC0/1.0 Public Domain.
Similarly, there has been a maturing of “improvised navies“. Beginning, in the modern era, with the “Tamil Tigers” extensive use of smallcraft, as well as leveraging civilian freighters as mobile sea bases, many navies – notably that of Iran – have embraced the widespread use of small, high-speed boats to both attack larger civilian vessels, but also to execute the normal range of of uses for such vessels, such as inshore patrol and policing (in small, poor nations), guerrilla supply along inshore and riverine areas, and the insertion of small teams of combat troops – much like large-state special forces – into remote areas to avoid interception. This has occasionally escalated to actual, theater-level amphibious campaigns.
In the America’s, “narco submarines” have been a continual headache for police and naval forces in several countries. While these vessels (most are not really ‘submarines‘…but some are) are not known to be used for covert insertions, they certainly can be. For the moment, however, the United States seems to still be blessed with the rule from before the 9/11 Attacks, that most of the terrorist and guerrilla groups in the world refrained from attacking targets inside the United States, as most of their funding came from ex-patriot donations from their communities of immigrants and refugees living here.
Crew of the Coast Guard cutter Stratton interdicting semi-submersible vessel on July 18 2015. USCG photo bu PO2 LaNola Stone. Public Domain.
But there is also a little talked about element: “DIY Air Forces“. Increasingly, in addition to drones, well-funded insurgent groups are leveraging lightweight civilian aircraft, including autogyros. While the legions of internet flag officers around the world laughed at the Communist Chinese idea of deploying autogyros for lightweight air assault…but, after the Hamas offensive that began on October 7th of 2023, only the truly stupid still laugh, as Hamas deployed airborne raiders (against, being fair, a group of unarmed teens and 20-somethings at a rave) via paragliders, which are essentially a parachute driven by a large fan worn by the user.
Technology is advancing, and the once-fanciful shticks used as stunts in movies from the 1960’s to the 1990’s, are no longer fantasy, but hard, capable combat systems that are affordable – and acquirable – by virtually anyone.
Training, Command, and Combat Control in the Digital Age
Perhaps one of the most striking examples of democratized military capabilities comes from recent conflicts, where non-state actors have rapidly established sophisticated command and control systems using off-the-shelf technology.
In the terrorist assault on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008, the Lashkar-e-Taiba attacker’s command group repurposed a commercial office as an improvised command center, and did so at short notice. Equipped with consumer-grade computers, open-source mapping software, and encrypted messaging apps, they coordinated dispersed, complex operations, including verifying assassination targets in real time, using Google to match pictures of victims to their names and titles via facial recognition technologies, with an efficiency that rivaled traditional military and police command structures.
More and more, new desktop software and smartphone-based apps are offering armed non-governmental actors the ability to use many of the same tools as far better funded national armed forces. These tools run the gamut, from translation apps to 3D mapping and planning tools that, hwiler perhaps not exactly ‘military spec’, are certainly ‘good enough’; in some cases, regular national forces use many of these same programs and apps, because the civilian developers simply build better tools.
But there is a deeper question: How are “rag-tag guerrillas” acquiring the training necessary to conduct these operations?
In the ‘old days’, this was mostly done via trial and error or via some group of experienced advisors, either from the national military, or from a ‘friendly’ foreign power; occasionally, desperate but well-funded groups would hire foreign mercenaries to train and lead their “popular liberation forces” in the field…But today, those blocked or otherwise unable to attend formal military training courses have an alternate: finding military training manuals online.
There are literally dozens of archival repositories scattered throughout the internet, loaded with declassified or never-classified military manuals from dozens of nations. These are frequently the current editions of manuals on a given subject. It is important to note that this is no substitute for a measured, supervised course of instruction. Leaders – especially military leaders – are not created overnight. However…in an environment where military leadership is suddenly needed, those individuals who see themselves as filling that role, can now tweeze out at least a reasonable series of academic learning.
But what about actual “field training“?
In previous decades of the late-20th Century, civilians attempting to provide themselves with military training usually resorted, to be frank, to the old children’s game pf “Army”, shouting “BANG!” at each other with rifles; in this, they were not too different from pre-World War 2 training, at least in the United States. The US military, obviously, radically reformed its training regimen after that war, to make its troops far better prepared for the next go-round.
Today, however, the increasing popularity of “combat games” such as AirSoft (or the older paintball) offer a facsimile of military training – neither as good, nor as consistent as a regular force – that is still sufficient to offer much more than a “first step”.
The Global Implications of Military-Sphere Democratization
The democratization of military capabilities is redrawing the maps of global power and conflict. Small nations and non-state actors now have access to capabilities once reserved solely to major powers and their proxies. This shift is forcing a reevaluation of traditional military doctrines and international relations:
Asymmetric Warfare Evolved: The line between state and non-state military capabilities is blurring, making conflicts more unpredictable and potentially more protracted.
Proliferation Challenges: Traditional arms control measures are struggling to adapt to a world where military capabilities can be ‘printed’ or improvised.
Ethics and Legality: The ease of accessing military capabilities raises complex ethical and legal questions about the conduct of war and the definition of combatants.
Innovation Acceleration: The decentralized nature of these developments is driving rapid innovation, often outpacing traditional military R&D cycles.
Global Security Landscape: As capabilities proliferate, the potential for conflict may increase, but so too might the barriers to large-scale war.
A Look Ahead
In this new landscape, the international community faces tough questions. How does the world manage the proliferation of military capabilities in an age of digital sharing and additive manufacture? Can international laws and norms adapt quickly enough to address these changes?
The democratization of military capabilities is not just changing how wars are fought; it’s changing who can fight them effectively and why they’re fought in the first place. As technology continues to evolve, so too will the face of warfare. The challenge for the global community is to navigate this new reality, seeking ways to harness its potential for defense and deterrence while mitigating its risks. The reality, however, is that the result of both the widespread dissemination of information, matched to blockchain technology, virtual private networks (VPNs), and additive manufacture, make controlling the flow of information virtually impossible.
In the jungles of Myanmar, the deserts of Syria, and countless other corners of the globe, the future of conflict is being written not just by states and their armies, but by individuals armed with ingenuity, determination, and increasingly, the tools to challenge traditional power structures. The world must take notice and adapt, for the genie of democratized military capability cannot be put back in the bottle.
At the same time, these tools are just that – tools. Tools are inanimate objects, and because of this, they have no independent intent. Tools are used for both good and evil actions, and those with the intent determine the direction and tone of the use of those tools – no matter where those tools are directed.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Earlier this week, the United States accelerated the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and its carrier battle group to the Middle East – an operation which was already in progress to relieve the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and its own battle group of escorting warships, who have been on station in the region for months – in response to signs that the increasingly unstable regime in Iran may attempt to significantly widen its proxy war against the state of Israel which began on October 7 of last year.
The Good Ol’ Days
The origin of the aircraft carrier battle group takes its origins from the world-spanning naval warfare of World War II, primarily from its operations in the Pacific Ocean. The devastating Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7th, 1941, demonstrated the power of carrier-based aviation and the vulnerability of battleships, marking a fundamental shift in naval strategy, as the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyed the United States Navy’s main battle force in the attack. The United States Navy – stripped of its battleship fleet by the sneak attack on its Hawaiian base, and whose Asiatic Fleet was functionally neutralized in the opening stages of the war by staggeringly unbelievable levels of incompetence and mismanagement – was forced to continue the fight with only three aircraft carriers, something it had never seriously considered as a possibility.
Photograph taken from a Japanese plane during the torpedo attack on ships moored on both sides of Ford Island shortly after the beginning of the Pearl Harbor attack. IJN photo, via the US Navy. Public Domain.
As the war raged on, the U.S. Navy quickly adapted, forming diverse, multi-ship task forces centered on its massive aircraft carriers. The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in 1942 proved the effectiveness of this approach, with American carriers dealing a decisive blow to the Japanese fleet, while remaining largely protected by much smaller destroyers and destroyer-escorts, which both shot down attacking Japanese aircraft, and sometimes absorbed bombs and torpedoes meant for the carriers. As the war progressed, these carrier task forces became increasingly sophisticated, with hard-learned doctrine and techniques using destroyers primarily for anti-submarine warfare and cruisers studded with heavy automatic cannons for air defense, even at close range.
Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns on a Mk 12 quadruple mount firing on board USS Hornet (CV-12), circa February 1945, probably during gunnery practice. Photo credit: Lt. Cmdr. Charles Kerlee, USN. Public Domain.
Into the Cold
In the post-war era, the advent of jet aircraft and guided missiles led to further refinements to both aircraft carriers themselves, but also in their organization and tactics. The introduction of the angled flight deck and steam catapults (these are now being replaced with electromagnetic catapults on the new Gerald R. Ford-class carriers) in the 1950s enhanced carrier operations, while the development of guided missile destroyers and cruisers improved the group’s air defense capabilities, at least in theory. Modern navies, however, would get a severe reality check in 1982, as the very modern British Royal Navy was badly hammered by the second-tier air force of Argentina in the savage (especially allowing for its relatively small size) Battle of San Carlos, causing a sobering reassessment by all navies of their own capabilities and tactics. (On a historical side note, the Falklands War also saw the destruction of the ARA General Belgrano, the former USS Phoenix (CL-46), a Brooklyn-class cruiser from World War 2, which had survived the Pearl Harbor attack, to be sunk by a British attack submarine some forty years later.)
A Standard Missile-3 is launched from the Japanese Aegis Destroyer JS Kongo (DDG 173), 2007. US Navy photo. Public Domain.
The Cold War saw the carrier battle group evolve into one of – if not the primary – key instruments of power projection. The nuclear-powered USS Enterprise (CVN-65), commissioned in 1961, heralded a new era of endurance for carrier operations. However, this would be tempered with the realization that while the range of the carrier itself was now measured in decades, instead of miles, it was still restricted by the ranges of its gas-turbine engined escort vessels, and the constant need for resupply of everything from food to bombs, spare parts and fuel for its aircraft wing. The development of the Aegis combat system in the 1980s (and its associated ballistic missile defense component) would significantly enhance the group’s air defense capabilities, while continuous development of anti-submarine and anti-mine technologies further protected the carrier and its escorts. These capabilities did not come without cost, however: hard lessons were learned from the attacks on the USS Stark, the USS Samuel B. Roberts, and the bombing of the USS Cole. These lessons continue to be learned, but the takeaway is that naval warfare – like all warfare – is not a video game, despite breathlessly giddy news stories to the contrary.
In the realm of anti-submarine warfare, the US Navy pioneered the modern use of armed combat drones in warfare, when it deployed the QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter), built by Gyrodyne, in 1959.
In the Persian Gulf, a port quarter view of the guided missile frigate USS STARK (FFG-31) listing to port after being hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles, 18 May 1987. Public Domain.
The Dawn of the Millennium and the GWOT
The post-Cold War period has seen carrier battle groups involved in numerous conflicts, from the 1990-91 Gulf War to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The groups have also played crucial roles in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Today’s carrier battle groups, while retaining their core structure developed over some fifty years, continue to evolve to meet new challenges. The integration of stealth aircraft, more advanced unmanned systems, and advanced, internet-based networking and cyberwar capabilities ensures that the carrier battle group will remain a fundamental cornerstone of naval power projection for the rest of the 21st Century.
Laying at the heart of the United States Navy’s global power projection capabilities, the carrier battle group (CVBG), also known as a carrier strike group (CSG) is a formidable assembly of warships and aircraft, centered around a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, representing one of the most potent concentrations of military might ever to sail the world’s oceans. Usually comprising an aircraft carrier, a single guided missile cruiser for air defense, at least two LAMPS-capable warships (focusing on anti-submarine and surface warfare), and one or two anti-submarine destroyers or frigates, such battle groups frequently deploy more combat power than that possessed by most individual nations in the world.
The cornerstone of any carrier battle group is the aircraft carrier itself. As of 2024, the US Navy operates eleven nuclear-powered carriers, primarily of the Nimitz class, with the newer Gerald R. Ford class gradually being introduced into service. These floating airfields, crewed by between 4,000 and 5,000 sailors, displace approximately 100,000 tons and can carry an air wing of 60-75 aircraft.
The air wing of a 21st Century US aircraft carrier typically consists of:
EA-18G Growlers: Electronic warfare aircraft for jamming enemy radar and communications.
E-2D Hawkeyes: Airborne early warning and control aircraft.
MH-60R/S Seahawk helicopters: For anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and utility missions.
F-35C Lightning II: The Navy’s newest stealth multirole fighter, gradually being integrated into carrier air wings.
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft conduct a test flight near St. Augustine, FL, 2009. US Navy photo. Public Domain.
Surrounding the carrier are several Aegis-equipped guided missile cruisers and destroyers. These ships form a protective screen around the carrier and provide a wide range of capabilities:
Ticonderoga class cruisers: Usually one or two per battle group, these ships specialize in air defense but are also capable of land attack and anti-ship warfare.
Arleigh Burke class destroyers: Typically three to four per group, these versatile warships can perform anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare missions.
Both classes of ships are equipped with the Aegis combat system, which integrates powerful radars with various close-in and long-range weapon systems, allowing for sophisticated air and missile defense capabilities.
Although not always visible, one or two nuclear-powered attack submarines often operate in conjunction with a carrier battle group. These could be Los Angeles-, Virginia-, or Seawolf-class nuclear-powered submarines. Their primary roles include:
Gathering intelligence
Providing an unseen protective screen against enemy submarines
Hospital ships: While not typically part of the regular battle group, these can be attached for humanitarian missions or in anticipation of major combat operations.
Royal Australian Navy ship HMAS Sirius (OR-266) and amphibious transport dock USS Juneau (LPD-10) conducts a replenishment at sea (RAS), 2007. US Navy photo. Public Domain.
An entire battle group, such as that outlined above, is under the command of a Rear Admiral (lower half), who typically serves as the Commander, Carrier Strike Group (CCSG). The CCSG and their staff coordinate the activities of all ships and aircraft in the group, ensuring they work together as a cohesive fighting unit.
A fully equipped US carrier battle group is ideally positioned to:
Project power far from American shores, with the ability to strike targets hundreds of miles inland.
Establish air superiority over a wide area.
Conduct sustained air operations, launching over 100 sorties per day.
Provide a visible deterrent to potential adversaries.
Respond rapidly to crises anywhere in the world.
Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.
The versatility of the carrier battle group allows it to transition quickly from peacetime presence to crisis response to full-scale war fighting. This is no more true than in its mission of supporting assault landings by combat units (MAGTF’s) of the United States Marine Corps, which remains a part of the Department of the Navy. The US Navy’s ten Amphibious Ready Groups are able to quickly insert up to 6,000 US Marines quickly, at multiple points along a hostile shoreline, ranging well inland, if necessary…as long as the naval squadron can get to the area quickly enough – hence, the acceleration of the USS Abraham Lincoln and her CVBG to the Levant.
As of 2024, the US Navy continues to adapt its carrier battle groups to meet evolving threats:
Anti-ship ballistic missiles: The development of these weapons, particularly by China, has led to increased emphasis on integrated air and missile defense capabilities.
Unmanned systems: The Navy continues to explore the integration of unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles to extend the reach and capabilities of the battle group.
Cyber warfare: Increased focus on protecting the battle group’s networks and exploiting adversary vulnerabilities in the digital domain.
Distributed lethality: Spreading offensive capabilities across more platforms in the battle group to complicate enemy targeting.
Conclusion
The Navy is continuously evolving the concept of the carrier battle group. Some areas of focus include:
The integration of directed energy weapons for close-in defense.
Development of long-range anti-ship missiles to counter peer competitors.
Exploration of smaller, more numerous carriers to distribute capabilities.
Enhanced networking capabilities to better integrate with joint and allied forces.
The US carrier battle group remains a cornerstone of American military power projection, and will continue to do so well into the 21st Century, and likely beyond. Its ability to bring a flexible, sustained, and potent military presence to any region of the world makes it a unique and invaluable strategic asset. As geopolitical tensions and technological advancements continue to shape the global security landscape, and as unrest continues to disrupt the trade vital to the modern world, the carrier battle group will continue to evolve, maintaining its role as a key instrument of US national security policy, as well as protecting the civilized world at large.
The period from 2020 onward has seen a significant escalation in tensions between Israel and its regional adversaries, primarily Iran and its proxy forces, Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the more distant Houthi’s of Yemen. This complex web of conflicts and alliances has continued to shape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, and has significantly escalated tensions, to the point of a realistic chance for a much-expanded war.
The long-standing animosity between Israel and Islamic revolutionary Iran began to intensify in the early 2020’s. Iran’s nuclear program remained a central point of contention, with Israel consistently opposing any deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear development; this attempt at preventing nuclear proliferation, however integral to Israel’s security as it may be, is also highly unrealistic; the assassination of top Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, widely attributed to Israel, marked a significant escalation, as this differed from the Israeli Mossad’s previous assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh in Dubai, as the killing of Fakhrizadeh happened within Iran itself.
In this context, Israel is now accused of the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political head, who was killed in his hotel room on July 31st, in an apparent drone attack. This, too, occurred in Iran, but in the capital of Tehran itself. While Israel is unarguably at war, following the Hamas offensive of Oct. 7, 2023, an assassination such as this – known as a “decapitation strike” in military parlance – happening in a technically-neutral country (even given the events of April of 2024), is doing Israel no favors internationally.
The Biden administration has proven itself ineffectual with its diplomatic efforts, demonstrating both weakness and incoherence, to the point of encouraging the ambition of the Iranian ruling mullahs.
The election of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi (who was killed on May 19th, 2024 in a helicopter crash while returning from neighboring Azerbaijian) as Iran’s president in 2021 further complicated diplomatic efforts. Raisi’s administration took a more confrontational stance towards both Israel and the West, leading to increased concerns about regional stability.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah – the Iran-backed militant group that has controlled Lebanon’s southeastern Bekaa Valley since the mid-1980’s, remained a significant threat to Israel’s northern border. In 2020 and 2021, there were several minor skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border, though both sides managed to avoid a full-scale conflict.
Israel continued to conduct airstrikes in Syria, targeting what it claimed were Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. These operations aimed to prevent the group from obtaining advanced missile systems that could threaten Israeli cities.
In 2022, tensions further escalated when Israel and Lebanon engaged in U.S.-mediated negotiations over their maritime border, which involved disputed gas fields. Hezbollah threatened to attack Israeli gas installations if an agreement wasn’t reached, leading to a tense standoff that was eventually resolved through diplomacy. Now, following a rocket attack on the Israeli Druze community of Majdal Shams on 27 July that killed a number of Druze children, Israel is at the point of invading southern Lebanon to try and attrit Hezbollah’s ability to strike into Israel, much as it attempted in 2006. In this, the ineffectual Lebanese government can offer no resistance against an invasion, or even an “incursion”, and calling on Muslim countries for aid could easily trigger a new civil war in the unstable and bankrupt nation.
In the south, the situation in Gaza remained volatile, with periodic flare-ups of violence between Israel and Hamas, which has retained power in Gaza since 2006, when Hamas won Gaza’s first election – then made sure that no other elections occurred to challenge its grip on power. In May 2021, a significant escalation occurred when Hamas and other militant groups in Gaza fired thousands of rockets at Israel. Israel responded with extensive airstrikes on Gaza, resulting in a 11-day conflict that caused substantial casualties and damage. The aftermath of this short conflict saw increased international pressure for a long-term solution to the Gaza situation. However, progress remained elusive, with Hamas maintaining its control over Gaza and continuing to clash with Israeli forces, which would escalate dramatically on October 7th of 2023.
In 2022 and 2023, there were several smaller-scale exchanges of fire between Gaza militants and Israel. These incidents, while not escalating to the level of the 2021 conflict, served to maintain a state of tension and uncertainty in the region.
The ongoing civil war in Syria that began in 2011, and the unstable situation in Lebanon have provided fertile ground for proxy conflicts involving Israel, Iran, and their respective allies. Israel continued its policy of preventing Iranian entrenchment in Syria through targeted airstrikes, while Iran sought to maintain and expand its influence in the region.
The Abraham Accords, negotiated by US President Donald Trump and signed in 2020, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, altered the regional dynamics. This realignment put additional pressure on Iran and its allies, as Israel’s diplomatic and strategic position in the Middle East was greatly strengthened.
The conflict between these actors is increasingly playing out in the cyber domain. Both Israel and Iran have engaged in sophisticated cyber attacks against each other’s infrastructure, including attempts to disrupt nuclear facilities, water supplies, and electrical grids. For its own part, rumors persist that Israel was at least partly behind the deployment of the highly destructive STUXNET virus in 2010.
Covert operations, including assassinations and sabotage, have become more frequent – as with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh noted above – as the conflict has evolved. These actions, carried out with only the thinnest veneer of “plausible deniability“, have served to maintain tension without triggering open warfare; that situation, however, may be coming to an end.
The United States remains heavily involved in the region – building on its rocky, 20 years “War on Terror” – by supporting Israel while also attempting to prevent a widening conflict. The Biden administration’s efforts to re-engage with Iran on the nuclear issue met with – being charitable – mixed success, complicated by regional tensions and domestic politics in both the U.S. and Iran, as well as its own failings in the disastrous end to United States adventurism in Afghanistan. The Biden-Harris administration has consistently demonstrated that it cannot make any sort of definitive decision, one way or another, on the diplomatic front.
Russia and China also play significant roles in the Levantine conflict, with Russia maintaining its presence in Syria and with China increasing its economic and diplomatic engagement with Iran. In both cases, Moscow and Beijing figuratively smell blood in the water, as they sense the weakness in NATO [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO] as a whole, but also in the United States in particular, as the Biden-Harris team continues to flounder internationally.
The ongoing conflicts and tensions have had severe humanitarian consequences, particularly in Gaza and parts of Lebanon. International organizations repeatedly called for increased access to provide aid and for all parties to respect international humanitarian law. The ongoing war in Gaza following the October 7 massacre, as well as the Houthi strikes against Red Sea shipping, has only made the situation far worse, with Israel now resolved to end the Gaza question once and for all, leading to worsening violence and rhetoric directed against them in the West, with criticism coming from all sides, driving the Israeli mindset further into an “Us Alone Against The World” outlook.
As of early 2024, the situation remained tense and unpredictable. While full-scale war has been avoided so far, the risk of escalation into a much wider war – a war with the potential to draw in larger powers is increasingly possible. The interplay between Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas continues to be a major driving factor in regional instability, with implications extending far beyond the Middle East. The international community is attempting to remain engaged, seeking ways to reduce tensions and prevent a larger conflict, but face significant challenges due to systemic internal problems facing Western nations, crushing demographic issues with Communist China, and Russia’s seemingly interminable war in Ukraine.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Beirut, Lebanon — Rena Bitter, assistant secretary for consular affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, told Americans in Lebanon to “create a crisis plan of action and leave before the crisis begins” in a video on YouTube and X on Monday, July 29, out of fear of a possible Israeli incursion into the troubled Middle Eastern country, as the ongoing war in Gaza seems to be widening, spilling further outside the fighting areas..
On Saturday, July 29, the Iranian-backed terror group Hezbollah staged a rocket attack on the Druze village of Majdal Shams, located in the disputed Golan Heights region, just south of the Lebanese border, and next to the Syrian border, killing some 12 children on a soccer field, and wounding several more. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed “severe retaliation” in response to the attack.
Lebanon’s government, long unstable and virtually bankrupt, has no effective means of controlling Hezbollah’s pseudo-state, which has dominated the southeastern Bekaa Valley region of the country since 1982. The government in Beirut has pleaded for calm, but few people on any side are listening to them.
As of Tuesday, July 30, the airlines Lufthansa, Swiss International Air Lines, Air France, and Turkish Airlines have suspended flights to Beirut, citing the escalating danger of conflict.
This is developing story, and The Freedomist will maintain a watch on this as it develops.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
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