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In previous articles, we have touched on the ideas for building “DIY” ground- and air-combat forces. Today, we will take a look at the naval aspect of this idea.

Water-based travel is not new. In fact, for the majority of human history, travel further than 100 miles in any direction was usually faster, cheaper and safer than overland travel, even if wide detours were necessary. Without getting into the physics of fluid dynamics, movement is a lot easier when nature is helping you along, especially when friction resistance is determined more by shape than by weight. It was not until the advent of railroads in the early 19^th Century that land travel became faster and comparatively safer than travel by water.

However, when looking at the military dimensions of water travel, while there were early examples of purpose-built warships, such as the Greek and Roman “triremes”, the vast majority of ships were perfectly suitable for both military and commercial use. Mostly, this consisted for transporting troops, animals, equipment and other supplies. Because of the ships’ designs of these eras, most vessels were also capable of going fairly far upriver; this was the main tactic of Viking raiders, from the 8^th-11^th Centuries, whose “Karvis”, “Snekkjas” and “Drakkars” drew as little as 30in/762mm in draft.

As previously noted, however, after about 1860, a dramatic divergence began to open between purely military and purely civilian merchant vessels. Without restating those points here, by the end of World War 2, it seemed that the divide was complete and unbridgeable: “Warships” fought in wars, and civilian vessels supported the warships, while remaining mostly unarmed.

But, there lurked an exception: the PT Boat.

Developed just as WW2 was starting, the “Patrol Torpedo Boat” quickly became famous as the heavily armed war vessel of WW2, on a weapon-to-tonnage basis. Not much larger than most commercial yachts, the PT’s were fully capable of sinking full-size warships – as long as their torpedoes worked. If there weren’t enough enemy warships around to sink, the PT’s could easily remove their torpedoes, and bolt on heavier cannons to destroy lightly armored barges and lighters, as well as extra machine guns, turning them into floating anti-aircraft batteries.

While the US Navy seemed to have forgotten the lessons of PT Boat warfare after the end of the war, that turned out to not be the case. While light-armed craft more or less vanished from the Navy’s inventory after WW2, that was due to the savage budget cuts and vicious organizational fights of the post-war years, more than because the Navy didn’t want the boats. Indeed, the Navy had to burn significant political clout just to help prevent the Marine Corps from being disbanded by an Army and Air Force that were battling for scarce funding.

As soon as the Vietnam War began to heat up, it was discovered that North Vietnam was supplying the Viet Cong and its own troops in the South by smuggling arms and supplies down the coast in civilian sampans. The solution to this were the “Swift Boats” – small, high-speed, aluminum-hulled boats, heavily armed with machine guns. With very shallow drafts, these fast craft were able to chase down almost any watercraft, and usually outgunned whatever they could catch. As well, they could land small parties of US and Vietnamese Marines or SEALs deep in enemy territory, doing great damage to areas the enemy had thought to be relatively safe.

After the war in Vietnam ended, the US Navy once again had to struggle for funding, and small combat craft went onto the back burner. But not completely. As funding improved in the 1980’s small combat craft came back to prominence, leading to the expansion of the Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC) career field in the Navy, and the development of the SOC-R. NATO partners took note, at least to some extent.

And all seemed rosy.

But – what about smaller groups? What about “guerrillas at sea”?

Like naval warfare and transport in general, small craft-based warfare is not new. In the modern era, say from 1800 to today, military raids against pirates operating from swampland bases with open canoes and boats was far more common than fighting large ships, à la Hollywood pirate films. Indeed, in World War 1, the “Battle for Lake Tanganyika” was fought and decided by a handful of small boats that barely qualified as life rafts; the largest vessel, the SMS Graf von Goetzen, was barely 235ft long; that’s short for a warship.

Likewise, Filipino guerrillas fighting the Japanese in their archipelago after Japan’s conquest of the island group in early-1942 made good use of small-boat smuggling tactics to make amphibious raids throughout the islands for three years, until the war ended. The Philippine government continued this successful strategy in the Huk Rebellion that followed the war, and both government and anti-government forces continue to use boats for the same purposes to this day.

But the real advent of modern guerrilla small craft warfare begins (as do many things in this realm) with the LTTE – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Starting from essentially scratch in 1976, the LTTE quickly showed – much as the Islamic State would do, decades later – that all that was required for an insurgency to grow exponentially, was intelligent, cunning and quick-witted leadership…Even if they end up using straight-out terror tactics.

In its 25-year history, the LTTE’s “Sea Tigers”, with no more than 3,000 personnel at any given time, not only fought the Sri Lankan Navy to a standstill, sinking nearly 30 vessels, while also conducting amphibious raids, it conducted widespread “strategic support operations”, until the Sri Lankan military got serious, got its collective act together, and ground the LTTE down by mid-2009.

But – what about other groups?

While the LTTE managed to create a ferociously effective “commando navy,” the “Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps”, has taken the direction of using masses of small “Boghammer”-type speedboats. Based on a design from the Swedish company Boghammar Marin AB developed in the 1980’s, the modern “Boghammer” has taken on the moniker to describe any improvised naval fighting vessel.

As used by the IRGC-N, the Boghammer is armed with a variety of weapons, including RPG-7 type rocket launchers, as many as three 12.7mm heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and 107mm multiple rocket launchers based on the Type 63 MRL. And these craft do pose a threat to major-nation warships, when used in swarms. After nearly ten years of study, it remains a problem that major-state navies – including those of the United States and Great Britain – don’t talk about in public.

That’s all well and good…but, what about “modern guerrillas”? The above examples, including the LTTE, were all either formally organized navies, or were at least funded on a regular basis. What about a small guerrilla force? What can they do on the water?

Quite a bit, actually.

While large, ocean going vessels are going to be mostly out of a small group’s reach, at least initially, acquiring civilian pleasure craft (through theft or “under the table” deals) that can be modified to carry weapons is not at all difficult. While craft as large as Boghammers are uncommon, they are not so unusual that they would be noticed.

There is, however, another class of vessel normally associated with major states that most people would not associated with guerrilla warfare: long-range submersibles – i.e., submarines…Specifically, drug-running “narco-subs”.

While “combat submersibles” in the modern era begin with David Bushnell’s Turtle in 1775-1776, submarines have only played a pivotal role in naval warfare since WW1, and the first “Battle of the Atlantic”. Submarines have always been complicated and dangerous craft – there is always a solid chance that something will go catastrophically wrong while submerged. Survival rates when things like that happen at sea are never good.

Submarines are also expensive, in the extreme. As a result, few people imagine a threadbare guerrilla army being able to operate something as technically complex and ridiculously expensive as a submarine. Sure, there are “vanity” submarines out there, used to excursions by cash-rich vacationers, but surely no one is actually building submarines intended for combat.

Established navies, however, beg to differ – which is why they are spending significant amounts of money designing advanced harbor-protection systems…specifically to counter small combat submarines.

But, for our purposes, narco-subs are not that. Narco-subs are generally thought of as “semi-submersible”, in that they cannot “deep dive,” like a conventional submarine. Instead, they are designed to run at or just below the surface. And these craft are not small – narco-subs with cargo capacities of up to 17,000lbs have been captured. That’s a significant capacity for a “guerrilla shipyard”.

And, as hard as the militaries of North and South America try, they cannot catch them all; at best, one in ten are estimated to be intercepted. Worse, the drug subs are being much more sophisticated, diving deeper, becoming less detectable, carrying more, and extending their range, with some now being able to cross the Atlantic, to bring drugs into the waters of Spain and Portugal.

This is a serious concern, and not from the narcotics angle. While infiltrating “operators” into a nation (even the United States) is relatively easy, importing weapons and explosives is not. And 10-17,000lbs of weapons, ammunition and explosives at a time provides significant capacity for an attacker.

Indeed, since 2000, abandoned narco-subs – true deep-diving models – have been discovered in South America that have cargo capacities in the range of 20,000lbs or more, and with ranges of c.3,700km, more than enough to reach New Orleans from most of the South American Caribbean coast.

Making matters much worse, these craft are very difficult to detect at sea, because their hulls are made mostly of fiberglass and Kevlar; are painted sea-blue; and vent their engine exhaust along the bottom of their hulls before releasing it to the atmosphere, cooling it to the point of being indistinguishable from the surrounding water. Coupled to them running just below – or well under – the surface, this makes them virtually invisible to radar and sonar. In fact, the vast majority of the narco-subs captured were spotted by aircraft, running on the surface.

So – why is this important? It’s “just” drugs, right?

Well, “cargo” covers a very broad scope. Narco-subs don’t have to carry drugs, after all. Coupled to this, is the fact the fact that the South American and Mexican cartels operate these subs in alliance with guerrilla groups such as the FARC, among others. It requires no great leap of imagination to picture a scenario of a group like Revolutionary Iran or the I.S. infiltrating two- to four-hundred trigger-pullers into the US, hidden among the masses of illegal immigrants being allowed into the country by a criminally – if not deliberately – incompetent political establishment so arrogant, that they believe that the Rules of War do not apply to them.

Why is the author so vehement about this?

In 1974, R&D Associates – a think tank in Santa Monica, California – working under contract for the Department of Defense, produced a document titled A Soviet Paramilitary Attack on U.S. Nuclear Forces – A Concept (PDF link). The paper sketched out a threat concept to US strategic nuclear forces, wherein Soviet Spetznatz special forces could potentially infiltrate sabotage teams into the US to attack ICBM, bomber and nuclear submarine bases, simply by walking in over the borders from Mexico and/or Canada. It goes into detail of then-current estimated numbers of illegal aliens crossing the US border, who were not intercepted by the Border Patrol, and pointed out that enough four- to six-man teams could be infiltrated and housed by ‘illegal’ KGB agents just long enough to sabotage US nuclear forces in preparation for a Soviet first strike.

Very James Bond, yes?

This paper remained classified until 1995.

A threat – a clear and present one – exists against the United States, and its citizens. While some would argue that this author is “letting the cat out of the bag” by speculating on this in public, none of the information in this article is classified; there is no “whistle-blower” information here. If this author can find it, anyone can. You, the Reader, simply aren’t being told any of this. I will let you speculate as to why that is the case. The author, here alone, is unable to take corrective measures against this threat – it is the job of the Reader to do so.

All I can do, is warn you.