Michael Cessna is a former Active Duty United States Marine, a long-time personal protection specialist, security and defense analyst, military subjects instructor, general information researcher and amateur historian. He has been contributing security and defense writing since 2015.
“Unconventional thinking” is one People are fond of creating pithy shortcuts and analogies. When it comes to “Things Military,” here is one of mine:
Military forces are like a conventional automobile – they need four tires, sitting on the ground in unison, or the car doesn’t go very far. Think of it as a Venn diagram, if the car analogy doesn’t work. Moving on…The four “tires” of the military are:
Catania, Sicily (Jan 15, 2003) – U.S. Marines stand prepare Meal’s Ready to Eat (MRE) for shipment. U.S. Navy photo.
1. Food– No matter how well-equipped or trained your troops may be, if they have no food, they will be unable to fight within seven days. Period. Troops need an absolute minimum of 2,800 calories (and preferably 3,500-3,600) – weighted towards carbohydrates – per day, in order to function effectively in combat. Without food, troops can function for three to five days, maximum. After that, their effectiveness rapidly falls off, until they will not be able to walk; that phase takes between eight and eleven days, and they will be dizzy and on the verge of incoherent after about six or seven days. There are examples of people “surviving” or “lasting” for two or more weeks without food — but those people were confined to bed, minimizing all physical exertion, and required constant care. In the case of hunger-strikers, after two weeks, they will be too weak to lift a glass of water to their lips. In situations where this has happened in the past, the medical remediation starts with small amounts of rice milk, with recovering taking weeks, at the very least.
Food. Because it is existential, few people give it any thought. You, on the other hand, can never let food drift too far from a military unit’s calculations.
Oil Field, Saratoga, Texas, 1908.
2. POL/Fodder (POL/F) – Modern armed forces, be they military, paramilitary or police, rely on powered systems at some level. Whether for vehicles, generators, stoves or fodder for animals (mules, yaks and camels are still used for military pack transport around the world), POL/F supplies are absolutely critical to operations. Neglect your POL/F, and your troops will be reduced to marching, carrying only what extra supplies they can carry on pack frames, or that they can drag behind them on hand carts…and then, their food requirements will skyrocket (see #1, above), requiring them to carry less operational weapons and supplies (i.e., mortars, mortar bombs, rockets and their launchers, artillery munitions, etc) in favor of the extra food needed – assuming, of course, that the operational weapons can even be carried or dragged by the troops.
Whether you intend – or are forced – to use bicycles, POL/F is a factor that you can never neglect, if you expect to function effectively in an operational environment.
Rows and rows of shells are stored upright in a New Zealand ammunition dump during World War I near Acheux, France.
3. Munitions– Another existential within the modern military sphere – and thus, frequently ignored – “munitions” are everything that physically strikes the enemy: ammunition of all kinds, knives, grenades, etc. If you are not careful in planning or accounting for the amount of ammunition you both have and need, your troops will very quickly burn through everything they have, leaving them – quite literally – with nothing but knives, sharp sticks, rocks and harsh language…that quip is only funny when no one is shooting at you.
Bridge radios of Irish offshore patrol ship LÉ Róisín (P51) photographed in Helsinki.
4. Communications– Without a radio communications system, you are limited to runners, bugles and whistles (all of which are still in use, in places) and the limit of the range of your voice. That is fine, at the lowest tactical levels, but those have long been rendered impractical for anything above platoon level, as the speed and scope of military operations has increased. There is also the issue of communications security, including codes and ciphers. It is an in-depth issue, far too complex to fully address here, but it is nonetheless something the prospective user needs to get a handle on early.
The Pennsylvania National Guard’s First Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry during a parade to mark the U.S. Army’s 237th anniversary in 2012. US Army photo.
5. Motivation– Finally, Motivation is the engine of the “military automobile.” Nothing outlined above, nothing in this document, and nothing in any conventional manual you will ever find, means anything if your troops are not motivated to strive, struggle and sacrifice for the Cause, whatever that cause might be. None of it matters, if your troops are not willing to use the tools at hand effectively, if at all. They will sit down when they think you can’t see them; they will desert if they think that they can get away with it; and they will run the first time someone shoots at them in earnest.
These are the five things you can never shortcut. The minute you think you can get away with short-sheeting these points, you’re losing.
One of the oft overlooked aspects of the military in general are the small items that form part of a soldier’s kit. While the vast majority of these items are very mundane, indeed, occasionally an item appears which offers a sea-change in its sphere.
While mass produced, purpose-designed combat first aid dressings date back to the early 1920’s with the advent of the “Carlisle Dressing“, developed at the US Army’s Carlisle Barracks, in the aftermath of World War One, surprisingly little further development occurred until PerSys Medical’s design came along. The Carlisle Bandage was a simple affair, simply a sterile dressing on one side, backed by a gauze, later cotton, cloth backing used to secure it in place. (Indeed, Bar-Natan attributes his drive to invent the bandage with being issued Carlisle bandages manufactured in 1938, during his time as an IDF medic.)
While the Carlisle and its successors were useful, and certainly saved lives on the battlefield, they were far from perfect solutions. The dressings frequently came loose, and the design allowed for a great deal of contamination to enter the wound area, even if tightly secured in place. The only way to effectively protect the wound from post-trauma infection was to apply an ace-type elastic wrap after applying the battle wound dressing. Obviously, this was rarely done, as medics tended to use the space and weight of the ace wrap to carry extra bandages, instead.
Variants of the Carlisle were used all the way into the 1990’s, two being included in the first-aid kit of the day, until the deployment of the modern IFAK, which includes the “Emergency Dressing”, as it is termed by the US Military.
Bar-Natan’s design abandoned the simplicity of the Carlisle, in favor of a significantly improved version which, although somewhat more complex to use, provides far better care for an injury victim. The Emergency Bandage comes already attached to an ace-type wrap, which is integral to the dressing’s function. After removal, the sterile side of the dressing is applied as direct pressure to the wound area, and the elastic wrap is wound one turn around the extremity (or the torso or head), until it meets the second essential part of the design.
U.S. Military First Aid Kit. US Department of Defense photo.
The Emergency Bandage’s patented “pressure bar” is a stirrup-shaped device mounted directly with the elastic wrap. Slipping the wrap through the stirrup of the pressure bar, then reversing the direction of the wrap, causes the pressure bar to exert a mild tourniquet-type force against the wound. This results in the creation of an additional barrier to external media contaminating the injury. The wrap is then secured in place by the bandage’s closure bar, which hooks into the bandage in much the same way as a ballpoint pen clipping to a shirt pocket.
US Military-issue IFAK, 2012. US Army photo.
Additionally, the Emergency Bandage can in many instances be self-applied one-handed, something extremely difficult, if not impossible, with the Carlisle-model dressing family.
Mated to QuikClot-impregnated gauze, this provides a very powerful field dressing that is practical, easy to use and easy to train on. Indeed, the Emergency Bandage has been credited with saving many of the victims of the notorious 2011 shooting in Tucson, AZ, in which Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords was critically wounded.
The Emergency Bandage – the “Israeli Bandage” to many US troops – has saved, and continues to save, lives in combat theaters and disaster emergencies, around the world.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
When the United States Marine Corps’ (USMC) Commandant, General David H. Berger, announced his radical visionin 2019 of “reinventing” the Marine Corps to perform duties on a basis more in line with the guidance from then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, his program proved to be highly controversial, not least, in light of recent events in Ukraine and Russia. This vision radically restructures the Marine Corps, removing main battle tanks entirely, and significantly reducing both “bayonet strength” in infantry battalions, as well as heavily cutting back on conventional artillery and tactical air transport, all in an attempt to fight the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
It is bewildering – to say the least – as to how these ideas could work verses a major-war opponent may be an open question. Primarily, the controversy revolves around the significantly reduced capacity in fire support.
However, times change, and technology changes apace.
Okinawa, April – June 1945: An American rocket ship fires a salvo of rockets during the bombardment of Okinawa. US Navy photo.
Case in point: As technology and high-tech industry has expanded throughout the world, more and more nations are developing energetic and dynamic design firms. Recently unveiled by Indonesian shipbuilder PT Ludin, the Atasena-class X-18 ATC (Armored Troop Carrier) – originally called, for obvious reasons, the “Tank Boat” – may look like something out of a “GI Joe” movie, but it is definitely an innovative development of preexisting concepts.
Name of Indonesia islands greater than 1000 km2 in area.
Comprised of over 18,000 separate islands, and being on the front lines of both insurgency, piracy and general world unrest, Indonesia has a definite need for an inshore fire support vessel with a heavy punch. In this, the X-18 “Tank Boat” certainly delivers.
Designed by PT Ludin, the X-18 ATC is to be built by the veteran small craft yards of North Sea Boats. The current production unit that has undergoing testing by the Indonesian Army is armed with the Cockerill C1030 MK44S 30mm cannon unmanned turret. A mock-up vessel, shown at international arms shows when the details of the X-18 were released mounted a mock-up of a planned Cockerill 105mm cannon with an automatic loading system in a small, 2-person turret, with a 360° traverse and a pair of .50cal/12.7x99mm heavy machine guns as secondary weapons, with other secondary weapons possible. In either configuration, the X-18 can also carry up to 60 troops, up to 5 tons of cargo, or a variety of small, rigid-hulled inflatables. This would allow the deployment of conventional boarding or landing parties, as well as special operations teams — who could potentially have 105mm artillery support within a 10km arc from the craft. Another planned version would mount some form of dedicated anti-ship, and possibly anti-submarine, missiles.
CONCLUSION
With a reported draft of only 0.8 meters and a reported 600nm range (the distance from Washington, D.C. to Miami, FL) at 9 knots (but able to cruise at 40 knots, with a 50 knot maximum speed), the twin-hulled catamaran design would certainly have long legs. The design is impressive enough – in theory – to have reportedly garnered an early order from the United Arab Emirates, with India, Greece and the Philippines expressing serious interest.
A U.S. riverboat (Zippo monitor) deploying napalm during the Vietnam War. US Navy photo.
While its armor (NATO Stanag 4569) may be rather unimpressive, proof only against small arms and shell fragments at a distance, in the inshore environment, the ability to swiftly bring large numbers of troops, backed up by significant firepower, to bear on an enemy’s rear areas is a major advancement in firepower.
This is something that the USMC, struggling with shrinking procurement budgets and a general drop-off in enlistments, should seriously consider adding to its arsenal, not least because of a projected purchase price of under US$20million each.
Not every bright idea comes out of the US defense establishment.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
We all hear about them on the news: Those places where Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are housed and trained; where they form up to deploy to some remote space on a map that most of us had never heard of a week ago…
But — what is a ‘base’, exactly?
Here at The Freedomist, we covered one aspect of this question some time ago, but this article will take a broad overview of the question at large.
Aside from castles or fortresses, “bases” come in a vast array of forms. Certain histrionics aside, a “military base” can come in almost literally any form. There are massive bases, such as Fort Bliss, in Texas or the Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, which are larger than some states, but there are also tiny installations that are also bases, such as Marine Barracks, Washington D.C., which is a mere 6 acres (2.4 ha) in size, and has been in continuous use since 1801. As a result, a base can take almost any shape.
At the same time, size comparisons obscure the question. A different way to think about a “generic” base, however, would be to consider it as a collection of components. Generally speaking, a “base” – while it may have a specific purpose – is where troops can be housed and trained for combat; where they can do at least basic levels of maintenance on weapons and equipment; and where supplies sufficient for a unit to deploy (in theory) can be safely and securely stored.
The training component is the hard part here, because even with the many advances in “virtual” training that have taken place in the last thirty-odd years, troops still need to actually fire live ammunition thought their weapons; short of actual nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, nothing focuses training like the dangers of live-fire. When we are dealing with classes of personal weapons, firing ranges of fifty to five hundred yards or meters in length may well be sufficient. Once we move into longer-ranged weapons – heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, tank cannons and actual artillery – the ranges quickly become very long range.
But…short of that? Let’s do a thought experiment.
We will start with a large open field. A road, perhaps a highway or freeway, runs along one side of the field. Imagine one to four multi-story motels, clustered together; nearby, is a small, two-story office building. To one side, there is a gas/convenience station, and a large chain-style restaurant. There are one or two warehouses, a full-service garage, a few large parking lots filled (hopefully) with large and heavy vehicles. There are a scattering of other buildings, including one that is very “blockish”-looking building surrounded with barbed wire; there might even be a fire station. There is likely a shooting range, one hundred to five hundred yards/meters in length. If the unit’s home nation is relatively wealthy – and wise – there may be a small housing development across the road from the actual base, with family homes for married troop’s whose families live with them. None of the buildings are very “upscale”; most would be described with uncharitable snobbery as “drab” or even “ramshackle” or “brutalist” if someone wanted to be nasty. That would be the effect of government contracting restrictions.
What was just described above are the very basic facilities for an infantry battalion of 700-1,000 troops. There would be a few more buildings if the unit is more specialized, but the above description represents a generic enough core. Drop, say, another dozen or so of these areas close together, add an actual hospital, a large supermarket nestled next to a department store (if they’re not combined), a branch bank, a few more gas stations and regional-scale airport that can handle C-130-type aircraft, a few very long-distance (say, two to five miles in range) and you have a base suitable for a brigade-to-division scale unit – anything from eight to sixteen thousand troops.
Reserve or militia units can get away with one or two buildings, with a large and fenced-off parking lot, as long as they keep personal weapons and a basic load or two of ammunition at home…However, these units are going to be extremely limited in what operations they can carry out.
In sum, most military bases are not too dissimilar from a small town – except, of course, for the weapons, uniforms and intent. Aside from the occasional museum, most military installations /are/ drab, dreary and uninviting, and not places most people would want to live in for very long. But that dividing line, that willingness to tolerate minimalist living environments because their belief in the greater good, is best described in a paraphrase of the words of neoconservative essayist and film critic Richard Grenier —
Originally, this article was going to be considerably different, until research suddenly swerved in a different direction. That direction is to reinforce a fundamental military truth:
Artillery was, is, remains and will remain, the “King of Battle.”
While retaining the “Dragon Fire II” vehicle-mounted 120mm mortar, the reading on the rationale behind these decisions stands testament to an unacceptable failure by the military establishment in the United States to focus on reality.
Since combat operations commenced in Afghanistan in 2001, the US military in general has drilled down to a focus almost exclusively on “counterinsurgency operations” (COIN). Although pointedly left unsaid in public, this is a reaction to the fact that the US military establishment essentially abandoned COIN operations in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, to focus exclusively on the perceived threat of a Soviet invasion to Western Europe, and the assumed nuclear exchanges that would follow. In the aftermath of the 9/11 Attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan deteriorating into guerilla conflicts, the US military swung the pendulum 180° in the opposite direction from the 1980’s.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Francis Fukuyama foolishly proclaiming the “End of History”, although rarely spoken out loud, military forces were seen as almost redundant anachronisms in many quarters, and should be reduced both in scale and capabilities, rendering them as something like heavily-armed police forces, with the occasional, movie-ready SWAT teams for hostage rescue. Combat operations like the first Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom were seen as aberrations, large operations against technologically inferior despot forces with lots of heavy (if antiquated) weapons and gear, and lots of troops, who – if not very well-trained or motivated – at least had plenty of simple weapons, and who would require somewhat more force than the international equivalent of a beat cop holding up their hand and saying “HALT!” in a loud voice.
Enter Russia.
While we are not going to delve too deeply, here, into the politics of this year’s Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia is currently – by their own counts (which should, of course, always be taken with a large grain of salt) – running an average of c.580 fire missions per day. Assuming that these missions are run according to Russian military doctrine, each of these missions are a “battery shoot” involving a battery of four to six weapons. Roughly 30% of these would be rocket artillery, mostly from BM-21 ‘Grad’ type rocket systems, with the remainder fired by conventional “tube” artillery [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artillery]. Using the most conservatively realistic figures, this equals approximately 7,000 conventional artillery rounds being fired.
Per day.
This come out to over 200,000 rounds in a 30-day period.
In contrast, the Western democracies have “bet the farm” on weapon accuracy, developing “precision everything” in mortar, rocket and conventional artillery rounds. They chose this route, because the conventional news media is ecstatic over images of dead civilians, which is much more likely when using “dumb” weapons. Needless to say, such casualty-limiting precision comes at a price: the M982 “Excalibur” 155mm precision-guided artillery round costs anywhere from US$68,000 to $175,000 per round (depending on who is counting).
In the West, conventional “dumb” artillery rounds cost between US$300 and $1,000 each. This, of course, begs the question: is “smart” better than “dumb“?
Certainly – if you can afford it. Can the West?
Currently, following the defense budget cuts in FY2022 by the Biden administration, artillery ammunition procurement is being cutby some 36%. In the very best case scenario, this means that the United States currently produces enough ammunition in a calendar year for anywhere between ten days and three weeks of combat firing, based – again – on the mostconservative take on Russian claims of artillery fire missions and estimated rates of ammunition expenditure in Ukraine. And the United States is sending ammunition to Ukraine to go along with the 155mm howitzers and other weapons we are already supplying.
And the US is not alone. In 2021, the British Army conducted a large-scale, “main force” wargame where they completely exhausted national stocks of critical ammunition – at the national level – in eight days. Similarly, only about 2,100 units of the vaunted Javelin missile are produced each year – and the Ukrainians are claiming to fire “hundreds” of Javelins daily, leaving the US defense industry scrambling to bring new production streams online. The FIM-92 Stinger anti-aircraft missile is in a similar situation.
Worse still, Russia is known to have fired over 1,000 “cruise missiles” since invading the Ukraine proper in February of 2022. Even given the highly questionable reports of those firings’ performance, it is clear that the Russian industrial base is still more than capable of supplying the weapons and ammunition to the firing lines (the logistical aspects of this are an entirely different subjects).
It is vital to keep in mind, again, that the technical accuracy and reliability of the Russian arsenal is not the question, here. The fact is that they are able to maintain production and consumption rates of comparatively “dumb” systems – and firing something at the enemy is better than firing nothing, because you’re waiting on resupply.
The conclusion here is clear: the West is functionally trying to counter Russian aggression from a hospital bed, while ignorant children are playing with its life support equipment.
This is not 1939, and the West is no longer the “Arsenal of Democracy.” Ukraine is paying, and will continue to pay, a heavy price for trusting the modern-day Western states…and unless something is done quickly, the people of the West may well pay that price, as well – assuming that we do not pay an even heavier price.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
As First-World States Amp Up Their High Tech, The Opposition Sticks To Basics
An F-35 Lightning II prepares to take off, Luke Air Force Base, AZ – USAF photo by Sr Airman Devante Williams; Public Domain
Over the last hundred years or so, uncountable amounts of money have been spent by various countries, to develop ever more sophisticated weapons and vehicles, many times, almost literally reinventing the wheel. The latest gargantuan expenditures that come to mind are the M1 Abrams tank, the Zumwalt destroyer and the F-35b airplane.
Iranian soldiers with a BGM-71 TOW missile during the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988
Why this should be so, is of great discomfort to both defense companies and armies, around the world. The reason defense companies are worried is that the civilian Toyota vehicles are “good enough” for most combat vehicle applications. They are simple, rugged, durable, easy to understand and operate, and – most importantly – cheap.
Roll-on/roll-off ferry terminal at Queenscliff, Victoria, 1993.
On the military side, these are also concerns, but the military – by necessity – goes deeper: the very ubiquitous nature of the vehicles (driven by market, not military forces), in addition to their built-in ruggedness, makes it supremely difficult to both identify and attrit an asymmetric enemy’s mobile infrastructure without attacking civilian targets at the same time.
Mongol horseman, 14th Century
It has long been known that light vehicles equate to light cavalry. Unfortunately, historically, conventional militaries have always had a distinctly difficult time dealing with forces that can master the techniques of light cavalry campaigns.
U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. Haiti, circa 1919.
Similarly, it has long been recognized that simple, robust weapons systems give unconventional forces near-parity of effectiveness at the “boots on the ground” level of combat. As long ago as 1940, in the US Marine Corps – in its “Small Wars Manual” – recognized that as technology developed, and lightweight, fully automatic weapons spread, the tactics the manual outlined would be rendered obsolete.
AK-74 assault rifle
Modern small arms development has essentially hit a plateau in the years since 1946. Once the move to self-loading rifles was complete, what remained were alterations to ergonomics and attachments. The weapons could be massed produced with a very high degree of mechanical simplicity built in…This, of course, resulted in the development of the near-universal AK-series of assault rifles in the hands of both urban and rural guerrilla forces, as well as the later tribal militias, to say nothing of its continued use by regular armed forces throughout the world.
Adding to the difficulty for conventional armies is the widespread deployment of highly effective, yet almost laughable uncomplicated, heavy support weapons at the squad level, primarily the RPG-7 and the General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG).
An Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier fires an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, Helmand province, Afghanistan, May 20, 2013. USMC photo.
The RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher, while becoming less capable against frontline combat vehicle armor, is still more than capable against light vehicles, light or hasty fortifications, and even some aircraft. A robust and simple design, the RPG-7 is a valuable weapon in any force’s arsenal, and is widely available.
PKM Machine Gun
Likewise, the Soviet-designed PKM GPMG is another simple, robust and highly capable weapon system, easily a match for anything produced by the West.
Of course, except for the Toyota pickup trucks, the two things that the above weapons all have in common is that they are both products of Cold War-era Soviet Army design bureaus, and were handed out in vast numbers to many armies and guerrilla groups as the Cold War ground on.
And yet, their effects remain.
Adding to the problem is the impact of remotely piloted drone technology, especially drones modified to drop small munitions on target. Coupled to cheap and reliable internet access and radio technology, as well as the wide dissemination of both automated and manual secure encryption methods, armies trying to chase down irregular, terrorist and/or guerrilla forces today have issues far outside the scope of previous generations.
The challenge for both conventional forces, defense companies, and perhaps especially the political leadership of First World powers, frankly, is to find a way to equip the large security forces necessary to ensure a counterbalance to terrorist groups that operate like multinational corporations, while not cutting off their noses to spite their faces, by bankrupting the countries they are trying to sell their products to.
In general, people tend like good things. This should be self-evident: good food, good sex, good booze (in no particular order), so…anything ‘good’ should be, well, “good” – right? Like – peace, for instance.
Right?
I mean, war is all about violence, blood, horror, terror, crippling and debilitating injuries and very tragic and untimely death, all of which are really bad things…So…Less war must be good.
Right?
Today, we will examine a tiny sliver of that question.
Paris Street in Rainy Weather, 1877, Gustave Caillebotte.
In 1856, in an attempt to “limit the scourge of war”, a collection of European nations’ representatives gathered in Paris, France and signed a convention, the “Paris Declaration“, that eliminated the practice of “privateering“, or “legalized piracy in time of war.”
Letter of marque given to Robert Sutton de Clonard for the privateer Comte d’Artois, 1780.
The mechanism of this decision was simple: the Admiralty court system that adjudicated the “condemnation” and auctioning of “prizes of war” were disestablished, more or less overnight, removing the purpose of issuing “Letters of Marque and Reprisal“…and freeing – it was hoped – merchant shipping from the scourge of “legalized plunder“…
…But what was the real effect of this declaration?
Prior to 1856 – for roughly 400 years, in a formal sense – Western nations had deliberately evolved the system of prize-capture to avoid the cost of keeping excessively large (and very expensive) fleets manned when there was no war going on. Since merchant ships were generally alone in dangerous waters anyway, it only made sense to build cargo ships that carried weapons comparable to warships, and by extension, to utilize those same ships in time of war.
Thus, as an adjunct to the very common practice on land of hiring part-time professional soldiers – i.e., mercenaries – to flesh out an army, armed merchantmen were offered commissions to supplement regular navies, until those navies could get their actual warships fully crewed. After ferrying troops and supplies, many of these armed merchantmen struck out at the merchant ships of the enemy, striking targets of opportunity, capturing enemy vessels, hauling them to friendly (or even neutral), to sell off the cargoes and the ships themselves (sometimes at a staggering profit), as well as ransoming the prisoners.
The Ranger, Private Ship of War, with her Prizes. By Nicholas Pocock, 1780
After 1856, this all changed.
As the United States (which did not sign the Paris Declaration) was to discover to its horror, the dismantling of the prize system removed any incentive to capturing ships intact — where shipping companies (previously, at least) had the chance of buying their captured vessels back, once there was no possibility of easily selling off a captured prize, there was no reason to not strip the surrendered ships of useful supplies and destroy them after capture. The crews were either abandoned on remote islands to uncertain (and very unpleasant) fates, or tossed ashore in the first non-hostile port the ship came to, with nothing but the clothes on their backs…if they were that lucky.
Four years after the Declaration, the various States that formed the Confederacy attempted to leave the Federal Union, sparking the four-year long American Civil War. Among its many disadvantages, the Southern Confederacy did not really have a maritime tradition, as their northern opponents did. As a result, lacking hard currency or deep economic capital internally, their few attempts at issuing Letters of Marque were dismal failures, as limited cash in a bottled market could not chase what should have been lucrative captures.
“The Alabama destroying the Texan Star, or Martaban, in the Malacca Straits – The Kwan-Tung, Chinese War-Steamer, in the distance. From a sketch by Commander Allen Young, Royal Navy.” London Illustrated News, April 2, 1864, p. 320. Public Domain
In a series of brutal cruises, Confederate Navy corsairs slashed and burned their way through the United States’ merchant fleets; the US Pacific whaling fleet (supplying vital supplies of whale oil in a pre-petroleum society) was almost completely destroyed. Indeed, by 1864 most US-flagged merchant ships were laid up in US ports, as crews flatly refused to leave port under US colors, because of the danger of prowling rebel raiders; not even ruinous insurance rates could entice crews to sea. To remain solvent, many American merchant investors had to sell their vessels to foreign companies in a buyers market, just to maintain some form of capitol flow. The US merchant fleet would not fully recover its position in the world’s shipping arena until after World War 2.
Other countries – and their navies – noticed.
A battleship squadron of the German High Seas Fleet; the far right vessel is the battlecruiser SMS Von der Tann, 1917.
The basic requirements of naval warfare had not changed, the future writings of US Navy Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan notwithstanding: an enemy nation’s merchant marine still had to be neutralized. This meant larger navies, with many more fighting ships in commission, at all times, since merchant ships could no longer, by about 1890, be easily converted into viable warships (since they could no longer be used as warships, there was no reason to design them with warship guns and armor). But, because technology was also expanding — both the fight between the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia (the former USS Merrimack) in 1862, as well as the Austro-Italian Battle of Lissa in 1866 marking the first engagements between “armored” (or, “ironclad”) naval warships and fleets — this began a race to develop ever-bigger guns, better armor, faster and more fuel-efficient engines…and the armies, jealous of the navies’ lavish funding, also took note. But, with few major wars (only one, really) between industrial states taking place between 1875 and 1914, no one really paid attention…except, of course, the builders of naval artillery and warships.
Photograph of U-111, a German Submarine.
Come the end 1914, with the land war in Western Europe lurching into a blood-soaked, trench-bound stalemate, enforced by machine guns and more field artillery than anyone had ever seen before, Imperial Germany turned to widely deploying previously experimental or unseen weapons – specifically, the submarine and poison gas.
While there had been a slow and steady development of submarines in the previous decades, few officers of the day took them seriously as anything but scouts for battle fleets. But, once the German High Seas Fleet’s inability to blockade Britain became clear, the Kaiser unleashed his U-Boat fleet.
British 55th (West Lancashire) Division troops blinded by gas, 10 April 1918.
The slaughter was tremendous, as merchant ship crews began dying in huge numbers, and mind-boggling amounts of ship tonnage was sent to the bottom. Britain was almost starved of war-making material, and actually began to experience food shortages. In the next round, in 1940, Britain very nearly did lose its war — and American and British merchant seamen died by the thousands…On land, the role of the machine gun and poison gas is better known. The never-ending quest to one-up to other guy was in full force.
“The battle between the Aisne and Marne: German ammunition column, teams and horses with gas masks when passing a gasified forest.”
On land, with the stalemate and slaughter of trench warfare enforced by machine guns, the German High Command was induced to take what for them was a radical (and, by their own admission, distasteful) action: allowing scientists, led by Fritz Haber, the chemist who perfected the extraction of ammonia from atmospheric nitrogen, to develop what had been annoyingly dangerous byproducts of industrial chemical processes into deadly weapons that killed indiscriminately…and ultimately, led directly to the Zyklon-B of Hitler’s gas chambers.
Ultimately, the quest for “more is not only better, it is vital” led directly to the atomic bomb. Although its destructive force was not truly understood at first, even after its effects were understood in their full horror, their development continued apace, leading to the culmination of destruction: the “Tsar Bomba” of the Soviet Union.
However, nothing happens in a vacuum — while states, and the armies and navies that served them, raced frantically to find faster, broader and more efficient ways to kill each other, those nations’ populations paid attention…and learned the unintended lesson:
Life is cheap, fragile, and easily thrown away — and if governments don’t care about the lives of their individual citizens, why should the citizens care about the lives of an “enemy” people?
Kill ’em all – let God sort ’em out.
Right?
Right?
Terrorists, 2020
…..Welcome to the so-called Islamic Caliphate of the 21st Century – and why not? They are merely responding to the stimuli they have been presented and raised with. They don’t have naval fleets, or fleets of airplanes — but they do have knives and cameras, and fear and horror are ancient and basic weapons. Doubly so, when they pay their troops in loot and slaves…just like the “good ol’ days.” And, in an era where humans can be easily enticed to volunteer to function as “squishy cruise missiles“, the addition of real horror to simple terrorism follows a direct course from that origin point.
So…the next time someone cries “Peace! PEACE!“, it may be instructive to wonder whythere was no peace in the first place.
It is also instructive to remember that sometimes, “peace” is another word for “surrender“.
NOTE TO THE READER: The following is a necessarily brief overview of a top-tier national military force. The opinions expressed are those of the author, and are based solely on “open-source” research. This is the first of a series on national military forces that may not be well-known to the general reader.
Additionally, a version of this article was previously published online, on May 29, 2017, by this author, at the former “Military Gazette” web page (now defunct). This version has been edited and updated, and is published here with the agreement and consent of the editorial staff, as well as this author.
Introduction
The modern Indian armed forces date from 1947, but trying to write even a general overview of the military history of India is far beyond the scope of an article such as this. Indeed, this article can give only the barest overview; thus, any holes that appear are unintentional, and were left out for the sake of brevity.
Postcard captioned “Gentlemen of India marching to chasten German Hooligans” in English and French, 1914
India did not lack for professionalism in armed forces when it gained its independence from Great Britain in 1947. Indeed, Indian forces had been fighting under British direction for well over 200 years, since at least 1774AD. Interestingly, this makes the modern Indian Army slightly older than its United States counterpart. Indian troops from across the subcontinent have repeatedly proven themselves the equal – if not the superior – to both British and European armed forces. India’s success as an independent state is directly attributable to the professionalism of both its Civil Service, and its Armed Forces, part of the latter being the subject of this article.
At the time of the Partition of India, the various British Imperial Indian forces were divided between between India and Pakistan; other than the inevitable disruption caused to organizational structures, both new countries inherited highly professional forces, as well as school structures and defense industries. As a result, Indian forces performed very well in their firsttests, and ensured India’s continued existence as a nation.
Indian soldiers of the 9th Battalion, Sikh Infantry test-firing a handgun aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) – US Navy photo
Although there would be missteps later on, India’s national integrity has never been seriously threatened over the course of the last seventy years, in stark contrast to many other former European colonies, who seem continually on the brink of complete and utter collapse.
With a total of over 5.137million troops – counting Active, Reserve and Paramilitary – India possesses the fourth-largest armed force in the world, ahead of even the People’s Republic of China, and the second-largest Active Duty force, overall, ahead of the United States. Below, we will briefly glance at India’s army, and will then assess its strategic capabilities.
Comprising some eighty percent of India’s national forces, the Army is a modern force, striving to upgrade its capabilities to keep pace with the more “public” militaries, such as those of the United States, Britain, France and Germany. However, those states are not India’s adversaries – those slots are taken up primarily by Pakistan and the PRC.
India, by and large, neither starts wars – directly or indirectly – nor seeks conflicts. In the past, however, India has faced attacks from both Pakistan and the PRC; in the former case, several times.
Indian army infantry vehicles move onto the firing range at Camp Bundela, India Oct. 26, 2009 – US Army photo
Like most states, the core of India’s armed forces is its infantry. Indian infantry have long been regarded as among the toughest and most capable in the world. India, like the United States, uses a modified “regimental system” within its army, with regiments such as the Madras, the Gurkha’s, and the Sikh Light Infantry (among many, many more) having long and distinguished histories, but those regiments primarily provide well-trained battalions to the Army’s divisional structures (some forty divisions, in fourteen corps), as part of the seven major commands that the Army is structured into, rather than deploy as complete units on the battlefield. These divisions, except for certain specialized units – such as mountain, parachute and several special forces units – are mingled with tanks and artillery to form cohesive battlefield units.
The Army’s F-INSAS program is a development project aimed at reequipping the individual soldier with an advanced suite of combat systems. This program, modeled on the US Army’s zombie-like “Future Force Warrior” program (that has been killed and resurrected so many times, it is now hard to keep track of the various iterations), is perhaps over-ambitious.
Lance Naik (Lance Cpl.) Fateh Singh, of the 4th Rajput Battalion of the Indian Army confirms the zero of his INSAS assault rifle, Donnelly Training Area, Fort Greely, Alaska, 2007 — US Army photo
However, the Indian Army demonstrated in 2016 that it has the intestinal and institutional fortitude to make choices that would embarrass other forces, in its acknowledgement that its 5.56x45mmINSAS rifle (no relation to the aforementioned program) simply wasn’t working. The Indian Army’s 2016 requirement is one of the clearest signs, yet, that the end of the “intermediate cartridge” ballistic dead-end is near, as the Army requirement acknowledged the need for a “full-power” (in this case, the venerable 7.62x51mm) cartridge for frontline service.
As a result, the Indian Army inked deals to both purchase and manufacture the AK-203 rifle in 7.62x39mm (a total of 670,000 – 70,000 directly from Russia, with the remainder to be manufactured under license) in Uttar Pradesh, while also purchasing slightly modified SIG Sauer 716 G2 Patrol rifles in 7.62mmNATO for more specialized units. Simultaneously, a deal for over 16,000 Israeli-madeNG-7 ‘Negev’ Light Machine Guns – also in 7.62x51mm NATO – was let in 2019, with the first batch of 6,000 arriving in India in early 2021.
While arguments can certainly be made over some of the choices made in the Army’s reequipping strategy, real armies always strive to stay out on the edge of technological development, while also keeping hold of tools and doctrines that have been proven to work, before adopting newer – but untested – concepts. Truly professional forces are able to acknowledge when they have taken a wrong turn, and move forward to fix the issue…That’s a lesson the US military would benefit from remembering.
Army Air
One of the challenges for the Army is its somewhat limited organic aircraft and helicopter assets. As it took the common page from other modern forces, India from the beginning separated its air forces from its ground forces. And, also like many modern armies, the result has been very spotty application of close air support (CAS) to the ground forces. Like all air forces, the Indian Air Force tries, but it is hampered in its efforts by both budgetary constraints and the associated need to focus on that service’s core missions. India is not alone in this issue; the US military discovered the problems inherent in this type of division with its own “Key West Agreement” in 1948, a confused decision that would cause delays and confusions that would impact combat operations well into the 1970’s.
Mi-35 Hind helicopter, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2009 – US Air Force photo
Arjun Mk II MBT, live demonstration, 2016 – photo by Indian Navy
On the brighter side, the Arjun Mk IIMBT has finally matured. After a rough start to its development cycle, and serious problems in its earlier version, as well as major cost overruns and an epically long (37 years, to be exact) development cycle, the Arjun has matured into a frontline weapon that is in the top tier of combat vehicles. The only real hurdle to its full-scale deployment, as with virtually every army, is money. On the other hand, its deployment, while slow, has finally allowed India to retire its 1940’s-era T-55’s. At the same time, the Defense Ministry settled on a modernizaton and upgrade program for its Soviet-era T-72’s and T-90’s, the better to avoid too unevenly improving systems.
Pinaka MBRL’s on parade, 2011
India’s burgeoning economy, however, has allowed plans to significantly modernize its artillery park to move forward with speed. Systems like the Dhanush howitzer, developed to replace the Haubits FH77/B units acquired from Sweden in the 1980’s; the excellent M1954 (M-46) 155mm model, as upgraded by Soltam, of one of the best artillery pieces ever built, with a maximum unassisted range of 27km/16.77mi, and an assisted range of 38km/23.61mi; rounding off the new purchases is the indiginously developed, truck-mounted Pinaka multiple rocket launcher (similar to the US ‘HIMARS‘), designed to replace the BM-21’s and ‘Smerch’ 9K58’s acquired from the Soviet Union. Something DRDO may want to look at is the EVO-105, which the Freedomist recently reviewed.
A serious problem, however, is in India’s IFV park. The ‘Abhay’ (Sanskrit: अभय, “Fearless”) IFV is still in “development hell” (although the incorporation of the 40mm Bofors L/70 gun is an inspired choice for a main weapon of this type). While DRDO has informed Russia that they intend to pursue an Indian IFV, rather than purchase the BMP-3, the Indian Army is stuck, in the meanwhile, with the abysmal BMP-2. The BMP series, generally speaking, has a well-deserved reputation as the worst of the IFV field: its limited range, cramped compartments, horrible ride and poor armor are legendary…well, perhaps “notorious” is a better term. Armor – as has been decisively proven – cannot operate without infantry support, and infantry need something more than a “battle taxi”, as good as the M113 might be. The original models of the US Marine Corps’LAV-series is another off-the shelf option that would be far superior to the BMP-series.
Combat Support
Ashok Leyland Stallion 4×4’s of the Indian Army, Himalaya region, 2010
India’s motorized military support is firmly anchored on three vehicles: the Ashok Leyland Stallion Mk III & IV, the Maruti Gypsy, and the Tatra 815, although the Tatra 815 is slowly being replaced by newer vehicles. These are all solid, highly capable vehicles, supplemented by smaller numbers of more specialized frames, easily the equal of other nation’s vehicle parks in capacity and reliablity.
As well, mine protected vehicles such as the venerable and battle-tested South AfricanCasspir and the domestically-produced Aditya are entering the vehicle pools in increasing numbers, in ackowledgement of the growing threat of IEDs.
Strategic Forces
India, as is well-known, maintains a nuclear arsenal and an ongoing development plan. This arsenal is currently estimated at between 150 and 300 devices. Currently, the known weapons available to be deployed are the short-range Prithvi-I and the intermediate-range Agni-III, with longer-range land-based weapons and MIRVs under development. The K-15 SagarikaSLBM, now operational, is now deployed aboard the INS Arihant…and awaiting sister ships.
Country’s first under-water- launched Missile B05 (Sagarika) was successfully flight tested from Bay of Bengal off the coast of Visakhapatnam.
This developmental pace is surprising only to people who lack a grounding on India’s regional security situation. A nuclear deterrent is definitely something taken seriously by the People’s Republic of China. But the main focus is India’s long-time enemy, Pakistan. While the nuclear program was originally more of a prestige program than an operational imperative, increasing instability in the Muslim world, coupled to both Pakistan and Iran’snuclear programs, as well as both 9/11 and the 2008 Mumbai attack have transformed the nuclear program into a real and pressing project: India has serious reasons to maintain a nuclear arsenal…which is a very serious range issues that need to be solved, lest they get out of hand.
Tactically, however, the main question is the true state of the Indian military’s nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) program for allowing individual troops to operate in such environments.
Conclusion
The Indian Army is a highly capable, well-disciplined and professional force, with a very long, and honored history. It has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of both making hard decisions, as well as admitting its errors, at least to a greater extent than many other top-tier forces. If the Indian Army has any weaknesses, they lay in procurement, which is something the force does not have full control over, although a critical need for a real airmobile component is its worst issue; there are very cogent reasons why virtually all modern militaries have abandoned parachute infantry as primary “first in” forces, in favor of heliborne formations.
The Army well understands that it needs to modernize its forces – too long tied into less-than-capable (to be polite), Soviet-era systems – a task made significantly easier by the increasingly close relationship to Western militaries, militaries that recognize the danger of an unstable, nuclear-armed Pakistan, as well as an increasingly bellicose China.
Armies exist to buy time through intimidation, for political leaders to avoid conflict. But those forces, for their intimidation strategies to work, must be capable of actually following through on their promise of ability.
Ultimately, the Indian Army succeeds in this quite admirably.
The goal of this column is to present news from around the world that is not often – if ever – covered by more mainstream entities, using local sources wherever possible, but occasionally using news aggregators not used, again, by the mainstream media. Also, please note that we do use links to Wikipedia; while Wikipedia is well-known as a largely-useless site for any kind of serious research, it does serve as a launch-pad for further inquiry, in addition to being generally free of malicious ads. As with anything from Wikipedia, always verify their sources before making any conclusions based on their pages.
This column will cover the preceding week of news.
To make it easier for readers to follow story source links: anytime you see a bracketed number marked in green – [1] – those are the source links relating to that story.
North America
The ongoing “Strategy of Tension” continued across the United States this week, with a continuing wave of hoax bomb threats being called in to various locations, primarily colleges and technical schools; curiously, several nursing schools were also on the call roster. As noted previously, many of the source links below refer to multiple calls and threats being made to schools in a given area. [1]-[13] In a few cases, actual devices were discovered, and in two cases, arrests were made. [14]-[16]
One interesting aspect of the devices being recovered, is that few, if any of them, were actually triggered. It remains to be seen, if this is a deliberate tactic, or if it is simply poor assembly.
In Nigeria, terrorist and bandit violence continues, as the wave of ambushes, kidnappings, targeted murders, skirmishing and violence continue, seemingly without respite.
In Somalia, heavy fighting was reported in a the villages of Yeed, Aato and Washaaqo along the country’s ill-defined border with Ethiopia. Reports – as usual in the area – remain sketchy, but it appears that Al-Shabaab fighters attacked detachments of Ethiopian regional police operating in that area of Somalia by agreement with Somali authorities, striking directly at the towns of Yeed and Aato, while also launching what appears to be “spoiling attack” on Washaaqo, to pin possible reinforcements.
As in Nigeria, scattered fighting continued apace throughout the Middle East, this week. Turkish forces inside Syriaand Iraq continued to launch drone and artillery strikes on essentially any armed force that is not Turkish. [1]-[3] Further south, in Iraq, several Iraqi troops have been killed in skirmishes with remnant Islamic State terrorists. [4]
In Afghanistan, a local-area Taliban commander was reportedly killed near the city of Kunduz, by unknown gunmen. This comes as a recent UN report concluded that IS-Khorasan and other groups are gaining ground in securing footholds in Afghanistan, as the Taliban’s hold on the country is increasingly shaky. This has the potential to return the world to the situation as it stood in 2001, with Afghanistan becoming a base-area, yet again, for terrorists from around the world.
In Pakistan, scattered attacks were reported, including a bombing of a girls’ school in the port of Gwadar, and a grenade attack on Frontier Corps (FC) police, that wounded a total of four people, including an FC officer.
In India, aside from the long-running violence in Jammu & Kashmir [1]-[6], the only issues of note were a hoax bomb threat against a private school and a bomb attack that injured one woman, being blamed on Naxalite activity. [7][8]
Finally, reports from Myanmar are emerging that the ethnic Arakan Army group has claimed to have killed several government soldiers and captured as many as thirteen more, including at least one officer. Myanmar, ruled by a military juntasince 2021, has seen an increasing number of rebels actively attacking its forces since it’s seizure of power.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th of 2022, the Ukrainian military has struggled to hold on against enormous pressure. While there have been successes against the surprisingly anemic Russian juggernaut, the fact is that the conflict has seen the return of massed artillery fires, at a scale and intensity not seen since at least the 1990-1991 Gulf War.
Derelict Tank in badly shelled mud area, Europe, 1917.
Artillery, in its many forms, has been a major component of armies since at least the 15th Century. Artillery can cause heavy damage to both attacking forces in an open field, but can also hammer fortifications into a moonscape, if allowed to.
French Caesar self-propelled howitzer fires into the Middle Euphrates River Valley.
Like many armies, Ukraine had allowed its artillery establishment to atrophy – despite armies depending on massed artillery for centuries – and it now finds itself desperately scrambling to replace damaged and lost artillery pieces, and scrape together more ammunition. This has seen the first mass deployments for systems such as the French ‘CAESAR‘ 155mm self-propelled howitzer, the M777155mm towed howitzer and the M142 HIMARS Multiple-Launch Rocket System, among others, all supplied by NATO states trying to shore up Ukraine’s defenses.
But none of these weapons – nor their ammunition – are arriving in the quantities Ukraine needs. There may be at least a partial solution to Ukraine’s problem, however:
The EVO-105, now designated the K105HT.
Improved K105HT during firing drill. Undated photo.
The EVO-105/K105HT uses an assembly of long-proven systems to make a lightweight, self-propelled artillery piece. While originally produced as a cost-saving idea to get the maximum utilization out of old artillery, the basic design could easily be adapted to artillery similar to the M101-series, such as the L118, or the M119. Although having a significantly shorter range than larger-caliber weapons (a maximum of 17.5km (10.9 mi), or 19.5km (12.1 mi) with RAP (Rocket-Assisted Projectiles)), the K105HT is much faster to “shoot-n-scoot“, firing one or two rounds, then rapidly moving to a new firing location, and can do this faster than most other similar systems.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but other states and other forces can take the artillery issue as a lesson from Ukraine’s failure to maintain a well-rounded defense establishment.
Artillery matters. Victory also matters – and artillery wins more wars than gory pictures do.
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