April 1, 2026

Politics

Destiny Tells Left, Right Needs to Fear Talking in Public Spaces

The most popular leftist Streamer, Stephen Bonnell, aka Destiny, is openly calling for conservatives to be assassinated for their political beliefs. He said “I mean, you need conservatives to be afraid of getting killed when they go to events, so that they look to their leadership to turn down the temperature. The issue is right now, they don’t feel like there’s any fear. I don’t know. It’s like memes. It’s just memes to everybody, I guess. I don’t know, bro.”

Popular Left-Wing Streamer Says Conservatives ‘Should Be Afraid Of Getting Killed’– trendingpoliticsnews.com
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Excerpt:

Popular left-wing streamer and debater Destiny appeared to condone the assassination of Charlie Kirk by saying that conservative figures need to be “afraid of being killed” every time they appear at a public event.

“I mean, you need conservatives to be afraid of getting killed when they go to events, so that they look to their leadership to turn down the temperature,” Destiny, whose real name is Stephen Bonnell, said in a stream following the assassination of Charlie Kirk. “The issue is right now, they don’t feel like there’s any fear. I don’t know. It’s like memes. It’s just memes to everybody, I guess. I don’t know, bro.”

The streamer doubled down on his violent rhetoric and refused to condemn the assassination of Charlie Kirk during an appearance on Piers Morgan Uncensored.

“I think that liberals need to wake up and finally realize that if they’re not willing to do it, it will never come down,” he said. The streamer then insinuated that Charlie Kirk deserved to die due to his support for President Donald Trump.

“If you wanted Charlie Kirk to be alive, Donald Trump shouldn’t have been president for the second term. Every time he’s in office, this happens. People joked about when Biden came in, it was so boring, nothing was going on. Seven out of ten of the largest protests in American history have happened under Donald Trump.”t

Trump’s Patience with Insurrectionist Democrats is Almost Over, He Warns

After the Washington, D.C. Democrat Mayor informed her police department that they are no longer allowed to cooperate with ICE Agents, President Donald Trump issued a threat that wasn’t just aimed at her, it was aimed at the whole Democratic Party. It was aimed at all insurrectionist Democrat leaders in all 50 states and all cities from coast to coast. The message is this, if you don’t comply, the next step is the Insurrectionist Act.

President Trump posted on Truth Social, “… Democrats, Mayor Muriel Bowser, who has presided over this violent criminal takeover of our Capital for years, has informed the Federal Government that the Metropolitan Police Department will no longer cooperate with ICE in removing and relocating dangerous illegal aliens. If I allowed this to happen, CRIME would come roaring back. To the people and businesses of Washington, D.C., DON’T WORRY, I AM WITH YOU, AND WON’T ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. I’ll call a National Emergency, and Federalize, if necessary!!!… “

INSURRECTION ACT: President Trump Just Told You What’s Coming Next– wltreport.com
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President Trump just posted this to TruthSocial:

FULL TEXT:

The Federal Government, under my auspices as President of the United States of America, has stepped into the complete criminal mess that was Washington, D.C., our Nation’s Capital. Because of this, D.C. has gone from one of the most dangerous and murder ridden cities in the U.S.A., and even around the World, to one of the safest – In just a few weeks. The “place” is absolutely booming, with restaurants, stores, and businesses packed and, for the first time in decades, virtually NO CRIME. It has been a beautiful thing to watch but, now, under pressure from the Radical Left Democrats, Mayor Muriel Bowser, who has presided over this violent criminal takeover of our Capital for years, has informed the Federal Government that the Metropolitan Police Department will no longer cooperate with ICE in removing and relocating dangerous illegal aliens. If I allowed this to happen, CRIME would come roaring back. To the people and businesses of Washington, D.C., DON’T WORRY, I AM WITH YOU, AND WON’T ALLOW THIS TO HAPPEN. I’ll call a National Emergency, and Federalize, if necessary!!! Thank you for your attention to this matter. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!!! President DJT

Ok so what does it all mean?

Very simply, he is putting all 50 states on notice that one way or another he is going to clean up the cesspools of crime and violence in this country.

The Mayors and Governors can either work together with him or he will do it himself — through the Insurrection Act.

This was already in play, but after the Charlie Kirk assassination I believe all restraints are off and our President has very little patience left.

WarClandestine agrees:

If you’ve been around here for a while, you know I’ve been telling you this was coming:

CHICAGO IS NEXT: President Trump About To Invoke The Insurrection Act?

What’s With the Bomb Near the Charlie Kirk Assassination?

A news van from KSTU-TV had a bomb affixed to it by a father-son team from Pakistan. Fortunately, the bomb did not work, but bomb experts called the device “real.”  Abeed Ahamed Nasir, 58, a  Pakistani-American, is listed as the “mastermind” behind the plan. 31-year-old Adil Justice Ahme Nasir, Abeed’s son, has also been arrested. Both men have been charged with manufacture, possession, or use of a weapon of mass destruction; attempted aggravated arson, and threats of terrorism. They both received other unique minor charges.

Alleged bomb plot near Charlie Kirk assassination lands Pakistani native and son with terrorism charges– www.theblaze.com
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A father and son were arrested in Salt Lake City on Sunday for allegedly affixing an explosive device to the bottom of a KSTU-TV news vehicle parked next to an occupied building.

The device was discovered just days after Charlie Kirk’s assassination around a half-hour drive away at Utah Valley University and amid an increased media presence in the area.

KSTU revealed that the device was determined to be real. While the explosive had reportedly been lit, the arrest report indicated that it “failed to function as designed.”

Law enforcement officials reportedly also ‘observed additional contraband and evidence of crimes outside the scope of the original warrant.’

Salt Lake County Jail records indicate that Adeeb Ahamed Nasir, 58 — whose race was somehow entered into the system as “white” — is a Pakistani-born American citizen.

He was booked into the jail on Sunday and charged with the manufacture, possession, or use of a weapon of mass destruction; attempted aggravated arson; possession of an explosive/chemical/incendiary; threat of terrorism; and felony possession of parts for an explosion/chemical/incendiary device.

Nasir’s American-born son, 31-year-old Adil Justice Ahme Nasir, has been charged with manufacture/possession/use of a weapon of mass destruction; attempted aggravated arson; threat of terrorism; and possession both of an explosive/chemical/incendiary device and parts to make one.

The Salt Lake City Police Department confirmed to Blaze News that the FBI is handling the case.

American Activist Charlie Kirk Slain on College Campus by Sniper

Charlie Kirk, a prominent conservative American activist, was murdered by a sniper’s bullet at a Utah event on the Utah Valley University campus on Wednesday, September 10, 2025. At this time, no motive for the shooting has been announced. The shooter has been arrested. Charlie Kirk was only 31 years old. The shooter has been identified as 22-year-old Tyler Robinson. He was turned in by his family, with his father detaining him until the police arrived.

President Trump said of the news of the shooter being captured, “I hope he was going to be found guilty, I would imagine, and I hope he gets the death penalty. What he did. Charlie Kirk was the finest person that he didn’t deserve this. He worked so hard and so well. Everybody liked him.”

Charlie Kirk Shot at Utah College Event: Report– people.com
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Excerpt:

 

NEED TO KNOW

  • Shots were fired at a Charlie Kirk event in Utah on Wednesday, Sept. 10
  • The right-wing political commentator was manning his well-known “Prove Me Wrong” table when gunfire broke out
  • Kirk shared photos and video from the event on X just moments before the shooting began.

Charlie Kirk was shot during a campus event at Utah Valley University on Wednesday, Sept. 10.

The 31-year-old right-wing political commentator was manning his signature “Prove Me Wrong” table as part of his American Comeback Tour on the Orem, Utah, campus, when shots were fired.

Video posted from the event appeared to show Kirk being shot in the side of the head or neck as he spoke to the crowd from under a white pop-up tent.

After the shot rang out, the crowd dispersed in a panic, with onlookers shouting “Run, run, run!”

Utah Senator Mike Lee posted to X shortly after news of the shooting broke, writing, “I am tracking the situation at Utah Valley University closely. Please join me in praying for Charlie Kirk and the students gathered there.”

Kirk shared photos and video from the event on X just moments before the shooting began.

“WE. ARE. SO. BACK. 🔥🔥🔥. Utah Valley University is FIRED UP and READY for the first stop back on the American Comeback Tour,” he wrote.

PEOPLE reached out to the Utah Valley University Police Department who confirmed “there were shots fired, yes.”

This is a developing story. Please check back for updates.

Will the GOP Stop the Epstein Files Release Vote by the House?

The Republican party appears poised to block the release of Jeffrey Epstein files by not signing a petition that would force a vote on the matter. The petition needs 218 votes. It currently stands at 215, with only 4 republicans signing the petition so far.

Thomas Massie claimed, on an ABC interview, “During our appearance on ABC yesterday, my colleague Rep. Ro Khanna announced we will have the 218 votes needed for the Epstein discharge petition by the end of this month. When this vote happens, will your congressman vote for transparency and justice… or against?”

Republicans Blocking Discharge Resolution To Force Release Of Epstein Documents– dailycaller.com
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Excerpt:

Republican Kentucky Rep. Thomas Massie and Democrat California Rep. Ro Khanna’s discharge petition, which would force the government to release the Jeffrey Epstein files, has 215 signatures — three short of the majority.

As of publication, Massie is one of only four Republicans in the House to sign the petition, compared with 211 of 212 House Democrats. Colorado Rep. Lauren Boebert, South Carolina Rep. Nancy Mace and Georgia Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene joined Massie in signing the petition.

“American” Police Force has Arabic Patches

“American” Police Force has Arabic Patches

A police force in America has chosen to allow its officers to use a foreign language on their police patches. In this case, the language is Arabic.  Dearborn Heights moved closer to becoming a de facto foreign country when the police force “chose” to allow “American” citizens the “option” of having Arabic police patches to “better serve” a community that clearly has no intention of integrating with the American republic.

Police Department In Michigan Becomes First City In U.S. To Put Arabic On Police Patches– wltreport.com
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Excerpt:

Soon, instead of pressing 1 for English or 2 for Spanish, we may hear press three for Arabic…

A city in Michigan has become the first police department in the United States to put Arabic on its police patches.

The Dearborn Heights Police Department has revealed its news patches have the words “Dearborn Heights Police” in both English and Arabic

Fox 2 Detroit had the full scoop:

The Dearborn Heights Police Department is unveiling a new officer-designed police patch that will be the first one in the country to feature Arabic.

Police confirmed to FOX 2 on Wednesday that the department has a new optional patch that officers can wear as part of their uniform.

The patch includes the Michigan seal in the center with the words ‘Dearborn Heights Police’ written in both English and Arabic.

According to police, the patch was created by Officer Ermily Murdoc, who designed it to reflect and honor the diversity of our community.

The Ghost of Faustin Wirkus

 

 

 

 

 



It is a general article of faith in most armed forces around the world, that the enlisted soldier – meaning, that 18 to 22 year old kid brought into the military, because war is a young person’s game – need close supervision by a college-educated officer, so that the young soldier can be kept out of trouble. But, while young adults, far from home for the first time, getting into trouble is a given despite supervision, that is not the real reason.

The real reason the establishment and their commissioned officers, is that unless the enlisted troops are closely monitored, they will invariably “go off script”. Case in point: Faustin Wirkus

…Or, if you prefer, King Faustin II of La Gonâve, Haiti.

Born in about 1896, Faustin Wirkus was born into a Polish family in Rypin, Poland, then part of the Russian Empire. In around 1905, the family moved to the coal country in Dupont, Pennsylvania. After a few years working in the coal fields as a child, in 1915 Wirkus enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, and was soon deployed to the island of Haiti, rising to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant by 1920.

The United States had intervened in Haiti in 1915, following a wild series of uprisings that had resulted in the lynching death of the then-President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, to – as always – “protect American interests”. The United States quickly established what amounted to a military dictatorship, administered by the US Marine Corps. Part of this administration involved recruiting a Gendarmerie that could be carefully trained as a kind of “lightweight military police”, to keep the island under control and to hunt down bandits and rebels.

U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. Haiti, circa 1919. Department of the Navy photo, 1919. Public Domain.

 

Haiti, unlike today, had a very credible military reputation. After throwing off the yoke of French colonial oppression in 1804, Port-au-Prince decided to flex its muscle as the Spanish Empire began to collapse, invading and conquering the neighboring Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (the modern Dominican Republic) in 1822. Haiti’s 20-odd year rule over Santo Domingo was so brutal, that February 27 is celebrated as the day Dominicans finally overthrew Haitian rule, and gained their independence.

Following this, Haiti began its downward spiral, resulting in the collapse in 1915, that led the United States to intervene.

Following his basic training, Faustin Wikus was deployed to the island in 1915 as part of the “Advanced Base Force“, and was assigned to the “Haitian Constabulary” (the formal name for the Gendarmerie) in 1918. The Gendarmerie’s first US commander was the legendary Smedley Butler, then a Major in the Marine Corps, making it no surprise that the Gendarmerie’s all-Black Shooting Team went on to take Olympic Bronze in the Men’s Free Rifle Team event at the 1924 Paris Olympics.

Wirkus, meanwhile, apparently fell in love with Haiti, and worked hard to try and help stabilize the country. Because of how the Gendarmerie was organized, many enlisted Marines were given commissions as officers in the Constabulary, leading small units of native Gendarmes.

It was in this capacity that Wirkus eventually arrived at La Gonâve Island, in 1926. While there is some conjecture – nearly one hundred years on, hampered be scanty records – Wirkus came into contact with a woman named Ti Memenne. Recognized locally as a “tribal queen”, which was a position not recognized by the nation’s republican government, she was apparently arrested for “trivial voodoo offences“, where it seems that she came into contact with Wirkus for the first time, with him aiding in her release from custody.

When Wirkus (apparently volunteering on his own in late-June or early-July of 1926) was sent to La Gonâve to assume command of the Constabulary unit there, he had apparently made such an impression on Queen Ti Memenne, that she convined her subjects that he was the reincarnation of Faustin Soloque, the first (and last) Emperor of the Second Empire of Haiti…and then convinced them to agree that Wirkus should be crowned as King Faustin II, Co-Monarch of La Gonâve in a Voodoo ceremony.

Queen Ti Memenne (L) and GySgt Faustin Wirkus (R), on La Gonâve Island, c.1927. Unknown USMC Photographer. Public Domain.

 

Well, then.

Wirkus went on to “rule” the island until 1929, when he was removed from the island and transffered back to the United States, proper. Apparently, Wirkus’ efficiency at ruling the island had cut too deeply into the corruption kickbacks Haitian politicians were extracting from the island. The United States government was only too happy to comply with this request, because the idea of a US enlisted man ruling as a “king” of a foreign island while still on active duty, was very unpopular…”alarming”, even.

Wirkus subsequently left the Marine Corps in 1931, and did a stint on the speaking circuit, giving talks about his time as the “White King of La Gonâve“. Then, with war looming again in 1939, Wirkus reenlisted in the Marine Corps, serving first as a recruiter, then as a gunnery instructor, eventually rising to the dual ranks of Warrant Officer [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_officer] and Marine Gunner [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_gunner] for aviation gunnery.

Faustin Wirkus fell ill in January of 1945, and passed away on October 8th of that year. He was survived by his wife, Yula, and his son – Faustin, Jr. – who went on to serve in the Marine Corps as a helicopter pilot.

So. What does the story of Faustin Wirkus teach us?

Primarily, that enlisted troops – and especially Marines – are hyper unpredictable. Give them a clear goal, and they will do whatever is necessary to make it work.

Whatever. Is. Necessary.

And for the Establishment, that is not a good thing – after all, if some unlettered, uncouth enlisted critter can accomplish national goals with minimal supervision, why do their own high-society positions and privilege need to exist? I mean, how can their friends skim off the top of contracts, when some 25 year-old kid with a high school diploma, an attitude, a hangover and a coffee pot can do a better job, faster and more efficiently?

While the foregoing statement is rather “tongue in cheek”, it really isn’t, because it is very real – after all, how the hell can the Ivy League alumni expect to shave off hundreds of millions of dollars of money deducted from the troop’s pay to fund mess hall menus, leaving them eating lima beans and toast for “Thanksgiving Dinner”…assuming that the mess hall is even open? Because the $460 per month deducted from the troop’s pay to fund the mess halls on-post comes to $115 per week – I don’t know about you, but I can eat pretty well on $115 a week, including steak and shrimp…assuming that I can use a hot plate in the barracks – which on most bases, you can’t do.

Because you can eat at the mess hall. You know – dining on lima beans and toast.

And that’s LONG before we talk about telling troops to fix and repair their own barracks – It’s almost like there is little, if any, need for contracting with civilian companies to do anything beyond making weapons, ammunition and gear…and maybe uniforms. Maybe.

U.S. Marines with Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, show Brig. Gen. Andrew M. Niebel, the commanding general of 1st MLG, how they patch holes in the barracks during Operation Clean Sweep at Camp Pendleton, California, Oct. 16, 2024. LCpl Deja Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps photo. Public Domain.

 

And this extends to security, because as the recent mass shooting at Fort Stewart, GA shows, troops trained to handle some of the most lethal weapons on the planet cannot be trusted to go about armed to protect themselves from either jilted lovers or, you know, terrorists.

And believe me when I say that this has been the norm on US military bases for decades.

Feel safe?

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

War Economics in the Shadows

 

 

 



 

Wars require money, in some form. Combatants have to buy weapons, ammunition, food, vehicles, fuel, spare parts, lay down bribes for intelligence and suborning various people, and medical supplies, along with just simple tools…and that’s before we talk about whether they actually pay their fightersd.

In the shadowy realm of contemporary warfare, the most destructive conflicts are increasingly those where the combatants get their war chests filled by distant, foreign capitals. From Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression to Yemen’s devastating civil war, proxy conflicts have become the preferred method of great power competition — offering what military strategists euphemistically callquick, relatively cheap and low-risk options for the continuation of policy aims“.

Proxy warfare has evolved from Cold War-era confrontations into a sophisticated financial enterprise that operates through complex networks of state sponsors, shell companies, and illicit economic activities. As Foreign Policy columnist Emma Ashford observed, proxy wars have become a preferred method of great power competition, allowing major powers to exert influence while maintaining plausible deniability. Understanding the financial mechanisms that sustain these conflicts is crucial for comprehending modern geopolitical dynamics and developing effective countermeasures.

Yet behind every proxy war lies a complex economic ecosystem that determines not just who fights, but how long they can sustain the violence. Understanding these financial networks reveals uncomfortable truths about modern warfare: conflicts are increasingly about economic endurance rather than battlefield tactics, and the nations writing the checks often have more control over outcomes than the soldiers pulling triggers.

 

The State Funding Model: Direct Government Support

The most straightforward financing mechanism involves direct state funding of proxy forces. President Vladimir Putin’s extraordinary admission in June 2023 revealed that “the financing of the entire Wagner group was fully ensured by the State,” with the Russian Defense Ministry pouring nearly $1 billion into Wagner operations from May 2022 to May 2023. This disclosure shattered decades of Kremlin denials and provided unprecedented insight into how major powers fund their proxy operations.

No nation has perfected the economics of proxy warfare quite like Iran. Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” represents perhaps history’s most sophisticated proxy financing operation, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force managing an estimated budget exceeding $1 billion annually for terrorist financing. This staggering sum supports between 140,000 and 185,000 proxy fighters across Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen.

Groups that are part of the “Axis of Resistance”. 2024 image via Kaliper1. CCA/2.5

Iran represents perhaps the most systematic state-sponsored proxy financing network. The U.S. State Department estimated that Iran spent more than $16 billion supporting the Assad regime and its proxies between 2012 and 2020. In 2020 alone, Iran funneled more than $700 million to Hezbollah, while providing more than $100 million annually to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These massive transfers occur through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which serves as Tehran’s primary mechanism for financing proxy operations across the Middle East.

The scale of Iran’s investment becomes clear when examining individual recipients. Hezbollah alone receives more than $700 million annually from Tehran, a sum that dwarfs the entire defense budgets of many small nations. As Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah candidly admitted in 2016: “Hezbollah’s budget, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran’s proxy economics operate on multiple levels simultaneously. Beyond direct cash transfers, Tehran provides weapons manufacturing capabilities, enabling proxies to achieve self-sufficiency while maintaining plausible deniability. In Syria, Iran helped organize, train, and fund over 100,000 Shia fighters, demonstrating how proxy economics can scale to conventional warfare levels when strategic interests demand it.

The sophistication of Iran’s financial network became apparent in 2016 when Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly announced that “all of his organization’s funding comes directly from Iran,” emphasizing that “the budget of Hizbullah, its salaries, its expenses, its food, its drink, its weapons, and its missiles come from the Islamic Republic of Iran“. This funding bypasses traditional banking systems, with Nasrallah confirming that transfers occur directly, “not through banks and other financial institutions”.

The Iranian model reveals a crucial economic principle: proxy wars succeed when sponsors can provide “stable and ample funding” while maintaining political control over their assets. Tehran achieves this through what former CIA analyst Norman Roule describes as controlling “their weaponry, their funding and significant political relationships with their key leaders”.

 

Economic Integration and Development Funding

China has pioneered a more sophisticated approach through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which launched in 2013 with the Silk Road Fund’s $40 billion initial capital. While ostensibly focused on infrastructure development, analysts worry that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development and military expansion. The program’s dual-use potential becomes apparent through [debt-trap diplomacy, where China allegedly uses unsustainable loans to gain leverage over debtor governments.

A 2021 study analyzed over one hundred debt financing contracts China signed with foreign governments and found that the contracts often contain clauses that restrict restructuring with the Paris Club, providing Beijing with significant leverage over partner nations. This economic influence can be converted into military access, as demonstrated by China’s naval base in Djibouti, which many observers see as the first of many potential military expansions.

 

The Technology Transfer Economy

Modern proxy warfare increasingly revolves around technology transfer rather than simple arms sales. The Iran-North Korea weapons pipeline exemplifies this evolution, with both nations sharing ballistic missile technology, submarine designs, and nuclear expertise. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile closely resembles North Korea’s Hawasong-14, while satellite imagery suggests Iranian technical expertise contributed to North Korean missile silo construction.

This technological cooperation creates self-sustaining proxy economies. Rather than remaining dependent on foreign suppliers, proxies gradually develop indigenous capabilities. Iran has mastered this approach, transferring not just weapons but “the means of production and modification to enable independent manufacturing” to its proxy network.

The economic advantages are compelling. Technology transfer builds redundancy of supply, reduces shipping risks, enhances deniability, and creates local employment that strengthens proxy loyalty. For sponsors, it represents a long-term investment strategy that pays dividends far beyond any single conflict.

 

The Ukrainian Counter-Model: Coalition Economics

Ukraine’s defense against Russian invasion illustrates a different proxy economic model—multilateral coalition funding. Rather than relying on a single sponsor, Ukraine has assembled a diverse funding coalition including the United States, European Union, individual NATO members, and unexpected participants like Japan and South Korea.

This approach offers both advantages and vulnerabilities. Coalition funding can provide massive resource flows — U.S. assistance alone has exceeded $350 billion according to various estimates. However, it also creates dependency on multiple political systems with different priorities and election cycles. As U.S. support becomes uncertain under changing administrations, the sustainability of coalition-funded proxy warfare faces its ultimate test.

Japan and South Korea’s involvement demonstrates how proxy economics extend beyond traditional security partnerships. Both nations provide substantial non-lethal aid while “replenishing U.S. weapons stocks, supplying the United States with artillery shells and thereby freeing up Washington’s ability to send shells to Ukraine.” This creates layered economic relationships where allies subsidize great power proxy warfare indirectly.

 

The Russian Adaptation: Sanctions and Substitution

Russia’s proxy economic strategy has evolved dramatically under international sanctions pressure. Traditional funding mechanisms disrupted, Moscow has increasingly relied on partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to sustain both its direct war effort and proxy relationships. China provides crucial economic support that enables Russia to withstand Western sanctions, while Iran supplies drones and North Korea provides ammunition and even troops.

This adaptation reveals how proxy economics adjust to pressure. When conventional funding channels close, sponsors develop alternative networks. Russia’s use of Wagner Group mercenaries represented an attempt to privatize proxy relationships, creating plausible deniability while maintaining operational control. The Wagner model failed primarily due to political rather than economic factors, but its brief success demonstrated the potential for corporate proxy structures.

 

Escalation Economics

Perhaps most concerning is how proxy war economics influence conflict escalation. Traditional deterrence theory assumes rational actors will avoid escalation due to increasing costs. However, proxy warfare inverts this logic. As former CIA analyst Norman Roule observes, Iran operates as “an arsonist that then subcontracts out to other arsonists”, empowering proxies with resources while maintaining strategic distance.

This creates moral hazard problems where proxies may escalate beyond their sponsor’s intentions, confident that economic support will continue. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel exemplifies this dynamic—Iran provided the economic foundation enabling Hamas capability, but the timing and scale caught Tehran off-guard, demonstrating how proxy economics can enable conflicts that spiral beyond original parameters.

 

Resource Extraction and Illicit Trade

Proxy groups increasingly finance their operations through control of natural resources and illicit trade networks. The U.S. Treasury Department revealed in 2023 that Wagner Group entities in the Central African Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Russia engaged in illicit gold dealings to fund Wagner operations. These operations involve sophisticated shell company networks, with Wagner using companies like Midas and Diamville to convert CAR-origin gold into U.S. dollars.

The U.S. Treasury Department exposed a convoluted Iranian illicit financing scheme in 2018 where Hezbollah officials, working with Iranian operatives and Russian companies, facilitated shipment of millions of barrels of Iranian oil to the Assad regime. The Assad regime would then transfer hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to the IRGC-QF, which distributed funds to Hamas and Hezbollah. In one documented transaction, a Hezbollah official confirmed receipt of $63 million as part of this oil-for-terror scheme.

 

The Sustainability Question

Ultimately, proxy war economics succeed or fail based on sustainability. Iran’s model works because oil revenues provide consistent funding streams relatively insulated from international pressure. Coalition models like Ukraine’s support depend on sustained political will across multiple democracies—a more fragile foundation.

The economic lessons are clear: modern conflicts are won by whichever side can maintain funding longest, not necessarily whichever side fights best. This reality transforms strategy from tactical to economic, making treasury departments as important as defense ministries in determining conflict outcomes. As proxy wars become the dominant form of great power competition, understanding their economic foundations becomes essential for anticipating tomorrow’s conflicts—and their likely victors.

 

Private Sector and Diaspora Financing

Proxy organizations also tap into private funding sources and diaspora communities. Hezbollah has relied on funding from the Shi’ite Lebanese Diaspora in West Africa, the United States, and the Triple Frontier region along the junction of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. These networks often operate through legitimate businesses and charities that serve as fronts for money laundering operations.

The United States has sanctioned numerous charities and front companies for providing financial support to proxy groups, including the Holy Land Foundation, which was designated in 2001 for providing millions of dollars annually to Hamas. These sanctions have had limited effectiveness, as current U.S. sanctions have not significantly impacted Iran’s relationships with its proxies.

 

Banking and Financial System Exploitation

Modern proxy financing relies heavily on exploiting legitimate financial institutions. A C4ADS report on leaked Wagner documents showed that without legitimate financial institutions such as JP Morgan Chase and HSBC as intermediaries, the Wagner Group would not have been able to establish a foothold in Africa. In 2017, the Sudanese Mining company Meroe Gold, acting as a shell company for Wagner, used JP Morgan Chase to process payments to sellers in China.

Iran has developed sophisticated methods to circumvent banking sanctions. The U.S. designated Bank Saderat in 2006 for facilitating transfers of hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, new financial networks continuously emerge to replace sanctioned institutions.

 

Government-to-Government Contracts

Some proxy financing occurs through legitimate government contracts that provide plausible cover for military support. Putin revealed that Wagner received contracts worth billions of rubles, including payments from governments who hired Wagner services, such as the Malian government, which reportedly paid Wagner more than $10 million each month. These arrangements allow both parties to maintain the fiction that the services being provided are purely commercial rather than military.

 

A Brave, New World

The financing of proxy warfare presents significant challenges for international security and governance. As noted by RAND Corporation analysts, geopolitical drivers of proxy warfare can often be self-reinforcing, with states able to develop proxy warfare capabilities very quickly, within a couple of years. The financial networks supporting these capabilities are equally adaptable, evolving new methods to circumvent sanctions and detection.

Recent developments suggest that proxy warfare financing will continue to evolve with the global financial system. Cryptocurrency, digital payment systems, and new forms of economic integration provide both opportunities and challenges for states seeking to fund proxy operations while maintaining deniability.

The complexity of modern proxy war financing reflects the broader evolution of international conflict, where economic warfare, information operations, and traditional military action converge in ways that challenge conventional approaches to conflict resolution and accountability. Understanding these financial mechanisms is essential for policymakers seeking to address the root causes of contemporary global instability.

…Money makes the world go ’round – it also helps to burn it.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Operation Gladio: NATO’s Secret Army and the Cold War’s Hidden Front

 

 

 

 



In the shadowy world of Cold War espionage, few programs were as extensive — or as controversial — as Operation Gladio, NATO’s clandestine network of “stay-behind” forces designed to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. What began as a reasonable defensive precaution evolved into a decades-long covert operation that would eventually raise profound questions about democratic oversight, government accountability, and the thin line between national security and state-sponsored terrorism.

Origins in Wartime Necessity

The concept of stay-behind forces emerged from the bitter lessons of World War II, when resistance movements across Nazi-occupied Europe demonstrated both the potential and the limitations of guerrilla warfare against occupying forces. As the Iron Curtain descended across Europe in the late 1940s, Western intelligence services faced a stark reality: the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional superiority meant that any Soviet invasion would likely overrun Western Europe’s conventional defenses within days.

Soviet tanks near Odessa, April 1944. Red Army, USSR, photo. Public Domain.

The solution, conceived jointly by the CIA and Britain’s MI6, was elegantly simple in theory: pre-position trained personnel, weapons caches, and communication equipment throughout Western Europe to serve as the nucleus of resistance movements should the worst occur. These stay-behind units would conduct sabotage operations, gather intelligence, and coordinate with NATO forces attempting to liberate occupied territory.

The formal structure began with the Western Union’s Clandestine Committee (WUCC) in 1948, which was subsequently integrated into NATO as the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) in 1951. By 1958, NATO had established the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) to coordinate secret warfare operations across member nations.

Named after the double-edged gladius sword of Roman legionaries, Operation Gladio was officially established in 1956, though its roots stretched back to the immediate postwar period. The program’s existence was kept secret not only from the Soviet Union but from most Western European populations and even many of their elected officials.

The Network Expands

What made Gladio unique was its scope and sophistication. Unlike ad hoc resistance movements that formed spontaneously during wartime, these were professionally organized networks with carefully selected personnel, standardized equipment, and regular training exercises. Each participating NATO country maintained its own stay-behind organization: Gladio in Italy, Absalon in Denmark, P26 in Switzerland, ROC in Norway, I&O in the Netherlands, SDRA8 in Belgium, and similar networks in Germany, France, Austria, Greece, and Turkey.

The typical Gladio cell consisted of 10-15 individuals, often recruited from military special forces, intelligence services, or civilian volunteers with particular skills—radio operators, demolitions experts, former resistance fighters. These operatives underwent intensive training in sabotage techniques, covert communications, and survival skills, often at secret facilities in NATO countries or neutral territories.

Weapons caches were carefully concealed throughout the countryside—buried in forests, hidden in caves, stored in seemingly abandoned buildings, and secured in underground bunkers scattered across mountain locations. The arsenal was impressive and comprehensive: automatic weapons, explosives, pistols, ammunition, knives, navigation equipment, spy radios, guerrilla warfare manuals, specialized assassination weapons, and emergency supplies including brandy and chocolate. Cache discoveries as late as 1996 revealed the true scope of the program. In Italy alone, investigators discovered 622 hidden weapons dumps containing everything from machine guns to anti-tank rockets, demonstrating the massive scale of NATO’s secret preparations.

American officer and French partisan crouch behind an auto during a street fight in a French city, 1944. US Army photo. Public Domain.

According to former CIA Director William Colby, who oversaw Scandinavian operations, these networks required careful coordination with NATO planning, radio communications linked to potential government-in-exile locations, and specialized equipment secured from the CIA. The operation extended beyond traditional NATO boundaries, with CIA support for anti-communist movements in Ukraine and covert operations in the Baltic countries.

The Strategy Behind the Shadows

From a strategic perspective, Gladio represented a form of deterrence through promised resistance. Soviet military planners would have to factor in not just the immediate costs of conquering Western Europe, but the ongoing expense of occupying territories where trained guerrillas could strike at supply lines, assassination key collaborators, and gather intelligence for NATO counterattacks.

This strategy drew heavily from successful resistance operations during World War II, particularly the French Resistance and Yugoslav partisans, while attempting to avoid their primary weaknesses: poor coordination with Allied forces, inadequate equipment, and security vulnerabilities that led to mass arrests.

The program also served intelligence-gathering functions during peacetime. Stay-behind operatives were positioned to monitor communist activities, track potential collaborators, and maintain surveillance on strategic targets. This dual-purpose nature would later prove controversial when allegations emerged that some units engaged in domestic political surveillance beyond their official mandate.

The Italian Revelation and Gladio Exposed

The existence of these networks remained one of the Cold War’s most closely guarded secrets until 1990, when Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti revealed the existence of Gladio to the Italian Senate. His disclosure was prompted by the discovery of a 1959 document from Italy’s military intelligence service SIFAR, titled “The special forces of SIFAR and Operation Gladio,” which detailed the secret army’s NATO connections and CIA training.

Andreotti’s revelation described Gladio as “the Italian branch of an international network of secret stay-behind armies that existed in all countries of Western Europe.” The Italian press called it “the best kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II”.

The Strategy of Tension Controversy

The most controversial aspect of Operation Gladio involves allegations that stay-behind networks became entangled with domestic terrorism during Italy’s “Years of Lead” (1968-1982). This period saw over 14,000 politically motivated attacks, including bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings by both far-left groups like the Red Brigades and far-right organizations such as Ordine Nuovo.

Critics, particularly Swiss academic Daniele Ganser, argue that Gladio networks participated in a “strategy of tension” designed to prevent communist parties from gaining power by conducting false flag operations that could be blamed on left-wing groups. Key incidents cited include the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan, which killed 17 people, and the 1980 Bologna railway station bombing that killed 85.

The interior of the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura in Piazza Fontana, Milan, after it was bombed in 1969. RAI photo. Public Domain.

The strategy of tension theory suggests that right-wing terrorism was designed to create public fear and drive voters toward authoritarian solutions. As Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga observed about the Bologna bombing: “Unlike leftist terrorism, which strikes at the heart of the state through its representatives, right-wing terrorism prefers acts such as massacres because acts of extreme violence promote panic and impulsive reactions”.

International Response and Investigations

Following Gladio’s exposure, the European Parliament passed a resolution on November 22, 1990, condemning “the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks” and calling for full investigation into these secret organizations. The resolution specifically protested “the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network”.

However, only Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland conducted parliamentary investigations into their respective networks. The George H.W. Bush administration refused to comment on the revelations, maintaining official silence about U.S. involvement.

Global Implications

While Gladio focused on Europe, the United States simultaneously developed similar programs worldwide. In Asia, the CIA created stay-behind networks in countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In Latin America, comparable programs supported anti-communist forces throughout the region.

These operations reflected a fundamental Cold War reality: the nuclear stalemate meant that much of the actual conflict would be fought through proxies, covert operations, and what would later be termed “hybrid warfare.” Stay-behind networks represented the defensive complement to more aggressive covert operations like the Bay of Pigs invasion or support for Afghan mujahideen.

The philosophical underpinning was straightforward: democratic governments had not just the right but the obligation to prepare for scenarios where normal constitutional processes might be suspended by foreign occupation. The question that would later haunt these programs was whether such extraordinary measures could be contained within democratic norms during peacetime, or whether they inevitably created parallel power structures accountable to no one.

The legacy of Operation Gladio continues to influence contemporary debates about government surveillance, covert operations, and the balance between security and transparency in democratic societies.

The Historical Debate

The true nature and extent of Gladio’s activities remain subjects of intense historical debate. The U.S. State Department has acknowledged the existence of NATO stay-behind efforts and Italy’s Gladio specifically, confirming their purpose as resistance preparation against potential Soviet aggression. However, American officials firmly deny any U.S. involvement in terrorism, characterizing allegations of false flag operations as Cold War-era Soviet disinformation.

Critics of the conspiracy theories point to the reliance on questionable documents, particularly the alleged U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B, which the State Department claims is a Soviet forgery designed to discredit American intelligence operations.

Legacy and Contemporary Relevance

Operation Gladio’s legacy extends far beyond its Cold War origins. The revelations fundamentally altered public understanding of post-war European history, demonstrating how deeply intelligence operations could penetrate democratic societies. The networks were never called upon to resist Soviet invasion, as the threat they were designed to counter ultimately never materialized.

The operation raises enduring questions about the balance between national security and democratic oversight, the accountability of intelligence agencies, and the potential for covert operations to exceed their original mandates. Whether Gladio remained purely a defensive contingency or evolved into something more sinister continues to divide historians and fuel conspiracy theories decades after its exposure.

What remains undisputed is that NATO and Western intelligence agencies maintained extensive secret networks throughout the Cold War, equipped with weapons and trained in unconventional warfare, operating largely outside democratic oversight. The full truth about their activities may never be completely known, ensuring that Operation Gladio remains one of the Cold War’s most intriguing and controversial legacies.

…The real question is: Are these networks still out there, on their own?

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

 

Somalia Is Unraveling: Al-Shabaab’s Siege of Mogadishu and the Specter of State Collapse

 

 



Introduction

The ancient nation of Somalia occupied a pivotal position in the ancient Indian Ocean trading network during Roman times, serving as a crucial intermediary between the Mediterranean world and the riches of Asia. The Somali coast, known to classical geographers as part of the “Land of Punt” and later “Barbarikon“, provided essential ports of call for merchants navigating the monsoon winds between Roman Egypt and India.

Somali traders controlled access to valuable aromatic resins, particularly frankincense and myrrh, which were harvested from the Boswellia and Commiphora trees, respectively, both of which are native to the region. These precious commodities were in enormous demand throughout the Roman Empire for religious ceremonies, medical applications, and luxury consumption. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a first-century maritime trading manual, describes numerous Somali ports including Malao, Mundus, and Mosylon, detailing the goods available and trading protocols.

Map of the routes of the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (1st century CE). 2007 map by PHGCOM. CCA/4.0

 

Beyond aromatics, Somalia served as a transshipment point for goods flowing between Africa’s interior and Asian markets. Gold, ivory, and exotic animals from the African hinterland passed through Somali ports en route to Roman and Indian merchants, while manufactured goods, textiles, and spices from India and Southeast Asia were distributed along the East African coast. This strategic position made Somali city-states wealthy intermediaries in a trade network that connected three continents and sustained the luxury economy of the Roman Empire.

 

Somalia’s Italian Colonial Years (1889-1960)

Somalia’s Italian colonial period began in the 1880’s when Italy gradually secured much of the territory through a series of protection treaties, with formal control established in 1889 when the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and Italy signed the Treaty of Wuchale. In 1885, Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the sultans of Obbia and Caluula, who placed their territories under Italy’s protection.

Unlike other European colonial powers, Italy initially struggled to establish effective control over the vast, arid territory. Starting in the 1890s, the Bimaal and Wa’dan revolts near Merca marked the beginning of Somali resistance to Italian expansion, coinciding with the rise of the anti-colonial Dervish movement in the north. The most dramatic upheaval occurred in British Somaliland, where the uprising led by Mohammed ibn Abdullah Hassan (known to the British as the Mad Mullah) took two decades to suppress.

The colonial administration focused primarily on the southern agricultural regions, establishing banana and cotton plantations along the Shebelle and Juba rivers. Effective Italian control remained largely limited to the coastal areas until the early 1920s, and by the end of 1927, following a two-year military campaign against Somali rebels, Rome finally asserted authority over the entirety of Italian Somaliland.

Italian rule intensified under Fascist governance after 1922. A new era of conflict began in Somalia in 1923 with the arrival of the first governor appointed by Mussolini, when a vigorous policy was adopted to develop and extend Italian imperial interests. Under the first fascist governor Cesare Maria De Vecchi (1923–1928), the colonial state planned ambitious policies of agricultural and infrastructural expansion, with the goal of preparing for the military conquest of neighboring Ethiopia.

In 1936, the region was integrated into Italian East Africa as the Somalia Governorate, which lasted until Italy’s loss of the region in 1941 during the East African campaign of World War II. By February 1942, most of Italian Somaliland had been captured by the British, and Italian Somalia was under British administration until 1949.

Following the war, Italian Somaliland became a United Nations trusteeship known as the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian administration from 1950 to 1960, with legislative elections held in 1956 and 1959. On November 21, 1949, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence.

On July 1, 1960, the Trust Territory of Somalia united with former British Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, with Mogadishu as the nation’s capital. The Italian colonial legacy left lasting impacts on Somali society, including architectural influences visible in Mogadishu today, agricultural techniques, administrative structures, and the Italian language, which was an official language during the Fiduciary Mandate and in the first years of independence, with the majority of Somalis having some understanding of the language by 1952.

 

The Fall of Siad Barre

Beginning with the 1969 seizure of power by Siad Barre, the country spent some twenty-one years under his iron-fisted dictatorship, until growing resistance to his military junta during the 1980s, eventually boiling over into all-out civil war. From 1988 to 1990, the Somali Armed Forces engaged in combat against various armed rebel groups, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the northeast, the Somali National Movement in the northwest, and the United Somali Congress in the south.

Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, c.1970. Public Domain.

 

The rebellion effectively began in 1978 following a failed coup d’état, when Barre began using his special forces, the “Red Berets,” to attack clan-based dissident groups opposed to his regime. The regime’s brutality intensified in 1988 with systematic human rights abuses and genocide against the Isaaq clan, resulting in up to 200,000 civilians killed and 500,000 refugees fleeing to Ethiopia.

In response to these humanitarian abuses, Western aid donors cut funding to the Somali regime, resulting in a rapid “retreat of the state,” accompanied by severe devaluation of the Somali Shilling and mass military desertion. On January 27, 1991, pressure from the United Somali Congress and other groups ultimately forced President Barre to flee Somalia, ending his dictatorship and plunging the country into civil war.

 

Operation Gothic Serpent and the Battle of Mogadishu

Following the United States’ 1992 intervention in Somalia in “Operation Provide Comfort“, to protect food distribution to the population, a shift began under the newly-elected Clinton administration, in mid-1993. This shift led to the United States leading what became known as “UNOSOM II” (United Nations Operation in Somalia II), an ill-advised attempt at forcible “nation-building“, with foregin nations attempting to impose “peace and unity” in an internally-warring nation at gunpoint.

Operation Gothic Serpent, launched in August 1993, represented the United States’ most significant military intervention in Somalia during the height of the civil war. The operation aimed to capture faction leader Mohamed Farrah Aidid, whose forces had killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers and were disrupting humanitarian aid distribution.

The mission culminated in the October 3-4, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, when U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force operators attempted to capture key Aidid lieutenants in the city center. The operation went catastrophically wrong when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades, trapping American forces in hostile territory.

Members of Task Force Ranger under fire in Somalia, October 3, 1993 — the Battle of Mogadishu. U.S. Army Rangers Photo. Public Domain.

 

During the 15-hour firefight that followed, 18 American soldiers were killed and 73 wounded, while Somali casualties numbered in the hundreds. The graphic images of dead American servicemen being dragged through Mogadishu’s streets shocked the American public and led directly to U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in March 1994.

The incident profoundly influenced U.S. foreign policy for years, contributing to American reluctance to intervene in subsequent humanitarian crises, including the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The battle became emblematic of the challenges facing international intervention in failed states.

 

The Return of the Terror State

Somalia now stands on the precipice of complete state collapse as Al-Shabaab militants have encircled the capital of Mogadishu in what analysts are calling the most serious threat to the government since the height of the civil war in the 1990’s. The terrorist organization’s lightning offensive, launched in February 2025, has shattered the fragile gains made by international forces over the past decade and returned the specter of jihadist control to the Horn of Africa.

VBIED attack by Al-Shabaab on base controlled by Ethiopian security forces, 2022. Al-Kataib Media Foundation. Public Domain.

 

The scale of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence cannot be overstated. From launching coordinated attacks across multiple provinces to capturing strategic towns within 30 kilometers of Mogadishu, the group has demonstrated a tactical sophistication and operational capability that has caught both the Somali government and international partners off guard. What began as seemingly isolated assaults on February 20, 2025, has evolved into a systematic campaign to strangle the capital and force the collapse of the federal government.

The terrorists have employed a multi-pronged strategy combining conventional military tactics with asymmetric warfare, utilizing car bombs, infiltration operations, and terror attacks to maximize psychological impact while minimizing their own exposure to counterstrikes. Their capture of Adan Yabaal on April 16th marked a particular turning point, as this strategic town had served as a crucial staging area for government counteroffensives.

 

A Regional Terror Network

Al-Shabaab’s current offensive represents more than a localized insurgency; it exemplifies the group’s evolution into a transnational terrorist organization capable of projecting power far beyond Somalia’s borders. This transformation was starkly illustrated in the January 15, 2019 attack on Nairobi’s DusitD2 hotel complex, which demonstrated Al-Shabaab’s expanding operational reach and recruitment capabilities.

The DusitD2 attack, marking the rise of “Obiwan Nairobi“, was particularly significant as it marked a strategic shift in Al-Shabaab’s methodology. Unlike previous operations that relied heavily on ethnic Somali operatives, the five-man terrorist cell that carried out the Nairobi assault included Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent, including a suicide bomber from the coastal city of Mombasa. The 20-hour siege resulted in 21 deaths and 28 injuries, representing Kenya’s worst terrorist attack in four years.

What made the DusitD2 attack particularly alarming for counterterrorism officials was the extensive planning involved. Security footage revealed that Al-Shabaab operatives had been conducting surveillance of the target since at least December 2016, demonstrating a level of operational security and long-term planning that suggested significant organizational sophistication. The attack also revealed the group’s ability to recruit from within Kenya’s security establishment, as one of the attackers was identified as the son of a Kenyan military officer.

 

The Collapse of International Strategy

The current crisis exposes the fundamental failure of the international community’s approach to Somalia over the past two decades. The transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and subsequently to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), has created critical security gaps that Al-Shabaab has ruthlessly exploited.

The timing of Al-Shabaab’s offensive was no coincidence. Launched just weeks after the ATMIS-to-AUSSOM transition on January 1, 2025, the attacks capitalized on coordination problems, reduced troop levels, and uncertain funding for the new mission. The group’s ability to “launch around 50 percent more attacks per month in 2025 compared to its 2024 average” demonstrates how effectively they have exploited this institutional vulnerability.

Compounding these challenges is the reduction in U.S. support under the Trump administration. American assistance to Somalia’s elite Danab special forces has been curtailed, including the cessation of salary supplements that had doubled soldiers’ pay from $200 to $400 per month. This has severely impacted morale and combat effectiveness of the only units that had previously proven capable of matching Al-Shabaab in direct confrontation.

 

The Siege Strategy

Al-Shabaab’s current approach reflects lessons learned from recent insurgent successes worldwide, particularly the Taliban’s 2021 conquest of Afghanistan and the Syrian opposition’s rapid advance on Damascus in 2024. Rather than attempting a direct assault on Mogadishu that would allow government forces to concentrate their remaining strengths, the terrorists have opted for a siege strategy designed to slowly strangle the capital.

By controlling the major roads and supply routes into Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab can gradually increase pressure on the city’s three million inhabitants while conducting a psychological warfare campaign through bombings, mortar attacks, and assassination attempts. The March 18th bombing of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade, which killed four people while narrowly missing the president himself, exemplifies this strategy of creating a climate of terror while systematically degrading government capabilities ([source]()).

 

International Response and Turkish Gambit

As traditional Western partners have reduced their commitments, Somalia has increasingly turned to Turkey for military assistance. Ankara has announced plans to nearly triple its deployment to 800 soldiers, including 300 commandos and 200 drone operators, while also securing lucrative contracts for port and airport operations in Mogadishu. This represents a significant shift in regional power dynamics as Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa.

The new terminal of Aden Abdulle International Airport built by Turkish companies in Mogadishu, Somalia. January 25, 2015 AMISOM Photo by Ilyas Ahmed. CC0/1.0 Universal Public Domain.

 

However, Turkey’s intervention faces the same fundamental challenges that have plagued international efforts in Somalia for decades: the inability of foreign forces to address the underlying governance failures that have made the country vulnerable to extremist exploitation in the first place.

 

The Looming Catastrophe

Current trajectory suggests Somalia is heading toward a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. With nearly 6 million people already requiring humanitarian assistance and 4.6 million facing acute food insecurity, the collapse of government control in Mogadishu would create a crisis that could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

Al-Shabaab’s vision extends far beyond Somalia’s borders. The group has never concealed its ambition to establish a caliphate encompassing all of East Africa, making their current advance on Mogadishu not just a threat to Somalia but to regional stability. With their demonstrated capability to conduct sophisticated attacks like the DusitD2 operation and their growing recruitment networks across the region, Al-Shabaab’s success in Somalia could serve as a launching pad for expanded terrorism throughout East Africa.

The international community faces a closing window to prevent a complete collapse of the Somali state. Without decisive action to reinforce Mogadishu’s defenses and address the fundamental governance challenges that have enabled Al-Shabaab’s rise, the world may soon witness the emergence of the first jihadist-controlled capital in Africa since the Taliban’s return to Kabul.

Somalia may now be a failed state, but the global community is at least trying to backstop the country…for the moment. But, in the current calculus of war around the world, the possibility of Somalia collapsing to Al-Shabaab, like Afghanistan to the Taliban, the possibility exists of a return to the “old days” of Somali piracy, up until 2012. This time, however, there are no easy answers for Western nations who rely on commercial vessels passing Somalia, but who – unlike post-2012 – are unable to juggle all the necessary theaters, making ignoring Somalia a very attractive, short-term proposition, in spite of the potential levels of economic damage.

This is also known as “whistling past the graveyard.”

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

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