Military vehicles develop slowly, and not in very predictable ways. Most of the time, the requirements for a military vehicle are largely divorced from what manufacturers actually come up with. However, sometimes, the stars align, and magic actually happens.
Case in point: the M113.
M113 crew firing their .50-caliber machine gun during South Vietnamese training exercise. US Army photo by PFC J.C. Rivera. Public Domain.
As World War 2 developed, the United States developed the M3 Half-Track, an odd – but highly effective – hybrid, with a wheeled front axel much like a truck, in front, with a “tracked” rear drive system that used what amounted to a very large rubber tire, stretched over a huge span.
While very strange, the M3 proved highly effective at everything from delivering infantry right behind the tanks, to light artillery, anti-aircraft and logistics, doubtless why some 38,000 ended up being produced. But, the half-track wasn’t perfect, and by the beginning of the 1950’s, the Army needed a replacement.
The M113 Armored Personnel Carrier stands as one of the most widely produced and utilized armored vehicles in military history, with its operational footprint spanning over six decades and more than 80 countries worldwide. The M113 is the unlikely gold standard for “battle taxis” arounf the world.
Since its introduction by Food Machinery Corporation (later United Defense) in 1960, the M113 has become synonymous with versatility, reliability, and adaptability in military operations across diverse theaters and conflict zones. While it can technically carry 11 troops, plus its 2-man crew, most current operators use an 8- or 9-man squad.
Originally developed to meet the U.S. Army’s requirement for a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier, one light enough to be air dropped, the M113 quickly demonstrated its value well beyond its initial design parameters. Two prototypes were initially produced, the aluminium-hulled T113 and the steel-hulled T114. The aluminum hull construction provided substantial weight savings compared to steel alternatives while maintaining adequate protection against small arms fire and artillery fragments. In contrast, the steel hulled design, owing to the severe weight restrictions set by the design targets, offered no greater protection than the aluminum hull. This lightweight design enabled the vehicle to achieve speeds of up to 42 mph on roads and maintain mobility across various terrains, from jungle environments to desert conditions.
US Army infantrymen armed with M16A1 rifles unload from an M113 armored personnel carrier during a training exercise, 1985. US Army photo. Public Domain.
The Vietnam War marked the M113’s combat debut and established its reputation for durability under harsh conditions. American forces employed thousands of M113s in Southeast Asia, where the vehicle’s amphibious capabilities proved invaluable in the Mekong Delta‘s waterlogged terrain. The “Green Dragon,” as it became known, served not only as a troop transport but also as a command post, ambulance, and fire support platform. Its aluminum armor, while initially questioned, demonstrated remarkable resistance to mines and improvised explosive devices, contributing to crew survivability rates that exceeded expectations.
International adoption of the M113 family has been unprecedented in armored vehicle history. Countries ranging from NATO allies to Middle Eastern nations, Asian powers, and African states have incorporated various M113 variants into their military arsenals. Australia, for instance, has operated M113s since the 1960’s and continues upgrading these platforms for modern operations. Similarly, nations like Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have maintained M113 fleets for decades, a testament to the platform’s capabilities in severe environments showing its enduring utility and cost-effectiveness.
The M113’s modular design has facilitated extensive variant development, with over 40 different “official” configurations currently documented. These include the M106 mortar carrier, M577 command post vehicle, M901 Improved TOW Vehicle, and M163 Vulcan Air Defense System; one variant, the M752, was built to launch the MGM-52 Lance tactical missile, which could launch nuclear warheads. This adaptability has allowed military forces to maximize their investment by utilizing a common chassis for multiple mission requirements, simplifying logistics, maintenance, and training procedures.
Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment drive an M-163 20mm Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system to a refueling area during Operation Desert Shield, c.1990-1991. US Army photo by SPC. Samuel Henry. Public Domain.
Production numbers underscore the M113’s global impact, with over 80,000 units manufactured across multiple production lines in the United States and licensed manufacturing facilities internationally. Countries including Italy, Turkey, and South Korea have produced their own variants, often incorporating indigenous modifications to meet specific operational requirements. This distributed production model has enhanced the platform’s accessibility and sustainability for allied nations.
Contemporary operations continue to validate the M113’s relevance in modern warfare. During conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, various nations deployed upgraded M113 variants equipped with enhanced armor packages, digital communication systems, and improved weapon stations. The platform’s relatively low signature and proven mechanical reliability have made it suitable for peacekeeping missions, border patrol duties, and domestic security operations.
The M113’s influence extends beyond traditional military applications. Law enforcement agencies, particularly SWAT teams and tactical units, have adopted surplus M113s for high-risk operations. Emergency services have converted these vehicles for disaster response, leveraging their mobility and protection in hazardous environments. This civilian adaptation demonstrates the platform’s fundamental design soundness and operational flexibility.
Modernization programs worldwide continue extending the M113’s service life well into the 21st century. Upgrade packages typically include improved armor protection, digital battlefield management systems, enhanced powertrains, and modernized weapon systems. Countries like Australia have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in comprehensive M113 upgrade programs, indicating long-term confidence in the platform’s viability.
Canadian Air-Defense, Anti-Tank System (ADATS), built on an M113 chassis, on display during the Royal Nova Scotia International Tattoo, 2008. Photo by Jonathon A.H., 2008. CCA/3.0
The M113’s legacy encompasses not only its direct military impact but also its influence on subsequent armored vehicle development. Design principles established with the M113 – including aluminum construction, amphibious capability, and modular architecture – have informed modern infantry fighting vehicle development programs worldwide.
Today, despite being supplemented or replaced by newer platforms in some applications, the M113 remains actively deployed across numerous conflict zones and operational theaters. Its combination of proven reliability, operational versatility, and cost-effectiveness ensures continued relevance in military inventories globally.
The M113’s near-seven decades of service represents an exceptional achievement in military vehicle design, establishing standards for durability and adaptability that continue influencing contemporary armored vehicle development. This enduring success reflects not merely engineering excellence but also a fundamental understanding of operational requirements that transcend technological generations.
Try as it has, the US Army has not been able to completely retire the M113, although it has, yet again, announced its imminent demise. Why is this the case? After all, the M113 was designed in the 1950’s, right? well, so was the AR-15, from which we got both the M16 and the M4, neither of which have been fully replaced, either.
The answer, then, is:
If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the military sphere, there is a great deal of ribbing and catcalling, both between different services of a nation’s armed forces, but also between the forces of different countries. For the most part, this ribbing is good-natured fun, especially when it is based on actual reality.
However, there has been a highly toxic level of mocking applied to the armed forces of France, a situation that has been getting worse over the last forty years.
The jokes abound – the beret being designed to facilitate surrender by not getting in the way of raising one’s hands; the notion of French tanks having more reverse gears than forward one; the idea that French genes could not be improved after World War 1 because American troops widely used prophylactics; and the idea that French rifles are excellent as surplus…because they were “only dropped once“…something applied to the Army of South Vietnam, as well.
It’s one thing, to make these jokes in actual jest. It is another thing entirely, when they become statements. Then, it’s no longer funny, but suicidally insulting.
In fact, the French military has maintained a track record of success on the battlefield for centuries. The source of these juvenile statements of inability only date from the Franco-Prussian War, and its catastrophic cost to the country. The military’s troubles in World War 1 came from holding the Imperial German Army at bay for three years, at a cost of 1.4 million casualties.
While the disaster of the openingof World War 2 led to France’s conquest by Nazi Germany, France’s military plan was not a bad plan, just a plan poorly executed…and the British did not do very well, then, either. The collapse of France’s colonial empire after World War 2 did come from overly ambitious military plans formed by not understanding that colonial warfare had changed…something the United States also failed to grasp, in the exact same place as Dien Bien Phu, a decade prior.
The fact is that, for all of it’s messy problems in the last century, the French military remains one of the most capable armed forces on the planet – if their leaders allow their generals to do their jobs.
The French Army’s reputation for military professionalism, despite its dramatic fluctuations over the past two centuries, has created a complex narrative that defies simple description. From the revolutionary fervor of the Napoleonic era to the post-WW2 colonial campaigns and modern peacekeeping operations, France’s military has continually demonstrated both exceptional competence and notable – but recoverable – failures that continue to shape perceptions today.
The Napoleonic Foundation
The modern French Army’s professional identity was forged in the crucible of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). Napoleon’s Grande Armée established standards of tactical innovation, logistical organization, and battlefield leadership that influenced military thinking across Europe, down to today. The army’s meritocratic promotion system, revolutionary at the time, created a professional officer corps based on ability rather than aristocratic birth. This period saw the development of combined arms tactics, the corps system, and sophisticated staff work that demonstrated clear military professionalism.
Vive l’Empereur! Charge of the 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807. 1891 painting by Édouard Detaille. Art Gallery of New South Wales. Public Domain.
However, even during this golden age, the French military exhibited characteristics that would later prove problematic. The cult of offensive action (offensive à outrance) and the emphasis on élan over methodical planning became deeply embedded in French military culture, later contributing to both spectacular victories and catastrophic defeats.
19th Century Trials and Adaptations
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 exposed serious deficiencies in post-Napoleonic French military professionalism. Poor intelligence, inadequate logistics, and outdated tactical thinking led to decisive defeat and the collapse of the Second Empire. The subsequent creation of the Third Republic saw significant military reforms, including the establishment of improved staff colleges and the modernization of equipment and tactics.
The colonial period (1830s-1960s) presents a particularly complex chapter in French military professionalism. The conquest of Algeria, the expansion into West and Equatorial Africa, and campaigns in Indochina demonstrated considerable tactical adaptability and logistical capability over vast distances. French colonial forces also developed expertise in irregular warfare, cultural adaptation, and civil-military cooperation that proved valuable in diverse environments, although these advantages rarely translated into warfare on the European continent, which was common to all the major European powers.
Yet this same period saw the development of what critics term “colonial habits” – reliance on superior firepower against less-equipped opponents, acceptance of harsh methods, and a certain detachment from metropolitan oversight that would later create problems in conventional conflicts.
World War I: Staying Power
The Great War stretched French military professionalism to its limits. Initial disasters, including the failure of Plan XVII and massive casualties from adherence to offensive doctrine, gave way to remarkable adaptation under pressure. The French Army demonstrated institutional learning capacity, rapidly developing new tactics for trench warfare, integrating new technologies, and maintaining cohesion through four years of unprecedented carnage.
French infantry pushing through enemy barbed wire, 1915. Agence de presse Meurisse. Public Domain.
The performance of French commanders like Ferdinand Foch and Philippe Pétain, along with the army’s ability to absorb and integrate lessons from the battlefield, demonstrated core professional competencies. However, the trauma of the war also reinforced defensive thinking that would prove problematic in the next conflict.
1940: Collapse and Recovery
The defeat of 1940 represents perhaps the most significant challenge to claims of French military professionalism. Despite having numerically superior and often technically advanced equipment, the French Army was comprehensively outmaneuvered by German forces employing innovative combined arms tactics. Analysis reveals multiple professional failures: inadequate intelligence, poor communications, inflexible command structures, and outdated operational concepts.
Yet the same period saw examples of French military professionalism in different contexts. The Free French forces under Charles de Gaulle, though small, maintained military traditions and eventually contributed significantly to the liberation of France. The French Resistance, while not strictly military, demonstrated tactical innovation and operational security that impressed Allied observers.
Colonial Wars and Professional Dilemmas
The post-war colonial defeats in Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962) present perhaps the most controversial chapters in assessing French military professionalism. In Indochina, French forces demonstrated remarkable tactical competence in difficult conditions, developing techniques counterinsurgency and showing considerable adaptability. However, strategic failures and political constraints ultimately led to defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
The Algerian War proved even more problematic. While French forces achieved significant tactical successes against the FLN, the conflict saw disturbing breakdowns in professional conduct, including widespread use of torture and involvement in attempted coups against the civilian government. The Battle of Algiers (1956-1957) exemplified this tension between tactical effectiveness and questionable methods.
Since 1962, the French Army has undergone a significant revamping of its professional nature. The end of conscription in 1996 created an all-volunteer force with higher educational standards and improved training. French forces have demonstrated competence in various international operations, from peacekeeping in the Balkans to counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region of Africa.
Operations like Serval (2013) and Barkhane (2014-2022) in Mali showcased French capabilities in rapid deployment, intelligence gathering, and coordination with international partners. These operations demonstrated institutional learning from previous colonial experiences while maintaining focus on legitimate military objectives.
And it is here, that a more detailed look at Operation Serval is instructive on just how adaptable French forces can be.
Strategic Challenges of Operation Serval (2013)
Operation Serval presented the French military with a complex array of strategic challenges that tested every aspect of modern expeditionary warfare capabilities. The intervention in the war in Mali, launched on January 11, 2013, required France to project power across 4,000 kilometers into the heart of the Sahel region under severe time constraints and with limited initial international support.
Geographical and Logistical Complexity
Mali’s vast territory — larger than France and Germany combined — posed immediate strategic challenges. The northern regions under jihadist control encompassed over 800,000 square kilometers of desert and semi-arid terrain with minimal infrastructure. French forces faced the fundamental problem of securing lines of communication across this enormous space while maintaining operational tempo against a mobile enemy well-adapted to the local environment.
The logistical challenge proved particularly acute given Mali’s landlocked position and limited transportation infrastructure. France had to establish supply chains through multiple African partners, primarily using bases in Ivory Coast, Chad, and Niger. The single major airfield at Bamako created a critical vulnerability, while the absence of reliable road networks forced heavy reliance on air transport for sustained operations. This logistical complexity demanded unprecedented coordination between French forces, African partners, and international allies.
Map of the conflict in Northern Mali, c.2013, by WikiUser Orionist. CCA/3.0.
Time Sensitivity and Strategic Surprise
Perhaps the most critical challenge was the compressed timeline. Intelligence indicated that jihadist forces were preparing to advance south toward Bamako, Mali’s capital, potentially within days of the French decision to intervene. This left no time for the deliberate planning and force buildup typical of major military operations. French planners had to balance the immediate need to halt jihadist momentum with the longer-term requirement to establish sustainable operations across northern Mali.
The rapid deployment requirement meant accepting significant strategic risks. Initial French forces numbered fewer than 1,000 troops — inadequate for controlling territory, but sufficient to provide a rapid response capability. This created a dangerous window where French forces operated with minimal reserves while still building combat power in theater.
Coalition Building Under Pressure
France faced the delicate challenge of building international legitimacy while maintaining operational flexibility. The African Union had authorized the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), but this force remained months from deployment. France needed to demonstrate that Serval was not another unilateral European intervention in Africa, while simultaneously retaining command authority essential for rapid operations.
The diplomatic challenge extended to securing overflight rights, basing agreements, and logistics support from multiple African and European partners. Each agreement required careful negotiation to balance French operational needs with partner nation sensitivities about sovereignty and post-colonial relationships.
French officer making contact with the population in southern Mali. 2016 photo by WikiUser TM1972. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
Enemy Adaptation and Asymmetric Threats
The jihadist coalition in northern Mali presented a sophisticated opponent that combined conventional capabilities with insurgent tactics. Groups like AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) had years to prepare defensive positions and supply caches across the region. They possessed advanced weaponry captured from Libyan stockpiles, including anti-aircraft systems that threatened French air operations.
More challenging was the enemy’s ability to blend into local populations and exploit grievances against the Malian government. French forces had to distinguish between ideological jihadists and local groups with legitimate political grievances, while avoiding civilian casualties that could undermine popular support for the intervention.
Strategic Success Despite Constraints
Despite these formidable challenges, Operation Serval achieved its strategic objectives within weeks. French forces halted jihadist advances, secured major population centers, and degraded enemy capabilities sufficiently to allow AFISMA deployment. The operation demonstrated sophisticated understanding of modern warfare’s political dimensions—achieving military objectives while building conditions for successful transition to international peacekeeping forces.
The strategic challenges of Serval illustrate the complexity of contemporary expeditionary operations and highlight the French military’s capacity for rapid, effective intervention in challenging operational environments. This success provides compelling evidence of institutional competence that deserves recognition in serious strategic analysis.
Contemporary Assessment
Today’s French Army exhibits many characteristics of a professional military force: clear command structures, standardized training, integration with NATO allies, and adherence to international laws of war. However, debates continue about the persistence of certain cultural traits from earlier periods, particularly regarding operations in former colonial territories.
The French military’s professional reputation ultimately rests on its demonstrated capacity for adaptation, institutional learning, and technical competence across diverse operational environments. While historical controversies remain, the modern force has largely addressed the systemic issues that plagued earlier generations, creating a military organization that generally meets contemporary standards of professionalism.
Conclusion
The French military faces challenges, to be sure. But other, larger forces – usually with highly inflated perceptions of their own ability – face whose same challenges, as all armed forces try to navigate the swirling tempest of the emerging “One-N-Twenty“.
Don’t write off an army because of some bumps over the course of several centuries: You make mistakes, too.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
It is a general article of faith in most armed forces around the world, that the enlisted soldier – meaning, that 18 to 22 year old kid brought into the military, because war is a young person’s game – need close supervision by a college-educated officer, so that the young soldier can be kept out of trouble. But, while young adults, far from home for the first time, getting into trouble is a given despite supervision, that is not the real reason.
The real reason the establishment and their commissioned officers, is that unless the enlisted troops are closely monitored, they will invariably “go off script”. Case in point: Faustin Wirkus…
…Or, if you prefer, King Faustin II of La Gonâve, Haiti.
Born in about 1896, Faustin Wirkus was born into a Polish family in Rypin, Poland, then part of the Russian Empire. In around 1905, the family moved to the coal country in Dupont, Pennsylvania. After a few years working in the coal fields as a child, in 1915 Wirkus enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, and was soon deployed to the island of Haiti, rising to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant by 1920.
The United States had intervened in Haiti in 1915, following a wild series of uprisings that had resulted in the lynching death of the then-President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, to – as always – “protect American interests”. The United States quickly established what amounted to a military dictatorship, administered by the US Marine Corps. Part of this administration involved recruiting a Gendarmerie that could be carefully trained as a kind of “lightweight military police”, to keep the island under control and to hunt down bandits and rebels.
U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. Haiti, circa 1919. Department of the Navy photo, 1919. Public Domain.
Haiti, unlike today, had a very credible military reputation. After throwing off the yoke of French colonial oppression in 1804, Port-au-Prince decided to flex its muscle as the Spanish Empire began to collapse, invading and conquering the neighboring Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (the modern Dominican Republic) in 1822. Haiti’s 20-odd year rule over Santo Domingo was so brutal, that February 27 is celebrated as the day Dominicans finally overthrew Haitian rule, and gained their independence.
Following this, Haiti began its downward spiral, resulting in the collapse in 1915, that led the United States to intervene.
Following his basic training, Faustin Wikus was deployed to the island in 1915 as part of the “Advanced Base Force“, and was assigned to the “Haitian Constabulary” (the formal name for the Gendarmerie) in 1918. The Gendarmerie’s first US commander was the legendary Smedley Butler, then a Major in the Marine Corps, making it no surprise that the Gendarmerie’s all-Black Shooting Team went on to take Olympic Bronze in the Men’s Free Rifle Team event at the 1924 Paris Olympics.
Wirkus, meanwhile, apparently fell in love with Haiti, and worked hard to try and help stabilize the country. Because of how the Gendarmerie was organized, many enlisted Marines were given commissions as officers in the Constabulary, leading small units of native Gendarmes.
It was in this capacity that Wirkus eventually arrived at La Gonâve Island, in 1926. While there is some conjecture – nearly one hundred years on, hampered be scanty records – Wirkus came into contact with a woman named Ti Memenne. Recognized locally as a “tribal queen”, which was a position not recognized by the nation’s republican government, she was apparently arrested for “trivial voodoo offences“, where it seems that she came into contact with Wirkus for the first time, with him aiding in her release from custody.
When Wirkus (apparently volunteering on his own in late-June or early-July of 1926) was sent to La Gonâve to assume command of the Constabulary unit there, he had apparently made such an impression on Queen Ti Memenne, that she convined her subjects that he was the reincarnation of Faustin Soloque, the first (and last) Emperor of the Second Empire of Haiti…and then convinced them to agree that Wirkus should be crowned as King Faustin II, Co-Monarch of La Gonâve in a Voodoo ceremony.
Queen Ti Memenne (L) and GySgt Faustin Wirkus (R), on La Gonâve Island, c.1927. Unknown USMC Photographer. Public Domain.
Well, then.
Wirkus went on to “rule” the island until 1929, when he was removed from the island and transffered back to the United States, proper. Apparently, Wirkus’ efficiency at ruling the island had cut too deeply into the corruption kickbacks Haitian politicians were extracting from the island. The United States government was only too happy to comply with this request, because the idea of a US enlisted man ruling as a “king” of a foreign island while still on active duty, was very unpopular…”alarming”, even.
Wirkus subsequently left the Marine Corps in 1931, and did a stint on the speaking circuit, giving talks about his time as the “White King of La Gonâve“. Then, with war looming again in 1939, Wirkus reenlisted in the Marine Corps, serving first as a recruiter, then as a gunnery instructor, eventually rising to the dual ranks of Warrant Officer [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_officer] and Marine Gunner [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_gunner] for aviation gunnery.
Faustin Wirkus fell ill in January of 1945, and passed away on October 8th of that year. He was survived by his wife, Yula, and his son – Faustin, Jr. – who went on to serve in the Marine Corps as a helicopter pilot.
So. What does the story of Faustin Wirkus teach us?
Primarily, that enlisted troops – and especially Marines – are hyper unpredictable. Give them a clear goal, and they will do whatever is necessary to make it work.
Whatever. Is. Necessary.
And for the Establishment, that is not a good thing – after all, if some unlettered, uncouth enlisted critter can accomplish national goals with minimal supervision, why do their own high-society positions and privilege need to exist? I mean, how can their friends skim off the top of contracts, when some 25 year-old kid with a high school diploma, an attitude, a hangover and a coffee pot can do a better job, faster and more efficiently?
While the foregoing statement is rather “tongue in cheek”, it really isn’t, because it is very real – after all, how the hell can the Ivy League alumni expect to shave off hundreds of millions of dollars of money deducted from the troop’s pay to fund mess hall menus, leaving them eating lima beans and toast for “Thanksgiving Dinner”…assuming that the mess hall is even open? Because the $460 per month deducted from the troop’s pay to fund the mess halls on-post comes to $115 per week – I don’t know about you, but I can eat pretty well on $115 a week, including steak and shrimp…assuming that I can use a hot plate in the barracks – which on most bases, you can’t do.
Because you can eat at the mess hall. You know – dining on lima beans and toast.
And that’s LONG before we talk about telling troops to fix and repair their own barracks – It’s almost like there is little, if any, need for contracting with civilian companies to do anything beyond making weapons, ammunition and gear…and maybe uniforms. Maybe.
U.S. Marines with Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, show Brig. Gen. Andrew M. Niebel, the commanding general of 1st MLG, how they patch holes in the barracks during Operation Clean Sweep at Camp Pendleton, California, Oct. 16, 2024. LCpl Deja Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps photo. Public Domain.
And this extends to security, because as the recent mass shooting at Fort Stewart, GA shows, troops trained to handle some of the most lethal weapons on the planet cannot be trusted to go about armed to protect themselves from either jilted lovers or, you know, terrorists.
And believe me when I say that this has been the norm on US military bases for decades.
Feel safe?
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
This is not the typical article that I write, here. In an odd way, this is unusually personal…and I have no real idea why.
What started as a curious observation, eventually became something of an obsession. I knew that something was wrong about my observation, but I couldn’t put my finger on why it was wrong. Many might see this as an odd — possibly disturbing — example of OCD, but as you will see, while it is certainly “odd”, it is not irrational…Not least, because it is properly placed between two earlier articles here. It is connected to the two, but because it was so odd, it appears here as the third installment, instead of its proper place as the second article in the series.
It took that long for me to parse out what had happened. As to why it happened…well, we’ll get to that point.
Firearms are curious things, when it comes to weapons. If you look back through all verifiable human history, there are no mentions of “firearms”, as we understand the term — going back as far as c.50,000 years ago, to the oldest cave paintings and petroglyphs — before about the 8th Century AD (c.900 AD). Every other weapon that appears is a club, a spear, a bow and arrow, a sling, and the occasional jawbone of an ass. But, once gunpowder was invented, and someone realized that it was useful as a weapon in more than rockets, development began in earnest.
Over the centuries, lessons were learned, and weapons, projectiles and propellants were improved, sometimes slowly, sometimes at breakneck speeds…Until 1945.
In the aftermath of World War 2, there were something like thirteen “calibers” of military small arms in general use in the world. As the Cold War began to dawn, the Soviet Union — in the form of Russia — established a regimen of standardization in small arms ammunition, beginning with the 7.62x54mmR caliber for rifles and machine guns, and the 7.62x25mm “Tokarev” for handguns and submachine guns. This was not unusual — the 7.62mm as a basic bore diameter had been settled on by the Soviet’s predecessor, the Imperial Russia of the Romanov Dynasty.
(Note:When reading a weapon’s caliber in millimeters, the numbers at the beginning are the bullet’s diameter in millimeters; the number following the ‘x’ is the overall length of the cartridge, again in millimeters.)
But, before the Warsaw Pact was formally organized, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949. As a purely and openly military alliance, the NATO member states quickly decided that the alliance’s national militaries needed to standardize on a common caliber, even if they did not adopt the same small arms.
To describe caliber in brief, caliber is determined by the diameter of the barrel, but is also determined by the chamber — which holds the cartridge case — and the spiral grooves (“rifling“) that stabilizes the projectile as it moves down the barrel. It is this combination of features that determine the caliber of a firearm, and is the reason why you cannot “trade” ammunition between different weapons, without a great deal of serious machinist work.
But…The first, and most critical step in making a barrel is to punch a bore down the length of the “barrel blank” (the steel bar stock you are cutting the barrel from) at the precise diameter, because as the old rubric goes, you can take material away, but you cannot add it back. With this established, you can move on to rifling the bore, and reaming our the chamber for the (usually) brass cartridge case, forming the overall “cartridge“.
This is not an academic exercise, because in the world of military procurement, few decisions are made without extensive documentation, cost-benefit analysis, and strategic rationale, because the cartridge — the bullet, propellant and case — represents a colossal expenditure of money and infrastructure. For NATO, a standard cartridge for rifles and machine guns made perfect sense, both in a manufacturing sense, but also in the tactical and strategic senses: being able to share ammunition would cure one of the chief problems the Allies had during World War 2.
So…What’s the problem? The problem is what the NATO nations standardized on…and no one knows why. One of the most significant standardization decisions of the 20th century — the global convergence on 7.62mm-diameter ammunition — remains curiously undocumented and logically inexplicable.
Consider the scope of this convergence: the Soviet 7.62×25mm Tokarev pistol cartridge for handguns and submachine guns; the 7.62×39mm “intermediate” rifle round for the AK-47/AKM; the 7.62×51mm NATO standard for the M14, FN FAL and H&K G3, as well as in the M-60 and MAG-58/M240 General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG’s); and the 7.62×54mmR Russian full-power cartridge in the ‘Dragunov’ SVD “Designated Marksman’s Rifle” (DMR) and the PK-series GPMG. Four distinct ammunition types, serving five completely different tactical roles — pistol, submachine gun, assault rifle, battle rifle, and machine gun — yet all sharing the same precise bore diameter to within hundredths of a millimeter.
From a manufacturing perspective, this represents extraordinary efficiency. The same rifling buttons, bore drilling equipment, and quality control gauges can produce barrels for weapons ranging from sidearms to tripod-mounted machine guns. But this efficiency only matters if you’re planning coordinated, large-scale production across multiple weapon systems — exactly what you’d need for rapid global mobilization. More importantly, uniformity is a real concern, because of how “good enough” barrels can be made in very basic workshops.
The timeline of adoption makes conventional military explanations even more problematic. When NATO standardized on 7.62×51mm in the 1950s, superior alternatives were readily available. The .30-06 Springfield had proven performance and massive existing production infrastructure. The 8mm Mauser was the world’s most widely distributed rifle cartridge. The .303 British had decades of successful Commonwealth service.
Instead, NATO chose to develop an entirely new cartridge that required complete retooling of production lines and weapons systems. This makes sense tactically, strategically, politically and diplomatically. No doubt. You take the logistical and manufacturing infrastructure hits, but it makes everyone in the alliance feel like they’re not the only ones making sacrifices. The official justifications — improved efficiency and reduced weight — however, would apply equally to other available diameters.
So — why 7.62mm diameter, specifically? Why precisely the same diameter as the bullets used by the Soviet Union…not the cartridges, not the bullets themselves, but the bullet diameter?
The mystery deepens when examining the ballistic evidence. The abandoned cartridges — .303 British, 8mm Mauser, and .30-06 — all delivered essentially identical performance, despite bore diameters ranging from 7.57mm to 7.92mm. The differences are all within normal manufacturing tolerances and offer no meaningful ballistic advantages.
From a purely ballistics and physics perspective, these major “battle rifle” cartridges deliver functionally identical terminal performance despite NATO’s insistence on 7.62x51mm standardization. Cross-sectional analysis reveals the marginal differences:
The .30-06 Springfield (150gr @ 2910 fps) delivers 2,820 ft-lbs of energy
The 8mm Mauser (198gr @ 2600 fps) produces 2,800 ft-lbs
The .303 British (174gr @ 2440 fps) generates 2,300 ft-lbs
The 7.62x51mm NATO (147gr @ 2750 fps) yields 2,470 ft-lbs
These performance variations fall within normal manufacturing tolerances and environmental factors. At combat ranges under 400 meters (which is the normal range for most infantry engagements), the sectional density, penetration, and lethality differences in these cartridges are statistically insignificant. Wind drift, drop, and terminal ballistics vary by mere percentages.
The engineering reality is that any of these cartridges would have served NATO’s stated requirements equally well, as the FN-49 rifle would demonstrate, being made in multiple cartridges, depending on what the customer wanted. The choice of 7.62mm over existing alternatives cannot be justified by ballistic superiority – suggesting the true rationale lay elsewhere entirely.
SAFN .30-06 Springfield 1951. 2007 photo by Wikimedia User “Ainat00”. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
The technical evidence is clear: NATO’s choice of 7.62mm as a bullet diameter cannot be explained by ballistic superiority or manufacturing convenience alone. When military organizations abandon proven systems and invest billions in retooling for marginally different alternatives, there are usually compelling strategic reasons documented in procurement records. But those records, if they exist, remain conspicuously absent from public view. What we’re left with is a pattern that suggests coordination on a scale that transcends normal military alliance cooperation—and raises uncomfortable questions about what scenarios would justify such systematic preparation.
Manufacturing compatibility, not ballistic performance, appears to have been designed for rapid, large-scale interoperability — but between whom, and for what purpose?
Yet somehow, across different continents, political systems, and industrial bases, everyone converged on 7.62mm as a bullet diameter. The Soviets, developing their own weapons independently, chose the 7.62mm bore diameter for their entire small arms family, because they had been using it for so long, and wanted to make only the most minimal changes, as their industrial base struggled to recover from the devastation of World War 2.
But then, we have the example of NATO, deciding to completely retool their arms infrastructure to make a completely new round…whose diameter was precisely the same as that of their supposed enemies on the opposite side of the Fulda Gap…not the same cartridges, but the same bullet diameters — the most important part of a modern firearm. To put the proverbial ‘last nail’ on the problem, the only 7.62mm diameter weapon in wide use by NATO members at the organization’s formation in 1949 was the US .30 Carbine round, which is 7.62x33mm.
The only logical possibility is clear: This wasn’t market pressure or alliance requirements — this was systematic coordination at a level that transcends normal military procurement.
The 7.62mm convergence may represent the most successful case of industrial coordination in military history — a decades-long effort to ensure global manufacturing compatibility for weapons systems across supposedly competing nations. Whether driven by legitimate defense planning or more extraordinary circumstances, the technical evidence suggests coordination at levels most people would find difficult to accept.
The question isn’t whether this coordination exists — the manufacturing evidence is too consistent to ignore. The question is, what scenarios would justify such systematic preparation, and why has the public never been informed of the reasoning behind these decisions?
As we pointed out in the “Hamlet” article above, none of the possible reasons for this subtle standardization are good…But there is one last wrinkle, that I cannot shake from my mind…
Illicit drugs are everywhere. Since at least the Imperial Chinese attempts at curbing the British opium trade, governments have – for one reason or another – tried to end, or at least restrict as far as possible, the flow of drugs they find objectionable. From cannabis to cocaine, and opium/heroin to fentanyl, massive, militarized law enforcement structures have been built up, to try and end the trade.
For the most part, these efforts have failed.
The problem are the iron laws of supply and demand, and the Streisand Effect: If you overreact to the problem, people get curious as to why…and when trust in government is problematic, that urge becomes obsessive. And in an environment of induced artificial scarcity, imposed by efforts to ban “Bad Thing X” – be that drugs or alcohol – both demand for that substance, as well as its price tends to skyrocket…and the harder law enforcement cracks down, the more creative the suppliers get in bringing their product to market.
Case in point: The “narco submarine“. We discussed the “big-state” military aspects of leveraging narco-sub technology last year, but now we take a deeper dive into the flip-side of the “big-state” use of this ecosystem.
The evolution of narco-submarine technology from crude, semi-submersible craft to sophisticated vessels capable of trans-Atlantic voyages represents more than just an escalation in drug trafficking capabilities—it signals a potential paradigm shift in how insurgent and terrorist organizations could maintain covert supply networks across vast distances.
Trans-Atlantic range narco submarine in Aldán, Cangas, Galicia, Spain, 2019, following its capture by Spanish authorities. Photo by Estevoaei. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine has long emphasized the critical importance of disrupting enemy supply lines. However, the emergence of advanced narco-submarines, some capable of carrying multi-ton payloads across oceanic distances while remaining largely undetected, introduces a new variable into this equation. These vessels, originally developed by South American drug cartels to transport cocaine, have demonstrated remarkable sophistication in recent seizures, featuring diesel-electric propulsion, advanced navigation systems, and even air-independent propulsion capabilities.
The implications now extend far beyond narcotics. Intelligence assessments suggest these platforms could theoretically transport weapons, explosives, communications equipment, or even personnel across traditional maritime security perimeters. Unlike conventional smuggling methods that rely on commercial shipping or aircraft — both heavily monitored — narco-submarines operate in the vast expanses of international waters where detection remains extraordinarily difficult.
This point cannot be overstated: While the “old school” methods have long been known, and control measures developed to address them, the rise of covert submarine logistics at the small(ish) scale is a titanic problem, because almost any coastal beach, inlet or swamp is now a potential delivery point. While traditional inseriton methods like rough airstrips or road checkpoints can be easily identified, the sheer scale and unimproved nature of naval landing avenues severely hamstrings surveillance efforts – airstrips, roads and even drop zones are almost comically easy to identify, especially when they are not on official maps as crossing or entry points. Beaches, however, are everywhere.
Recent interdictions have revealed vessels with ranges exceeding 6,000 nautical miles, sufficient to connect South American manufacturing bases with conflict zones in Africa, the Middle East, or even Europe. The technical expertise required to construct these platforms has proliferated through criminal networks, with evidence suggesting construction techniques and blueprints have spread beyond their Colombian and Ecuadorian origins.
A primary case study of even non-submersible combat logistics support to an insurgent force comes from Mozambique, in 2020-2023:
The Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado demonstrated sophisticated maritime capabilities between 2020-2023 that transformed what began as a land-based rebellion into a complex amphibious threat. Ansar al-Sunna militants systematically leveraged traditional dhow boats and small craft to create covert supply networks that proved nearly impossible for Mozambican security forces to interdict.
The insurgents’ capture of the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 marked a strategic watershed, providing direct access to established heroin trafficking routes from the Makran Coast. Intelligence assessments suggest the group began “taxing” drug shipments landed from dhows, creating a maritime revenue stream that complemented traditional funding sources. This convergence of insurgent logistics and narcotics trafficking created a self-reinforcing cycle — drug money funded operations while operational control over landing sites enabled further revenue collection.
The tactical sophistication was remarkable. Insurgents used coordinated land-sea assaults, arriving simultaneously from multiple vectors to overwhelm defensive positions. They demonstrated proficiency with maritime navigation, successfully conducting what were functionally full-on amphibious operations across the island chains of the Quirimbas archipelago. Perhaps most concerning, they showed adaptive capabilities — after reportedly sinking a Mozambican patrol boat with an RPG-7, they captured additional vessels to expand their maritime fleet.
The geographic advantages were substantial. Cabo Delgado’s extensive coastline, numerous islands, and traditional reliance on dhow-based trade provided perfect cover for covert supply operations. The insurgents exploited the fact that legitimate maritime commerce — fishing, inter-island transport, and traditional trade — created background noise that masked military supply movements. With limited Mozambican naval capabilities and virtually no maritime patrol presence, the ocean became an uncontested highway for insurgent logistics.
For insurgent groups, the strategic value is clearly compelling. As the World War 2 OSS demonstrated, traditional arms trafficking routes face increasing scrutiny from international security partnerships and advanced surveillance systems. Port security measures, while effective against conventional smuggling, are largely irrelevant to vessels that can surface miles offshore and transfer cargo to smaller craft or coastal staging areas.
The financial model also aligns with insurgent economics. Drug trafficking organizations have demonstrated willingness to treat narco-submarines as expendable assets — vessels are often scuttled after single-use missions. This operational approach could extend to insurgent logistics, where the strategic value of delivered materiel outweighs platform preservation.
Counter-narcotics operations have struggled with these platforms despite significant resource investments. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that even with enhanced detection capabilities, the vast majority of narco-submarine transits remain undetected. This detection challenge would be magnified in insurgent applications, where hostile groups’ operational security might be even tighter and cargo manifests wouldn’t trigger the same intelligence indicators as bulk narcotics shipments.
The convergence of criminal and insurgent networks is not theoretical — established precedents exist in regions where these organizations share operational space and mutual interests. The DEA has linked 19 of 43 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations to some aspect of the global drug trade, demonstrating that such collaborations are already occurring. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) provided a decades-long example of how insurgent groups can leverage drug trafficking networks to fund operations and maintain supply lines, activities that continue with the FARC’s splinter factions.
Perhaps most concerning is the adaptive nature of this technology. Each interdiction reveals new innovations: improved stealth characteristics, enhanced range capabilities, and increasingly sophisticated construction techniques. The rapid evolution suggests that by the time security services develop effective countermeasures, the threat may have already evolved beyond current detection and interdiction capabilities.
This potential weaponization of narco-submarine technology by hostile non-state actors represents a convergence of criminal innovation and insurgent logistics that could fundamentally challenge existing maritime security frameworks and force a reassessment of how covert supply networks might operate in an era of advanced surveillance.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Electricity if the foundation of modern society. Many people wistfully ponder the idea of living permanently in the wilderness, the old “back to Nature” idea. The fact is, most people – at least in the West – are going to survive in the wild for longer than a week. Electricity is what allows you to read this, and not simply because the immediate of an internet connection: electricity is fundamental to the industrial processes that made the device you are reading this on.
America’s electrical grid represents both the backbone of modern civilization and its most vulnerable single point of failure. Recent incidents at power substations across the country have revealed a terrifying reality: a relatively small number of coordinated attacks could plunge vast regions into darkness for weeks or months, with cascading effects that would make Hurricane Katrina look like a minor inconvenience.
The December 2022 attack on two Duke Energy substations in Moore County, North Carolina, illustrated the basic vulnerability. Two individuals with rifles caused a blackout affecting 45,000 people for several days. But this was amateur hour compared to what organized groups could accomplish with proper planning and coordination.
The math is sobering. The Department of Homeland Security has identified roughly 55,000 electrical substations nationwide, but destroying just nine of the most critical ones could theoretically black out the entire continental United States. Unlike the heavily fortified nuclear plants or major power stations, most substations are protected by little more than chain-link fencing and security cameras. Many critical transformer installations sit exposed in rural areas with minimal surveillance and lengthy emergency response times.
Marelli coupling transformer in Italy. 2020 photo by Herbert Hönigsperger. CCA/4.0 Int’l
What makes this threat particularly insidious is that it doesn’t require sophisticated weapons or technical expertise. The critical transformer equipment that steps down high-voltage transmission lines is custom-manufactured, expensive, and takes 12-18 months to replace under normal circumstances. A coordinated rifle attack, or even the intelligent use of a reciprocating saw, on multiple substations simultaneously could create a replacement bottleneck that extends outages for months across multiple states.
The cascading effects of a decently-coordinated series of attacks would be catastrophic. Within hours, water treatment plants would lose power, leading to pumping capacity failures. Hospitals could switch to backup diesel generators, but their fuel supplies typically last 72 to 96 hours. Cell towers would go dark as their backup batteries drain, as even those with some minimal solar backups would be drained faster than solar can recharge them. Gas stations could not pump fuel; grocery stores and ATM’s stop working – in the case of the grocery stores, that would be because few, if any,m are set up to switch to paper receipts. Supply chains would being to collapse, as refrigerated transport becomes impossible, electronic payment systems began failing, and regional grocery supply centers would not be able to fulfill orders, if they were even able to receive them.
Behind this vulnerability is the very thing that makes modern society as comfortable as we have become accustomed to: Just In Time Delivery. This is the system that dispatches all manner of inventory to retailers, homes and factories at will, usually arriving within 24 to 96 hours after ordering. This means that very few warehouse areas have more than three or four days of stock in their “back rooms”, at best. This is one of the reasons for the videos of stores being emptied in mere hours when a disaster strikes – it’s not simply damage to the structure, but the location’s inability to order replacement stock.
Most Americans have never experienced true grid-down conditions lasting more than a few days. The best estimates indicate that potentially 90% of Americans would be dead within one year of a sustained nationwide blackout due to starvation, disease, and violence. Even regional blackouts lasting weeks would likely trigger mass refugee movements, as happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, that local authorities couldn’t manage.
The threat isn’t theoretical. In recent years, domestic extremist groups have conducted surveillance of electrical infrastructure. FBI investigations have uncovered plots targeting substations by nihilistic accelerationists larping as neo-Nazis who believe destroying the grid would trigger societal collapse and racial conflict. The knowledge required for effective attacks are spreading through online forums and training materials.
International actors represent an even greater threat. Chinese and Russian operatives have been caught conducting reconnaissance of American electrical infrastructure. State actors could coordinate cyber attacks on grid control systems with simultaneous physical attacks on key substations, maximizing damage while minimizing the chances of rapid recovery.
And what happens if such a series of attacks do happen? None of the possibilities are good. Aside from the initial casualties of the sick and injured as hospital generators run dry of fuel, and those dying in the panic after the lights go out, the near-term (60 – 90 days) will see vast deaths via starvation, as most people have perhaps only two or three weeks worth of food at home, and human performance degrades fast, the longer we go without food. Rural areas are better positioned, since those areas are food producers by default, but they do not have the capacity to absorb refugees, nor to suddenly step up food production, because of the physics and biology of agriculture: even without the fact that most farmland is sectioned off for corporate, single-crop “monoculture” products, it takes time, at least sixty to ninety days, to grow most plants into nutritious crops that will sustain a human. And although hog hunting in the South does produce meat, it is barely impacting the hog population – and the vast majority of Americans have no comprehension of how dangerous feral hogs really are.
Accelerationist dream-world. Pixabay.
The fix is neither quick, simple nor cheap. Hardening critical substations would cost billions and take years to implement. Installing backup transformer capacity requires massive infrastructure investments that utility companies stridently resist making without punitive federal mandates. Meanwhile, the grid continues operating with vulnerabilities that a competent adversary could exploit with devastating effectiveness.
The uncomfortable truth is that America’s electrical grid was designed for reliability and efficiency, not security. In an era of increasing domestic extremism and great power competition, that design philosophy represents a strategic vulnerability that adversaries understand better than most Americans. The question isn’t whether someone will eventually attempt a coordinated grid attack — it’s whether we’ll address these vulnerabilities before they do.
The only good thing in this, is that if we go down, we will take the reast of the “developed world” with us.
Yay. I guess.
The lights we take for granted could go out faster than most people imagine, and stay out longer than our society could survive. As with many things we report here, you are on your own – after reading this, you cannot claim that you weren’t warned to prepare, because the government will not be able to help you.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The ultra-wealthy’s latest status symbol isn’t a super-yacht or private island — it’s a luxury survival bunker. From New Zealand’s exclusive retreats to underground complexes in Montana, billionaires are spending millions on fortified sanctuaries designed to weather civilization’s collapse. But these elaborate preparations reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of how disasters actually unfold and may create more problems than they solve.
While the idea of the “social construct” has been ballyhooed almost to death in the early 21st Century, it is a solid and verifiable doctrinal base. At the same time, the antithesis is also true…and in this context, the statement that “wealth is a social construct” is also a fundamental truth.
Although many people at the lower end of the economic spectrum may rage aginst the idea that they are taking part in a “social construct” from the moment they wake up in the morning, for the ultra-rich, the idea has been slowly growing that their wealth equates to them the level and aspects of medieval barons, that their wealth can insulate them from catastrophic events, events that result in a “Mad Max/Road Warrior” type of world. It is important to remember that the so-called “Robber Barons” of the late-19th Century in America and Europe may have been rapacious, but they were careful to cultivate actual loyalty among their guard forces.
For the modern mega-wealthy, such an attitude is what is known as “whistling past the graveyard“, a phenomenon best represented by the “luxury survival bunker“.
The modern luxury bunker industry promises the impossible: maintaining elite levels of comfort and safety while civilization burns above. Companies like Vivos and Rising S offer underground mansions complete with wine cellars, home theaters, and hydroponic gardens. The Survival Condo Project in Kansas converted a former missile silo into luxury apartments selling for millions, featuring a swimming pool, rock climbing wall, and armored vehicles. The implicit promise is that money can buy not just survival, but the preservation of pre-disaster lifestyle.
Underground World Home swimming pool built structure for the New York world’s Fair, 1964. Public Domain.
This approach fundamentally misunderstands disaster dynamics. Real catastrophes — whether economic collapse, climate disasters, or social upheaval — require adaptation, community cooperation, and practical skills, not isolation behind reinforced concrete. History shows that those who survive major disruptions are typically embedded in resilient communities with diverse skill sets, not isolated individuals hoarding resources.
Photo of the North Portal entrance to Cheyenne Mountain. Public Domain.
The bunker mentality creates several critical vulnerabilities for both survival and immediate security. First, these facilities become obvious targets once their existence becomes known. A luxury bunker essentially advertises its contents to anyone desperate enough to attempt breaching it. The very features that make them appealing — visible wealth, sophisticated systems, stockpiled resources — make them magnets for organized groups with nothing to lose.
Second, luxury bunkers require massive ongoing maintenance and technical expertise that their wealthy occupants rarely possess. Climate controls, water filtration, communications equipment, and power systems all demand specialized knowledge. When the contracted maintenance crews can’t or won’t reach the facility, these sophisticated systems become expensive liabilities. A billionaire who can’t repair a generator is far worse off than a farmer with a hand pump.
Third, the psychological toll of bunker life contradicts its luxury branding. Extended isolation, even in comfortable surroundings, creates mental health challenges that luxury amenities can’t address. Humans require social interaction, purpose, and connection to larger communities. A gold-plated prison cell is still a prison cell, and the mental deterioration that follows undermines the clear thinking necessary for actual survival.
The real self-defeating irony is economic. The resources spent on individual bunkers could create far more security if invested in community resilience, renewable infrastructure, or addressing the root causes of potential disasters. A billionaire who spent bunker money on local food security, renewable energy projects, or disaster preparedness for entire regions would be far safer than one hiding underground with a wine collection.
The bunker fantasy reflects the same thinking that created many of our current vulnerabilities, chiefly the belief that individual wealth can solve mass social inequality, and the fact that systemic risks require community-level responses, not individual escape plans. By definition, if society has collapsed enough to require bunker living, the economic systems that created that wealth no longer exist to maintain the bunker’s operations.
Genuine resilience comes from building robust, interconnected systems and communities capable of adapting to change. The wealthy would be better served by investing in the social fabric that sustains civilization — or which can at least “restart” it — rather than planning its abandonment. After all, if your survival plan assumes everyone else has failed, you’ve probably misunderstood both the problem and the solution.
True security isn’t found in isolation — it’s built through interdependence, community investment, and addressing challenges collectively rather than hiding from them individually.
But there is another psychological area to address: the delusion of “elite leadership.”
Leadership is only hard when you’re not humble…and getting into the category of being among the “ultra-rich” argues strongly against humility. “Humble” people do not vacation at Lake Como or along the Riviera on a yacht that costs more than a mid-sized city’s fire department engines. Consider the battle-hardened special-ops veterans the ultra-wealthy hire as “private security” (whether they actually know what “executive protection details” actually entail): As long as the world is intact, and the paychecks continue to flow, sure, they are happy to protect – even in lethal situations – the person and family of the person signing their checks.
But really – when everything goes to hell, who is that elite Operator going to put first: the tech-bro whose money is now so much vaporware, or their own family? Think about it.
All of the above being said, preparing for disasters – even “mega-disasters” – is not wrong. It is highly prudent and advisable. But don’t expect that burning your credit card limits on stuff will save you. Supplies are good. Training is vital. But should the worst ever happen, you are not a “lone wolf”, whether you have a family or not.
Act accordingly.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Lurking in the digital wasteland of the internet’s darker corners, is a beast. A group so vicious, that they have hit on a novel way of undermining civilization…by directly targeting children, like a truly deranged version of Fagin, from Oliver Twist, joining up with Jack the Ripper.
You need to pay attention, and spread the word. Monitor what your children are doing online, because these animals want them dead…and you, as well, if they can make that happen.
The 764 Terror Network: The Growing Digital Threat to Children
The 764 terror network represents one of the most disturbing online terror organizations yet encountered by law enforcement, targeting vulnerable children worldwide, to the extent of being classified as a “Tier One” investigative matter by the FBI, and officially designated as a terrorist network by the U.S. Department of Justice. Named after the zip-code of its founder’s Texas hometown, this decentralized network has evolved from a localized online community into a global movement that the FBI now characterizes as involving “nihilistic violent extremists.”
Origins and Leadership
The group known as “764” was founded in 2021 by Bradley Chance Cadenhead, then a 15-year-old from Stephenville, Texas, who operated under the username “Felix” on Discord. A bullied teenager who had dropped out of school, Cadenhead retreated to his bedroom and created his new online persona, regularly posting shocking images and cultivating a following of like-minded individuals.
Since the launch of the initial 764 group, which garnered a couple of hundred Discord followers, 764 has become a global movement, with an array of offshoots and subgroups that often rebrand and change their names to help keep social media companies and law enforcement from tracking them. Detectives working on these cases have told authorities to treat 764 “more as an ideology” than as a specific group.
In March of 2023, Cadenhead pleaded guilty to nine counts of child pornography possession and was sentenced to 80 years in state prison, with the judge citing his self-described status as a “cult leader”.
The network draws ideological inspiration from the Order of Nine Angles (O9A), a satanic neo-Nazi terrorist organization, incorporating elements of Western esotericism, Satanism, and accelerationist ideology aimed at societal collapse.
The FBI Terror Network Overview
As a group, 764 is a decentralized, Satanic, neo-Nazi, transnational, “sextortion” network that is reportedly adjacent to the Order of Nine Angles, a far-right Satanic terrorist network. It is classified as a terror network by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), and is considered a terrorist “Tier One” investigative matter by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI has more than 250 investigations underway into the network of violent predators known as “764,” making it the number one digital threat to children.
Operational Methods and Scope
764 operates primarily through gaming platforms like Roblox, Discord, and Telegram, methodically targeting minors aged 8-17, particularly those who are marginalized or struggling with mental health issues. The network follows a systematic approach: members befriend victims online, obtain compromising photos through social engineering or feigned romantic interest, then use blackmail to coerce increasingly disturbing acts including self-harm, animal abuse, and the production of child sexual abuse material.
Victims are frequently goaded into carving “764” or their abuser’s username into their bodies, sometimes “going down to the bone,” and these images become valuable currency within the network. The ultimate goal is often to push victims toward suicide, which is livestreamed for the entertainment of network members.
764 has been classified as a violent online network that seeks to destroy civilized society through the corruption and exploitation of vulnerable populations, which often include minors. The 764 network’s accelerationist goals include social unrest and the downfall of the current world order, including the U.S. Government. That’s why the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and the Justice Department’s National Security Division are now looking at 764 and its offshoots as a potential form of domestic terrorism, even coining a new term to characterize the most heinous actors: “nihilistic violent extremists.”
764’s Connection to Mass Violence: A Growing Pattern
The clearest documented connection between the 764 network and school violence is the case of Solomon Henderson, the 17-year-old Antioch High School shooter who killed one student in January 2025. Henderson made specific references to 764 and similar groups in social media posts before his attack, and was found to be “mutuals” online with Madison, Wisconsin school shooter Natalie Rupnow.
Henderson’s 288-page diary revealed extensive engagement with 764 ideology, including tattoos of swastikas and “764” on his arm, and posts stating “I feel like God. I can decide who lives and who dies” after his rampage. Court documents consistently show that 764 members initially come to law enforcement attention through tips regarding planned mass violence, not just child exploitation charges.
European Violence Connections
In October 2024, a 14-year-old Swedish 764 member known as “Slain” livestreamed eight attacks and three stabbings in Hässelby after running an offshoot called “No Lives Matter“. These attacks were filmed, set to music, and shared online to inspire others to engage in violence, with the perpetrator becoming a “celebrity” within 764 spaces and his videos regularly circulated among members.
Ideological Framework for Violence
FBI officials report that 764 networks deliberately share violent content and glorify past mass-casualty attacks such as the 1999 Columbine shooting, while introducing victims to neo-Nazi and Satanist ideologies to “desensitize these young people so that nothing really disturbs them anymore“. The network actively encourages people suffering from mental health problems to “kill themselves on camera or commit mass shootings“.
Other documented cases include 764 member Aidan Harding, charged in February 2025 with possession of child pornography, who had also allegedly plotted a mass casualty event and possessed 20 guns. Similarly, 23-year-old Hugo Figuerola was arrested in Spain for threatening a mass shooting and bombing in Valencia.
The pattern suggests 764 functions not merely as a child exploitation network, but as an active radicalizing force that systematically pushes vulnerable individuals—many of them minors themselves—toward increasingly extreme acts of violence, culminating in real-world attacks that mirror the online violence they’ve been conditioned to celebrate.
Direct Connections Between Rupnow and Henderson
Extremism researchers have documented that both Natalie Rupnow (the Madison shooter) and Solomon Henderson (the Nashville shooter) were active in the same online networks that glorify mass shooters, and they had direct contact as “mutuals” on social media platforms. Moments before Rupnow opened fire, she posted a photograph showing a white supremacist hand gesture, and Henderson immediately responded “Livestream it“.
After the Madison shooting, Henderson became “fixated” on Rupnow, posting numerous times on X supporting her and boasting that they were “mutuals,” sharing posts like “i used to be mutuals with someone who is now a real school shooter“. Henderson later called her a “Saintress” (a term common in these networks), used her photograph as his profile picture, and said he scrawled her name and those of other perpetrators on his weapon and gear.
Rupnow’s social media accounts showed “interest in neo-Nazi ideology and neo-Nazi violence, as well as demonstrating interest and engagement in online forums venerating mass shooters,” including posts featuring images of Parkland shooter Nikolas Cruz and references to Columbine and other mass attacks. At the time of her attack, Rupnow followed just 13 users on X, two of which were accounts linked to Henderson.
The extremist networks both shooters inhabited include Terrorgram, 764, and “Com” communities that have engaged in activities leading to convictions for child sexual abuse materials, sexually exploiting children, and soliciting hate crimes and murder of federal officials. These networks are described [https://nashvillebanner.com/2025/01/25/online-extremism-networks-radicalizing-young-people/] as “an online subculture that celebrates violent attacks and radicalizes young people into committing violence”.
Shared Ideological Elements
Both teenagers inhabited online networks with “an array of influences, ideologies and aesthetics” including “white supremacist, antisemitic, racist, neo-Nazi, occult or satanic beliefs” – the same ideological framework that characterizes 764 and its affiliated networks.
While Rupnow wasn’t directly identified as a 764 member, she was clearly operating within the same ecosystem of extremist networks that overlap with and feed into 764’s recruitment and radicalization pipeline. The documented connections show how these interconnected online communities create pathways between different extremist groups, allowing individuals to move between various networks while being exposed to similar radicalizing content and encouragement toward violence.
Recent Law Enforcement Actions
The FBI first issued a public warning about 764 in September 2023, urging parents to monitor their children’s online activities closely. Multiple federal prosecutions have resulted in significant sentences, including a 30-year prison term for Richard Densmore (“Rabid”), who created “Sewer” communities on Discord specifically for recruiting and exploiting children.
Multiple arrests have occurred worldwide. In March 2024, Cameron Finnigan, a 19-year-old from Horsham, UK, known as “Acid”, was arrested, and in January 2025 pleaded guilty to encouraging suicide, possessing a terrorism manual, and possessing indecent images of a child. Finnigan was subsequently sentenced to six years in jail.
In April 2025, Leonidas Varagiannis, also known as “War,” 21, a citizen of the United States residing in Thessaloniki, Greece, and Prasan Nepal, also known as “Trippy,” 20, of North Carolina, were arrested and charged for operating an international child exploitation enterprise known as “764”. As alleged, the defendants engaged in a coordinated criminal enterprise and led a core subgroup within 764 known as 764 Inferno, which allegedly exploited at least eight minors, some as young as 13, and operated through encrypted messaging applications.
Unfortunately the network has, perhaps inevitably, spawned numerous offshoots including CVLT, Court, Kaskar, Harm Nation, and others, making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to track and disrupt their activities.
Platform and Parental Awareness
Experts emphasize that 764 specifically targets children through popular gaming platforms, making parental awareness and monitoring of online activities crucial for protection. Mental health professionals note that the network specifically seeks out vulnerable children experiencing depression, isolation, or low self-esteem.
The 764 network represents a convergence of terrorist ideology, technological exploitation, and child abuse that challenges traditional law enforcement approaches, requiring coordinated international responses to protect vulnerable young people from what authorities describe as one of the most heinous online threats ever encountered.
Conclusion
The 764 network, without doubt, poses one of the most disturbing online threats to children since the opening of the Internet to the general public, combining elements of extremist ideology with systematic child exploitation. Law enforcement agencies worldwide are treating it as a top priority threat, deploying significant resources to combat its spread and protect potential victims.
The Freedomist takes this threat seriously, and is continuing its investigation, as of this writing. There may be a deeper situation at hand, but as of this article, we are still investigating that angle to avoid having to retract anything.
You should take this seriously, as well. This is an immediate threat to anyone reading this, as well as to their wider community.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The late actor Andreas Katsulas, in his role on the TV show “Babylon5” as Ambassador G’Kar, delivered the line:
“…something is moving, gathering its forces, quietly, quietly, hoping to go unnoticed…” (Babylon 5, S2E2, “Revelations”)
In 2025, something out there, for real, is “…gathering its forces, quietly…hoping to go unnoticed…” This “something” has been doing so for at least two decades, as of this reporting, that is preparing for some event or possibly multiple events, beginning in 2030, something that may represent an existential threat to human civilization, as we know it. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) both know this, and have been quietly moving on a plan of mitigation, a plan that transcends petty political party squabblings.
A plan that definitely involves you.
The first glimmer of this appeared in 2012, when people began asking why the DHS and DOJ were buying so much ammunition, enough – so those agencies and their cheerleaders claimed – for every armed DHS agent to fire over 100 rounds per month, according to the Government Accounting Office (GAO). To put a fine point on it DHS, alone, let two identical contracts on the same day, totaling over 46 million rounds of – per the report – “.223, 30-06, .308, 12 gauge, .357, .38, .40, .45, 7.62, and 9mm”…The shooters reading this already see two oddities: both .308 and 7.62 ammunition, rifle rounds that are dimensionally identical, differing only in specific technical details.
A portion of GAO-14-119 (2014). Government Accounting Office. Public Domain.
Interesting, but not necessarily alarming…if you don’t know what you’re looking at.
That’s a LOT of ammunition.
How much is “a lot“? The Department of Defense was burning through c.1.8 billion rounds of small arms ammunition, per year, at the height of the fighting in Iraq, and was buying ammunition from Israel in an attempt to address the shortfall…and not even the GAO could hide the scale of the purchases, no matter how hard they tried.
…but hey, that’s just some weirdo, “Alex Jones” ravings, right?
Right?
Well…the US Army, out of nowhere, released a massively redacted procurement order on September 23, 2024, to purchase M60E4/E6 General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG’s), with conversion/upgrade and training kits, for a total amount of $14,960,324.75. Some of the un-redacted portions of the purchase order are extremely interesting:
1. Technical Specifications:
M60E4/M60E6 variants with conversion kits
“Conversion kit upgrades any serviceable M60 receiver to M60E6/E4 configuration”
“Can convert and upgrade a serviceable M60 machine gun in fewer than 30 minutes”
2. Operational Requirements:
“Only One Responsible Source” – they specifically =need= M60s, nothing else will work
“No prior contract for this requirement was accomplished using Full and Open Competition”
“US Ordnance is the only known source that possesses the capability”
3. Customer Base Curiosities:
“M60E4 and M60E6 MGs are already currently in use by the [REDACTED] customers”
“Through its utilization for over two decades, [REDACTED] customers’ armed forces personnel have become very familiar with the M60 MG series”
4. Timeline Curiosity:
Five-year contract delivering through 2029
Company C, 1st Battalion 5th Marines machine gunner fires his M60 machine gun at an enemy position. February 1968, Hue City, Republic of South Vietnam. USMC photo. Public Domain.
Most curious. The culture of pedantic security tends to undo the intent of those most desperate to maintain it, because the extensive redactions, themselves, speak volumes…
The United States military – except for some very specialized units like the US Navy SEALS – hasn’t used the M60 in any numbers since about 2005. We supposedly “gifted” the African nation of Senegal some 2,500 M60’s (XLSX download) in 2002…Or – did we?
Certainly, Senegal got some older model M60’s from us, but in 2025 their total armed forces (army, navy and air force) currently stand at c.17,000 personnel – 2,500 GPMG’s would be one M60 for every 6.8 troops; in 2002, when this transfer supposedly happened, Senegal had all of 9,400 personnel, all-in…which would have been one M60 for every 3.76 troops. That is completely ludicrous – no one buys support weapons at that kind of loony ratio.
A portion of the 2014 spreadsheet on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s report on “Excess Defense Articles” (EDA’s) – Warning: Direct .xlsx download. Public Domain.
Very curious – what happened?
According to theDefense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): “…When items in the Department of Defense (DoD) inventory are no longer needed by any military service…they can be declared as excess equipment or Excess Defense Articles (EDA)”, but, “…Not all EDA are overseas; the majority will be in depots located in the continental United States, along with a few in Europe and one in Asia. EDA would only be overseas when in consolidated depot repair yards or where items are taken in-country as U.S. forces are leaving. In such cases, the host nation gets no preferential treatment with respect to EDA – unless Congress passes special legislation authorizing direct transfers in-country…”
So – where did those 2,500 M60’s actually go, in 2002? Are they still in US Government warehouses? The procurement model makes no logical sense, otherwise.
Most “land-force” infantry-type battalions have anywhere between twelve and twenty-25 GPMG’s, depending on their exact Table of Organization & Equipment (or, “TO&E”); this would include both the M60 and its replacement, the M240. The Pentagon’s near-$15 million order would field anywhere between 2,100 and 2,500 weapons, likely at the lower end. Assuming a median figure of 20 GPMGs to a battalion (600 – 1,000 people), c.2,100 GPMG’s are enough to outfit about 100battalions.
That is roughly 60,000 – 100,000 troops…Or is it?
You see, that number is based on only the “new-build” weapons in at US Army contract…What about the “conversion kits”? As specified, these kits can upgrade “older” M60 weapons to the E6/E4 standard “in less than 30 minutes“. There is no mission profile that requires that kind of conversion speed…no conventional (or even special operations) mission profile, that is.
As the purchase order specifically blanked out the numbers of both new weapons and conversion kits being ordered, the only reasonable conclusion is to assume a 1:1 ratio, of “new weapon:conversion kit”. Another reasonable assumption, based on the most commonly-quoted price for a new and complete M60E6, of some $6,000, is that a conversion kit likely runs around $1,000, each. Thus, using a figure of $7,000 for the combination of one new weapon and one conversion kit, that equates to 4,200 total weapons (4,274.3785 weapons, to be pedantic) for the near-$15 million purchase order.
In other words, they are reactivating old weapons, to be placed alongside the new ones.
At the above median of 20 weapons to a battalion-equivalent unit, that comes to 213.71 battalions…or – about the current size of the United States Marine Corps, when counting the low end of what constitutes a “battalion” (c.600 troops).
That’s a lot of battalions…Expressed differently, this would allow for some 20 or so battalion-equivalents of “security units” (essentially, Military Police) to be mobilized in all ten FEMA administrative regions.
FEMA Region Map, 2024. FEMA. Public Domain.
And, let’s not forget the fact that this order is for…M60 machine guns.
As noted above, except for a very few in use by highly specialized units like the US Navy SEALs, very few armed organizations use the M60 in any configuration or numbers, and the few who do, are mostly looking to replace their GPMG’s with something like a MAG-58/M240 or a Russian PK-series…So – who, exactly, are going to be getting up to 4,200 M60E6’s, enough to outfit a multi-division corps?
Given the level of redactions in the purchase order, we are forced into speculative territory, here, over who the likely recipients of this massive number of support weapons might be.
The only group that makes sense, in this context – as bizarre and extreme as it might sound – is the population of the United States, in the form of the Militia of the United States, as described in 10 USC 246of the US Code…
…I can already hear the howls of laughter – when you’re done, answer this question: Who else would be familiar with the M60 platform in such large numbers?
What most people do not realize about 10 USC 246, is that there is an exception to the 17 to 45 year old age limit: per 32 USC 313, referenced in 10 USC 246 above, all former active-duty Federal military personnel are subject to recall for Militia service – at any time, for any reason – until their 64th birthday.
So…why recall the gray-hairs, and what does this have to do with M60 machine guns?
Simply put: Any veteran of the United States Army or Marine Corps, who served between 1980 and 2000, will be highly familiar with the M60 – and even 25 to 30 years later, will remember how to operate and care for these weapons, with minimal “refresher” time…if given a weapon and a manual. In contrast, someone learning the M240, new, would take a week or so, at least, to learn to operate it safely.
While many people – even self-identifying “Patriots” – pay homage to the concept of “The Militia“, very few have any real idea of what would happen in an actual Militia call-up in 2025: Essentially, a gaggle of well-meaning people – some veterans, most not – would show up to a designated assembly point, most armed with rifles…and, giving credit where it is due, most of those individuals’ rifles will be both in better condition, and frankly just “better” overall, than anything in the hands of the regular military.
But…that’s all they will be: individuals – unorganized, largely untrained, with little in the way of supplies or support weapons…like the M60. That’s a no-win situation, one that has prevented actual militia call-outs for over a century. But it does bring up some interesting questions, chief among them:
If the government anticipates scenarios requiring militia activation, why isn’t there a systematic program already in place to ensure those militia units would be at least somewhat effective?
The M60 procurement suggests they expect to need these capabilities, but there’s no evidence of corresponding human resource development.
Back in 2023, we wrote about some potential scenarios requiring domestic militia activation. The recent procurement patterns, specifically concerning the M60, suggest the government may be preparing for exactly these contingencies, and more, but as of this writing there is no corresponding investment in the human side – while 10 USC 246 can certainly call up the “Militia of the United States“, it specifies no current mechanism for “musters”, unit establishment, or training for those it is designed to call forth…That is a fatal flaw which has existed for over a century, one which needs addressing, because armed people with no organization or command structure are a significant liability, not an asset. That’s something you, the Reader, might want to address by contacting your Representatives and Senators about modernizing 10 USC 246 implementation.
But we’re getting ahead of ourselves here.
Clearly, someone in Washington thinks that something is on the horizon. Between the massive ammunition purchases hand-waved off as “bulk buying of training ammunition“, and now a bizarre contract for a machine gun design some 20 years out of general issue, to meet completion in five years time, it is clear that something is afoot.
But, what, exactly? None of the logical and/or viable options are good.
While a certain sector of the “political fringe” is still on about an invasion of the United State by everyone from North Korea to Iran – which, given the failures of the Biden administration in 2021-2025 – is now a valid concern, not least because at least someone in the US Government has known about the threat for over 50 years, the reality is that “social” or “economic” collapse is not really a very realistic model requiring actual militia call-ups and martial law…but there are a few possibilities of concern, beginning in, or just prior to, 2030:
Beginning in 2029-2030, we will enter Solar Cycle 26, which is predicted to be a “Grand Solar Minimum“, leading to a major drop-off in global temperatures, potentially up-ending agricultural cycles around the world. It shouldn’t take a degree in Sociology or Psychology to see the levels of potential unrest that would result.
Then, at the end of 2032, there is the possibility of Asteroid 2024 YR4 impacting the Moon. While this probability is low – currently (mid-2025) standing at 4.3% – it is not zero. This matters, because such a Lunar impact would spew out a debris cloud that would pulverize most of the satellites in Low Earth Orbit, zeroing out payment processing, along with internet and cell service, for months at least…and virtually no store north of the Rio Grande is capable of ringing customers out using cash only…But don’t trust me – ask your local grocery store manager.
Then, there is the possibility of the Campi Flegrei supervolcano in Italy ‘waking up’. In addition to vaporizing the major world city of Naples, this could easily generate conditions similar to those that followed the eruption of Tambora, in 1815, which caused the “Year Without A Summer” in 1816, leading to the last great food subsistence crisis in North America.
And finally, there are the much-ballyhooed Iranian “sleeper cells” that Washington media Chicken-Littles are so terrified of, in the aftermath of President Donald Trump’s recent attacks on Iran’s nuclear program sites…However, refer to that “known threat” from above: the potential is certainly there, although the lack of action as of this writing tends to indicate that this threat is likely much overblown.
On balance, though, it is clear that right after the scheduled completion of the M60 contract, there are some potentially highly serious problems that could well actually require a “martial law” declaration, which, in turn would require the rapid mobilization of a Citizen militia force.
The signs are that the United States Government – or at least, entities =within= the government – have either known or strongly suspected that “something” was coming for at least two decades, and are worried enough about it, that they have now made an unprecedented public move to pre-position at least some of the tools necessary to make possible mitigation strategies work, tools that the people-at-large cannot realistically obtain on their own.
Whatever is going on, you – the Reader – need to stay ahead of the curve. If you are not sure what kind of preparations you need to take, you need to take action now to find out, and assess your situation…because, Militia or not, when everything goes sideways…
You are on your own.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The ancient nation of Somalia occupied a pivotal position in the ancient Indian Ocean trading network during Roman times, serving as a crucial intermediary between the Mediterranean world and the riches of Asia. The Somali coast, known to classical geographers as part of the “Land of Punt” and later “Barbarikon“, provided essential ports of call for merchants navigating the monsoon winds between Roman Egypt and India.
Somali traders controlled access to valuable aromatic resins, particularly frankincense and myrrh, which were harvested from the Boswellia and Commiphora trees, respectively, both of which are native to the region. These precious commodities were in enormous demand throughout the Roman Empire for religious ceremonies, medical applications, and luxury consumption. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a first-century maritime trading manual, describes numerous Somali ports including Malao, Mundus, and Mosylon, detailing the goods available and trading protocols.
Map of the routes of the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (1st century CE). 2007 map by PHGCOM. CCA/4.0
Beyond aromatics, Somalia served as a transshipment point for goods flowing between Africa’s interior and Asian markets. Gold, ivory, and exotic animals from the African hinterland passed through Somali ports en route to Roman and Indian merchants, while manufactured goods, textiles, and spices from India and Southeast Asia were distributed along the East African coast. This strategic position made Somali city-states wealthy intermediaries in a trade network that connected three continents and sustained the luxury economy of the Roman Empire.
Somalia’s Italian Colonial Years (1889-1960)
Somalia’s Italian colonial period began in the 1880’s when Italy gradually secured much of the territory through a series of protection treaties, with formal control established in 1889 when the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and Italy signed the Treaty of Wuchale. In 1885, Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the sultans of Obbia and Caluula, who placed their territories under Italy’s protection.
Unlike other European colonial powers, Italy initially struggled to establish effective control over the vast, arid territory. Starting in the 1890s, the Bimaal and Wa’dan revolts near Merca marked the beginning of Somali resistance to Italian expansion, coinciding with the rise of the anti-colonial Dervish movement in the north. The most dramatic upheaval occurred in British Somaliland, where the uprising led by Mohammed ibn Abdullah Hassan (known to the British as the Mad Mullah) took two decades to suppress.
The colonial administration focused primarily on the southern agricultural regions, establishing banana and cotton plantations along the Shebelle and Juba rivers. Effective Italian control remained largely limited to the coastal areas until the early 1920s, and by the end of 1927, following a two-year military campaign against Somali rebels, Rome finally asserted authority over the entirety of Italian Somaliland.
Italian rule intensified under Fascist governance after 1922. A new era of conflict began in Somalia in 1923 with the arrival of the first governor appointed by Mussolini, when a vigorous policy was adopted to develop and extend Italian imperial interests. Under the first fascist governor Cesare Maria De Vecchi (1923–1928), the colonial state planned ambitious policies of agricultural and infrastructural expansion, with the goal of preparing for the military conquest of neighboring Ethiopia.
In 1936, the region was integrated into Italian East Africa as the Somalia Governorate, which lasted until Italy’s loss of the region in 1941 during the East African campaign of World War II. By February 1942, most of Italian Somaliland had been captured by the British, and Italian Somalia was under British administration until 1949.
Following the war, Italian Somaliland became a United Nations trusteeship known as the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian administration from 1950 to 1960, with legislative elections held in 1956 and 1959. On November 21, 1949, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence.
On July 1, 1960, the Trust Territory of Somalia united with former British Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, with Mogadishu as the nation’s capital. The Italian colonial legacy left lasting impacts on Somali society, including architectural influences visible in Mogadishu today, agricultural techniques, administrative structures, and the Italian language, which was an official language during the Fiduciary Mandate and in the first years of independence, with the majority of Somalis having some understanding of the language by 1952.
The Fall of Siad Barre
Beginning with the 1969 seizure of power by Siad Barre, the country spent some twenty-one years under his iron-fisted dictatorship, until growing resistance to his military junta during the 1980s, eventually boiling over into all-out civil war. From 1988 to 1990, the Somali Armed Forces engaged in combat against various armed rebel groups, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the northeast, the Somali National Movement in the northwest, and the United Somali Congress in the south.
Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, c.1970. Public Domain.
The rebellion effectively began in 1978 following a failed coup d’état, when Barre began using his special forces, the “Red Berets,” to attack clan-based dissident groups opposed to his regime. The regime’s brutality intensified in 1988 with systematic human rights abuses and genocide against the Isaaq clan, resulting in up to 200,000 civilians killed and 500,000 refugees fleeing to Ethiopia.
In response to these humanitarian abuses, Western aid donors cut funding to the Somali regime, resulting in a rapid “retreat of the state,” accompanied by severe devaluation of the Somali Shilling and mass military desertion. On January 27, 1991, pressure from the United Somali Congress and other groups ultimately forced President Barre to flee Somalia, ending his dictatorship and plunging the country into civil war.
Operation Gothic Serpent and the Battle of Mogadishu
Following the United States’ 1992 intervention in Somalia in “Operation Provide Comfort“, to protect food distribution to the population, a shift began under the newly-elected Clinton administration, in mid-1993. This shift led to the United States leading what became known as “UNOSOM II” (United Nations Operation in Somalia II), an ill-advised attempt at forcible “nation-building“, with foregin nations attempting to impose “peace and unity” in an internally-warring nation at gunpoint.
Operation Gothic Serpent, launched in August 1993, represented the United States’ most significant military intervention in Somalia during the height of the civil war. The operation aimed to capture faction leader Mohamed Farrah Aidid, whose forces had killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers and were disrupting humanitarian aid distribution.
The mission culminated in the October 3-4, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, when U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force operators attempted to capture key Aidid lieutenants in the city center. The operation went catastrophically wrong when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades, trapping American forces in hostile territory.
Members of Task Force Ranger under fire in Somalia, October 3, 1993 — the Battle of Mogadishu. U.S. Army Rangers Photo. Public Domain.
During the 15-hour firefight that followed, 18 American soldiers were killed and 73 wounded, while Somali casualties numbered in the hundreds. The graphic images of dead American servicemen being dragged through Mogadishu’s streets shocked the American public and led directly to U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in March 1994.
The incident profoundly influenced U.S. foreign policy for years, contributing to American reluctance to intervene in subsequent humanitarian crises, including the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The battle became emblematic of the challenges facing international intervention in failed states.
The Return of the Terror State
Somalia now stands on the precipice of complete state collapse as Al-Shabaab militants have encircled the capital of Mogadishu in what analysts are calling the most serious threat to the government since the height of the civil war in the 1990’s. The terrorist organization’s lightning offensive, launched in February 2025, has shattered the fragile gains made by international forces over the past decade and returned the specter of jihadist control to the Horn of Africa.
The scale of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence cannot be overstated. From launching coordinated attacks across multiple provinces to capturing strategic towns within 30 kilometers of Mogadishu, the group has demonstrated a tactical sophistication and operational capability that has caught both the Somali government and international partners off guard. What began as seemingly isolated assaults on February 20, 2025, has evolved into a systematic campaign to strangle the capital and force the collapse of the federal government.
The terrorists have employed a multi-pronged strategy combining conventional military tactics with asymmetric warfare, utilizing car bombs, infiltration operations, and terror attacks to maximize psychological impact while minimizing their own exposure to counterstrikes. Their capture of Adan Yabaal on April 16th marked a particular turning point, as this strategic town had served as a crucial staging area for government counteroffensives.
A Regional Terror Network
Al-Shabaab’s current offensive represents more than a localized insurgency; it exemplifies the group’s evolution into a transnational terrorist organization capable of projecting power far beyond Somalia’s borders. This transformation was starkly illustrated in the January 15, 2019 attack on Nairobi’s DusitD2 hotel complex, which demonstrated Al-Shabaab’s expanding operational reach and recruitment capabilities.
The DusitD2 attack, marking the rise of “Obiwan Nairobi“, was particularly significant as it marked a strategic shift in Al-Shabaab’s methodology. Unlike previous operations that relied heavily on ethnic Somali operatives, the five-man terrorist cell that carried out the Nairobi assault included Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent, including a suicide bomber from the coastal city of Mombasa. The 20-hour siege resulted in 21 deaths and 28 injuries, representing Kenya’s worst terrorist attack in four years.
What made the DusitD2 attack particularly alarming for counterterrorism officials was the extensive planning involved. Security footage revealed that Al-Shabaab operatives had been conducting surveillance of the target since at least December 2016, demonstrating a level of operational security and long-term planning that suggested significant organizational sophistication. The attack also revealed the group’s ability to recruit from within Kenya’s security establishment, as one of the attackers was identified as the son of a Kenyan military officer.
The Collapse of International Strategy
The current crisis exposes the fundamental failure of the international community’s approach to Somalia over the past two decades. The transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and subsequently to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), has created critical security gaps that Al-Shabaab has ruthlessly exploited.
The timing of Al-Shabaab’s offensive was no coincidence. Launched just weeks after the ATMIS-to-AUSSOM transition on January 1, 2025, the attacks capitalized on coordination problems, reduced troop levels, and uncertain funding for the new mission. The group’s ability to “launch around 50 percent more attacks per month in 2025 compared to its 2024 average” demonstrates how effectively they have exploited this institutional vulnerability.
Compounding these challenges is the reduction in U.S. support under the Trump administration. American assistance to Somalia’s elite Danab special forces has been curtailed, including the cessation of salary supplements that had doubled soldiers’ pay from $200 to $400 per month. This has severely impacted morale and combat effectiveness of the only units that had previously proven capable of matching Al-Shabaab in direct confrontation.
The Siege Strategy
Al-Shabaab’s current approach reflects lessons learned from recent insurgent successes worldwide, particularly the Taliban’s 2021 conquest of Afghanistan and the Syrian opposition’s rapid advance on Damascus in 2024. Rather than attempting a direct assault on Mogadishu that would allow government forces to concentrate their remaining strengths, the terrorists have opted for a siege strategy designed to slowly strangle the capital.
By controlling the major roads and supply routes into Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab can gradually increase pressure on the city’s three million inhabitants while conducting a psychological warfare campaign through bombings, mortar attacks, and assassination attempts. The March 18th bombing of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade, which killed four people while narrowly missing the president himself, exemplifies this strategy of creating a climate of terror while systematically degrading government capabilities ([source]()).
International Response and Turkish Gambit
As traditional Western partners have reduced their commitments, Somalia has increasingly turned to Turkey for military assistance. Ankara has announced plans to nearly triple its deployment to 800 soldiers, including 300 commandos and 200 drone operators, while also securing lucrative contracts for port and airport operations in Mogadishu. This represents a significant shift in regional power dynamics as Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa.
The new terminal of Aden Abdulle International Airport built by Turkish companies in Mogadishu, Somalia. January 25, 2015 AMISOM Photo by Ilyas Ahmed. CC0/1.0 Universal Public Domain.
However, Turkey’s intervention faces the same fundamental challenges that have plagued international efforts in Somalia for decades: the inability of foreign forces to address the underlying governance failures that have made the country vulnerable to extremist exploitation in the first place.
The Looming Catastrophe
Current trajectory suggests Somalia is heading toward a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. With nearly 6 million people already requiring humanitarian assistance and 4.6 million facing acute food insecurity, the collapse of government control in Mogadishu would create a crisis that could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.
Al-Shabaab’s vision extends far beyond Somalia’s borders. The group has never concealed its ambition to establish a caliphate encompassing all of East Africa, making their current advance on Mogadishu not just a threat to Somalia but to regional stability. With their demonstrated capability to conduct sophisticated attacks like the DusitD2 operation and their growing recruitment networks across the region, Al-Shabaab’s success in Somalia could serve as a launching pad for expanded terrorism throughout East Africa.
The international community faces a closing window to prevent a complete collapse of the Somali state. Without decisive action to reinforce Mogadishu’s defenses and address the fundamental governance challenges that have enabled Al-Shabaab’s rise, the world may soon witness the emergence of the first jihadist-controlled capital in Africa since the Taliban’s return to Kabul.
Somalia may now be a failed state, but the global community is at least trying to backstop the country…for the moment. But, in the current calculus of war around the world, the possibility of Somalia collapsing to Al-Shabaab, like Afghanistan to the Taliban, the possibility exists of a return to the “old days” of Somali piracy, up until 2012. This time, however, there are no easy answers for Western nations who rely on commercial vessels passing Somalia, but who – unlike post-2012 – are unable to juggle all the necessary theaters, making ignoring Somalia a very attractive, short-term proposition, in spite of the potential levels of economic damage.
This is also known as “whistling past the graveyard.”
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
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