Michael Cessna is a former Active Duty United States Marine, a long-time personal protection specialist, security and defense analyst, military subjects instructor, general information researcher and amateur historian. He has been contributing security and defense writing since 2015.
Illicit drugs are everywhere. Since at least the Imperial Chinese attempts at curbing the British opium trade, governments have – for one reason or another – tried to end, or at least restrict as far as possible, the flow of drugs they find objectionable. From cannabis to cocaine, and opium/heroin to fentanyl, massive, militarized law enforcement structures have been built up, to try and end the trade.
For the most part, these efforts have failed.
The problem are the iron laws of supply and demand, and the Streisand Effect: If you overreact to the problem, people get curious as to why…and when trust in government is problematic, that urge becomes obsessive. And in an environment of induced artificial scarcity, imposed by efforts to ban “Bad Thing X” – be that drugs or alcohol – both demand for that substance, as well as its price tends to skyrocket…and the harder law enforcement cracks down, the more creative the suppliers get in bringing their product to market.
Case in point: The “narco submarine“. We discussed the “big-state” military aspects of leveraging narco-sub technology last year, but now we take a deeper dive into the flip-side of the “big-state” use of this ecosystem.
The evolution of narco-submarine technology from crude, semi-submersible craft to sophisticated vessels capable of trans-Atlantic voyages represents more than just an escalation in drug trafficking capabilities—it signals a potential paradigm shift in how insurgent and terrorist organizations could maintain covert supply networks across vast distances.
Trans-Atlantic range narco submarine in Aldán, Cangas, Galicia, Spain, 2019, following its capture by Spanish authorities. Photo by Estevoaei. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine has long emphasized the critical importance of disrupting enemy supply lines. However, the emergence of advanced narco-submarines, some capable of carrying multi-ton payloads across oceanic distances while remaining largely undetected, introduces a new variable into this equation. These vessels, originally developed by South American drug cartels to transport cocaine, have demonstrated remarkable sophistication in recent seizures, featuring diesel-electric propulsion, advanced navigation systems, and even air-independent propulsion capabilities.
The implications now extend far beyond narcotics. Intelligence assessments suggest these platforms could theoretically transport weapons, explosives, communications equipment, or even personnel across traditional maritime security perimeters. Unlike conventional smuggling methods that rely on commercial shipping or aircraft — both heavily monitored — narco-submarines operate in the vast expanses of international waters where detection remains extraordinarily difficult.
This point cannot be overstated: While the “old school” methods have long been known, and control measures developed to address them, the rise of covert submarine logistics at the small(ish) scale is a titanic problem, because almost any coastal beach, inlet or swamp is now a potential delivery point. While traditional inseriton methods like rough airstrips or road checkpoints can be easily identified, the sheer scale and unimproved nature of naval landing avenues severely hamstrings surveillance efforts – airstrips, roads and even drop zones are almost comically easy to identify, especially when they are not on official maps as crossing or entry points. Beaches, however, are everywhere.
Recent interdictions have revealed vessels with ranges exceeding 6,000 nautical miles, sufficient to connect South American manufacturing bases with conflict zones in Africa, the Middle East, or even Europe. The technical expertise required to construct these platforms has proliferated through criminal networks, with evidence suggesting construction techniques and blueprints have spread beyond their Colombian and Ecuadorian origins.
A primary case study of even non-submersible combat logistics support to an insurgent force comes from Mozambique, in 2020-2023:
The Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado demonstrated sophisticated maritime capabilities between 2020-2023 that transformed what began as a land-based rebellion into a complex amphibious threat. Ansar al-Sunna militants systematically leveraged traditional dhow boats and small craft to create covert supply networks that proved nearly impossible for Mozambican security forces to interdict.
The insurgents’ capture of the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 marked a strategic watershed, providing direct access to established heroin trafficking routes from the Makran Coast. Intelligence assessments suggest the group began “taxing” drug shipments landed from dhows, creating a maritime revenue stream that complemented traditional funding sources. This convergence of insurgent logistics and narcotics trafficking created a self-reinforcing cycle — drug money funded operations while operational control over landing sites enabled further revenue collection.
The tactical sophistication was remarkable. Insurgents used coordinated land-sea assaults, arriving simultaneously from multiple vectors to overwhelm defensive positions. They demonstrated proficiency with maritime navigation, successfully conducting what were functionally full-on amphibious operations across the island chains of the Quirimbas archipelago. Perhaps most concerning, they showed adaptive capabilities — after reportedly sinking a Mozambican patrol boat with an RPG-7, they captured additional vessels to expand their maritime fleet.
The geographic advantages were substantial. Cabo Delgado’s extensive coastline, numerous islands, and traditional reliance on dhow-based trade provided perfect cover for covert supply operations. The insurgents exploited the fact that legitimate maritime commerce — fishing, inter-island transport, and traditional trade — created background noise that masked military supply movements. With limited Mozambican naval capabilities and virtually no maritime patrol presence, the ocean became an uncontested highway for insurgent logistics.
For insurgent groups, the strategic value is clearly compelling. As the World War 2 OSS demonstrated, traditional arms trafficking routes face increasing scrutiny from international security partnerships and advanced surveillance systems. Port security measures, while effective against conventional smuggling, are largely irrelevant to vessels that can surface miles offshore and transfer cargo to smaller craft or coastal staging areas.
The financial model also aligns with insurgent economics. Drug trafficking organizations have demonstrated willingness to treat narco-submarines as expendable assets — vessels are often scuttled after single-use missions. This operational approach could extend to insurgent logistics, where the strategic value of delivered materiel outweighs platform preservation.
Counter-narcotics operations have struggled with these platforms despite significant resource investments. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that even with enhanced detection capabilities, the vast majority of narco-submarine transits remain undetected. This detection challenge would be magnified in insurgent applications, where hostile groups’ operational security might be even tighter and cargo manifests wouldn’t trigger the same intelligence indicators as bulk narcotics shipments.
The convergence of criminal and insurgent networks is not theoretical — established precedents exist in regions where these organizations share operational space and mutual interests. The DEA has linked 19 of 43 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations to some aspect of the global drug trade, demonstrating that such collaborations are already occurring. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) provided a decades-long example of how insurgent groups can leverage drug trafficking networks to fund operations and maintain supply lines, activities that continue with the FARC’s splinter factions.
Perhaps most concerning is the adaptive nature of this technology. Each interdiction reveals new innovations: improved stealth characteristics, enhanced range capabilities, and increasingly sophisticated construction techniques. The rapid evolution suggests that by the time security services develop effective countermeasures, the threat may have already evolved beyond current detection and interdiction capabilities.
This potential weaponization of narco-submarine technology by hostile non-state actors represents a convergence of criminal innovation and insurgent logistics that could fundamentally challenge existing maritime security frameworks and force a reassessment of how covert supply networks might operate in an era of advanced surveillance.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Electricity if the foundation of modern society. Many people wistfully ponder the idea of living permanently in the wilderness, the old “back to Nature” idea. The fact is, most people – at least in the West – are going to survive in the wild for longer than a week. Electricity is what allows you to read this, and not simply because the immediate of an internet connection: electricity is fundamental to the industrial processes that made the device you are reading this on.
America’s electrical grid represents both the backbone of modern civilization and its most vulnerable single point of failure. Recent incidents at power substations across the country have revealed a terrifying reality: a relatively small number of coordinated attacks could plunge vast regions into darkness for weeks or months, with cascading effects that would make Hurricane Katrina look like a minor inconvenience.
The December 2022 attack on two Duke Energy substations in Moore County, North Carolina, illustrated the basic vulnerability. Two individuals with rifles caused a blackout affecting 45,000 people for several days. But this was amateur hour compared to what organized groups could accomplish with proper planning and coordination.
The math is sobering. The Department of Homeland Security has identified roughly 55,000 electrical substations nationwide, but destroying just nine of the most critical ones could theoretically black out the entire continental United States. Unlike the heavily fortified nuclear plants or major power stations, most substations are protected by little more than chain-link fencing and security cameras. Many critical transformer installations sit exposed in rural areas with minimal surveillance and lengthy emergency response times.
Marelli coupling transformer in Italy. 2020 photo by Herbert Hönigsperger. CCA/4.0 Int’l
What makes this threat particularly insidious is that it doesn’t require sophisticated weapons or technical expertise. The critical transformer equipment that steps down high-voltage transmission lines is custom-manufactured, expensive, and takes 12-18 months to replace under normal circumstances. A coordinated rifle attack, or even the intelligent use of a reciprocating saw, on multiple substations simultaneously could create a replacement bottleneck that extends outages for months across multiple states.
The cascading effects of a decently-coordinated series of attacks would be catastrophic. Within hours, water treatment plants would lose power, leading to pumping capacity failures. Hospitals could switch to backup diesel generators, but their fuel supplies typically last 72 to 96 hours. Cell towers would go dark as their backup batteries drain, as even those with some minimal solar backups would be drained faster than solar can recharge them. Gas stations could not pump fuel; grocery stores and ATM’s stop working – in the case of the grocery stores, that would be because few, if any,m are set up to switch to paper receipts. Supply chains would being to collapse, as refrigerated transport becomes impossible, electronic payment systems began failing, and regional grocery supply centers would not be able to fulfill orders, if they were even able to receive them.
Behind this vulnerability is the very thing that makes modern society as comfortable as we have become accustomed to: Just In Time Delivery. This is the system that dispatches all manner of inventory to retailers, homes and factories at will, usually arriving within 24 to 96 hours after ordering. This means that very few warehouse areas have more than three or four days of stock in their “back rooms”, at best. This is one of the reasons for the videos of stores being emptied in mere hours when a disaster strikes – it’s not simply damage to the structure, but the location’s inability to order replacement stock.
Most Americans have never experienced true grid-down conditions lasting more than a few days. The best estimates indicate that potentially 90% of Americans would be dead within one year of a sustained nationwide blackout due to starvation, disease, and violence. Even regional blackouts lasting weeks would likely trigger mass refugee movements, as happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, that local authorities couldn’t manage.
The threat isn’t theoretical. In recent years, domestic extremist groups have conducted surveillance of electrical infrastructure. FBI investigations have uncovered plots targeting substations by nihilistic accelerationists larping as neo-Nazis who believe destroying the grid would trigger societal collapse and racial conflict. The knowledge required for effective attacks are spreading through online forums and training materials.
International actors represent an even greater threat. Chinese and Russian operatives have been caught conducting reconnaissance of American electrical infrastructure. State actors could coordinate cyber attacks on grid control systems with simultaneous physical attacks on key substations, maximizing damage while minimizing the chances of rapid recovery.
And what happens if such a series of attacks do happen? None of the possibilities are good. Aside from the initial casualties of the sick and injured as hospital generators run dry of fuel, and those dying in the panic after the lights go out, the near-term (60 – 90 days) will see vast deaths via starvation, as most people have perhaps only two or three weeks worth of food at home, and human performance degrades fast, the longer we go without food. Rural areas are better positioned, since those areas are food producers by default, but they do not have the capacity to absorb refugees, nor to suddenly step up food production, because of the physics and biology of agriculture: even without the fact that most farmland is sectioned off for corporate, single-crop “monoculture” products, it takes time, at least sixty to ninety days, to grow most plants into nutritious crops that will sustain a human. And although hog hunting in the South does produce meat, it is barely impacting the hog population – and the vast majority of Americans have no comprehension of how dangerous feral hogs really are.
Accelerationist dream-world. Pixabay.
The fix is neither quick, simple nor cheap. Hardening critical substations would cost billions and take years to implement. Installing backup transformer capacity requires massive infrastructure investments that utility companies stridently resist making without punitive federal mandates. Meanwhile, the grid continues operating with vulnerabilities that a competent adversary could exploit with devastating effectiveness.
The uncomfortable truth is that America’s electrical grid was designed for reliability and efficiency, not security. In an era of increasing domestic extremism and great power competition, that design philosophy represents a strategic vulnerability that adversaries understand better than most Americans. The question isn’t whether someone will eventually attempt a coordinated grid attack — it’s whether we’ll address these vulnerabilities before they do.
The only good thing in this, is that if we go down, we will take the reast of the “developed world” with us.
Yay. I guess.
The lights we take for granted could go out faster than most people imagine, and stay out longer than our society could survive. As with many things we report here, you are on your own – after reading this, you cannot claim that you weren’t warned to prepare, because the government will not be able to help you.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The ultra-wealthy’s latest status symbol isn’t a super-yacht or private island — it’s a luxury survival bunker. From New Zealand’s exclusive retreats to underground complexes in Montana, billionaires are spending millions on fortified sanctuaries designed to weather civilization’s collapse. But these elaborate preparations reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of how disasters actually unfold and may create more problems than they solve.
While the idea of the “social construct” has been ballyhooed almost to death in the early 21st Century, it is a solid and verifiable doctrinal base. At the same time, the antithesis is also true…and in this context, the statement that “wealth is a social construct” is also a fundamental truth.
Although many people at the lower end of the economic spectrum may rage aginst the idea that they are taking part in a “social construct” from the moment they wake up in the morning, for the ultra-rich, the idea has been slowly growing that their wealth equates to them the level and aspects of medieval barons, that their wealth can insulate them from catastrophic events, events that result in a “Mad Max/Road Warrior” type of world. It is important to remember that the so-called “Robber Barons” of the late-19th Century in America and Europe may have been rapacious, but they were careful to cultivate actual loyalty among their guard forces.
For the modern mega-wealthy, such an attitude is what is known as “whistling past the graveyard“, a phenomenon best represented by the “luxury survival bunker“.
The modern luxury bunker industry promises the impossible: maintaining elite levels of comfort and safety while civilization burns above. Companies like Vivos and Rising S offer underground mansions complete with wine cellars, home theaters, and hydroponic gardens. The Survival Condo Project in Kansas converted a former missile silo into luxury apartments selling for millions, featuring a swimming pool, rock climbing wall, and armored vehicles. The implicit promise is that money can buy not just survival, but the preservation of pre-disaster lifestyle.
Underground World Home swimming pool built structure for the New York world’s Fair, 1964. Public Domain.
This approach fundamentally misunderstands disaster dynamics. Real catastrophes — whether economic collapse, climate disasters, or social upheaval — require adaptation, community cooperation, and practical skills, not isolation behind reinforced concrete. History shows that those who survive major disruptions are typically embedded in resilient communities with diverse skill sets, not isolated individuals hoarding resources.
Photo of the North Portal entrance to Cheyenne Mountain. Public Domain.
The bunker mentality creates several critical vulnerabilities for both survival and immediate security. First, these facilities become obvious targets once their existence becomes known. A luxury bunker essentially advertises its contents to anyone desperate enough to attempt breaching it. The very features that make them appealing — visible wealth, sophisticated systems, stockpiled resources — make them magnets for organized groups with nothing to lose.
Second, luxury bunkers require massive ongoing maintenance and technical expertise that their wealthy occupants rarely possess. Climate controls, water filtration, communications equipment, and power systems all demand specialized knowledge. When the contracted maintenance crews can’t or won’t reach the facility, these sophisticated systems become expensive liabilities. A billionaire who can’t repair a generator is far worse off than a farmer with a hand pump.
Third, the psychological toll of bunker life contradicts its luxury branding. Extended isolation, even in comfortable surroundings, creates mental health challenges that luxury amenities can’t address. Humans require social interaction, purpose, and connection to larger communities. A gold-plated prison cell is still a prison cell, and the mental deterioration that follows undermines the clear thinking necessary for actual survival.
The real self-defeating irony is economic. The resources spent on individual bunkers could create far more security if invested in community resilience, renewable infrastructure, or addressing the root causes of potential disasters. A billionaire who spent bunker money on local food security, renewable energy projects, or disaster preparedness for entire regions would be far safer than one hiding underground with a wine collection.
The bunker fantasy reflects the same thinking that created many of our current vulnerabilities, chiefly the belief that individual wealth can solve mass social inequality, and the fact that systemic risks require community-level responses, not individual escape plans. By definition, if society has collapsed enough to require bunker living, the economic systems that created that wealth no longer exist to maintain the bunker’s operations.
Genuine resilience comes from building robust, interconnected systems and communities capable of adapting to change. The wealthy would be better served by investing in the social fabric that sustains civilization — or which can at least “restart” it — rather than planning its abandonment. After all, if your survival plan assumes everyone else has failed, you’ve probably misunderstood both the problem and the solution.
True security isn’t found in isolation — it’s built through interdependence, community investment, and addressing challenges collectively rather than hiding from them individually.
But there is another psychological area to address: the delusion of “elite leadership.”
Leadership is only hard when you’re not humble…and getting into the category of being among the “ultra-rich” argues strongly against humility. “Humble” people do not vacation at Lake Como or along the Riviera on a yacht that costs more than a mid-sized city’s fire department engines. Consider the battle-hardened special-ops veterans the ultra-wealthy hire as “private security” (whether they actually know what “executive protection details” actually entail): As long as the world is intact, and the paychecks continue to flow, sure, they are happy to protect – even in lethal situations – the person and family of the person signing their checks.
But really – when everything goes to hell, who is that elite Operator going to put first: the tech-bro whose money is now so much vaporware, or their own family? Think about it.
All of the above being said, preparing for disasters – even “mega-disasters” – is not wrong. It is highly prudent and advisable. But don’t expect that burning your credit card limits on stuff will save you. Supplies are good. Training is vital. But should the worst ever happen, you are not a “lone wolf”, whether you have a family or not.
Act accordingly.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Lurking in the digital wasteland of the internet’s darker corners, is a beast. A group so vicious, that they have hit on a novel way of undermining civilization…by directly targeting children, like a truly deranged version of Fagin, from Oliver Twist, joining up with Jack the Ripper.
You need to pay attention, and spread the word. Monitor what your children are doing online, because these animals want them dead…and you, as well, if they can make that happen.
The 764 Terror Network: The Growing Digital Threat to Children
The 764 terror network represents one of the most disturbing online terror organizations yet encountered by law enforcement, targeting vulnerable children worldwide, to the extent of being classified as a “Tier One” investigative matter by the FBI, and officially designated as a terrorist network by the U.S. Department of Justice. Named after the zip-code of its founder’s Texas hometown, this decentralized network has evolved from a localized online community into a global movement that the FBI now characterizes as involving “nihilistic violent extremists.”
Origins and Leadership
The group known as “764” was founded in 2021 by Bradley Chance Cadenhead, then a 15-year-old from Stephenville, Texas, who operated under the username “Felix” on Discord. A bullied teenager who had dropped out of school, Cadenhead retreated to his bedroom and created his new online persona, regularly posting shocking images and cultivating a following of like-minded individuals.
Since the launch of the initial 764 group, which garnered a couple of hundred Discord followers, 764 has become a global movement, with an array of offshoots and subgroups that often rebrand and change their names to help keep social media companies and law enforcement from tracking them. Detectives working on these cases have told authorities to treat 764 “more as an ideology” than as a specific group.
In March of 2023, Cadenhead pleaded guilty to nine counts of child pornography possession and was sentenced to 80 years in state prison, with the judge citing his self-described status as a “cult leader”.
The network draws ideological inspiration from the Order of Nine Angles (O9A), a satanic neo-Nazi terrorist organization, incorporating elements of Western esotericism, Satanism, and accelerationist ideology aimed at societal collapse.
The FBI Terror Network Overview
As a group, 764 is a decentralized, Satanic, neo-Nazi, transnational, “sextortion” network that is reportedly adjacent to the Order of Nine Angles, a far-right Satanic terrorist network. It is classified as a terror network by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), and is considered a terrorist “Tier One” investigative matter by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI has more than 250 investigations underway into the network of violent predators known as “764,” making it the number one digital threat to children.
Operational Methods and Scope
764 operates primarily through gaming platforms like Roblox, Discord, and Telegram, methodically targeting minors aged 8-17, particularly those who are marginalized or struggling with mental health issues. The network follows a systematic approach: members befriend victims online, obtain compromising photos through social engineering or feigned romantic interest, then use blackmail to coerce increasingly disturbing acts including self-harm, animal abuse, and the production of child sexual abuse material.
Victims are frequently goaded into carving “764” or their abuser’s username into their bodies, sometimes “going down to the bone,” and these images become valuable currency within the network. The ultimate goal is often to push victims toward suicide, which is livestreamed for the entertainment of network members.
764 has been classified as a violent online network that seeks to destroy civilized society through the corruption and exploitation of vulnerable populations, which often include minors. The 764 network’s accelerationist goals include social unrest and the downfall of the current world order, including the U.S. Government. That’s why the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division and the Justice Department’s National Security Division are now looking at 764 and its offshoots as a potential form of domestic terrorism, even coining a new term to characterize the most heinous actors: “nihilistic violent extremists.”
764’s Connection to Mass Violence: A Growing Pattern
The clearest documented connection between the 764 network and school violence is the case of Solomon Henderson, the 17-year-old Antioch High School shooter who killed one student in January 2025. Henderson made specific references to 764 and similar groups in social media posts before his attack, and was found to be “mutuals” online with Madison, Wisconsin school shooter Natalie Rupnow.
Henderson’s 288-page diary revealed extensive engagement with 764 ideology, including tattoos of swastikas and “764” on his arm, and posts stating “I feel like God. I can decide who lives and who dies” after his rampage. Court documents consistently show that 764 members initially come to law enforcement attention through tips regarding planned mass violence, not just child exploitation charges.
European Violence Connections
In October 2024, a 14-year-old Swedish 764 member known as “Slain” livestreamed eight attacks and three stabbings in Hässelby after running an offshoot called “No Lives Matter“. These attacks were filmed, set to music, and shared online to inspire others to engage in violence, with the perpetrator becoming a “celebrity” within 764 spaces and his videos regularly circulated among members.
Ideological Framework for Violence
FBI officials report that 764 networks deliberately share violent content and glorify past mass-casualty attacks such as the 1999 Columbine shooting, while introducing victims to neo-Nazi and Satanist ideologies to “desensitize these young people so that nothing really disturbs them anymore“. The network actively encourages people suffering from mental health problems to “kill themselves on camera or commit mass shootings“.
Other documented cases include 764 member Aidan Harding, charged in February 2025 with possession of child pornography, who had also allegedly plotted a mass casualty event and possessed 20 guns. Similarly, 23-year-old Hugo Figuerola was arrested in Spain for threatening a mass shooting and bombing in Valencia.
The pattern suggests 764 functions not merely as a child exploitation network, but as an active radicalizing force that systematically pushes vulnerable individuals—many of them minors themselves—toward increasingly extreme acts of violence, culminating in real-world attacks that mirror the online violence they’ve been conditioned to celebrate.
Direct Connections Between Rupnow and Henderson
Extremism researchers have documented that both Natalie Rupnow (the Madison shooter) and Solomon Henderson (the Nashville shooter) were active in the same online networks that glorify mass shooters, and they had direct contact as “mutuals” on social media platforms. Moments before Rupnow opened fire, she posted a photograph showing a white supremacist hand gesture, and Henderson immediately responded “Livestream it“.
After the Madison shooting, Henderson became “fixated” on Rupnow, posting numerous times on X supporting her and boasting that they were “mutuals,” sharing posts like “i used to be mutuals with someone who is now a real school shooter“. Henderson later called her a “Saintress” (a term common in these networks), used her photograph as his profile picture, and said he scrawled her name and those of other perpetrators on his weapon and gear.
Rupnow’s social media accounts showed “interest in neo-Nazi ideology and neo-Nazi violence, as well as demonstrating interest and engagement in online forums venerating mass shooters,” including posts featuring images of Parkland shooter Nikolas Cruz and references to Columbine and other mass attacks. At the time of her attack, Rupnow followed just 13 users on X, two of which were accounts linked to Henderson.
The extremist networks both shooters inhabited include Terrorgram, 764, and “Com” communities that have engaged in activities leading to convictions for child sexual abuse materials, sexually exploiting children, and soliciting hate crimes and murder of federal officials. These networks are described [https://nashvillebanner.com/2025/01/25/online-extremism-networks-radicalizing-young-people/] as “an online subculture that celebrates violent attacks and radicalizes young people into committing violence”.
Shared Ideological Elements
Both teenagers inhabited online networks with “an array of influences, ideologies and aesthetics” including “white supremacist, antisemitic, racist, neo-Nazi, occult or satanic beliefs” – the same ideological framework that characterizes 764 and its affiliated networks.
While Rupnow wasn’t directly identified as a 764 member, she was clearly operating within the same ecosystem of extremist networks that overlap with and feed into 764’s recruitment and radicalization pipeline. The documented connections show how these interconnected online communities create pathways between different extremist groups, allowing individuals to move between various networks while being exposed to similar radicalizing content and encouragement toward violence.
Recent Law Enforcement Actions
The FBI first issued a public warning about 764 in September 2023, urging parents to monitor their children’s online activities closely. Multiple federal prosecutions have resulted in significant sentences, including a 30-year prison term for Richard Densmore (“Rabid”), who created “Sewer” communities on Discord specifically for recruiting and exploiting children.
Multiple arrests have occurred worldwide. In March 2024, Cameron Finnigan, a 19-year-old from Horsham, UK, known as “Acid”, was arrested, and in January 2025 pleaded guilty to encouraging suicide, possessing a terrorism manual, and possessing indecent images of a child. Finnigan was subsequently sentenced to six years in jail.
In April 2025, Leonidas Varagiannis, also known as “War,” 21, a citizen of the United States residing in Thessaloniki, Greece, and Prasan Nepal, also known as “Trippy,” 20, of North Carolina, were arrested and charged for operating an international child exploitation enterprise known as “764”. As alleged, the defendants engaged in a coordinated criminal enterprise and led a core subgroup within 764 known as 764 Inferno, which allegedly exploited at least eight minors, some as young as 13, and operated through encrypted messaging applications.
Unfortunately the network has, perhaps inevitably, spawned numerous offshoots including CVLT, Court, Kaskar, Harm Nation, and others, making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to track and disrupt their activities.
Platform and Parental Awareness
Experts emphasize that 764 specifically targets children through popular gaming platforms, making parental awareness and monitoring of online activities crucial for protection. Mental health professionals note that the network specifically seeks out vulnerable children experiencing depression, isolation, or low self-esteem.
The 764 network represents a convergence of terrorist ideology, technological exploitation, and child abuse that challenges traditional law enforcement approaches, requiring coordinated international responses to protect vulnerable young people from what authorities describe as one of the most heinous online threats ever encountered.
Conclusion
The 764 network, without doubt, poses one of the most disturbing online threats to children since the opening of the Internet to the general public, combining elements of extremist ideology with systematic child exploitation. Law enforcement agencies worldwide are treating it as a top priority threat, deploying significant resources to combat its spread and protect potential victims.
The Freedomist takes this threat seriously, and is continuing its investigation, as of this writing. There may be a deeper situation at hand, but as of this article, we are still investigating that angle to avoid having to retract anything.
You should take this seriously, as well. This is an immediate threat to anyone reading this, as well as to their wider community.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The late actor Andreas Katsulas, in his role on the TV show “Babylon5” as Ambassador G’Kar, delivered the line:
“…something is moving, gathering its forces, quietly, quietly, hoping to go unnoticed…” (Babylon 5, S2E2, “Revelations”)
In 2025, something out there, for real, is “…gathering its forces, quietly…hoping to go unnoticed…” This “something” has been doing so for at least two decades, as of this reporting, that is preparing for some event or possibly multiple events, beginning in 2030, something that may represent an existential threat to human civilization, as we know it. The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) both know this, and have been quietly moving on a plan of mitigation, a plan that transcends petty political party squabblings.
A plan that definitely involves you.
The first glimmer of this appeared in 2012, when people began asking why the DHS and DOJ were buying so much ammunition, enough – so those agencies and their cheerleaders claimed – for every armed DHS agent to fire over 100 rounds per month, according to the Government Accounting Office (GAO). To put a fine point on it DHS, alone, let two identical contracts on the same day, totaling over 46 million rounds of – per the report – “.223, 30-06, .308, 12 gauge, .357, .38, .40, .45, 7.62, and 9mm”…The shooters reading this already see two oddities: both .308 and 7.62 ammunition, rifle rounds that are dimensionally identical, differing only in specific technical details.
A portion of GAO-14-119 (2014). Government Accounting Office. Public Domain.
Interesting, but not necessarily alarming…if you don’t know what you’re looking at.
That’s a LOT of ammunition.
How much is “a lot“? The Department of Defense was burning through c.1.8 billion rounds of small arms ammunition, per year, at the height of the fighting in Iraq, and was buying ammunition from Israel in an attempt to address the shortfall…and not even the GAO could hide the scale of the purchases, no matter how hard they tried.
…but hey, that’s just some weirdo, “Alex Jones” ravings, right?
Right?
Well…the US Army, out of nowhere, released a massively redacted procurement order on September 23, 2024, to purchase M60E4/E6 General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG’s), with conversion/upgrade and training kits, for a total amount of $14,960,324.75. Some of the un-redacted portions of the purchase order are extremely interesting:
1. Technical Specifications:
M60E4/M60E6 variants with conversion kits
“Conversion kit upgrades any serviceable M60 receiver to M60E6/E4 configuration”
“Can convert and upgrade a serviceable M60 machine gun in fewer than 30 minutes”
2. Operational Requirements:
“Only One Responsible Source” – they specifically =need= M60s, nothing else will work
“No prior contract for this requirement was accomplished using Full and Open Competition”
“US Ordnance is the only known source that possesses the capability”
3. Customer Base Curiosities:
“M60E4 and M60E6 MGs are already currently in use by the [REDACTED] customers”
“Through its utilization for over two decades, [REDACTED] customers’ armed forces personnel have become very familiar with the M60 MG series”
4. Timeline Curiosity:
Five-year contract delivering through 2029
Company C, 1st Battalion 5th Marines machine gunner fires his M60 machine gun at an enemy position. February 1968, Hue City, Republic of South Vietnam. USMC photo. Public Domain.
Most curious. The culture of pedantic security tends to undo the intent of those most desperate to maintain it, because the extensive redactions, themselves, speak volumes…
The United States military – except for some very specialized units like the US Navy SEALS – hasn’t used the M60 in any numbers since about 2005. We supposedly “gifted” the African nation of Senegal some 2,500 M60’s (XLSX download) in 2002…Or – did we?
Certainly, Senegal got some older model M60’s from us, but in 2025 their total armed forces (army, navy and air force) currently stand at c.17,000 personnel – 2,500 GPMG’s would be one M60 for every 6.8 troops; in 2002, when this transfer supposedly happened, Senegal had all of 9,400 personnel, all-in…which would have been one M60 for every 3.76 troops. That is completely ludicrous – no one buys support weapons at that kind of loony ratio.
A portion of the 2014 spreadsheet on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s report on “Excess Defense Articles” (EDA’s) – Warning: Direct .xlsx download. Public Domain.
Very curious – what happened?
According to theDefense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA): “…When items in the Department of Defense (DoD) inventory are no longer needed by any military service…they can be declared as excess equipment or Excess Defense Articles (EDA)”, but, “…Not all EDA are overseas; the majority will be in depots located in the continental United States, along with a few in Europe and one in Asia. EDA would only be overseas when in consolidated depot repair yards or where items are taken in-country as U.S. forces are leaving. In such cases, the host nation gets no preferential treatment with respect to EDA – unless Congress passes special legislation authorizing direct transfers in-country…”
So – where did those 2,500 M60’s actually go, in 2002? Are they still in US Government warehouses? The procurement model makes no logical sense, otherwise.
Most “land-force” infantry-type battalions have anywhere between twelve and twenty-25 GPMG’s, depending on their exact Table of Organization & Equipment (or, “TO&E”); this would include both the M60 and its replacement, the M240. The Pentagon’s near-$15 million order would field anywhere between 2,100 and 2,500 weapons, likely at the lower end. Assuming a median figure of 20 GPMGs to a battalion (600 – 1,000 people), c.2,100 GPMG’s are enough to outfit about 100battalions.
That is roughly 60,000 – 100,000 troops…Or is it?
You see, that number is based on only the “new-build” weapons in at US Army contract…What about the “conversion kits”? As specified, these kits can upgrade “older” M60 weapons to the E6/E4 standard “in less than 30 minutes“. There is no mission profile that requires that kind of conversion speed…no conventional (or even special operations) mission profile, that is.
As the purchase order specifically blanked out the numbers of both new weapons and conversion kits being ordered, the only reasonable conclusion is to assume a 1:1 ratio, of “new weapon:conversion kit”. Another reasonable assumption, based on the most commonly-quoted price for a new and complete M60E6, of some $6,000, is that a conversion kit likely runs around $1,000, each. Thus, using a figure of $7,000 for the combination of one new weapon and one conversion kit, that equates to 4,200 total weapons (4,274.3785 weapons, to be pedantic) for the near-$15 million purchase order.
In other words, they are reactivating old weapons, to be placed alongside the new ones.
At the above median of 20 weapons to a battalion-equivalent unit, that comes to 213.71 battalions…or – about the current size of the United States Marine Corps, when counting the low end of what constitutes a “battalion” (c.600 troops).
That’s a lot of battalions…Expressed differently, this would allow for some 20 or so battalion-equivalents of “security units” (essentially, Military Police) to be mobilized in all ten FEMA administrative regions.
FEMA Region Map, 2024. FEMA. Public Domain.
And, let’s not forget the fact that this order is for…M60 machine guns.
As noted above, except for a very few in use by highly specialized units like the US Navy SEALs, very few armed organizations use the M60 in any configuration or numbers, and the few who do, are mostly looking to replace their GPMG’s with something like a MAG-58/M240 or a Russian PK-series…So – who, exactly, are going to be getting up to 4,200 M60E6’s, enough to outfit a multi-division corps?
Given the level of redactions in the purchase order, we are forced into speculative territory, here, over who the likely recipients of this massive number of support weapons might be.
The only group that makes sense, in this context – as bizarre and extreme as it might sound – is the population of the United States, in the form of the Militia of the United States, as described in 10 USC 246of the US Code…
…I can already hear the howls of laughter – when you’re done, answer this question: Who else would be familiar with the M60 platform in such large numbers?
What most people do not realize about 10 USC 246, is that there is an exception to the 17 to 45 year old age limit: per 32 USC 313, referenced in 10 USC 246 above, all former active-duty Federal military personnel are subject to recall for Militia service – at any time, for any reason – until their 64th birthday.
So…why recall the gray-hairs, and what does this have to do with M60 machine guns?
Simply put: Any veteran of the United States Army or Marine Corps, who served between 1980 and 2000, will be highly familiar with the M60 – and even 25 to 30 years later, will remember how to operate and care for these weapons, with minimal “refresher” time…if given a weapon and a manual. In contrast, someone learning the M240, new, would take a week or so, at least, to learn to operate it safely.
While many people – even self-identifying “Patriots” – pay homage to the concept of “The Militia“, very few have any real idea of what would happen in an actual Militia call-up in 2025: Essentially, a gaggle of well-meaning people – some veterans, most not – would show up to a designated assembly point, most armed with rifles…and, giving credit where it is due, most of those individuals’ rifles will be both in better condition, and frankly just “better” overall, than anything in the hands of the regular military.
But…that’s all they will be: individuals – unorganized, largely untrained, with little in the way of supplies or support weapons…like the M60. That’s a no-win situation, one that has prevented actual militia call-outs for over a century. But it does bring up some interesting questions, chief among them:
If the government anticipates scenarios requiring militia activation, why isn’t there a systematic program already in place to ensure those militia units would be at least somewhat effective?
The M60 procurement suggests they expect to need these capabilities, but there’s no evidence of corresponding human resource development.
Back in 2023, we wrote about some potential scenarios requiring domestic militia activation. The recent procurement patterns, specifically concerning the M60, suggest the government may be preparing for exactly these contingencies, and more, but as of this writing there is no corresponding investment in the human side – while 10 USC 246 can certainly call up the “Militia of the United States“, it specifies no current mechanism for “musters”, unit establishment, or training for those it is designed to call forth…That is a fatal flaw which has existed for over a century, one which needs addressing, because armed people with no organization or command structure are a significant liability, not an asset. That’s something you, the Reader, might want to address by contacting your Representatives and Senators about modernizing 10 USC 246 implementation.
But we’re getting ahead of ourselves here.
Clearly, someone in Washington thinks that something is on the horizon. Between the massive ammunition purchases hand-waved off as “bulk buying of training ammunition“, and now a bizarre contract for a machine gun design some 20 years out of general issue, to meet completion in five years time, it is clear that something is afoot.
But, what, exactly? None of the logical and/or viable options are good.
While a certain sector of the “political fringe” is still on about an invasion of the United State by everyone from North Korea to Iran – which, given the failures of the Biden administration in 2021-2025 – is now a valid concern, not least because at least someone in the US Government has known about the threat for over 50 years, the reality is that “social” or “economic” collapse is not really a very realistic model requiring actual militia call-ups and martial law…but there are a few possibilities of concern, beginning in, or just prior to, 2030:
Beginning in 2029-2030, we will enter Solar Cycle 26, which is predicted to be a “Grand Solar Minimum“, leading to a major drop-off in global temperatures, potentially up-ending agricultural cycles around the world. It shouldn’t take a degree in Sociology or Psychology to see the levels of potential unrest that would result.
Then, at the end of 2032, there is the possibility of Asteroid 2024 YR4 impacting the Moon. While this probability is low – currently (mid-2025) standing at 4.3% – it is not zero. This matters, because such a Lunar impact would spew out a debris cloud that would pulverize most of the satellites in Low Earth Orbit, zeroing out payment processing, along with internet and cell service, for months at least…and virtually no store north of the Rio Grande is capable of ringing customers out using cash only…But don’t trust me – ask your local grocery store manager.
Then, there is the possibility of the Campi Flegrei supervolcano in Italy ‘waking up’. In addition to vaporizing the major world city of Naples, this could easily generate conditions similar to those that followed the eruption of Tambora, in 1815, which caused the “Year Without A Summer” in 1816, leading to the last great food subsistence crisis in North America.
And finally, there are the much-ballyhooed Iranian “sleeper cells” that Washington media Chicken-Littles are so terrified of, in the aftermath of President Donald Trump’s recent attacks on Iran’s nuclear program sites…However, refer to that “known threat” from above: the potential is certainly there, although the lack of action as of this writing tends to indicate that this threat is likely much overblown.
On balance, though, it is clear that right after the scheduled completion of the M60 contract, there are some potentially highly serious problems that could well actually require a “martial law” declaration, which, in turn would require the rapid mobilization of a Citizen militia force.
The signs are that the United States Government – or at least, entities =within= the government – have either known or strongly suspected that “something” was coming for at least two decades, and are worried enough about it, that they have now made an unprecedented public move to pre-position at least some of the tools necessary to make possible mitigation strategies work, tools that the people-at-large cannot realistically obtain on their own.
Whatever is going on, you – the Reader – need to stay ahead of the curve. If you are not sure what kind of preparations you need to take, you need to take action now to find out, and assess your situation…because, Militia or not, when everything goes sideways…
You are on your own.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Wars require money, in some form. Combatants have to buy weapons, ammunition, food, vehicles, fuel, spare parts, lay down bribes for intelligence and suborning various people, and medical supplies, along with just simple tools…and that’s before we talk about whether they actually pay their fightersd.
In the shadowy realm of contemporary warfare, the most destructive conflicts are increasingly those where the combatants get their war chests filled by distant, foreign capitals. From Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression to Yemen’s devastating civil war, proxy conflicts have become the preferred method of great power competition — offering what military strategists euphemistically call “quick, relatively cheap and low-risk options for the continuation of policy aims“.
Proxy warfare has evolved from Cold War-era confrontations into a sophisticated financial enterprise that operates through complex networks of state sponsors, shell companies, and illicit economic activities. As Foreign Policy columnist Emma Ashford observed, proxy wars have become a preferred method of great power competition, allowing major powers to exert influence while maintaining plausible deniability. Understanding the financial mechanisms that sustain these conflicts is crucial for comprehending modern geopolitical dynamics and developing effective countermeasures.
Yet behind every proxy war lies a complex economic ecosystem that determines not just who fights, but how long they can sustain the violence. Understanding these financial networks reveals uncomfortable truths about modern warfare: conflicts are increasingly about economic endurance rather than battlefield tactics, and the nations writing the checks often have more control over outcomes than the soldiers pulling triggers.
The State Funding Model: Direct Government Support
The most straightforward financing mechanism involves direct state funding of proxy forces. President Vladimir Putin’s extraordinary admission in June 2023 revealed that “the financing of the entire Wagner group was fully ensured by the State,” with the Russian Defense Ministry pouring nearly $1 billion into Wagner operations from May 2022 to May 2023. This disclosure shattered decades of Kremlin denials and provided unprecedented insight into how major powers fund their proxy operations.
No nation has perfected the economics of proxy warfare quite like Iran. Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” represents perhaps history’s most sophisticated proxy financing operation, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force managing an estimated budget exceeding $1 billion annually for terrorist financing. This staggering sum supports between 140,000 and 185,000 proxy fighters across Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen.
Groups that are part of the “Axis of Resistance”. 2024 image via Kaliper1. CCA/2.5
Iran represents perhaps the most systematic state-sponsored proxy financing network. The U.S. State Department estimated that Iran spent more than $16 billion supporting the Assad regime and its proxies between 2012 and 2020. In 2020 alone, Iran funneled more than $700 million to Hezbollah, while providing more than $100 million annually to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These massive transfers occur through Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), which serves as Tehran’s primary mechanism for financing proxy operations across the Middle East.
The scale of Iran’s investment becomes clear when examining individual recipients. Hezbollah alone receives more than $700 million annually from Tehran, a sum that dwarfs the entire defense budgets of many small nations. As Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah candidly admitted in 2016: “Hezbollah’s budget, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
Iran’s proxy economics operate on multiple levels simultaneously. Beyond direct cash transfers, Tehran provides weapons manufacturing capabilities, enabling proxies to achieve self-sufficiency while maintaining plausible deniability. In Syria, Iran helped organize, train, and fund over 100,000 Shia fighters, demonstrating how proxy economics can scale to conventional warfare levels when strategic interests demand it.
The Iranian model reveals a crucial economic principle: proxy wars succeed when sponsors can provide “stable and ample funding” while maintaining political control over their assets. Tehran achieves this through what former CIA analyst Norman Roule describes as controlling “their weaponry, their funding and significant political relationships with their key leaders”.
Economic Integration and Development Funding
China has pioneered a more sophisticated approach through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which launched in 2013 with the Silk Road Fund’s $40 billion initial capital. While ostensibly focused on infrastructure development, analysts worry that the BRI could be a Trojan horse for China-led regional development and military expansion. The program’s dual-use potential becomes apparent through [debt-trap diplomacy, where China allegedly uses unsustainable loans to gain leverage over debtor governments.
A 2021 study analyzed over one hundred debt financing contracts China signed with foreign governments and found that the contracts often contain clauses that restrict restructuring with the Paris Club, providing Beijing with significant leverage over partner nations. This economic influence can be converted into military access, as demonstrated by China’s naval base in Djibouti, which many observers see as the first of many potential military expansions.
The Technology Transfer Economy
Modern proxy warfare increasingly revolves around technology transfer rather than simple arms sales. The Iran-North Korea weapons pipeline exemplifies this evolution, with both nations sharing ballistic missile technology, submarine designs, and nuclear expertise. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile closely resembles North Korea’s Hawasong-14, while satellite imagery suggests Iranian technical expertise contributed to North Korean missile silo construction.
This technological cooperation creates self-sustaining proxy economies. Rather than remaining dependent on foreign suppliers, proxies gradually develop indigenous capabilities. Iran has mastered this approach, transferring not just weapons but “the means of production and modification to enable independent manufacturing” to its proxy network.
The economic advantages are compelling. Technology transfer builds redundancy of supply, reduces shipping risks, enhances deniability, and creates local employment that strengthens proxy loyalty. For sponsors, it represents a long-term investment strategy that pays dividends far beyond any single conflict.
The Ukrainian Counter-Model: Coalition Economics
Ukraine’s defense against Russian invasion illustrates a different proxy economic model—multilateral coalition funding. Rather than relying on a single sponsor, Ukraine has assembled a diverse funding coalition including the United States, European Union, individual NATO members, and unexpected participants like Japan and South Korea.
This approach offers both advantages and vulnerabilities. Coalition funding can provide massive resource flows — U.S. assistance alone has exceeded $350 billion according to various estimates. However, it also creates dependency on multiple political systems with different priorities and election cycles. As U.S. support becomes uncertain under changing administrations, the sustainability of coalition-funded proxy warfare faces its ultimate test.
Japan and South Korea’s involvement demonstrates how proxy economics extend beyond traditional security partnerships. Both nations provide substantial non-lethal aid while “replenishing U.S. weapons stocks, supplying the United States with artillery shells and thereby freeing up Washington’s ability to send shells to Ukraine.” This creates layered economic relationships where allies subsidize great power proxy warfare indirectly.
The Russian Adaptation: Sanctions and Substitution
Russia’s proxy economic strategy has evolved dramatically under international sanctions pressure. Traditional funding mechanisms disrupted, Moscow has increasingly relied on partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea to sustain both its direct war effort and proxy relationships. China provides crucial economic support that enables Russia to withstand Western sanctions, while Iran supplies drones and North Korea provides ammunition and even troops.
This adaptation reveals how proxy economics adjust to pressure. When conventional funding channels close, sponsors develop alternative networks. Russia’s use of Wagner Group mercenaries represented an attempt to privatize proxy relationships, creating plausible deniability while maintaining operational control. The Wagner model failed primarily due to political rather than economic factors, but its brief success demonstrated the potential for corporate proxy structures.
Escalation Economics
Perhaps most concerning is how proxy war economics influence conflict escalation. Traditional deterrence theory assumes rational actors will avoid escalation due to increasing costs. However, proxy warfare inverts this logic. As former CIA analyst Norman Roule observes, Iran operates as “an arsonist that then subcontracts out to other arsonists”, empowering proxies with resources while maintaining strategic distance.
This creates moral hazard problems where proxies may escalate beyond their sponsor’s intentions, confident that economic support will continue. The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel exemplifies this dynamic—Iran provided the economic foundation enabling Hamas capability, but the timing and scale caught Tehran off-guard, demonstrating how proxy economics can enable conflicts that spiral beyond original parameters.
Resource Extraction and Illicit Trade
Proxy groups increasingly finance their operations through control of natural resources and illicit trade networks. The U.S. Treasury Department revealed in 2023 that Wagner Group entities in the Central African Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Russia engaged in illicit gold dealings to fund Wagner operations. These operations involve sophisticated shell company networks, with Wagner using companies like Midas and Diamville to convert CAR-origin gold into U.S. dollars.
The U.S. Treasury Department exposed a convoluted Iranian illicit financing scheme in 2018 where Hezbollah officials, working with Iranian operatives and Russian companies, facilitated shipment of millions of barrels of Iranian oil to the Assad regime. The Assad regime would then transfer hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars to the IRGC-QF, which distributed funds to Hamas and Hezbollah. In one documented transaction, a Hezbollah official confirmed receipt of $63 million as part of this oil-for-terror scheme.
The Sustainability Question
Ultimately, proxy war economics succeed or fail based on sustainability. Iran’s model works because oil revenues provide consistent funding streams relatively insulated from international pressure. Coalition models like Ukraine’s support depend on sustained political will across multiple democracies—a more fragile foundation.
The economic lessons are clear: modern conflicts are won by whichever side can maintain funding longest, not necessarily whichever side fights best. This reality transforms strategy from tactical to economic, making treasury departments as important as defense ministries in determining conflict outcomes. As proxy wars become the dominant form of great power competition, understanding their economic foundations becomes essential for anticipating tomorrow’s conflicts—and their likely victors.
Private Sector and Diaspora Financing
Proxy organizations also tap into private funding sources and diaspora communities. Hezbollah has relied on funding from the Shi’ite Lebanese Diaspora in West Africa, the United States, and the Triple Frontier region along the junction of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. These networks often operate through legitimate businesses and charities that serve as fronts for money laundering operations.
The United States has sanctioned numerous charities and front companies for providing financial support to proxy groups, including the Holy Land Foundation, which was designated in 2001 for providing millions of dollars annually to Hamas. These sanctions have had limited effectiveness, as current U.S. sanctions have not significantly impacted Iran’s relationships with its proxies.
Banking and Financial System Exploitation
Modern proxy financing relies heavily on exploiting legitimate financial institutions. A C4ADS report on leaked Wagner documents showed that without legitimate financial institutions such as JP Morgan Chase and HSBC as intermediaries, the Wagner Group would not have been able to establish a foothold in Africa. In 2017, the Sudanese Mining company Meroe Gold, acting as a shell company for Wagner, used JP Morgan Chase to process payments to sellers in China.
Iran has developed sophisticated methods to circumvent banking sanctions. The U.S. designated Bank Saderat in 2006 for facilitating transfers of hundreds of millions of dollars annually to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, new financial networks continuously emerge to replace sanctioned institutions.
Government-to-Government Contracts
Some proxy financing occurs through legitimate government contracts that provide plausible cover for military support. Putin revealed that Wagner received contracts worth billions of rubles, including payments from governments who hired Wagner services, such as the Malian government, which reportedly paid Wagner more than $10 million each month. These arrangements allow both parties to maintain the fiction that the services being provided are purely commercial rather than military.
A Brave, New World
The financing of proxy warfare presents significant challenges for international security and governance. As noted by RAND Corporation analysts, geopolitical drivers of proxy warfare can often be self-reinforcing, with states able to develop proxy warfare capabilities very quickly, within a couple of years. The financial networks supporting these capabilities are equally adaptable, evolving new methods to circumvent sanctions and detection.
Recent developments suggest that proxy warfare financing will continue to evolve with the global financial system. Cryptocurrency, digital payment systems, and new forms of economic integration provide both opportunities and challenges for states seeking to fund proxy operations while maintaining deniability.
The complexity of modern proxy war financing reflects the broader evolution of international conflict, where economic warfare, information operations, and traditional military action converge in ways that challenge conventional approaches to conflict resolution and accountability. Understanding these financial mechanisms is essential for policymakers seeking to address the root causes of contemporary global instability.
…Money makes the world go ’round – it also helps to burn it.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
In the shadowy world of Cold War espionage, few programs were as extensive — or as controversial — as Operation Gladio, NATO’s clandestine network of “stay-behind” forces designed to wage guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. What began as a reasonable defensive precaution evolved into a decades-long covert operation that would eventually raise profound questions about democratic oversight, government accountability, and the thin line between national security and state-sponsored terrorism.
Origins in Wartime Necessity
The concept of stay-behind forces emerged from the bitter lessons of World War II, when resistance movements across Nazi-occupied Europe demonstrated both the potential and the limitations of guerrilla warfare against occupying forces. As the Iron Curtain descended across Europe in the late 1940s, Western intelligence services faced a stark reality: the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional superiority meant that any Soviet invasion would likely overrun Western Europe’s conventional defenses within days.
Soviet tanks near Odessa, April 1944. Red Army, USSR, photo. Public Domain.
The solution, conceived jointly by the CIA and Britain’s MI6, was elegantly simple in theory: pre-position trained personnel, weapons caches, and communication equipment throughout Western Europe to serve as the nucleus of resistance movements should the worst occur. These stay-behind units would conduct sabotage operations, gather intelligence, and coordinate with NATO forces attempting to liberate occupied territory.
The formal structure began with the Western Union’s Clandestine Committee (WUCC) in 1948, which was subsequently integrated into NATO as the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC) in 1951. By 1958, NATO had established the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) to coordinate secret warfare operations across member nations.
Named after the double-edged gladius sword of Roman legionaries, Operation Gladio was officially established in 1956, though its roots stretched back to the immediate postwar period. The program’s existence was kept secret not only from the Soviet Union but from most Western European populations and even many of their elected officials.
The Network Expands
What made Gladio unique was its scope and sophistication. Unlike ad hoc resistance movements that formed spontaneously during wartime, these were professionally organized networks with carefully selected personnel, standardized equipment, and regular training exercises. Each participating NATO country maintained its own stay-behind organization: Gladio in Italy, Absalon in Denmark, P26 in Switzerland, ROC in Norway, I&O in the Netherlands, SDRA8 in Belgium, and similar networks in Germany, France, Austria, Greece, and Turkey.
The typical Gladio cell consisted of 10-15 individuals, often recruited from military special forces, intelligence services, or civilian volunteers with particular skills—radio operators, demolitions experts, former resistance fighters. These operatives underwent intensive training in sabotage techniques, covert communications, and survival skills, often at secret facilities in NATO countries or neutral territories.
Weapons caches were carefully concealed throughout the countryside—buried in forests, hidden in caves, stored in seemingly abandoned buildings, and secured in underground bunkers scattered across mountain locations. The arsenal was impressive and comprehensive: automatic weapons, explosives, pistols, ammunition, knives, navigation equipment, spy radios, guerrilla warfare manuals, specialized assassination weapons, and emergency supplies including brandy and chocolate. Cache discoveries as late as 1996 revealed the true scope of the program. In Italy alone, investigators discovered 622 hidden weapons dumps containing everything from machine guns to anti-tank rockets, demonstrating the massive scale of NATO’s secret preparations.
American officer and French partisan crouch behind an auto during a street fight in a French city, 1944. US Army photo. Public Domain.
According to former CIA Director William Colby, who oversaw Scandinavian operations, these networks required careful coordination with NATO planning, radio communications linked to potential government-in-exile locations, and specialized equipment secured from the CIA. The operation extended beyond traditional NATO boundaries, with CIA support for anti-communist movements in Ukraine and covert operations in the Baltic countries.
The Strategy Behind the Shadows
From a strategic perspective, Gladio represented a form of deterrence through promised resistance. Soviet military planners would have to factor in not just the immediate costs of conquering Western Europe, but the ongoing expense of occupying territories where trained guerrillas could strike at supply lines, assassination key collaborators, and gather intelligence for NATO counterattacks.
This strategy drew heavily from successful resistance operations during World War II, particularly the French Resistance and Yugoslav partisans, while attempting to avoid their primary weaknesses: poor coordination with Allied forces, inadequate equipment, and security vulnerabilities that led to mass arrests.
The program also served intelligence-gathering functions during peacetime. Stay-behind operatives were positioned to monitor communist activities, track potential collaborators, and maintain surveillance on strategic targets. This dual-purpose nature would later prove controversial when allegations emerged that some units engaged in domestic political surveillance beyond their official mandate.
The Italian Revelation and Gladio Exposed
The existence of these networks remained one of the Cold War’s most closely guarded secrets until 1990, when Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti revealed the existence of Gladio to the Italian Senate. His disclosure was prompted by the discovery of a 1959 document from Italy’s military intelligence service SIFAR, titled “The special forces of SIFAR and Operation Gladio,” which detailed the secret army’s NATO connections and CIA training.
The most controversial aspect of Operation Gladio involves allegations that stay-behind networks became entangled with domestic terrorism during Italy’s “Years of Lead” (1968-1982). This period saw over 14,000 politically motivated attacks, including bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings by both far-left groups like the Red Brigades and far-right organizations such as Ordine Nuovo.
Critics, particularly Swiss academic Daniele Ganser, argue that Gladio networks participated in a “strategy of tension” designed to prevent communist parties from gaining power by conducting false flag operations that could be blamed on left-wing groups. Key incidents cited include the 1969 Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan, which killed 17 people, and the 1980 Bologna railway station bombing that killed 85.
The interior of the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura in Piazza Fontana, Milan, after it was bombed in 1969. RAI photo. Public Domain.
The strategy of tension theory suggests that right-wing terrorism was designed to create public fear and drive voters toward authoritarian solutions. As Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga observed about the Bologna bombing: “Unlike leftist terrorism, which strikes at the heart of the state through its representatives, right-wing terrorism prefers acts such as massacres because acts of extreme violence promote panic and impulsive reactions”.
International Response and Investigations
Following Gladio’s exposure, the European Parliament passed a resolution on November 22, 1990, condemning “the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks” and calling for full investigation into these secret organizations. The resolution specifically protested “the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network”.
However, only Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland conducted parliamentary investigations into their respective networks. The George H.W. Bush administration refused to comment on the revelations, maintaining official silence about U.S. involvement.
Global Implications
While Gladio focused on Europe, the United States simultaneously developed similar programs worldwide. In Asia, the CIA created stay-behind networks in countries like South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In Latin America, comparable programs supported anti-communist forces throughout the region.
These operations reflected a fundamental Cold War reality: the nuclear stalemate meant that much of the actual conflict would be fought through proxies, covert operations, and what would later be termed “hybrid warfare.” Stay-behind networks represented the defensive complement to more aggressive covert operations like the Bay of Pigs invasion or support for Afghan mujahideen.
The philosophical underpinning was straightforward: democratic governments had not just the right but the obligation to prepare for scenarios where normal constitutional processes might be suspended by foreign occupation. The question that would later haunt these programs was whether such extraordinary measures could be contained within democratic norms during peacetime, or whether they inevitably created parallel power structures accountable to no one.
The legacy of Operation Gladio continues to influence contemporary debates about government surveillance, covert operations, and the balance between security and transparency in democratic societies.
The Historical Debate
The true nature and extent of Gladio’s activities remain subjects of intense historical debate. The U.S. State Department has acknowledged the existence of NATO stay-behind efforts and Italy’s Gladio specifically, confirming their purpose as resistance preparation against potential Soviet aggression. However, American officials firmly deny any U.S. involvement in terrorism, characterizing allegations of false flag operations as Cold War-era Soviet disinformation.
Critics of the conspiracy theories point to the reliance on questionable documents, particularly the alleged U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B, which the State Department claims is a Soviet forgery designed to discredit American intelligence operations.
Legacy and Contemporary Relevance
Operation Gladio’s legacy extends far beyond its Cold War origins. The revelations fundamentally altered public understanding of post-war European history, demonstrating how deeply intelligence operations could penetrate democratic societies. The networks were never called upon to resist Soviet invasion, as the threat they were designed to counter ultimately never materialized.
The operation raises enduring questions about the balance between national security and democratic oversight, the accountability of intelligence agencies, and the potential for covert operations to exceed their original mandates. Whether Gladio remained purely a defensive contingency or evolved into something more sinister continues to divide historians and fuel conspiracy theories decades after its exposure.
What remains undisputed is that NATO and Western intelligence agencies maintained extensive secret networks throughout the Cold War, equipped with weapons and trained in unconventional warfare, operating largely outside democratic oversight. The full truth about their activities may never be completely known, ensuring that Operation Gladio remains one of the Cold War’s most intriguing and controversial legacies.
…The real question is: Are these networks still out there, on their own?
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
The ancient nation of Somalia occupied a pivotal position in the ancient Indian Ocean trading network during Roman times, serving as a crucial intermediary between the Mediterranean world and the riches of Asia. The Somali coast, known to classical geographers as part of the “Land of Punt” and later “Barbarikon“, provided essential ports of call for merchants navigating the monsoon winds between Roman Egypt and India.
Somali traders controlled access to valuable aromatic resins, particularly frankincense and myrrh, which were harvested from the Boswellia and Commiphora trees, respectively, both of which are native to the region. These precious commodities were in enormous demand throughout the Roman Empire for religious ceremonies, medical applications, and luxury consumption. The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a first-century maritime trading manual, describes numerous Somali ports including Malao, Mundus, and Mosylon, detailing the goods available and trading protocols.
Map of the routes of the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (1st century CE). 2007 map by PHGCOM. CCA/4.0
Beyond aromatics, Somalia served as a transshipment point for goods flowing between Africa’s interior and Asian markets. Gold, ivory, and exotic animals from the African hinterland passed through Somali ports en route to Roman and Indian merchants, while manufactured goods, textiles, and spices from India and Southeast Asia were distributed along the East African coast. This strategic position made Somali city-states wealthy intermediaries in a trade network that connected three continents and sustained the luxury economy of the Roman Empire.
Somalia’s Italian Colonial Years (1889-1960)
Somalia’s Italian colonial period began in the 1880’s when Italy gradually secured much of the territory through a series of protection treaties, with formal control established in 1889 when the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II and Italy signed the Treaty of Wuchale. In 1885, Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the sultans of Obbia and Caluula, who placed their territories under Italy’s protection.
Unlike other European colonial powers, Italy initially struggled to establish effective control over the vast, arid territory. Starting in the 1890s, the Bimaal and Wa’dan revolts near Merca marked the beginning of Somali resistance to Italian expansion, coinciding with the rise of the anti-colonial Dervish movement in the north. The most dramatic upheaval occurred in British Somaliland, where the uprising led by Mohammed ibn Abdullah Hassan (known to the British as the Mad Mullah) took two decades to suppress.
The colonial administration focused primarily on the southern agricultural regions, establishing banana and cotton plantations along the Shebelle and Juba rivers. Effective Italian control remained largely limited to the coastal areas until the early 1920s, and by the end of 1927, following a two-year military campaign against Somali rebels, Rome finally asserted authority over the entirety of Italian Somaliland.
Italian rule intensified under Fascist governance after 1922. A new era of conflict began in Somalia in 1923 with the arrival of the first governor appointed by Mussolini, when a vigorous policy was adopted to develop and extend Italian imperial interests. Under the first fascist governor Cesare Maria De Vecchi (1923–1928), the colonial state planned ambitious policies of agricultural and infrastructural expansion, with the goal of preparing for the military conquest of neighboring Ethiopia.
In 1936, the region was integrated into Italian East Africa as the Somalia Governorate, which lasted until Italy’s loss of the region in 1941 during the East African campaign of World War II. By February 1942, most of Italian Somaliland had been captured by the British, and Italian Somalia was under British administration until 1949.
Following the war, Italian Somaliland became a United Nations trusteeship known as the Trust Territory of Somalia under Italian administration from 1950 to 1960, with legislative elections held in 1956 and 1959. On November 21, 1949, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence.
On July 1, 1960, the Trust Territory of Somalia united with former British Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, with Mogadishu as the nation’s capital. The Italian colonial legacy left lasting impacts on Somali society, including architectural influences visible in Mogadishu today, agricultural techniques, administrative structures, and the Italian language, which was an official language during the Fiduciary Mandate and in the first years of independence, with the majority of Somalis having some understanding of the language by 1952.
The Fall of Siad Barre
Beginning with the 1969 seizure of power by Siad Barre, the country spent some twenty-one years under his iron-fisted dictatorship, until growing resistance to his military junta during the 1980s, eventually boiling over into all-out civil war. From 1988 to 1990, the Somali Armed Forces engaged in combat against various armed rebel groups, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the northeast, the Somali National Movement in the northwest, and the United Somali Congress in the south.
Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, c.1970. Public Domain.
The rebellion effectively began in 1978 following a failed coup d’état, when Barre began using his special forces, the “Red Berets,” to attack clan-based dissident groups opposed to his regime. The regime’s brutality intensified in 1988 with systematic human rights abuses and genocide against the Isaaq clan, resulting in up to 200,000 civilians killed and 500,000 refugees fleeing to Ethiopia.
In response to these humanitarian abuses, Western aid donors cut funding to the Somali regime, resulting in a rapid “retreat of the state,” accompanied by severe devaluation of the Somali Shilling and mass military desertion. On January 27, 1991, pressure from the United Somali Congress and other groups ultimately forced President Barre to flee Somalia, ending his dictatorship and plunging the country into civil war.
Operation Gothic Serpent and the Battle of Mogadishu
Following the United States’ 1992 intervention in Somalia in “Operation Provide Comfort“, to protect food distribution to the population, a shift began under the newly-elected Clinton administration, in mid-1993. This shift led to the United States leading what became known as “UNOSOM II” (United Nations Operation in Somalia II), an ill-advised attempt at forcible “nation-building“, with foregin nations attempting to impose “peace and unity” in an internally-warring nation at gunpoint.
Operation Gothic Serpent, launched in August 1993, represented the United States’ most significant military intervention in Somalia during the height of the civil war. The operation aimed to capture faction leader Mohamed Farrah Aidid, whose forces had killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers and were disrupting humanitarian aid distribution.
The mission culminated in the October 3-4, 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, when U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force operators attempted to capture key Aidid lieutenants in the city center. The operation went catastrophically wrong when two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by rocket-propelled grenades, trapping American forces in hostile territory.
Members of Task Force Ranger under fire in Somalia, October 3, 1993 — the Battle of Mogadishu. U.S. Army Rangers Photo. Public Domain.
During the 15-hour firefight that followed, 18 American soldiers were killed and 73 wounded, while Somali casualties numbered in the hundreds. The graphic images of dead American servicemen being dragged through Mogadishu’s streets shocked the American public and led directly to U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in March 1994.
The incident profoundly influenced U.S. foreign policy for years, contributing to American reluctance to intervene in subsequent humanitarian crises, including the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The battle became emblematic of the challenges facing international intervention in failed states.
The Return of the Terror State
Somalia now stands on the precipice of complete state collapse as Al-Shabaab militants have encircled the capital of Mogadishu in what analysts are calling the most serious threat to the government since the height of the civil war in the 1990’s. The terrorist organization’s lightning offensive, launched in February 2025, has shattered the fragile gains made by international forces over the past decade and returned the specter of jihadist control to the Horn of Africa.
The scale of Al-Shabaab’s resurgence cannot be overstated. From launching coordinated attacks across multiple provinces to capturing strategic towns within 30 kilometers of Mogadishu, the group has demonstrated a tactical sophistication and operational capability that has caught both the Somali government and international partners off guard. What began as seemingly isolated assaults on February 20, 2025, has evolved into a systematic campaign to strangle the capital and force the collapse of the federal government.
The terrorists have employed a multi-pronged strategy combining conventional military tactics with asymmetric warfare, utilizing car bombs, infiltration operations, and terror attacks to maximize psychological impact while minimizing their own exposure to counterstrikes. Their capture of Adan Yabaal on April 16th marked a particular turning point, as this strategic town had served as a crucial staging area for government counteroffensives.
A Regional Terror Network
Al-Shabaab’s current offensive represents more than a localized insurgency; it exemplifies the group’s evolution into a transnational terrorist organization capable of projecting power far beyond Somalia’s borders. This transformation was starkly illustrated in the January 15, 2019 attack on Nairobi’s DusitD2 hotel complex, which demonstrated Al-Shabaab’s expanding operational reach and recruitment capabilities.
The DusitD2 attack, marking the rise of “Obiwan Nairobi“, was particularly significant as it marked a strategic shift in Al-Shabaab’s methodology. Unlike previous operations that relied heavily on ethnic Somali operatives, the five-man terrorist cell that carried out the Nairobi assault included Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent, including a suicide bomber from the coastal city of Mombasa. The 20-hour siege resulted in 21 deaths and 28 injuries, representing Kenya’s worst terrorist attack in four years.
What made the DusitD2 attack particularly alarming for counterterrorism officials was the extensive planning involved. Security footage revealed that Al-Shabaab operatives had been conducting surveillance of the target since at least December 2016, demonstrating a level of operational security and long-term planning that suggested significant organizational sophistication. The attack also revealed the group’s ability to recruit from within Kenya’s security establishment, as one of the attackers was identified as the son of a Kenyan military officer.
The Collapse of International Strategy
The current crisis exposes the fundamental failure of the international community’s approach to Somalia over the past two decades. The transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and subsequently to the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), has created critical security gaps that Al-Shabaab has ruthlessly exploited.
The timing of Al-Shabaab’s offensive was no coincidence. Launched just weeks after the ATMIS-to-AUSSOM transition on January 1, 2025, the attacks capitalized on coordination problems, reduced troop levels, and uncertain funding for the new mission. The group’s ability to “launch around 50 percent more attacks per month in 2025 compared to its 2024 average” demonstrates how effectively they have exploited this institutional vulnerability.
Compounding these challenges is the reduction in U.S. support under the Trump administration. American assistance to Somalia’s elite Danab special forces has been curtailed, including the cessation of salary supplements that had doubled soldiers’ pay from $200 to $400 per month. This has severely impacted morale and combat effectiveness of the only units that had previously proven capable of matching Al-Shabaab in direct confrontation.
The Siege Strategy
Al-Shabaab’s current approach reflects lessons learned from recent insurgent successes worldwide, particularly the Taliban’s 2021 conquest of Afghanistan and the Syrian opposition’s rapid advance on Damascus in 2024. Rather than attempting a direct assault on Mogadishu that would allow government forces to concentrate their remaining strengths, the terrorists have opted for a siege strategy designed to slowly strangle the capital.
By controlling the major roads and supply routes into Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab can gradually increase pressure on the city’s three million inhabitants while conducting a psychological warfare campaign through bombings, mortar attacks, and assassination attempts. The March 18th bombing of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s motorcade, which killed four people while narrowly missing the president himself, exemplifies this strategy of creating a climate of terror while systematically degrading government capabilities ([source]()).
International Response and Turkish Gambit
As traditional Western partners have reduced their commitments, Somalia has increasingly turned to Turkey for military assistance. Ankara has announced plans to nearly triple its deployment to 800 soldiers, including 300 commandos and 200 drone operators, while also securing lucrative contracts for port and airport operations in Mogadishu. This represents a significant shift in regional power dynamics as Turkey seeks to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa.
The new terminal of Aden Abdulle International Airport built by Turkish companies in Mogadishu, Somalia. January 25, 2015 AMISOM Photo by Ilyas Ahmed. CC0/1.0 Universal Public Domain.
However, Turkey’s intervention faces the same fundamental challenges that have plagued international efforts in Somalia for decades: the inability of foreign forces to address the underlying governance failures that have made the country vulnerable to extremist exploitation in the first place.
The Looming Catastrophe
Current trajectory suggests Somalia is heading toward a humanitarian catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. With nearly 6 million people already requiring humanitarian assistance and 4.6 million facing acute food insecurity, the collapse of government control in Mogadishu would create a crisis that could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.
Al-Shabaab’s vision extends far beyond Somalia’s borders. The group has never concealed its ambition to establish a caliphate encompassing all of East Africa, making their current advance on Mogadishu not just a threat to Somalia but to regional stability. With their demonstrated capability to conduct sophisticated attacks like the DusitD2 operation and their growing recruitment networks across the region, Al-Shabaab’s success in Somalia could serve as a launching pad for expanded terrorism throughout East Africa.
The international community faces a closing window to prevent a complete collapse of the Somali state. Without decisive action to reinforce Mogadishu’s defenses and address the fundamental governance challenges that have enabled Al-Shabaab’s rise, the world may soon witness the emergence of the first jihadist-controlled capital in Africa since the Taliban’s return to Kabul.
Somalia may now be a failed state, but the global community is at least trying to backstop the country…for the moment. But, in the current calculus of war around the world, the possibility of Somalia collapsing to Al-Shabaab, like Afghanistan to the Taliban, the possibility exists of a return to the “old days” of Somali piracy, up until 2012. This time, however, there are no easy answers for Western nations who rely on commercial vessels passing Somalia, but who – unlike post-2012 – are unable to juggle all the necessary theaters, making ignoring Somalia a very attractive, short-term proposition, in spite of the potential levels of economic damage.
This is also known as “whistling past the graveyard.”
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
As we have written elsewhere, “heavy” machine guns are essential tools for militaries around the world. While the US-made M2HB was originally intended as an anti-tank weapon, it evolved over time into a kind of highly lethal “Swiss Army Knife“, capable of engaging infantry, light vehicles (and some not-so-light), helicopters and other types of aircraft, while also being able to be fired from those same platforms…But the M2HB, as definitive as it is, is by no means alone on the battlefield.
Around the world, combat forces use a weapon just as capable, and nearly as venerable, and have done so since the end of World War 2, a weapon that has become iconic as the antithesis of the M2…And that is our subject this week.
Origin and Development
The DShK 12.7mm heavy machine gun stands as one of the Soviet Union’s most enduring weapons, remaining in active service more than eight decades after its introduction. Development began in 1929, when the Red Army identified the need for a heavy machine gun comparable to the American M2 Browning. The initial design was finalized by Vasily Degtyaryov in 1931, utilizing the same gas operation system found in his earlier infantry machine guns.
This first iteration, designated the DK (Degtyaryov Krupnokaliberny or “Degtyaryov Large Caliber“), had significant limitations. It relied on a cumbersome 30-round drum magazine and suffered from a disappointingly low rate of fire. Production began in 1933, but only small quantities were manufactured through 1935.
The breakthrough came when designer Georgy Shpagin significantly improved the weapon by replacing the drum feed with a belt-fed system using a rotary-feed cylinder. This redesigned weapon entered production in 1938 as the DShK 1938, with its name deriving from both designers (Degtyaryov-Shpagin Krupnokaliberny). Soviet troops affectionately nicknamed it “Dushka” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DShK], meaning “dear one” or “sweetie” in Russian.
Georgy Semyonovich Shpagin. February 1945 photo by unknown photographer for Izvestiya. Public Domain.
Technical Specifications and Capabilities
The DShK fires the powerful 12.7×108mm cartridge, a round slightly larger than its American counterpart, the .50 BMG. Operating at a rate of fire of approximately 600 rounds per minute, the weapon boasts an effective range of 2.4 kilometers (1.5 miles) against ground targets. Perhaps more impressively, it can penetrate up to 20mm of armor at ranges up to 500 meters, making it effective against lightly armored vehicles.
The weapon features distinctive “spider web” ring sights designed specifically for anti-aircraft use, highlighting its dual-purpose role as both an anti-vehicle and anti-aircraft weapon. The original DShK weighed approximately 34 kg (75 pounds) for the gun alone, but when mounted on its wheeled carriage with armor shield, the complete system weighed a substantial 157 kg (346 pounds).
DShK 1938 version in Vietnam, in the anti-aircraft role, with the “spider web” sight. Date and photographer unknown. Image from the Vietnam War Archives. CCA/4.0 Int’l.
During World War II, the Soviets made a critical improvement to the DShK by introducing a simpler, more cost-effective muzzle brake in 1944, patterned after the Polish Wz. 35 anti-tank rifle. This replaced the more complex original design and improved both production efficiency and reliability.
The DShK-M: Post-War Evolution
Following World War II, Soviet engineers further refined the design. In 1946, they introduced the DShK 38/46, more commonly known as the DShKM. This modernized version featured a redesigned feed mechanism that allowed belts to be loaded from either side, a simplified production process using more stamped sheet metal components, and a new disintegrating belt that broke apart in 10-round increments.
These improvements made the weapon more reliable and easier to manufacture at scale. Production of the DShKM continued until 1980, with more than one million units manufactured. The weapon was also produced under license in numerous countries including China and Pakistan (as the Type 54), Pakistan, Iran, Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Military Applications and Deployment
Throughout its service life, the DShK has been employed in multiple roles. During World War II, the Red Army primarily used it as an anti-aircraft weapon, mounting it on GAZ-AA trucks, IS-2 tanks, ISU-152 self-propelled artillery, and the T-40 amphibious tank. When deployed as an infantry support weapon, it was typically mounted on a two-wheeled trolley with an armor shield.
After the war, the DShK became a standard fixture on Soviet armor. Almost all Soviet-designed tanks prior to the T-64 featured the distinctive DShK mounted on the commander’s cupola, creating an iconic silhouette of Soviet military might.
Members of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) Army fire the 12.7mm DShK machine gun from the top of a Soviet-designed T-55 main battle tank, January 1998. US Army photo by SSG K. Price. Public Domain.
In the 1970’s, the Soviet military began replacing the DShK with the newer NSV “Utyos” heavy machine gun, which was significantly lighter and more accurate. However, the transition was never complete, and the DShK remained in widespread service.
Contemporary Combat Use
Despite being in current, limited, production only in China, Pakistan and Iran, the DShK continues to see active service in conflicts worldwide. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), the weapon played a critical role for both sides. Soviet tanks deployed it as an anti-aircraft weapon, while Mujahideen fighters used captured DShKs and Chinese Type 54 copies to devastating effect against Soviet helicopters from mountainous positions.
Kunar, Afghanistan October 1987: Jamiat-e Islami group shelter and “Dashaka” (DShK) .50 cal. machine gun position in the Shultan Valley. 1987 photo by Erwin Franzen. CCA/3.0
The weapon featured prominently in the Vietnam War, where it was smuggled through Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia for use by Communist forces. Military historians estimate that a significant portion of the 7,500 American helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft lost during the conflict were brought down by DShK fire.
In more recent conflicts, the DShK has become a fixture of what military analysts call “technicals” — pickup trucks with heavy weapons mounted in the bed. These mobile weapons platforms have featured prominently in civil wars in Somalia, Libya, Syria, and other conflicts across Africa and the Middle East.
In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, Ukrainian forces have found innovative new uses for the DShK. Notably, Ukrainian troops have successfully employed DShKs fitted with searchlights to shoot down Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. This approach has proven both cost-effective and reliable compared to using expensive MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems).
Ukrainian forces have also modified the DShK for infantry use by adding features like bipods, a shoulder stock, a pistol grip, and Picatinny rails for mounting modern optics. The resulting hybrid weapon functions as a heavy anti-materiel rifle with good accuracy out to 800 meters.
Legacy
The DShK holds the distinction of being, alongside the American M2 Browning, one of only two .50 caliber machine guns designed before World War II that remain in active service today. This remarkable longevity speaks to the fundamental soundness of its design and its versatility across different combat roles.
While newer weapons like the NSV and Kord have been developed to replace it, the massive quantities of DShKs produced and distributed worldwide ensure that this Soviet heavyweight will continue to appear on battlefields for decades to come — a testament to its reliability, effectiveness, and adaptability to evolving warfare requirements.
Like many weapons we discuss here, “obsolescent” does not necessarily equal “obsolete” – sometimes, “good enough” soundly trumps “newest”, something important to keep in mind.
The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To
Beginning on May 6, India launched what it calls “Operation Sindoor“, striking multiple targets in Pakistan that it claims are “terrorist infrastructure”, in retaliation for the April 22 attack on the Pahalgam resort are in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Radical Islamist jihadists massacred 26 men – 24 Hindus, one Christian, and one Muslim who tried to stop them – in front of their families. This has terrified the nations of the world, as both India and Pakistan have nuclear arsenals of ~180 warheads, each…and the potential for a nuclear exchange is very high.
The disputed Kashmir region, showing the sub-regions administered by India, Pakistan, and China. 2003 map by US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Public Domain.
As we reported in January, the “weakest link” in this equation remains Pakistan: Unable to maintain control of it’s creations – the Taliban in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself – as well as Lakshar-e-Taiba and its clone, The Resistance Front (TRF) (the group responsible for the Pahalgam attack), Pakistan is also losing control of its Balochistan province to regional separatists, as it struggles to contain multiple threats, mostly of its own making, while others – like the TRF – have now provoked India into military-scale violence.
The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir represents one of the most enduring territorial conflicts in modern history, entangling India and Pakistan in a complex web of historical, religious, and geopolitical tensions since their independence from British rule in 1947. Alongside this territorial conflict, the countries faced another critical challenge: sharing the waters of the Indus River system, ultimately resolved through the landmark Indus Waters Treaty of 1960.
Origins of the Kashmir Dispute
Colonial Roots and Partition (1846-1947)
The foundations of the conflict trace back to 1846 when the British East India Company, following their victory in the First Anglo-Sikh War, sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, through the Treaty of Amritsar. This established the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir under Dogra rule, despite its Muslim-majority population.
View of the Pahalgam Valley, 2011. Photo by KennyOMG. CCA/3.0
When British India was partitioned in August 1947, the fate of its princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, was left to their respective rulers. Despite having a Muslim-majority population, Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. Caught between accession to India or Pakistan, Singh initially sought independence. However, when tribal raiders from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province invaded Kashmir in October 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession with India in exchange for military assistance.
This pivotal decision ignited the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-48). The conflict ended with a UN-brokered ceasefire in January 1949, leaving Kashmir divided along what became known as the Line of Control (LoC). India controlled approximately two-thirds of the territory, including the Kashmir Valley, Jammu, and Ladakh, while Pakistan administered the remaining third, known as Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas (now Gilgit-Baltistan).
The UN resolutions calling for a plebiscite to determine Kashmir’s final status were never implemented due to disagreements over the conditions for such a vote. India maintained that Pakistan must first withdraw its forces, while Pakistan insisted that India should reduce its military presence before any referendum.
Subsequent Conflicts and Changing Dynamics
The unresolved Kashmir issue led to further wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, though the latter focused primarily on the independence of East Pakistan’s (now Bangladesh). The 1972 Simla Agreement established the LoC as the de facto border and committed both nations to resolve their differences peacefully.
The dispute took a darker turn in the late 1980’s with the emergence of an armed insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Pakistan provided moral and material support to the separatist movement, while India deployed substantial military forces to counter it. The conflict became increasingly militarized, with accusations of human rights abuses on both sides.
The 1999 Kargil War, a limited conflict sparked by Pakistani infiltration across the LoC, further strained relations. The post-2001 era saw sporadic peace initiatives alternating with periods of heightened tensions, particularly following terrorist attacks in India allegedly linked to Pakistan-based groups.
Soldiers of the Indian Army depicted after capturing a hill from Pakistani forces during the Kargil War, 1999. Indian Army photo. GODL.
And then…there is Article 370.
Article 370: An Unnecessary Knife-Twist
Article 370 was a special provision in the Indian Constitution that granted Jammu and Kashmir significant autonomy within the Indian Union. Enacted in 1949 as a “temporary provision,” it allowed the state to have its own constitution, flag, and considerable independence in all matters except foreign affairs, defense, and communications.
The provision emerged from the unique circumstances of Kashmir’s accession to India. When Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in 1947, it was with the understanding that Kashmir would retain substantial autonomy. Article 370 formalized this arrangement, restricting the Indian Parliament’s legislative powers over the state and requiring consultation with the state government for extending constitutional provisions beyond the agreed domains.
Over time, Article 370’s implementation evolved. Through presidential orders, particularly in 1954, many provisions of the Indian Constitution were gradually extended to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 35A, introduced through this mechanism, allowed the state legislature to define “permanent residents” and grant them special privileges regarding property rights and government employment.
For seven decades, Article 370 remained a politically charged issue. Supporters viewed it as honoring India’s commitment to Kashmir’s distinct identity, while critics saw it as an obstacle to full integration and development.
On August 5, 2019, the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, effectively nullified Article 370 through presidential orders and parliamentary legislation. The state was simultaneously reorganized into two union territories: Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and Ladakh (without one). This dramatic constitutional restructuring fundamentally altered Kashmir’s relationship with the central government and remains deeply contested both domestically and internationally.
The Indus Waters Treaty: A Rare Success in Water Diplomacy…With Implications
Against this backdrop of territorial conflict, both countries faced another pressing challenge: sharing the waters of the Indus River system, which originates in Tibet and flows through both countries. The Indus and its tributaries are vital for agriculture, energy production, and water supply in both nations.
Facilitated by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan. The treaty allocated the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan, though India retained limited rights to use the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes, irrigation, and hydroelectric power.
The treaty established the Permanent Indus Commission to address disputes and facilitate communication on water-related issues. It also included provisions for the construction of replacement works to compensate Pakistan for the loss of water from the eastern rivers.
Remarkably, the Indus Waters Treaty has survived three wars and numerous crises in Indo-Pakistani relations until now. It stands as a testament to the potential for cooperation even amid broader conflicts, though it has faced increasing strain in recent decades due to growing water scarcity, climate change, and dam construction projects.
Legacy and Contemporary Challenges
The Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, with both countries maintaining their respective claims to the entire territory. The region’s strategic importance has only increased with China’s growing influence in parts of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, creating a complex trilateral dimension to the conflict.
Meanwhile, the Indus Waters Treaty, despite its durability, faces mounting pressures. India’s construction of dams on the western rivers, though technically permissible under the treaty, has raised concerns in Pakistan about reduced water flow. Climate change threatens the Himalayan glaciers that feed the Indus system, potentially exacerbating water scarcity and heightening tensions over the existing allocation framework.
The intertwined histories of the Kashmir dispute and the Indus Waters Treaty illustrate both the challenges and possibilities of Indo-Pakistani relations—a narrative of persistent conflict alongside pragmatic cooperation necessitated by shared geographical realities.
Pakistan’s Political Instability: A Dangerous Variable
Pakistan is experiencing significant political instability, with 2024 being one of the most violent years in over a decade. The February elections failed to restore order and were marred by allegations of military manipulation to keep former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his party out of power. This contentious domestic political situation creates opportunities for militants to exploit local anger and makes it more difficult for the government to mount a unified challenge against these groups.
The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) government faces multiple internal challenges, including skyrocketing commodity prices and difficulties finalizing deals with the International Monetary Fund to stop the devaluation of the rupee. This economic pressure has eroded public confidence in the current government.
In the security sphere, multiple groups are eroding Pakistan’s internal stability, with the “Pakistani Taliban” and ISIS-K, as well as a number of Balochi groups, are all vying to either carve out their own sections of Pakistan, or to seize outright control of the entire nation – and its nuclear arsenal. And all the while, the mainline Taliban are also sharpening their knives, looking to dismember the entire Pakistani state. In this, those groups have been greatly aided by the failures of the Biden administration in 2021, which left behind vast amounts of advanced military equipment for the taking.
Looking into 2025, Pakistan continues to grapple with a volatile political and economic environment characterized by political paralysis, fragmented coalitions, and increasing military influence that hinders effective governance. This combination of political fragmentation, economic crisis, and rising security challenges combined to create a volatile mix of factors with significant regional implications.
The Nuclear Dimension: Stakes at Their Highest
Both India and Pakistan have built up nuclear arsenals primarily designed to prevent wars, not start them. India maintains a “no first use” policy, meaning it will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack on Indian forces or territories. Pakistan, however, has a “full spectrum deterrence” policy aimed at using tactical nuclear weapons to counter both nuclear threats and conventional military attacks from India.
The BADGER explosion on April 18, 1953. Photo by of National Nuclear Security Administration / Nevada Site Office. Public Domain.
The nuclear stakes are enormously high – even a small nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan could kill 20 million people in a week. If such an exchange triggered even a minor “nuclear winter”, nearly 2 billion people in the developing world would be at risk of death by starvation.
The introduction of nuclear weapons in 1974 fundamentally changed the dynamic of the India-Pakistan conflict, raising the stakes of any confrontation. India’s first nuclear test that year triggered an arms race that eventually saw Pakistan develop its own nuclear capabilities two decades later.
Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif recently stated that Pakistan would only use its nuclear weapons if “there is a direct threat to our existence.” However, he has also warned that Pakistan’s military has been reinforced because an Indian military incursion is “imminent” following the recent attack in Kashmir.
The Water Crisis: An Exitential Dimension to Conflict
The April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in the popular tourist destination of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir, killed 26 vacationing tourists. The attack was claimed by a group called The Resistance Front (TRF), which Indian authorities claim is closely linked to the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, site of the April 22 attack. 2017 photo by Srinu maripi. CCA/4.0
The Indus Waters Treaty suspension by India follows the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir. Pakistan has deemed this suspension illegal, with significant implications for its agriculture and economy. About 80% of Pakistan’s cultivated land relies on the Indus river system.
In response to the attack, India announced the immediate suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, something not done in the more than 60 years of the treaty’s existence. The Indian government stated the treaty will remain suspended “until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.” India has closed its main land border with Pakistan at Attari and ordered Pakistani nationals in India to leave the country within 48 hours. India is also reducing diplomatic staff at both missions from 55 to 30 personnel and has expelled military advisors from Pakistan’s embassy in New Delhi…In effect, India has had enough of Pakistan supporting anti-Indian insurgents.
Pakistan has responded to India’s moves with its own countermeasures:
Pakistan has closed its airspace to all Indian airlines, and suspended all trade with India, including through third countries, and halted special South Asian visas issued to Indian nationals. Pakistan has also rejected India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, with officials stating that any attempt to stop or divert water belonging to Pakistan would be considered “an act of war”.
The Indus Waters Treaty suspension is particularly significant because the treaty gave Pakistan unrestricted access to the waters of the three western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—which account for nearly 70% of the total water flow in the Indus river system. Around 80% of Pakistan’s cultivated land, approximately 16 million hectares, depends on water from this vast river network.
Military Modernization: Raising the Stakes
Both India and Pakistan have acquired new military hardware since their last major clash in 2019, opening up new conventional strike options. India has inducted 36 French-made Rafale fighter jets with advanced capabilities, while Pakistan has acquired J-10 fighters from China. Both sides have also upgraded their air defense systems.
Donald Trump’s United States now faces the challenge of balancing its support for India with calls for restraint from Pakistan. With both nations holding nuclear weapons, the risk of escalation is high, and Washington will likely push for diplomatic solutions to de-escalate the crisis.
The current crisis represents the biggest breakdown in India-Pakistan relations since 2019, when a suicide bombing killed 40 Indian soldiers in Kashmir. The current situation follows a pattern where flare-ups between the countries have seen targeted attacks and reprisals, escalating slowly while giving each side the option to step back and defuse. However, the current nature of the strategic moves are of a severity not seen since 1971.
Conclusion
While both sides are desperate to moderate the fighting, the better to avoid the nuclear threshold, Pakistan’s internal instability implies the possibility that external forces in Afghanistan could take this moment to strike Pakistan from the opposite border. The potential impact is hard to model, but should a major land conflict arise, it is possible that Pakistan’s government could collapse, bringing control of its nuclear arsenal into question.
BREAKING Update: Operation Sindoor
On May 6, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” conducting missile strikes in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Reports indicate there were at least 24 strikes across nine target locations, with explosions heard across Kashmir. These strikes were in direct retaliation for the April 22nd attack on a resort in Pahalgam, a picturesque town in the Himalayas of Indian-controlled Kashmir, which killed some 26 tourists, infront of their families.
The operation targeted six locations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir (Muzaffarabad and Kotli) and Pakistan’s Punjab province (Bahawalpur), crossing both the Line of Control and the international border. India describes the strikes as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory.”
The casualties and damage reported, to 5.7.2025:
Pakistan claims at least 26 civilians were killed and 46 injured by India’s strikes, including teenagers and children, with the youngest victim being three years old. Twelve civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir were also reportedly killed by Pakistani shelling from across the border.
The strikes hit what India calls “terrorist infrastructure” sites, some allegedly linked to the attack that killed 25 Hindu tourists and one local in Indian Kashmir last month. The name “Sindoor” is significant – it refers to the red powder Hindu women apply to their foreheads when married.
Pakistan’s response:
Pakistan has called India’s strikes an “act of war” and stated it would respond. Pakistani forces have already exchanged gunfire with Indian forces along the Line of Control.
As both countries’ leaders held crisis meetings, the UN Secretary-General has expressed “deep concern” over the strikes, and several nations including the US, UAE, China, and Japan have called for de-escalation.
This represents the worst fighting in more than two decades between these nuclear-armed neighbors. The situation is still developing rapidly, with Pakistan promising to retaliate “at a time, place and manner of its choosing.” Major airlines are now avoiding Pakistani airspace as tensions remain high.
The Freedomist is continuing to monitor events as they evolve.
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