No matter how you consume your news, whether from the “mainstream” or from more “alternative” sources, recent months have been all abuzz about the “mighty HIMARS“; and the HIMARS is, indeed, a very capable system…for those who either have friends, or who can afford it. But — what about us? What about the “poor’s“? Every weapon has a development cycle, and HIMARS is no exception. In this article, we will take a (very) brief look at the history of rocket artillery, and a singular weapon that is everything the HIMARS is not: cheap, simple, flexible, and readily available for anyone or any group with even a modest mount of cash.
Rocket artillery is far from ‘new.’ In fact, rockets were arguably the first practical use for gunpowder when it was invented in China, in the 9th Century AD. As gunpowder migrated westward, however, the idea of rocketry largely disappeared, until the late 18th-early 19th century, when rocketry began to reappear, most famously in the form of the Congreve Rocket. These early attempts were wildly unreliable, including having a nasty habit of exploding on their own, or returning to their owners in the most unpleasant of manners. Thus, it should not be surprising that rockets mostly disappeared from European-style warfare after about 1850 or so.
As a result, it would take until World War 2 to resurrect rocket artillery in a meaningful way, with the German introduction of the “Nebelwerfer” (or, ‘smoke mortar’) multiple rocket launcher (MRL) system. The system fired a variety of rockets, normally 5 – 7 at a time, depending on their exact size and weight. While initially intended to deliver chemical weapons, the distaste – and fear – from all sides outside of Asia about using such weapons caused the Germans to quickly develop high-explosive rounds for the various calibers. These were used to devastating effect by the Germans, initially…not so much for their raw destructive power, but for their terrifying psychological effects on troops who had never imagined the sound the rockets produced.
All of the major Allies quickly copied the concept, and by the end of the war, were deploying far larger and more capable designs. However, the love affair with short-range multiple rocket systems wouldn’t last. By the mid-1950’s, most “First World” nations had largely begun to abandon the battlefield MRL; the notable exception was the Soviet Army and it’s subject armies, who maintained the devastating BM-21 ‘Grad’ into the present day. The reason for this abandonment of MRL’s was that, despite the MRL’s decided advantages (they were cheap and lightweight, compared conventional artillery, and were capable of firing truly impressive amounts of rounds in a time far shorter than regular artillery when grouped into batteries), they had significant disadvantages: their range tended to be shorter; they took far longer to reload; they were nearly impossible to use in “direct fire”, a feature of conventional artillery; and their rockets’ velocity was far too low to actually penetrate dug-in shelters or tank armor.
The reason the Soviet Bloc hung on the BM-21, was that while it had all of the disadvantages cited above, it had a very powerful warhead, a long range, was simple and easy to maintain, and was far cheaper and easier to build than conventional artillery. The Soviets accepted the downsides of the MRL idea, and found a way to incorporate it into their artillery fighting doctrine.
And then – The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came looking for weapons.
The Chinese Communists, following their disastrous – if effective – intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953), had a terribly disorganized arsenal. As China had spent the previous fifty years alternating between civil wars and hellish foreign invasions (WW2 actually begins in 1937, in China, instead of Poland in 1939), the PLA was stuck with a hodge-podge of weapons from at least six or more sources, they were badly in need of a complete rearmament strategy, literally from the top, down.
The immediate problems for the CCP was that their manufacturing base had to be completely rebuilt – which, being fair, was a problem for most of the active participants of the war, although Mao Tse Tung’s “Great Leap Forward” almost destroyed the country wholesale – but, more cripplingly, they had very little money to buy foreign equipment. Unable to pay even the Soviet Union for enough field artillery, the PLA went looking for an alternative.
And, in 1963, they created one of the most important, but least-known, pieces of artillery in modern history: the 107mm Type-63 MRL.
A 12-shot launcher mounted on a 2-wheeled trailer, the system weighed in at about 1,300lbs/602kg, and only needed a crew of five. It was capable of firing a wide variety of ammunition (albeit limited to HE-types, as well as incendiary and smoke rounds) to (initially) c.5mi/8km; ranges were quickly improved. Some models could be broken into 2-tube loads for transport through rough terrain, by either people or mules. Eventually, a variety of single-tube launchers were developed for the rocket ammunition. The PLA realized that they had a good thing, and eventually equipped each infantry division with 18 units.
It was also quickly realized that the unit’s light weight made it easy to mount on small vehicles, giving the launcher the ability to quickly fire its rockets, and quickly relocate to avoid counter-battery fires.
As word got around, and the units began to be used by Communist guerrillas and regular armies, the system became a source of hard currency through exports and licensing; at least seven countries would eventually obtain legal production licenses for both the launchers and their ammunition.
Naturally, the advantages of the Type-63 became apparent to every rebel, guerrilla and terrorist group in the world, and those entities quickly began competing with small armies to buy, steal or beg units on both the legal and black markets.
The Type-63 has proved itself to be a significant game-changer in “low intensity conflicts” because it allows small forces operating on a shoe-string budget to seriously threaten adversaries who cannot afford the advanced systems, like battlefield radars or C-RAM (which are fantastic to have, if you can afford or get them, somehow), to counter the fast-moving artillery. As a result, lightweight, highly mobile “technical” units can add a significant punch to their operations.
While susceptible to well (and expensively) equipped Western armies, the Type-63 remains a significant threat to anyone without powerful “friends” willing to commit to their aid.
The Type-63 has been reshaping battles for nearly 65 years, at this writing. There seems to be no end in sight for this venerable weapon…not least, because it is now being deployed on high-speed inshore craft…Newer may often be better, but old weapons will still harm you.
About Author
Michael Cessna
Michael Cessna is a former Active Duty United States Marine, a long-time personal protection specialist, security and defense analyst, military subjects instructor, general information researcher and amateur historian. He has been contributing security and defense writing since 2015.
