April 1, 2026

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Bayesian Inference: A Framework for Skeptical News Consumption

Bayesian Inference: A Framework for Skeptical News Consumption

Michael Cessna October 3, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

The world of 2025 is a highly confusing place. For years, if not decades, the news has been a confusing morass, frequently presenting as “news” what the average person clearly understand to be propaganda, only to be denounced and shouted down if they dare to question the Newspeak. It can be both upsetting and confusing.

What is happening?

It’s not so much some overarching conspiracy, for the most part. Some of it certainly is, but the vast majority is news organizations following the dictum of, “If it bleeds, then it leads“. Certain reference sites, like Snopes and Wikipedia, frequently engage in “gray propaganda”, gently seeming to tell you one thing, but in a very carefully curated way, that actually tells you the opposite.

But – how can the average consumer wade through the haze? Below, I will briefly present the method I relay on, for the most part, in writing.

In an era of information overload and competing narratives, the average news consumer faces a challenging question: how should we evaluate new information when we already hold prior beliefs about a subject? The answer does not lie in abandoning skepticism, nor blindly accepting every claim at face value, but in applying a mathematical framework that has served scientists and intelligence analysts for centuries: Bayesian inference.

The Bayesian Approach: Updating Beliefs With Evidence

Named after 18th-century mathematician Thomas Bayes, Bayesian inference provides a structured method for updating our confidence in a hypothesis as new evidence emerges. Unlike binary “true or false” thinking, Bayesian reasoning recognizes that most real-world claims exist on a spectrum of probability. We start with a prior belief — our initial assessment of how likely something is to be true — and systematically adjust that belief as we encounter new information.

The fundamental insight is deceptively simple: the credibility we assign to new information should depend on both the quality of that information and what we already know about the subject. Strong evidence should shift our beliefs significantly, while weak or contradictory evidence should barely move the needle. Recent research has shown that humans can be understood as performing Bayesian inference with systematic biases, suggesting our cognitive processes follow probabilistic rather than purely logical patterns.

Prior Probabilities: What You Think Before The News Breaks

Before evaluating any news story, Bayesian thinking requires honest assessment of your starting position. What did you believe before this new information appeared? This “prior probability” shouldn’t be arbitrary — it should reflect your accumulated knowledge, the base rates of similar claims, and the historical track record of comparable situations.

For instance, if a news outlet reports that a politician has been caught in a scandal, your prior probability should consider: How common are such scandals generally? What is this politician’s past record? What is the news source’s track record on similar stories? A claim that would be extraordinary for one politician might be entirely mundane for another, and Bayesian reasoning accounts for this context.

 

 

The challenge is that humans often have poorly calibrated priors. We overestimate the likelihood of dramatic events, underestimate mundane explanations, and let confirmation bias inflate our confidence in beliefs that align with our preferences. Studies have demonstrated that cognitive biases can distort public understanding and contribute to the rapid dissemination of false narratives, with misinformation spreading faster than accurate news because it aligns with existing beliefs and triggers emotional reactions. Bayesian thinking forces us to make these priors explicit rather than leaving them as un-examined assumptions.

Evaluating the Evidence: Likelihood Ratios

Once you’ve established your prior belief, the next step is evaluating how much the new evidence should shift that belief. This is where likelihood ratios enter the picture. Ask yourself: if the claim were true, how likely would I be to see this specific evidence? Conversely, if the claim were false, how likely would I be to see this evidence anyway?

Consider a news report citing “anonymous sources” claiming a major policy shift. If the policy shift were real, would we expect to see anonymous leaks? Almost certainly — major policy changes rarely remain largely secret until they are released. But if the policy shift were not happening, might we still see such reports? Also yes — media organizations sometimes run with unreliable tips, and disinformation campaigns deliberately plant false stories.

The key is that strong evidence is evidence we would expect to see if the claim is true, but not expect to see if the claim is false. Weak evidence is information that would be equally likely under either scenario. A photograph of an event is stronger evidence than an anonymous quote about the event. A leaked internal document is stronger than a second-hand account. Research on misinformation receptivity conceptualizes the problem as weighing the reliability of incoming information against the reliability of prior beliefs.

Common Pitfalls: Where Bayesian Reasoning Goes Wrong

Even when applying Bayesian principles, news consumers make predictable errors. Confirmation bias leads us to treat evidence supporting our existing views as stronger than it actually is, while dismissing contradictory evidence as weak or suspect. Studies show that people fail to update enough when truly strong evidence appears, remaining anchored to their priors even when they shouldn’t be.

Another common mistake is ignoring base rates—the background frequency of events. The base rate fallacy causes people to focus on specific case information while neglecting crucial statistical context. Dramatic claims about rare events require dramatically strong evidence, because the prior probability is low to begin with. A report of political corruption in a notoriously corrupt system requires less evidence to be credible than the same report in a historically clean government.

Media coverage frequently falls prey to this fallacy. If a person is shown a series of news stories about a particular crime, they may overestimate the frequency of that crime, even if it is actually quite rare.

Practical Application: A Daily Discipline

Applying Bayesian inference to news consumption doesn’t require complex mathematics. It requires disciplined thinking: acknowledge your starting beliefs honestly, evaluate evidence quality rigorously, and update your confidence proportionally. When multiple independent sources corroborate a story, your confidence should increase substantially. When evidence is ambiguous or sources are unreliable, your beliefs should barely shift.

The Bayesian framework doesn’t eliminate uncertainty—it manages it. In a media environment designed to generate clicks through certainty and outrage, thinking probabilistically is an act of intellectual resistance. It allows you to remain open to new information while maintaining appropriate skepticism, to change your mind when evidence warrants it, and to resist manipulation by those who exploit cognitive biases.

The news will always be noisy, biased, and incomplete. Bayesian thinking provides a rational method for navigating that noise without succumbing either to cynical dismissal of all information or credulous acceptance of comfortable narratives.

Conclusion

As I point out above, Bayesian methods are not foolproof – they can still lead to mistakes. However, overall, it is a good yardstick to start from. Why is this important? Because if you are reading this in the United States, you have the ability to effect change by voting – and if your thinking is skewed by those seeking to manpulate you, you need to be aware of how those parties are trying to manipulate you, because your vote counts.

This stuff seriously impacts your personal “bottom line”.

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Is Cyberwarfare Ready For Primetime?

Is Cyberwarfare Ready For Primetime?

Michael Cessna September 26, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

Within the military sphere, there are two constants: the idea that newerr is always better, and that a good goal to shoot for is to risk as few of your own people’s lives as possible…Neither of these things are true, but they do remain constants.

As we pointed out last week, the “newer is always better” mantra is fundamentally flawed, both in concept and in execution. The perfect example of this is a situation this author was made aware of just a couple of days ago: there is now, apparently, an offering out there for a belt-fed AR-15 type upper receiver chambered in .300 Blackout. To be clear, this is basically a toy for big kids with big bank accounts – it has zero utility for any real-world tactical application. The .300 Blackout cartridge is designed for a very specific role, at which, it does very well…but for anything outside that role, it is basically dead weight.

But it is neat.

This is not a digression – the .300 Blackout perfectly fits the “newer is always better” paradigm…but ignores the “general use” nature required of almost every type of “tactical” system. And, in line with that idea, is various drives for incorporating “cyberwarfare“.

The evolving landscape of modern conflict has fundamentally altered how nations project power and pursue strategic objectives…in the public eye, at least. As military and political leaders grapple with the complexities of 21st-century warfare, the integration of conventional kinetic operations with cyber capabilities has indicated the possibilities of both a strategic imperative and a source of significant operational challenges. This seeming convergence may represent a paradigm shift that demands careful analysis of the distinct advantages and limitations of each domain…or, it could be simply a re-branding of older, traditional tool kits, with eye-wateringly expensive toys.

The Traditional Foundation: Conventional Warfare’s Enduring Strengths

Conventional warfare retains several critical advantages that cyber operations cannot fully replicate or counter. Physical destruction remains the ultimate form of military persuasion — when infrastructure is physically destroyed, it requires substantial time and resources to rebuild. The psychological impact of conventional military action is immediate and visceral, creating clear demonstrations of state capability and resolve. Moreover, conventional forces operate within well-established legal frameworks under international humanitarian law, providing clearer rules of engagement and attribution mechanisms.

The command and control structures of conventional military operations have been refined over centuries, offering predictable hierarchies and time-tested operational doctrines. When NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations alongside air, land, and sea in 2016, it acknowledged that traditional military structures provide the foundational architecture for multi-domain operations.

Additionally, a little-spoken of aspect of conventional warfare is that it requires little in the way of advanced communications, power systems or satellite support – those things all certainly help, but plenty of lower-tier conventional forces repeatedly fight and win without them.

The Digital Revolution: Cyber Warfare’s Strategic Appeal

Cyberwarfare, however, offers unique advantages that conventional operations cannot match. The speed of digital operations allows for near-instantaneous effects across vast distances, while the relatively low cost of entry democratizes access to sophisticated capabilities. Research indicates that cyber attacks have become increasingly prevalent, with Russian cyberattacks on Ukraine jumping by nearly 70% in 2024, surpassing 4,000 incidents targeting critical infrastructure.

The important thing to remember, though, is that cyberwar campaigns have to be targeted for maximum and immediate impact in support of the conventional battle, versus the “pre-kinetic” oeprational phase.

Perhaps most significantly, then, cyber operations excel in the “gray zone” between peace and war, enabling states to pursue strategic objectives out of public sight, while maintaining plausible deniability about what could be viewed as actual acts of war. This ambiguity complicates adversary response calculations and allows for persistent, low-level campaigns that can achieve strategic effects over time without triggering conventional military responses.

Integration Challenges: Technical and Operational Complexities

The convergence of conventional and cyber warfare presents substantial integration challenges. The UK’s establishment of CyberEM Command represents one approach to addressing the fragmentation of cyber and electromagnetic capabilities across different military units. However, coordinating across multiple government agencies and military branches requires overcoming significant bureaucratic hurdles and distinct organizational cultures.

At the same time, technical integration poses equally complex challenges. For states dependent on legacy military systems, those systems must interface with cutting-edge cyber capabilities, creating potential vulnerabilities and incompatibility holes while demanding substantial investment in both personnel and infrastructure. The military cyber security market, valued at $17.0 billion in 2025, reflects the significant resources required to achieve effective integration.

This creates a significant divide, where wealthier nations with stronger economies potentially have a distinct advantage over poorer nations. However, the inverse is also true, where the perception of dominance is not actually the case, because the poorer nation’s electronic systems cannot be directly impacted by the richer state’s cyber systems.

Strategic Advantages of Hybrid Integration

When successfully integrated, conventional and cyber capabilities create magnified effects that exceed the sum of their individual contributions. Cyber operations can disable enemy communications and sensors immediately before conventional strikes, while kinetic operations can destroy hardened targets that resist digital infiltration. This combined approach enables more efficient resource allocation and creates multiple dilemmas for adversaries who must defend across both physical and digital domains simultaneously.

Recent exercises like Cobra Gold 2025’s CYBEREX demonstrate the value of integrating cyber capabilities into multinational military training, building interoperability and collective defense capabilities essential for modern warfare.

The caveat, of course, is that the targets must be dependent on systems that can be attacked via cyber tools. This is the fundamental flaw in Tofflerian-derived concepts, because cyber advantages do not work in reverse.

Limitations and Vulnerabilities

Despite these advantages, integrated warfare approaches carry inherent risks, as noted above. Cyber weapons can be unpredictable, potentially causing unintended collateral damage or being reverse-engineered by adversaries. Analysis suggests that in sustained conflicts, cyber attacks tend to be “scattershot, unfocused and ineffective against hardened systems“, particularly military command-and-control networks designed with cyber resilience in mind.

The attribution challenge in cyberspace can complicate escalation management, while the interconnected nature of modern military systems creates new vulnerabilities. A successful cyber attack on integrated systems could potentially cascade across multiple military functions, creating systemic failures that purely conventional forces might better compartmentalize. Worse, cyberattacks, as happened with the STUXNET virus, can easily spread far outside the “cyber battlespace”, directly attacking the deploying nation’s own computer infrastructure.

Future Implications

As hybrid warfare continues to mature with AI-enabled operations and increasingly sophisticated state and non-state actors, military organizations must develop comprehensive strategies that leverage the strengths of both conventional and cyber domains while mitigating their respective weaknesses. This requires not only technological investment but also doctrinal evolution, training adaptation, and international cooperation frameworks that address the borderless nature of modern conflict.

The path forward demands careful balance – embracing the transformative potential of cyber-conventional integration while maintaining realistic expectations about what digital operations can and cannot achieve in the broader context of national security strategy.

“Newer“, as stated, is not necessarily “better“. Like any software implementation, careful thought needs to be applied to any new injection into the calculus, because there are “do-overs” in a “digital Blackhawk Down“.

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Toffler Delenda Est

Toffler Delenda Est

Michael Cessna September 19, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

There is a cancer at the heart of the United States Armed Forces, and therefore, Western military thought, a cancer that first appeared in 1970, and slowly wormed its way into the minds within the Pentagon. Those minds, desperately seeking to rationalize the failures of relying on “logic” and statistical analysis to frontline, “real world” combat developed by Robert McNamara and his “Whiz Kids”, swiftly absorbed the writings of an academic “futurist” couple, who had never been faced with the reality of any form of military service.

The toxic influence of Alvin and Heidi Toffler on US military thinking over the past 35 years represents one of the most consequential intellectual failures in modern defense policy. Through their seductive but fundamentally flawed “waves of warfare” theory, the Tofflers provided Pentagon planners with an oversimplified framework that has repeatedly led American forces astray, contributing to strategic disasters from Somalia to Afghanistan.

This has manifested into what Colonel Michael Pietrucha, USAF (Ret.) called the “Death of Military Strategy”, an apt appelation that has – unintentionally – contributed to the skyrocketing suicide rate among both serving members of the military, as well as in the veteran community.

The Tofflers’ central premise, outlined in their 1993 book “War and Anti-War,” posited that warfare evolves through distinct “waves”, corresponding to economic development:

  • First Wave: agricultural warfare
  • Second Wave: industrial warfare
  • Third Wave: information-age warfare

However, critics noted from the beginning that “the Tofflers have suffered some critical reviews of their work, especially concerning their selective historical perspective.”

The Seductive Appeal of Technological Determinism

The Tofflers’ influence coincided with America’s post-Cold War search for military transformation and “the American way of war’s fascination with technology and the search for that technological ‘silver bullet’ that will deliver victory quickly and with a minimum of loss of life.” Their theory, echoing McNamara’s insistence on the superiority of logically and emotionlessly applied statistical analysis and comparison, offered Pentagon leaders exactly what they wanted to hear: that American technological superiority would render traditional military concerns obsolete.

Their ideas became particularly influential among political figures like Newt Gingrich, who called “The Third Wave” one of the “great seminal works of our time,” and among military leaders seeking to justify massive investments in information warfare capabilities. By the early 1980’s, “the Tofflers’ work had begun to influence the thinking of some influential members of the U.S. military. And by the early 1990’s, the transforming U.S. military had begun to influence the thinking of the Tofflers.”

No doubt, this has been a massive boon to the defense industry, who were suddenly handed every excuse necessary to produce all the “latest and greatest” toys, at staggering prices…like the M1301 ISV.

The Fundamental Flaws

Military analysts began identifying serious problems with Tofferian thinking. Academic critiques argued that “the Tofflers’ concepts of First, Second, and Third Wave warfare are overgeneralized and distort historical understandings of Western warfare,” urging “military leaders to reassess these theories and explore the necessity for more nuanced frameworks that better reflect the complexities of modern warfare.”

Critics noted that while the Tofflers’ “approach is fundamentally sound, it fails to address transitional forms of warfare and omits conceptual changes in warfighting introduced by Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon Bonaparte, and others.” The theory’s rigid categorization ignored the persistent importance of geography, culture, politics, and human factors in warfare.

And those last four factors are just the tip of the iceberg. Any “theory of war” that ignores – or worse, dismisses – those factors is guaranteed to fail, every time…as recent history has amply demonstrated.

Strategic Consequences

The Toffler-influenced Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) led to several catastrophic strategic miscalculations. The Pentagon’s obsession with “Third Wave” information warfare and precision strikes created a dangerous overconfidence in technology’s ability to solve complex political problems. This thinking directly contributed to:

  • The belief that shock and awe tactics in Iraq would create rapid political transformation
  • Underestimation of insurgent adaptability in Iraq and Afghanistan
  • Over-reliance on surveillance technology while neglecting human intelligence
  • The mistaken assumption that information dominance could substitute for adequate troop levels

Military historians noted how “RMA proponents over-emphasize the importance of technology in driving revolutionary change,” arguing that “leadership along with institutional, organizational, and intellectual initiative are equally, if not more, important than technological innovation.”

The Persistence of “First Wave” Realities

The ultimate irony of Toffler influence is how consistently “primitive” opponents have outmaneuvered America’s high-tech military. From Somali militias to Taliban fighters to Iraqi insurgents, adversaries using decidedly “First Wave” tactics – guerrilla warfare, improvised explosives, local knowledge – repeatedly frustrated America’s “Third Wave” military machine.

As one analyst observed, “It is the great equalizer, you don’t have to be big and rich to apply the kind of judo you need in information warfare. That’s why poor countries are going to go for this faster than technologically advanced countries.” The Toffler’s failed to anticipate how their own theories would be turned against American forces.

The bottom line is that in the 60 years from 1965 to 2025, the vast majority of land-based conflicts have been won by guerrilla or insurgent forces, using rudimentary uniforms, organization, weapons, vehicles, tactics, and propaganda strategies that are not far removed from World War 2. These forces – whatever their political or religious leanings – know what they want to accomplish, know their target audiences, and know how to use their available resources to maximum effect.

This is not a function of “disruptive” technologies like mini-drones or the Internet. Those are just democratized tools, all of which have countermeasures that can be quickly developed and deployed, as is now happening across the conflict zones map. Whet the Toffler’s ignored, is that technology disperses, eventually. The damning part of this, is that it was recognized as early as 1940 by professional officers of the United States Marine Corps – something the Toffler’s could have easily found, had they been doing actual “research”:

“…If marines have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the past, they must now prepare themselves for the increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in the future. The future opponent may be as well armed as they are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against, isolated detachments at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater extent than a white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament. will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment…” – FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual (1940)

 

Screenshot of FMFRP 12-15 Small Wars Manual (1940). USMC. Public Domain.

 

Lasting Damage

Three and a half decades later, American military culture remains infected by Toffler-style techno-optimism. Despite repeated failures, Pentagon planning still prioritizes platform acquisition over strategic thinking, information dominance over cultural understanding, and technological solutions over political wisdom. The Tofflers provided intellectual cover for avoiding warfare’s fundamental realities, creating a generation of military leaders who confused gadgetry with strategy.

The time has come to recognize the Toffler influence for what it was: a seductive but dangerous distraction that cost American lives, squandered resources, and undermined strategic effectiveness when it mattered most.

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Ghosts of Victory Rising

Ghosts of Victory Rising

Michael Cessna September 12, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

Old things rarely go away forever. In military terms, many things are frequently relegated to museums. But sometimes – things lay dormant, “sleeping” if you like, waiting for someone to need them again.

Like, for example, old air bases.

Eighty years after B-29 Superfortresses thundered down its runways carrying atomic bombs toward Japan, the airfield complex at Tinian, in the Northern Marianas Islands, is awakening from its jungle slumber. What was once the world’s busiest airport in 1945 — with 40,000 personnel and four 8,500-foot runways — has become ground zero for America’s most ambitious Pacific military infrastructure project since World War II.

The U.S. Air Force has committed nearly half a billion dollars to restore this historic airfield in the Northern Marianas, with satellite imagery showing dramatic progress as over 20 million square feet of degraded pavement emerges from decades of tropical overgrowth. Fluor Corporation received a $409 million contract in April 2024 to complete the restoration within five years, transforming what Pacific Air Forces commander General Kenneth Wilsbach called an “extensive facility” back into operational readiness.

But this isn’t nostalgia driving American bulldozers through Tinian’s jungle. This is strategic necessity in an era of renewed great power competition. The reclamation project is part of the U.S. military’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) strategy, which shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning. Translation: China’s expanding missile arsenal can now reach America’s major Pacific bases like Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and Kadena in Okinawa, making distributed basing a survival imperative rather than strategic preference.

The timing is no coincidence, either. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, established in fiscal year 2021 and modeled after the European Deterrence Initiative created following Russia’s 2014 Crimea invasion, represents the largest regional deterrence investment since the Cold War, with congressional authorizations totaling over $40 billion from fiscal years 2021-2024. Tinian sits at the heart of this investment, positioned strategically in what military planners call the “Second Island Chain” — a defensive arc spanning from Japan through the Marianas to Australia designed to project American power deep into the Western Pacific.

The Pacific Ocean is massive. Most people don’t think of this on a daily basis, as if it comes up at all, it is in the form of air travel, measured in hours. A modern United States Navy supply ship, moving at 20 knots (about 23 mph) will require a minimum of 13 days to move from San Francisco, California to Manila in the Philippines. For modern armed conflict, this is a crushingly long distance. As a result, maintaining bases across the wide expanse of the Pacific is not an optional decision. It is for this reason, that the Second and Third Island Chains have been defined, and why real money is being spent to fortify both strategic lines.

Pacific Island Chains Map, 2024. US Navy. Public Domain.

 

Recent analysis by the Hudson Institute suggests just 10 missiles with cluster munitions could neutralize all exposed aircraft and fuel facilities at major U.S. airbases, underscoring why dispersion has become doctrine. Tinian’s restoration provides what one Pentagon official described as critical “divert capability” if primary bases become “unusable” — a euphemism for what happens when Chinese missiles start flying with any accuracy.

The island’s compact 39 square miles and sparse population of 3,000 residents belie its outsize strategic importance. Located less than 1,500 miles from both Tokyo and Beijing, Tinian still offers the same geographic advantages that made it invaluable in 1945. The difference now, is that instead of targeting Imperial Japan, American planners are positioning combat power to deter — or if necessary, directly combat — Chinese aggression across multiple potential flash points from the Philippines to the South China Sea.

Work that began in January 2024 has already achieved significant milestones, with a groundbreaking ceremony in August marking “one of the most extensive rehabilitation projects in Air Force history”. RED HORSE engineering squadrons — specialists in rapid runway construction — have been clearing jungle and restoring infrastructure that lay dormant since 1946, when the last American units departed what was then the world’s most formidable air base.

The symbolism is inescapable: where atomic weapons once departed to end one world war, conventional deterrence now prepares to prevent the next one. History may not repeat on Tinian, but it certainly echoes in the roar of returning American aircraft engines.

Tinian Island, 1982, Northern Mariana Islands (MNP). USAF Photo. Public Domain

But…why? Why are both the United States and Communist China struggling so hard over the regions off the Asian eastern coast? In a word – money. Ocean commerce currently accounts for between $2.5 and 3 trillion of revenue, yearly, providing around 150 million full time jobs. Look around your house – chances are nearly certain that at least one expensive item within your sight came from overseas, unless you are living in a wooden hut – and even then, at least one of the tools used to build that hut probably came to you via ship, whether you realize it or not.

The world is getting progressively more dangerous as 2025 winds onwards. It is neither hyperbole nor paranoia to chant “Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum” when one goes to bed at night, because things have a tendency to creep up on you in the dark. It is for this reason that smart military’s only throw things that work away very slowly.

Including real estate…something that the BRAC should have paid more attention to.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

The Aluminium Taxi – The M113

The Aluminium Taxi – The M113

Michael Cessna September 5, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

 

Military vehicles develop slowly, and not in very predictable ways. Most of the time, the requirements for a military vehicle are largely divorced from what manufacturers actually come up with. However, sometimes, the stars align, and magic actually happens.

Case in point: the M113.

M113 crew firing their .50-caliber machine gun during South Vietnamese training exercise. US Army photo by PFC J.C. Rivera. Public Domain.

 

As World War 2 developed, the United States developed the M3 Half-Track, an odd – but highly effective – hybrid, with a wheeled front axel much like a truck, in front, with a “tracked” rear drive system that used what amounted to a very large rubber tire, stretched over a huge span.

While very strange, the M3 proved highly effective at everything from delivering infantry right behind the tanks, to light artillery, anti-aircraft and logistics, doubtless why some 38,000 ended up being produced. But, the half-track wasn’t perfect, and by the beginning of the 1950’s, the Army needed a replacement.

The M113 Armored Personnel Carrier stands as one of the most widely produced and utilized armored vehicles in military history, with its operational footprint spanning over six decades and more than 80 countries worldwide. The M113 is the unlikely gold standard for “battle taxis” arounf the world.

Since its introduction by Food Machinery Corporation (later United Defense) in 1960, the M113 has become synonymous with versatility, reliability, and adaptability in military operations across diverse theaters and conflict zones. While it can technically carry 11 troops, plus its 2-man crew, most current operators use an 8- or 9-man squad.

Originally developed to meet the U.S. Army’s requirement for a lightweight, amphibious armored personnel carrier, one light enough to be air dropped, the M113 quickly demonstrated its value well beyond its initial design parameters. Two prototypes were initially produced, the aluminium-hulled T113 and the steel-hulled T114. The aluminum hull construction provided substantial weight savings compared to steel alternatives while maintaining adequate protection against small arms fire and artillery fragments. In contrast, the steel hulled design, owing to the severe weight restrictions set by the design targets, offered no greater protection than the aluminum hull. This lightweight design enabled the vehicle to achieve speeds of up to 42 mph on roads and maintain mobility across various terrains, from jungle environments to desert conditions.

US Army infantrymen armed with M16A1 rifles unload from an M113 armored personnel carrier during a training exercise, 1985. US Army photo. Public Domain.

The Vietnam War marked the M113’s combat debut and established its reputation for durability under harsh conditions. American forces employed thousands of M113s in Southeast Asia, where the vehicle’s amphibious capabilities proved invaluable in the Mekong Delta‘s waterlogged terrain. The “Green Dragon,” as it became known, served not only as a troop transport but also as a command post, ambulance, and fire support platform. Its aluminum armor, while initially questioned, demonstrated remarkable resistance to mines and improvised explosive devices, contributing to crew survivability rates that exceeded expectations.

International adoption of the M113 family has been unprecedented in armored vehicle history. Countries ranging from NATO allies to Middle Eastern nations, Asian powers, and African states have incorporated various M113 variants into their military arsenals. Australia, for instance, has operated M113s since the 1960’s and continues upgrading these platforms for modern operations. Similarly, nations like Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have maintained M113 fleets for decades, a testament to the platform’s capabilities in severe environments showing its enduring utility and cost-effectiveness.

The M113’s modular design has facilitated extensive variant development, with over 40 different “official” configurations currently documented. These include the M106 mortar carrier, M577 command post vehicle, M901 Improved TOW Vehicle, and M163 Vulcan Air Defense System; one variant, the M752, was built to launch the MGM-52 Lance tactical missile, which could launch nuclear warheads. This adaptability has allowed military forces to maximize their investment by utilizing a common chassis for multiple mission requirements, simplifying logistics, maintenance, and training procedures.

Soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment drive an M-163 20mm Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft gun system to a refueling area during Operation Desert Shield, c.1990-1991. US Army photo by SPC. Samuel Henry. Public Domain.

Production numbers underscore the M113’s global impact, with over 80,000 units manufactured across multiple production lines in the United States and licensed manufacturing facilities internationally. Countries including Italy, Turkey, and South Korea have produced their own variants, often incorporating indigenous modifications to meet specific operational requirements. This distributed production model has enhanced the platform’s accessibility and sustainability for allied nations.

Contemporary operations continue to validate the M113’s relevance in modern warfare. During conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, various nations deployed upgraded M113 variants equipped with enhanced armor packages, digital communication systems, and improved weapon stations. The platform’s relatively low signature and proven mechanical reliability have made it suitable for peacekeeping missions, border patrol duties, and domestic security operations.

The M113’s influence extends beyond traditional military applications. Law enforcement agencies, particularly SWAT teams and tactical units, have adopted surplus M113s for high-risk operations. Emergency services have converted these vehicles for disaster response, leveraging their mobility and protection in hazardous environments. This civilian adaptation demonstrates the platform’s fundamental design soundness and operational flexibility.

Modernization programs worldwide continue extending the M113’s service life well into the 21st century. Upgrade packages typically include improved armor protection, digital battlefield management systems, enhanced powertrains, and modernized weapon systems. Countries like Australia have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in comprehensive M113 upgrade programs, indicating long-term confidence in the platform’s viability.

Canadian Air-Defense, Anti-Tank System (ADATS), built on an M113 chassis, on display during the Royal Nova Scotia International Tattoo, 2008. Photo by Jonathon A.H., 2008. CCA/3.0

The M113’s legacy encompasses not only its direct military impact but also its influence on subsequent armored vehicle development. Design principles established with the M113 – including aluminum construction, amphibious capability, and modular architecture – have informed modern infantry fighting vehicle development programs worldwide.

Today, despite being supplemented or replaced by newer platforms in some applications, the M113 remains actively deployed across numerous conflict zones and operational theaters. Its combination of proven reliability, operational versatility, and cost-effectiveness ensures continued relevance in military inventories globally.

The M113’s near-seven decades of service represents an exceptional achievement in military vehicle design, establishing standards for durability and adaptability that continue influencing contemporary armored vehicle development. This enduring success reflects not merely engineering excellence but also a fundamental understanding of operational requirements that transcend technological generations.

Try as it has, the US Army has not been able to completely retire the M113, although it has, yet again, announced its imminent demise. Why is this the case? After all, the M113 was designed in the 1950’s, right? well, so was the AR-15, from which we got both the M16 and the M4, neither of which have been fully replaced, either.

The answer, then, is:

If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

Only Dropped Once…

Only Dropped Once…

Michael Cessna August 29, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

 

In the military sphere, there is a great deal of ribbing and catcalling, both between different services of a nation’s armed forces, but also between the forces of different countries. For the most part, this ribbing is good-natured fun, especially when it is based on actual reality.

However, there has been a highly toxic level of mocking applied to the armed forces of France, a situation that has been getting worse over the last forty years.

The jokes abound – the beret being designed to facilitate surrender by not getting in the way of raising one’s hands; the notion of French tanks having more reverse gears than forward one; the idea that French genes could not be improved after World War 1 because American troops widely used prophylactics; and the idea that French rifles are excellent as surplus…because they were “only dropped once“…something applied to the Army of South Vietnam, as well.

It’s one thing, to make these jokes in actual jest. It is another thing entirely, when they become statements. Then, it’s no longer funny, but suicidally insulting.

In fact, the French military has maintained a track record of success on the battlefield for centuries. The source of these juvenile statements of inability only date from the Franco-Prussian War, and its catastrophic cost to the country. The military’s troubles in World War 1 came from holding the Imperial German Army at bay for three years, at a cost of 1.4 million casualties.

While the disaster of the opening of World War 2 led to France’s conquest by Nazi Germany, France’s military plan was not a bad plan, just a plan poorly executed…and the British did not do very well, then, either. The collapse of France’s colonial empire after World War 2 did come from overly ambitious military plans formed by not understanding that colonial warfare had changed…something the United States also failed to grasp, in the exact same place as Dien Bien Phu, a decade prior.

The fact is that, for all of it’s messy problems in the last century, the French military remains one of the most capable armed forces on the planet – if their leaders allow their generals to do their jobs.

The French Army’s reputation for military professionalism, despite its dramatic fluctuations over the past two centuries, has created a complex narrative that defies simple description. From the revolutionary fervor of the Napoleonic era to the post-WW2 colonial campaigns and modern peacekeeping operations, France’s military has continually demonstrated both exceptional competence and notable – but recoverable – failures that continue to shape perceptions today.

The Napoleonic Foundation

The modern French Army’s professional identity was forged in the crucible of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815). Napoleon’s Grande Armée established standards of tactical innovation, logistical organization, and battlefield leadership that influenced military thinking across Europe, down to today. The army’s meritocratic promotion system, revolutionary at the time, created a professional officer corps based on ability rather than aristocratic birth. This period saw the development of combined arms tactics, the corps system, and sophisticated staff work that demonstrated clear military professionalism.

Vive l’Empereur! Charge of the 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807. 1891 painting by Édouard Detaille. Art Gallery of New South Wales. Public Domain.

 

However, even during this golden age, the French military exhibited characteristics that would later prove problematic. The cult of offensive action (offensive à outrance) and the emphasis on élan over methodical planning became deeply embedded in French military culture, later contributing to both spectacular victories and catastrophic defeats.

19th Century Trials and Adaptations

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 exposed serious deficiencies in post-Napoleonic French military professionalism. Poor intelligence, inadequate logistics, and outdated tactical thinking led to decisive defeat and the collapse of the Second Empire. The subsequent creation of the Third Republic saw significant military reforms, including the establishment of improved staff colleges and the modernization of equipment and tactics.

The colonial period (1830s-1960s) presents a particularly complex chapter in French military professionalism. The conquest of Algeria, the expansion into West and Equatorial Africa, and campaigns in Indochina demonstrated considerable tactical adaptability and logistical capability over vast distances. French colonial forces also developed expertise in irregular warfare, cultural adaptation, and civil-military cooperation that proved valuable in diverse environments, although these advantages rarely translated into warfare on the European continent, which was common to all the major European powers.

Yet this same period saw the development of what critics term “colonial habits” – reliance on superior firepower against less-equipped opponents, acceptance of harsh methods, and a certain detachment from metropolitan oversight that would later create problems in conventional conflicts.

World War I: Staying Power

The Great War stretched French military professionalism to its limits. Initial disasters, including the failure of Plan XVII and massive casualties from adherence to offensive doctrine, gave way to remarkable adaptation under pressure. The French Army demonstrated institutional learning capacity, rapidly developing new tactics for trench warfare, integrating new technologies, and maintaining cohesion through four years of unprecedented carnage.

French infantry pushing through enemy barbed wire, 1915. Agence de presse Meurisse. Public Domain.

 

The performance of French commanders like Ferdinand Foch and Philippe Pétain, along with the army’s ability to absorb and integrate lessons from the battlefield, demonstrated core professional competencies. However, the trauma of the war also reinforced defensive thinking that would prove problematic in the next conflict.

1940: Collapse and Recovery

The defeat of 1940 represents perhaps the most significant challenge to claims of French military professionalism. Despite having numerically superior and often technically advanced equipment, the French Army was comprehensively outmaneuvered by German forces employing innovative combined arms tactics. Analysis reveals multiple professional failures: inadequate intelligence, poor communications, inflexible command structures, and outdated operational concepts.

Yet the same period saw examples of French military professionalism in different contexts. The Free French forces under Charles de Gaulle, though small, maintained military traditions and eventually contributed significantly to the liberation of France. The French Resistance, while not strictly military, demonstrated tactical innovation and operational security that impressed Allied observers.

Colonial Wars and Professional Dilemmas

The post-war colonial defeats in Indochina (1946-1954) and Algeria (1954-1962) present perhaps the most controversial chapters in assessing French military professionalism. In Indochina, French forces demonstrated remarkable tactical competence in difficult conditions, developing techniques counterinsurgency and showing considerable adaptability. However, strategic failures and political constraints ultimately led to defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

The Algerian War proved even more problematic. While French forces achieved significant tactical successes against the FLN, the conflict saw disturbing breakdowns in professional conduct, including widespread use of torture and involvement in attempted coups against the civilian government. The Battle of Algiers (1956-1957) exemplified this tension between tactical effectiveness and questionable methods.

Since 1962, the French Army has undergone a significant revamping of its professional nature. The end of conscription in 1996 created an all-volunteer force with higher educational standards and improved training. French forces have demonstrated competence in various international operations, from peacekeeping in the Balkans to counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region of Africa.

Operations like Serval (2013) and Barkhane (2014-2022) in Mali showcased French capabilities in rapid deployment, intelligence gathering, and coordination with international partners. These operations demonstrated institutional learning from previous colonial experiences while maintaining focus on legitimate military objectives.

And it is here, that a more detailed look at Operation Serval is instructive on just how adaptable French forces can be.

Strategic Challenges of Operation Serval (2013)

Operation Serval presented the French military with a complex array of strategic challenges that tested every aspect of modern expeditionary warfare capabilities. The intervention in the war in Mali, launched on January 11, 2013, required France to project power across 4,000 kilometers into the heart of the Sahel region under severe time constraints and with limited initial international support.

Geographical and Logistical Complexity

Mali’s vast territory — larger than France and Germany combined — posed immediate strategic challenges. The northern regions under jihadist control encompassed over 800,000 square kilometers of desert and semi-arid terrain with minimal infrastructure. French forces faced the fundamental problem of securing lines of communication across this enormous space while maintaining operational tempo against a mobile enemy well-adapted to the local environment.

The logistical challenge proved particularly acute given Mali’s landlocked position and limited transportation infrastructure. France had to establish supply chains through multiple African partners, primarily using bases in Ivory Coast, Chad, and Niger. The single major airfield at Bamako created a critical vulnerability, while the absence of reliable road networks forced heavy reliance on air transport for sustained operations. This logistical complexity demanded unprecedented coordination between French forces, African partners, and international allies.

Map of the conflict in Northern Mali, c.2013, by WikiUser Orionist. CCA/3.0.

 

Time Sensitivity and Strategic Surprise

Perhaps the most critical challenge was the compressed timeline. Intelligence indicated that jihadist forces were preparing to advance south toward Bamako, Mali’s capital, potentially within days of the French decision to intervene. This left no time for the deliberate planning and force buildup typical of major military operations. French planners had to balance the immediate need to halt jihadist momentum with the longer-term requirement to establish sustainable operations across northern Mali.

The rapid deployment requirement meant accepting significant strategic risks. Initial French forces numbered fewer than 1,000 troops — inadequate for controlling territory, but sufficient to provide a rapid response capability. This created a dangerous window where French forces operated with minimal reserves while still building combat power in theater.

Coalition Building Under Pressure

France faced the delicate challenge of building international legitimacy while maintaining operational flexibility. The African Union had authorized the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), but this force remained months from deployment. France needed to demonstrate that Serval was not another unilateral European intervention in Africa, while simultaneously retaining command authority essential for rapid operations.

The diplomatic challenge extended to securing overflight rights, basing agreements, and logistics support from multiple African and European partners. Each agreement required careful negotiation to balance French operational needs with partner nation sensitivities about sovereignty and post-colonial relationships.

French officer making contact with the population in southern Mali. 2016 photo by WikiUser TM1972. CCA/4.0 Int’l.

 

Enemy Adaptation and Asymmetric Threats

The jihadist coalition in northern Mali presented a sophisticated opponent that combined conventional capabilities with insurgent tactics. Groups like AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) had years to prepare defensive positions and supply caches across the region. They possessed advanced weaponry captured from Libyan stockpiles, including anti-aircraft systems that threatened French air operations.

More challenging was the enemy’s ability to blend into local populations and exploit grievances against the Malian government. French forces had to distinguish between ideological jihadists and local groups with legitimate political grievances, while avoiding civilian casualties that could undermine popular support for the intervention.

Strategic Success Despite Constraints

Despite these formidable challenges, Operation Serval achieved its strategic objectives within weeks. French forces halted jihadist advances, secured major population centers, and degraded enemy capabilities sufficiently to allow AFISMA deployment. The operation demonstrated sophisticated understanding of modern warfare’s political dimensions—achieving military objectives while building conditions for successful transition to international peacekeeping forces.

The strategic challenges of Serval illustrate the complexity of contemporary expeditionary operations and highlight the French military’s capacity for rapid, effective intervention in challenging operational environments. This success provides compelling evidence of institutional competence that deserves recognition in serious strategic analysis.

Contemporary Assessment

Today’s French Army exhibits many characteristics of a professional military force: clear command structures, standardized training, integration with NATO allies, and adherence to international laws of war. However, debates continue about the persistence of certain cultural traits from earlier periods, particularly regarding operations in former colonial territories.

The French military’s professional reputation ultimately rests on its demonstrated capacity for adaptation, institutional learning, and technical competence across diverse operational environments. While historical controversies remain, the modern force has largely addressed the systemic issues that plagued earlier generations, creating a military organization that generally meets contemporary standards of professionalism.

Conclusion

The French military faces challenges, to be sure. But other, larger forces – usually with highly inflated perceptions of their own ability – face whose same challenges, as all armed forces try to navigate the swirling tempest of the emerging “One-N-Twenty“.

Don’t write off an army because of some bumps over the course of several centuries: You make mistakes, too.

 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

The Ghost of Faustin Wirkus

The Ghost of Faustin Wirkus

Michael Cessna August 15, 2025 0

 

 

 

 

 

It is a general article of faith in most armed forces around the world, that the enlisted soldier – meaning, that 18 to 22 year old kid brought into the military, because war is a young person’s game – need close supervision by a college-educated officer, so that the young soldier can be kept out of trouble. But, while young adults, far from home for the first time, getting into trouble is a given despite supervision, that is not the real reason.

The real reason the establishment and their commissioned officers, is that unless the enlisted troops are closely monitored, they will invariably “go off script”. Case in point: Faustin Wirkus…

…Or, if you prefer, King Faustin II of La Gonâve, Haiti.

Born in about 1896, Faustin Wirkus was born into a Polish family in Rypin, Poland, then part of the Russian Empire. In around 1905, the family moved to the coal country in Dupont, Pennsylvania. After a few years working in the coal fields as a child, in 1915 Wirkus enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, and was soon deployed to the island of Haiti, rising to the rank of Gunnery Sergeant by 1920.

The United States had intervened in Haiti in 1915, following a wild series of uprisings that had resulted in the lynching death of the then-President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, to – as always – “protect American interests”. The United States quickly established what amounted to a military dictatorship, administered by the US Marine Corps. Part of this administration involved recruiting a Gendarmerie that could be carefully trained as a kind of “lightweight military police”, to keep the island under control and to hunt down bandits and rebels.

U.S. Marines and guide in search of bandits. Haiti, circa 1919. Department of the Navy photo, 1919. Public Domain.

 

Haiti, unlike today, had a very credible military reputation. After throwing off the yoke of French colonial oppression in 1804, Port-au-Prince decided to flex its muscle as the Spanish Empire began to collapse, invading and conquering the neighboring Spanish colony of Santo Domingo (the modern Dominican Republic) in 1822. Haiti’s 20-odd year rule over Santo Domingo was so brutal, that February 27 is celebrated as the day Dominicans finally overthrew Haitian rule, and gained their independence.

Following this, Haiti began its downward spiral, resulting in the collapse in 1915, that led the United States to intervene.

Following his basic training, Faustin Wikus was deployed to the island in 1915 as part of the “Advanced Base Force“, and was assigned to the “Haitian Constabulary” (the formal name for the Gendarmerie) in 1918. The Gendarmerie’s first US commander was the legendary Smedley Butler, then a Major in the Marine Corps, making it no surprise that the Gendarmerie’s all-Black Shooting Team went on to take Olympic Bronze in the Men’s Free Rifle Team event at the 1924 Paris Olympics.

Wirkus, meanwhile, apparently fell in love with Haiti, and worked hard to try and help stabilize the country. Because of how the Gendarmerie was organized, many enlisted Marines were given commissions as officers in the Constabulary, leading small units of native Gendarmes.

It was in this capacity that Wirkus eventually arrived at La Gonâve Island, in 1926. While there is some conjecture – nearly one hundred years on, hampered be scanty records – Wirkus came into contact with a woman named Ti Memenne. Recognized locally as a “tribal queen”, which was a position not recognized by the nation’s republican government, she was apparently arrested for “trivial voodoo offences“, where it seems that she came into contact with Wirkus for the first time, with him aiding in her release from custody.

When Wirkus (apparently volunteering on his own in late-June or early-July of 1926) was sent to La Gonâve to assume command of the Constabulary unit there, he had apparently made such an impression on Queen Ti Memenne, that she convined her subjects that he was the reincarnation of Faustin Soloque, the first (and last) Emperor of the Second Empire of Haiti…and then convinced them to agree that Wirkus should be crowned as King Faustin II, Co-Monarch of La Gonâve in a Voodoo ceremony.

Queen Ti Memenne (L) and GySgt Faustin Wirkus (R), on La Gonâve Island, c.1927. Unknown USMC Photographer. Public Domain.

 

Well, then.

Wirkus went on to “rule” the island until 1929, when he was removed from the island and transffered back to the United States, proper. Apparently, Wirkus’ efficiency at ruling the island had cut too deeply into the corruption kickbacks Haitian politicians were extracting from the island. The United States government was only too happy to comply with this request, because the idea of a US enlisted man ruling as a “king” of a foreign island while still on active duty, was very unpopular…”alarming”, even.

Wirkus subsequently left the Marine Corps in 1931, and did a stint on the speaking circuit, giving talks about his time as the “White King of La Gonâve“. Then, with war looming again in 1939, Wirkus reenlisted in the Marine Corps, serving first as a recruiter, then as a gunnery instructor, eventually rising to the dual ranks of Warrant Officer [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_officer] and Marine Gunner [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_gunner] for aviation gunnery.

Faustin Wirkus fell ill in January of 1945, and passed away on October 8th of that year. He was survived by his wife, Yula, and his son – Faustin, Jr. – who went on to serve in the Marine Corps as a helicopter pilot.

So. What does the story of Faustin Wirkus teach us?

Primarily, that enlisted troops – and especially Marines – are hyper unpredictable. Give them a clear goal, and they will do whatever is necessary to make it work.

Whatever. Is. Necessary.

And for the Establishment, that is not a good thing – after all, if some unlettered, uncouth enlisted critter can accomplish national goals with minimal supervision, why do their own high-society positions and privilege need to exist? I mean, how can their friends skim off the top of contracts, when some 25 year-old kid with a high school diploma, an attitude, a hangover and a coffee pot can do a better job, faster and more efficiently?

While the foregoing statement is rather “tongue in cheek”, it really isn’t, because it is very real – after all, how the hell can the Ivy League alumni expect to shave off hundreds of millions of dollars of money deducted from the troop’s pay to fund mess hall menus, leaving them eating lima beans and toast for “Thanksgiving Dinner”…assuming that the mess hall is even open? Because the $460 per month deducted from the troop’s pay to fund the mess halls on-post comes to $115 per week – I don’t know about you, but I can eat pretty well on $115 a week, including steak and shrimp…assuming that I can use a hot plate in the barracks – which on most bases, you can’t do.

Because you can eat at the mess hall. You know – dining on lima beans and toast.

And that’s LONG before we talk about telling troops to fix and repair their own barracks – It’s almost like there is little, if any, need for contracting with civilian companies to do anything beyond making weapons, ammunition and gear…and maybe uniforms. Maybe.

U.S. Marines with Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, show Brig. Gen. Andrew M. Niebel, the commanding general of 1st MLG, how they patch holes in the barracks during Operation Clean Sweep at Camp Pendleton, California, Oct. 16, 2024. LCpl Deja Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps photo. Public Domain.

 

And this extends to security, because as the recent mass shooting at Fort Stewart, GA shows, troops trained to handle some of the most lethal weapons on the planet cannot be trusted to go about armed to protect themselves from either jilted lovers or, you know, terrorists.

And believe me when I say that this has been the norm on US military bases for decades.

Feel safe?

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

A Puzzlement, Part 2.5 – The 7.62mm Mystery

A Puzzlement, Part 2.5 – The 7.62mm Mystery

Michael Cessna August 8, 2025 0

 

 

 

This is not the typical article that I write, here. In an odd way, this is unusually personal…and I have no real idea why.

What started as a curious observation, eventually became something of an obsession. I knew that something was wrong about my observation, but I couldn’t put my finger on why it was wrong. Many might see this as an odd — possibly disturbing — example of OCD, but as you will see, while it is certainly “odd”, it is not irrational…Not least, because it is properly placed between two earlier articles here. It is connected to the two, but because it was so odd, it appears here as the third installment, instead of its proper place as the second article in the series.

It took that long for me to parse out what had happened. As to why it happened…well, we’ll get to that point.

Firearms are curious things, when it comes to weapons. If you look back through all verifiable human history, there are no mentions of “firearms”, as we understand the term — going back as far as c.50,000 years ago, to the oldest cave paintings and petroglyphs — before about the 8th Century AD (c.900 AD). Every other weapon that appears is a club, a spear, a bow and arrow, a sling, and the occasional jawbone of an ass. But, once gunpowder was invented, and someone realized that it was useful as a weapon in more than rockets, development began in earnest.

Over the centuries, lessons were learned, and weapons, projectiles and propellants were improved, sometimes slowly, sometimes at breakneck speeds…Until 1945.

In the aftermath of World War 2, there were something like thirteen “calibers” of military small arms in general use in the world. As the Cold War began to dawn, the Soviet Union — in the form of Russia — established a regimen of standardization in small arms ammunition, beginning with the 7.62x54mmR caliber for rifles and machine guns, and the 7.62x25mm “Tokarev” for handguns and submachine guns. This was not unusual — the 7.62mm as a basic bore diameter had been settled on by the Soviet’s predecessor, the Imperial Russia of the Romanov Dynasty.

(Note: When reading a weapon’s caliber in millimeters, the numbers at the beginning are the bullet’s diameter in millimeters; the number following the ‘x’ is the overall length of the cartridge, again in millimeters.)

But, before the Warsaw Pact was formally organized, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949. As a purely and openly military alliance, the NATO member states quickly decided that the alliance’s national militaries needed to standardize on a common caliber, even if they did not adopt the same small arms.

To describe caliber in brief, caliber is determined by the diameter of the barrel, but is also determined by the chamber — which holds the cartridge case — and the spiral grooves (“rifling“) that stabilizes the projectile as it moves down the barrel. It is this combination of features that determine the caliber of a firearm, and is the reason why you cannot “trade” ammunition between different weapons, without a great deal of serious machinist work.

But…The first, and most critical step in making a barrel is to punch a bore down the length of the “barrel blank” (the steel bar stock you are cutting the barrel from) at the precise diameter, because as the old rubric goes, you can take material away, but you cannot add it back. With this established, you can move on to rifling the bore, and reaming our the chamber for the (usually) brass cartridge case, forming the overall “cartridge“.

This is not an academic exercise, because in the world of military procurement, few decisions are made without extensive documentation, cost-benefit analysis, and strategic rationale, because the cartridge — the bullet, propellant and case — represents a colossal expenditure of money and infrastructure. For NATO, a standard cartridge for rifles and machine guns made perfect sense, both in a manufacturing sense, but also in the tactical and strategic senses: being able to share ammunition would cure one of the chief problems the Allies had during World War 2.

So…What’s the problem? The problem is what the NATO nations standardized on…and no one knows why. One of the most significant standardization decisions of the 20th century — the global convergence on 7.62mm-diameter ammunition — remains curiously undocumented and logically inexplicable.

Consider the scope of this convergence: the Soviet 7.62×25mm Tokarev pistol cartridge for handguns and submachine guns; the 7.62×39mm “intermediate” rifle round for the AK-47/AKM; the 7.62×51mm NATO standard for the M14, FN FAL and H&K G3, as well as in the M-60 and MAG-58/M240 General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG’s); and the 7.62×54mmR Russian full-power cartridge in the ‘Dragunov’ SVD “Designated Marksman’s Rifle” (DMR) and the PK-series GPMG. Four distinct ammunition types, serving five completely different tactical roles — pistol, submachine gun, assault rifle, battle rifle, and machine gun — yet all sharing the same precise bore diameter to within hundredths of a millimeter.

From a manufacturing perspective, this represents extraordinary efficiency. The same rifling buttons, bore drilling equipment, and quality control gauges can produce barrels for weapons ranging from sidearms to tripod-mounted machine guns. But this efficiency only matters if you’re planning coordinated, large-scale production across multiple weapon systems — exactly what you’d need for rapid global mobilization. More importantly, uniformity is a real concern, because of how “good enough” barrels can be made in very basic workshops.

The timeline of adoption makes conventional military explanations even more problematic. When NATO standardized on 7.62×51mm in the 1950s, superior alternatives were readily available. The .30-06 Springfield had proven performance and massive existing production infrastructure. The 8mm Mauser was the world’s most widely distributed rifle cartridge. The .303 British had decades of successful Commonwealth service.

Instead, NATO chose to develop an entirely new cartridge that required complete retooling of production lines and weapons systems. This makes sense tactically, strategically, politically and diplomatically. No doubt. You take the logistical and manufacturing infrastructure hits, but it makes everyone in the alliance feel like they’re not the only ones making sacrifices. The official justifications — improved efficiency and reduced weight — however, would apply equally to other available diameters.

So — why 7.62mm diameter, specifically? Why precisely the same diameter as the bullets used by the Soviet Union…not the cartridges, not the bullets themselves, but the bullet diameter?

The mystery deepens when examining the ballistic evidence. The abandoned cartridges — .303 British, 8mm Mauser, and .30-06 — all delivered essentially identical performance, despite bore diameters ranging from 7.57mm to 7.92mm. The differences are all within normal manufacturing tolerances and offer no meaningful ballistic advantages.

From a purely ballistics and physics perspective, these major “battle rifle” cartridges deliver functionally identical terminal performance despite NATO’s insistence on 7.62x51mm standardization. Cross-sectional analysis reveals the marginal differences:

  • The .30-06 Springfield (150gr @ 2910 fps) delivers 2,820 ft-lbs of energy
  • The 8mm Mauser (198gr @ 2600 fps) produces 2,800 ft-lbs
  • The .303 British (174gr @ 2440 fps) generates 2,300 ft-lbs
  • The 7.62x51mm NATO (147gr @ 2750 fps) yields 2,470 ft-lbs

These performance variations fall within normal manufacturing tolerances and environmental factors. At combat ranges under 400 meters (which is the normal range for most infantry engagements), the sectional density, penetration, and lethality differences in these cartridges are statistically insignificant. Wind drift, drop, and terminal ballistics vary by mere percentages.

The engineering reality is that any of these cartridges would have served NATO’s stated requirements equally well, as the FN-49 rifle would demonstrate, being made in multiple cartridges, depending on what the customer wanted. The choice of 7.62mm over existing alternatives cannot be justified by ballistic superiority – suggesting the true rationale lay elsewhere entirely.

SAFN .30-06 Springfield 1951. 2007 photo by Wikimedia User “Ainat00”. CCA/4.0 Int’l.

 

The technical evidence is clear: NATO’s choice of 7.62mm as a bullet diameter cannot be explained by ballistic superiority or manufacturing convenience alone. When military organizations abandon proven systems and invest billions in retooling for marginally different alternatives, there are usually compelling strategic reasons documented in procurement records. But those records, if they exist, remain conspicuously absent from public view. What we’re left with is a pattern that suggests coordination on a scale that transcends normal military alliance cooperation—and raises uncomfortable questions about what scenarios would justify such systematic preparation.

Manufacturing compatibility, not ballistic performance, appears to have been designed for rapid, large-scale interoperability — but between whom, and for what purpose?

Yet somehow, across different continents, political systems, and industrial bases, everyone converged on 7.62mm as a bullet diameter. The Soviets, developing their own weapons independently, chose the 7.62mm bore diameter for their entire small arms family, because they had been using it for so long, and wanted to make only the most minimal changes, as their industrial base struggled to recover from the devastation of World War 2.

But then, we have the example of NATO, deciding to completely retool their arms infrastructure to make a completely new round…whose diameter was precisely the same as that of their supposed enemies on the opposite side of the Fulda Gap…not the same cartridges, but the same bullet diameters — the most important part of a modern firearm. To put the proverbial ‘last nail’ on the problem, the only 7.62mm diameter weapon in wide use by NATO members at the organization’s formation in 1949 was the US .30 Carbine round, which is 7.62x33mm.

The only logical possibility is clear: This wasn’t market pressure or alliance requirements — this was systematic coordination at a level that transcends normal military procurement.

The implications become more unsettling when considering modern developments. Recent U.S. military procurement of obsolete M60 GPMG’s, massive ammunition purchases by US domestic agencies, and the recent emergence of “plug-and-fight” deployment systems all suggest preparation for scenarios requiring rapid mass armament using standardized systems.

The 7.62mm convergence may represent the most successful case of industrial coordination in military history — a decades-long effort to ensure global manufacturing compatibility for weapons systems across supposedly competing nations. Whether driven by legitimate defense planning or more extraordinary circumstances, the technical evidence suggests coordination at levels most people would find difficult to accept.

The question isn’t whether this coordination exists — the manufacturing evidence is too consistent to ignore. The question is, what scenarios would justify such systematic preparation, and why has the public never been informed of the reasoning behind these decisions?

As we pointed out in the “Hamlet” article above, none of the possible reasons for this subtle standardization are good…But there is one last wrinkle, that I cannot shake from my mind…

All of this happened very quickly…..after 1947.

 

Additional Resources:

– NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)
– Congressional Defense Primer: Conventional Ammunition Production Industrial Base
– International Ammunition Technical Guidelines 

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

The Shadow Fleets

The Shadow Fleets

Michael Cessna August 1, 2025 0

 

 

Illicit drugs are everywhere. Since at least the Imperial Chinese attempts at curbing the British opium trade, governments have – for one reason or another – tried to end, or at least restrict as far as possible, the flow of drugs they find objectionable. From cannabis to cocaine, and opium/heroin to fentanyl, massive, militarized law enforcement structures have been built up, to try and end the trade.

For the most part, these efforts have failed.

The problem are the iron laws of supply and demand, and the Streisand Effect: If you overreact to the problem, people get curious as to why…and when trust in government is problematic, that urge becomes obsessive. And in an environment of induced artificial scarcity, imposed by efforts to ban “Bad Thing X” – be that drugs or alcohol – both demand for that substance, as well as its price tends to skyrocket…and the harder law enforcement cracks down, the more creative the suppliers get in bringing their product to market.

Case in point: The “narco submarine“. We discussed the “big-state” military aspects of leveraging narco-sub technology last year, but now we take a deeper dive into the flip-side of the “big-state” use of this ecosystem.

The evolution of narco-submarine technology from crude, semi-submersible craft to sophisticated vessels capable of trans-Atlantic voyages represents more than just an escalation in drug trafficking capabilities—it signals a potential paradigm shift in how insurgent and terrorist organizations could maintain covert supply networks across vast distances.

Trans-Atlantic range narco submarine in Aldán, Cangas, Galicia, Spain, 2019, following its capture by Spanish authorities. Photo by Estevoaei. CCA/4.0 Int’l.

Traditional counter-insurgency doctrine has long emphasized the critical importance of disrupting enemy supply lines. However, the emergence of advanced narco-submarines, some capable of carrying multi-ton payloads across oceanic distances while remaining largely undetected, introduces a new variable into this equation. These vessels, originally developed by South American drug cartels to transport cocaine, have demonstrated remarkable sophistication in recent seizures, featuring diesel-electric propulsion, advanced navigation systems, and even air-independent propulsion capabilities.

The implications now extend far beyond narcotics. Intelligence assessments suggest these platforms could theoretically transport weapons, explosives, communications equipment, or even personnel across traditional maritime security perimeters. Unlike conventional smuggling methods that rely on commercial shipping or aircraft — both heavily monitored — narco-submarines operate in the vast expanses of international waters where detection remains extraordinarily difficult.

This point cannot be overstated: While the “old school” methods have long been known, and control measures developed to address them, the rise of covert submarine logistics at the small(ish) scale is a titanic problem, because almost any coastal beach, inlet or swamp is now a potential delivery point. While traditional inseriton methods like rough airstrips or road checkpoints can be easily identified, the sheer scale and unimproved nature of naval landing avenues severely hamstrings surveillance efforts – airstrips, roads and even drop zones are almost comically easy to identify, especially when they are not on official maps as crossing or entry points. Beaches, however, are everywhere.

Recent interdictions have revealed vessels with ranges exceeding 6,000 nautical miles, sufficient to connect South American manufacturing bases with conflict zones in Africa, the Middle East, or even Europe. The technical expertise required to construct these platforms has proliferated through criminal networks, with evidence suggesting construction techniques and blueprints have spread beyond their Colombian and Ecuadorian origins.

A primary case study of even non-submersible combat logistics support to an insurgent force comes from Mozambique, in 2020-2023:

The Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado demonstrated sophisticated maritime capabilities between 2020-2023 that transformed what began as a land-based rebellion into a complex amphibious threat. Ansar al-Sunna militants systematically leveraged traditional dhow boats and small craft to create covert supply networks that proved nearly impossible for Mozambican security forces to interdict.

The insurgents’ capture of the port of Mocímboa da Praia in August 2020 marked a strategic watershed, providing direct access to established heroin trafficking routes from the Makran Coast. Intelligence assessments suggest the group began “taxing” drug shipments landed from dhows, creating a maritime revenue stream that complemented traditional funding sources. This convergence of insurgent logistics and narcotics trafficking created a self-reinforcing cycle — drug money funded operations while operational control over landing sites enabled further revenue collection.

The tactical sophistication was remarkable. Insurgents used coordinated land-sea assaults, arriving simultaneously from multiple vectors to overwhelm defensive positions. They demonstrated proficiency with maritime navigation, successfully conducting what were functionally full-on amphibious operations across the island chains of the Quirimbas archipelago. Perhaps most concerning, they showed adaptive capabilities — after reportedly sinking a Mozambican patrol boat with an RPG-7, they captured additional vessels to expand their maritime fleet.

The geographic advantages were substantial. Cabo Delgado’s extensive coastline, numerous islands, and traditional reliance on dhow-based trade provided perfect cover for covert supply operations. The insurgents exploited the fact that legitimate maritime commerce — fishing, inter-island transport, and traditional trade — created background noise that masked military supply movements. With limited Mozambican naval capabilities and virtually no maritime patrol presence, the ocean became an uncontested highway for insurgent logistics.

For insurgent groups, the strategic value is clearly compelling. As the World War 2 OSS demonstrated, traditional arms trafficking routes face increasing scrutiny from international security partnerships and advanced surveillance systems. Port security measures, while effective against conventional smuggling, are largely irrelevant to vessels that can surface miles offshore and transfer cargo to smaller craft or coastal staging areas.

The financial model also aligns with insurgent economics. Drug trafficking organizations have demonstrated willingness to treat narco-submarines as expendable assets — vessels are often scuttled after single-use missions. This operational approach could extend to insurgent logistics, where the strategic value of delivered materiel outweighs platform preservation.

Counter-narcotics operations have struggled with these platforms despite significant resource investments. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that even with enhanced detection capabilities, the vast majority of narco-submarine transits remain undetected. This detection challenge would be magnified in insurgent applications, where hostile groups’ operational security might be even tighter and cargo manifests wouldn’t trigger the same intelligence indicators as bulk narcotics shipments.

The convergence of criminal and insurgent networks is not theoretical — established precedents exist in regions where these organizations share operational space and mutual interests. The DEA has linked 19 of 43 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations to some aspect of the global drug trade, demonstrating that such collaborations are already occurring. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) provided a decades-long example of how insurgent groups can leverage drug trafficking networks to fund operations and maintain supply lines, activities that continue with the FARC’s splinter factions.

Perhaps most concerning is the adaptive nature of this technology. Each interdiction reveals new innovations: improved stealth characteristics, enhanced range capabilities, and increasingly sophisticated construction techniques. The rapid evolution suggests that by the time security services develop effective countermeasures, the threat may have already evolved beyond current detection and interdiction capabilities.

This potential weaponization of narco-submarine technology by hostile non-state actors represents a convergence of criminal innovation and insurgent logistics that could fundamentally challenge existing maritime security frameworks and force a reassessment of how covert supply networks might operate in an era of advanced surveillance.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

The 30-Minute Apocalypse: How Coordinated Grid Attacks Could Cripple America

The 30-Minute Apocalypse: How Coordinated Grid Attacks Could Cripple America

Michael Cessna July 25, 2025 0

 

 

 

Electricity if the foundation of modern society. Many people wistfully ponder the idea of living permanently in the wilderness, the old “back to Nature” idea. The fact is, most people – at least in the West – are going to survive in the wild for longer than a week. Electricity is what allows you to read this, and not simply because the immediate of an internet connection: electricity is fundamental to the industrial processes that made the device you are reading this on.

America’s electrical grid represents both the backbone of modern civilization and its most vulnerable single point of failure. Recent incidents at power substations across the country have revealed a terrifying reality: a relatively small number of coordinated attacks could plunge vast regions into darkness for weeks or months, with cascading effects that would make Hurricane Katrina look like a minor inconvenience.

The December 2022 attack on two Duke Energy substations in Moore County, North Carolina, illustrated the basic vulnerability. Two individuals with rifles caused a blackout affecting 45,000 people for several days. But this was amateur hour compared to what organized groups could accomplish with proper planning and coordination.

The math is sobering. The Department of Homeland Security has identified roughly 55,000 electrical substations nationwide, but destroying just nine of the most critical ones could theoretically black out the entire continental United States. Unlike the heavily fortified nuclear plants or major power stations, most substations are protected by little more than chain-link fencing and security cameras. Many critical transformer installations sit exposed in rural areas with minimal surveillance and lengthy emergency response times.

Marelli coupling transformer in Italy. 2020 photo by Herbert Hönigsperger. CCA/4.0 Int’l

 

What makes this threat particularly insidious is that it doesn’t require sophisticated weapons or technical expertise. The critical transformer equipment that steps down high-voltage transmission lines is custom-manufactured, expensive, and takes 12-18 months to replace under normal circumstances. A coordinated rifle attack, or even the intelligent use of a reciprocating saw, on multiple substations simultaneously could create a replacement bottleneck that extends outages for months across multiple states.

The cascading effects of a decently-coordinated series of attacks would be catastrophic. Within hours, water treatment plants would lose power, leading to pumping capacity failures. Hospitals could switch to backup diesel generators, but their fuel supplies typically last 72 to 96 hours. Cell towers would go dark as their backup batteries drain, as even those with some minimal solar backups would be drained faster than solar can recharge them. Gas stations could not pump fuel; grocery stores and ATM’s stop working – in the case of the grocery stores, that would be because few, if any,m are set up to switch to paper receipts. Supply chains would being to collapse, as refrigerated transport becomes impossible, electronic payment systems began failing, and regional grocery supply centers would not be able to fulfill orders, if they were even able to receive them.

Behind this vulnerability is the very thing that makes modern society as comfortable as we have become accustomed to: Just In Time Delivery. This is the system that dispatches all manner of inventory to retailers, homes and factories at will, usually arriving within 24 to 96 hours after ordering. This means that very few warehouse areas have more than three or four days of stock in their “back rooms”, at best. This is one of the reasons for the videos of stores being emptied in mere hours when a disaster strikes – it’s not simply damage to the structure, but the location’s inability to order replacement stock.

Most Americans have never experienced true grid-down conditions lasting more than a few days. The best estimates indicate that potentially 90% of Americans would be dead within one year of a sustained nationwide blackout due to starvation, disease, and violence. Even regional blackouts lasting weeks would likely trigger mass refugee movements, as happened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, that local authorities couldn’t manage.

The threat isn’t theoretical. In recent years, domestic extremist groups have conducted surveillance of electrical infrastructure. FBI investigations have uncovered plots targeting substations by nihilistic accelerationists larping as neo-Nazis who believe destroying the grid would trigger societal collapse and racial conflict. The knowledge required for effective attacks are spreading through online forums and training materials.

International actors represent an even greater threat. Chinese and Russian operatives have been caught conducting reconnaissance of American electrical infrastructure. State actors could coordinate cyber attacks on grid control systems with simultaneous physical attacks on key substations, maximizing damage while minimizing the chances of rapid recovery.

And what happens if such a series of attacks do happen? None of the possibilities are good. Aside from the initial casualties of the sick and injured as hospital generators run dry of fuel, and those dying in the panic after the lights go out, the near-term (60 – 90 days) will see vast deaths via starvation, as most people have perhaps only two or three weeks worth of food at home, and human performance degrades fast, the longer we go without food. Rural areas are better positioned, since those areas are food producers by default, but they do not have the capacity to absorb refugees, nor to suddenly step up food production, because of the physics and biology of agriculture: even without the fact that most farmland is sectioned off for corporate, single-crop “monoculture” products, it takes time, at least sixty to ninety days, to grow most plants into nutritious crops that will sustain a human. And although hog hunting in the South does produce meat, it is barely impacting the hog population – and the vast majority of Americans have no comprehension of how dangerous feral hogs really are.

Accelerationist dream-world. Pixabay.

The fix is neither quick, simple nor cheap. Hardening critical substations would cost billions and take years to implement. Installing backup transformer capacity requires massive infrastructure investments that utility companies stridently resist making without punitive federal mandates. Meanwhile, the grid continues operating with vulnerabilities that a competent adversary could exploit with devastating effectiveness.

The uncomfortable truth is that America’s electrical grid was designed for reliability and efficiency, not security. In an era of increasing domestic extremism and great power competition, that design philosophy represents a strategic vulnerability that adversaries understand better than most Americans. The question isn’t whether someone will eventually attempt a coordinated grid attack — it’s whether we’ll address these vulnerabilities before they do.

The only good thing in this, is that if we go down, we will take the reast of the “developed world” with us.

Yay. I guess.

The lights we take for granted could go out faster than most people imagine, and stay out longer than our society could survive. As with many things we report here, you are on your own – after reading this, you cannot claim that you weren’t warned to prepare, because the government will not be able to help you.

 

 

 

The Freedomist — Keeping Watch, So You Don’t Have To

 

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